¹ The steering committee consists of Peter, Hommelhoff, Hopt, Klaus J., Marcus, Lutter, Peter, Doralt, Jean-Nicolas, Druey and Eddy, Wymeersch. The “Forum Europeaeum “started its work in 1992;Google Scholar it has received financial support from the Thyssen Foundation. Corporate Group Law for Europe” is published in German (ZGR (1998) 672)Google Scholar, French (Rev.soc. (1999) 43, 285Google Scholar), Spanish (Rev.der.mercantil (1999) 445Google Scholar), and Italian (Riv.soc. (2000) forthcoming).

² Chaput, , Droit des Sociétés (Paris: Presses Univ. de France 1993) note 718Google Scholar, with reference to an issue-oriented approach to group law.

³ The proceedings of the conference are documented in Zentrum für Europäisches Wirtschaftsrecht der Universität Bonn (Adenauerallee 24 – 42, D-53113 Bonn), Symposion – Ein Konzernrecht für Europa, brochure no. 109 (Vorträge und Berichte) (1999).Google Scholar

⁴ See Windbichler, , “Vor § 15”, in: Groß;kommentar zum AktG (Hopt, and Wiedemann, [eds]), 4th ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter 1999) note 62.Google Scholar

⁵ Council Directive 89/440/EC of 18 July 1989; Blanpain, and Windey, , European Works Councils (Leuven: Peeters 1995) p. 68.Google Scholar

⁶ See the case VW v. Niedersachsen, BGHZ 135, 107; also quoted in the Corporate Group Law Principles and Proposals (s. 2.2.2).

⁷ “Contrôle de fait”, Chaput, supra n. 2, note 775.

⁸ Eumig (Austria) and Metallgesellschaft (Germany).

⁹ Cf. Art. 4 (2) Council Directive 88/627/EC of 12 December 1988 (Transparency): it is left to the Member States to provide for appropriate information rights when voting rights are attributed to a person other than the actual shareholder.

¹⁰ Gause, , Verbundene Gesellschaften importugiesischen Recht – Ein europäischer Vergleich, § 5 A (Berlin: Berlin Verlag/Nomos, forthcoming).Google Scholar

¹¹ Gerum, , Mitbestimmung und Corporate Governance (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung 1998) p. 10.Google Scholar

¹² Roth, and Altmeppen, , GmbHG, 3rd ed. (München: Beck 1997)Google Scholar, Ann. § 13,notes 132 et seq..

¹³ See, e.g., Windbichler, , “Arbeitsrechtler und andere Laien in der Baugrube des Gesellschaftsrechts – Rechtsanwendung und Rechtsfortbildung”, in: Festschrift Kissel (München: Beck 1994) p. 1287Google Scholar, and Windbichler, , “Durchgriffshaftung im horizontalen GmbH & Co. KG-Konzern” (case note), RdA (2000) 235 at p. 238.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Clark, Robert C., Corporate Law (Boston: Little, Brown 1986Google Scholar) has a whole chapter on “The Ground Rules of Corporate Combinations” in US law famous for the non-existence of group law. § 10.6 (pp. 443–458) deals with appraisal rights and MBCA § 13. “Today, the apologists for appraisal rights can proffer two serious arguments for them – one based on a claim of defeated expectations and one based on the risk of unfair treatment in major corporate transactions” (p. 444).

¹⁵ In addition to the laws quoted by the Forum (s. 7.1.2) the short-form merger according to MBCA § 11.04 may be mentioned, also Art. 490 of the Portuguese Company Law which is contested, however, as to its constituionality; cf. Gause, supra n. 10.

¹⁶ The case is documented by Deutsche Schutzvereinigung für Wertpapierbesitz (DSW), Düsseldorf (2000).

¹⁷ Cf. Windbichler, , “Alternative Dispute Resolution v. Shareholders' Suits”, in: Corporations, Capital Markets and Business in the Law, Liber Amicorum Richard M. Buxbaum (Baums, Hopt and Horn [eds.]) (2000) 617 at p. 627Google Scholar. See also Defriez, , “Takeover Regulation in the United Kingdom”,Google Scholar in: von, Rosen and Seifert, (eds.), Die Übernahme börsennotierter Unternehmen (1999) 30 at p. 39:Google Scholar “The composition and powers of the Panel have evolved over the years as circumstances have changed. Nevertheless, it remains a non-statutory body, which status allows it to operate with speed, flexibility and certainty and with minimal risk of interference by the courts.”

¹⁸ See Gause, supra n. 10.

¹⁹ S. 8.3.4.1: whether such a thing as “group interest” exists is controversial. Based on the “Rozenblum” concept, the Forum seems to assume that such a group interest can at least be created.

²⁰ The remark of the Forum that the Group Declaration would be in place within EU law (s. 8.3.3.1) is therefore not convincing.

²¹ S. 8.3.8: “The Group Declaration does not give rise to any of these problems. Both legal persons remain in existence in accordance with the laws and regulations of their respective States of incorporation. The co-determination rights whether in the parent or in the subsidiary are not affected. In Germany, on conclusion of a corporate agreement, no problems in connection with codetermination arise, and therefore there are no special legal provisions in Germany dealing with that situation.”

²² Cf. Kübler, , “‘Shareholder Value’: Eine Herausforderung für das Deutsche Recht”, in: Festschrift Zöllner (Köln: Heymann 1998) 321 at pp. 327 et seq. and p. 334;Google ScholarWindbichler, , “Corporate governance und Mitbestimmung als ‘wirtschaftsrechtlicher ordre public’”, in: Festschrift für Gerold Bezzenberger (Westermann, and Mock, [eds.]) (Berlin: de Gruyter 2000) 797 at p. 803.Google Scholar

²³ If both parent and subsidiary are subject to co-determination according to the Law of 1976, the part of the parent's supervisory board that represents shareholders has to act on certain structural decisions with respect to the subsidiary.

²⁴ Cf. Ehricke, , Das abhängige Konzernunternehmen in der Insolvenz (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 1998) pp. 457Google Scholar et seq., comparing German and French law.

²⁵ See my comments above on the Group Concept, supra s. 3.1

²⁶ Blumberg, , Law of Corporate Groups. Tort, Contract, and Other Common Law Problems in the Substantive Law of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations (Gaithersburg: Aspen Law & Business 1997)Google Scholar Supplement, pp. XII et seq.

²⁷ Analyzing the availability of this instrument under German law, Sieger, and Hasselbach, , “Tracking Stock' im deutschen Aktienrecht – im Blickpunkt: Praktische Überlegungen zur Einführung von ‘subsidiary’ / ‘divisional’ shares”, BB (1999) 1277 with further references.Google Scholar

²⁸ The Forum formulates this as a benefit of the group structured by declaration or agreement, see s. 8.1.1. final para.: “The benefit gained in exchange for these legal obligations and cost factors is the considerable advantage of having a subsidiary which is legally and commercially securely based and which at any time could be again separated from the group, floated on the market or disposed of as a self-contained company.” In jurisdictions without provisions for corporate agreements and the like, it seems to be possible to reap similar benefits.

²⁹ The major part of German law on “qualifizierte faktische Konzerne”(qualified de facto corporate groups) was developed on a case-by-case basis, pertaining to such small businesses and closely held companies.

³⁰ Schneider, and Strenger, , “Die ‘Corporate Governance-Grundsätze’ der Grundsatzkommission Corporate Governance”, AG (2000) 106.Google Scholar

³¹ The consultation document from The UK Department of Trade and Industry's Company Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law, For a Competitive Economy, The Strategic Framework (Great Britain, Department of Trade and Industry 1999) at least points this out in an annex entitled “Other issues yet to be addressed: Groups” (p. 213).

³² Embid, Irujo, “Grupos y gobierno corporativo”, in Esteban Velasco (ed.), El gobierno de las sociedades cotizadas (1999) 595.Google Scholar The lack of legislation in the field of group law is satirized as “‘permanente vacación’ del legislador … en la mayoría de los países”.