¹ Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms adopted on 4 November 1950 in Rome (henceforth: the Convention). The catalogue of rights guaranteed by the Convention is supplemented by protocols thereto (Protocol No. 1 adopted on 20 March 1952 in Paris, Protocol No. 4 adopted on 16 September 1963 in Strasbourg, Protocol No. 6 adopted on 28 April 1983 in Strasbourg, Protocol No. 7 adopted on 22 November 1984 in Strasbourg, Protocol No. 12 adopted on 12 November 2000 in Rome and Protocol No. 13 adopted on 3 May 2002 in Vilnius). In the present text, if not indicated otherwise, the notion of the Convention includes also those protocols.

² According to Art. 8(1) of Protocol No. 16, it will enter into force when ratified by 10 parties to the Convention. Current information on the states which have signed and ratified the Protocol is available at www.conventions.coe.int/, visited 23 July 2015.

³ See e.g. Dzehtsiarou, K., ‘Interaction between the European Court of Human Rights and Member States: European Consensus, Advisory Opinions and the Question of Legitimacy’, in S. Flogaitis et al. (eds.), The European Court of Human Rights and Its Discontents: Turning Criticism into Strength (Elgar 2013) p. 116Google Scholar at p. 133, and Sicilianos, L.A., ‘L’élargissement de la compétence consultative de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme – À propos du Protocole no 16 à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme’, 97 Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme (2014) p. 9Google Scholar at p. 28.

⁴ See especially Dzehtsiarou, K. and O’Meara, N., ‘Advisory Jurisdiction and the European Court of Human Rights: A Magic Bullet for Dialogue and Docket-control?’, 34 Legal Studies (2014) p. 444-468Google Scholarpassim. However, the analysis presented by those authors is based significantly on the data concerning the number of references for a preliminary ruling submitted to the ECJ and does not take into consideration the distinct character of the two institutions. In our opinion it is then too pessimistic. See also Sicilianos, supra n. 3, p. 14, and Gerards, J., ‘Advisory Opinions, Preliminary Rulings and the New Protocol No. 16 to the European Convention on Human Rights: A Comparative and Critical Appraisal’, 21 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2014) p. 648Google Scholar.

⁵ For more on the reasons for the reform of the Strasbourg system and proposed solutions see e.g.: Mowbray, A., ‘Beyond Protocol 14’, 6 Human Rights Law Review (2006) p. 578-584Google Scholar; Mowbray, A., ‘Faltering Steps on the Path to Reform of the Strasbourg Enforcement System’, 7 Human Rights Law Review (2007), p. 609-618Google Scholar; Rui, J.P., ‘The Interlaken, Izmir and Brighton Declarations: Towards a Paradigm Shift in the Strasbourg Court’s Interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights?’, 31 Nordic Journal of Human Rights (2013) p. 28-54Google Scholar, as well as Declarations of Izmir (adopted on 27 April 2011) and Brighton (adopted on 20 April 2012) – both available at <wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1781937>, visited 7 July 2014.

⁶ More on the relations between the ECtHR and ECJ after Lisbon as well as in the context of EU accession to the Convention: Besselink, L.F.M., ‘Should the European Union Ratify the European Convention for Human Rights? Some Remarks on the Relations between the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice’, in A. Føllesdal et al. (eds.), Constituting Europe: The European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context (Cambridge University Press 2013) p. 301-333Google Scholar; Besselink, L.F.M., ‘The Protection of the Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon (General Report)’, in J. Laffranque (ed.), Reports of the FIDE Congress Tallinn 2012. Vol. 1: The Interaction between the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the European Convention on Human Rights and National Constitutions (Tartu University Press 2012) p. 1-62Google Scholar; Jacqué, J.P., ‘The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’, 48 Common Market Law Review (2011) p. 995-1023Google Scholar; Weiß, W., ‘Human Rights in the EU: Rethinking the Role of the European Convention on Human Rights after Lisbon’, 7 European Constitutional Law Review (2011) p. 64-95Google Scholar.

⁷ Protocol No. 14 amending the control system of the Convention adopted on 13 May 2004 in Strasbourg (CETS No. 194) [henceforth: Protocol No. 14], which entered into force on 1 June 2010. For more see: Caflisch, L., ‘The Reform of the European Court of Human Rights: Protocol No. 14 and Beyond’, 6 Human Rights Law Review (2006) p. 403-415Google Scholar.

⁸ For more on pilot judgments see e.g.: Garlicki, L., ‘Broniowski and After: On the Dual Nature of “Pilot Judgments”’, in L. Caflisch et al. (eds.), Liber Amicorum Luzius Wildhaber: Human Rights - Strasbourg Views / Droits de l'homme - Regards de Strasbourg (Engel 2007) p. 177-192Google Scholar; Sadurski, W., ‘Partnering with Strasbourg: Constitutionalisation of the European Court of Human Rights, the Accession of Central and East European States to the Council of Europe, and the Idea of Pilot Judgments’, 9 Human Rights Law Review (2009) p. 397-453Google Scholar; Fyrnys, M., ‘Expanding Competences by Judicial Lawmaking: The Pilot Judgment Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights’, 12 German Law Journal (2011) p. 1231-1259Google Scholar; Leach, P. et al., Responding to Systemic Human Rights Violations: An Analysis of ‘Pilot Judgments’ of the European Court of Human Rights and their Impact at National Level (Intersentia 2010)Google Scholar.

⁹ Art. 35(3)(b) Convention as amended by Protocol No. 14.

¹⁰ Art. 27 Convention as amended by Protocol No. 14.

¹¹ Art. 28(1)(b) Convention as amended by Protocol No. 14.

¹² See e.g. Declaration of Brighton, para. 33.

¹³ Cf. Art. 46 Convention as amended by Protocol No. 14.

¹⁴ This tendency is well illustrated by Protocol No. 15 (adopted on 15 June 2013 in Strasbourg, not yet in force), which amends the Preamble to the Convention to mention the principle of subsidiarity.

¹⁵ See e.g. Reflection Paper on the Proposal to extend the Court’s advisory jurisdiction, <www.coe.int/t/dgi/brighton-conference/documents/Court-Advisory-opinions_en.pdf>, visited 5 July 2014, para. 4 and 10. For more on the objectives of Protocol No. 16 see Gerards, supra n. 4, p. 631-632, 637 ff.

¹⁶ The Court was granted the jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions by Protocol No. 2 adopted on 6 May 1963 in Strasbourg (CETS No. 044), which entered into force in 1970. The current wording of Art. 47-49 of the Convention was established by Protocol No 11 adopted on 11 May 1994 in Strasbourg (CETS No. 155), which entered into force in 1998.

¹⁷ As long as they might not be decided when examining a case. See: decision on the competence of the Court to give an advisory opinion of 2 June 2004, in which the Court decided that it did not have the competence to issue an opinion on the coexistence of the Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the European Convention on Human Rights. The ECtHR stated in particular that it could not decide whether a complaint submitted to the Human Rights Commission of the Commonwealth of Independent States constituted ‘another procedure of international investigation’ mentioned in Art. 35(2)(b) of the Convention as this question may arise in future cases pending before the Court.

¹⁸ So far the Court has issued only two advisory opinions. Both concerned issues related to the procedure for election of judges (advisory opinion on certain legal questions concerning the lists of candidates submitted with a view to the election of judges to the European Court of Human Rights of 12 February 2008 and advisory opinion on certain legal questions concerning the lists of candidates submitted with a view to the election of judges to the European Court of Human Rights [No. 2] of 22 January 2010).

¹⁹ Art. 1(1) Protocol No. 16.

²⁰ Art. 3 Protocol No. 16 states that another party to the Convention or other person may be invited to take part in the proceedings (by submitting written comments or taking part in a hearing) when it is ‘in the interest of the proper administration of justice’.

²¹ See: Opinion of the Court on Draft Protocol No. 16 to the Convention extending its competence to give advisory opinions on the interpretation of the Convention, adopted on 6 May 2013, <www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2013_Protocol_16_Court_Opinion_ENG.pdf>, visited 5 July 2014, para. 12.

²² Declarations may then be modified by the unilateral declaration of a party to the Convention.

²³ See e.g. Gragl, P., ‘(Judicial) Love is Not a One-Way Street: The EU Preliminary Reference Procedure as a Model for ECtHR Advisory Opinions under Draft Protocol No 16’, 38 European Law Review (2013)Google Scholar no. 3 <ssrn.com/abstract=2305803>, visited 5 July 2014, p. 4.

²⁴ For more on the notion of a court or tribunal under the Convention see e.g. Grabenwarter, CH., European Convention on Human Rights: Commentary (Beck, Hart, Nomos Helbing Lichtenhahn Verlag 2014) p. 113-116Google Scholar; P. Hofmański and A. Wróbel, notes to Art. 6 in L. Garlicki (ed.), Konwencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych Wolności, t.1, Komentarz do artykułów 1-18 [Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, vol. 1, Commentary to articles 1-18] (Beck 2010) p. 309-311.

²⁵ Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 16 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (CETS No. 214) para. 8. At the same time the Report points out the need to limit the number of bodies authorised to request an advisory opinion in order to avoid a proliferation of requests and to ensure that the dialogue between courts will take place at the appropriate level.

²⁶ For instance it would be possible for a supreme court (or the highest administrative court) to request an opinion even though in a given case a party wishing to file an individual application would be required under Art. 35(1) of the Convention to bring a constitutional complaint (cf. ECtHR 9 October 2003, Case No. 47414/99, Szott-Medyńska v Poland (admissibility decision), and ECtHR 16 March 2010, Case No. 14337/02, Liss v Poland (admissibility decision)). See also Explanatory Report, supra n. 25, para. 8.

²⁷ See Art. 91 in conjunction with Art. 9 Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej [Polish Constitution]. See also e.g. L. Garlicki, ‘Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z perspektywy Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka’ [Constitution of the Republic of Poland from the Perspective of the European Court of Human Rights] in Z. Maciąg (ed.), Stosowanie Konstytucji RP z 1997 roku – doświadczenia i perspektywy [Application of the 1997 Polish Constitution: Experiences and Perspectives] (Oficyna Wydawnicza AFM 2006) p. 43 at p. 45. For more on the position of the Convention in particular states see e.g. Blackburn, R. and Polakiewicz, J. (eds.), Fundamental Rights in Europe: The European Convention on Human Rights and Its Member States 1950-2000 (Oxford University Press 2001)Google Scholar, and Keller, H. and Stone-Sweet, A., A Europe of Rights: The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (Oxford University Press 2008)Google Scholar.

²⁸ L. Garlicki, ‘Cooperation of Courts: The Role of Supranational Jurisdictions in Europe’, International Journal of Constitutional Law (2008) no. 3-4 p. 509-522; E. Bjorge, ‘National Supreme Courts and the Development of ECHR Rights’, International Journal of Constitutional Law (2011) no. 1 p. 5-31; Sadurski, W., Constitutionalism and the Enlargement of Europe (Oxford 2012) p. 27-33Google Scholar.

²⁹ Concrete review of legislation or constitutional complaint (notwithstanding if in a particular legal system it may concern only unconstitutionality of legislation or also of the application of law).

³⁰ A constitutional court’s competence to decide on the conventionality of law is quite rare, but is provided for e.g. in the constitutions of Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.

³¹ For more on such an interpretation of national constitutions see e.g. Keller, H. and Stone-Sweet, A., ‘Assessing the Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems’, in Keller and Stone-Sweet (eds.), supra n. 27, p. 683-688Google Scholar; Sadurski, supra n. 28, p. 23-24.

³² It should be noted, however, that due to the different scopes of constitutional courts’ jurisdiction and the diversity of statutory regulations, from a national perspective some additional factors may be of relevance for deciding whether an opinion can be requested in a particular procedure. Firstly, the national evidence regulations may determine the question whether advisory opinion proceedings shall be instituted at the court’s own initiative or at the request of the parties to the proceedings only. Secondly, the constitutional distinction between ex-ante and ex-post constitution review may limit the application of the advisory opinion procedure only to ex-post hierarchical control of norms.

³³ Critically about this solution: Dzehtsiarou and O’Meara, supra n. 4, p. 20, and Ploszka, A., ‘Nowa opinia doradcza Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka’ [New Advisory Opinion of the ECtHR], Państwo i Prawo (2013) no. 10 p. 97Google Scholar.

³⁴ In this context, one may claim that Art. 10 of Protocol No. 16 creates a basis for the presumption that a body indicated in the declaration of a party to the Convention is authorised to request an opinion and a body not mentioned in such declaration does not fall within the scope of Art. 1(1) of Protocol No. 16. However, this presumption can be rebutted in the course of proceedings before the ECtHR.

³⁵ L. Garlicki, note 2 to Art. 46 in L. Garlicki (ed.), Konwencja o Ochronie Praw Człowieka i Podstawowych Wolności. T. 2 Komentarz do artykułów 19-59 oraz Protokołów dodatkowych [Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, vol. 2, Commentary to Articles 19-59 and Additional Protocols], (Beck 2011) p. 353.

³⁶ It should be noted especially as follows: First, under Art. 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the object and purpose of the Convention should be given more significance than its literal reading. Second, considering the normative character of a treaty aimed at human rights protection, in case of the Convention there are no grounds to apply a rule according to which all ambiguities should be interpreted in favour of limiting states’ obligations. On the contrary, interpretation should be based on the principle of effectiveness. Third, when determining the scope of obligations of parties to the Convention and competences of the institutions of the Council of Europe, one should treat the principle of subsidiarity of the Convention system as a starting point. (For more on the interpretation of the Convention see also Matscher, F., ‘Methods of Interpretation of the Convention’, in R.S. Macdonald et al. (eds.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1993), p. 63-81Google Scholar; Garlicki, L., ‘The methods of interpretation’, in. F. Mélin-Soucramanien (ed.), L’interprétation constitutionnelle (Dalloz 2005) p. 139-153Google Scholar, and Wildhaber, L., ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and International Law’, 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2007) no. 2 p. 217-232Google Scholar.)

³⁷ For more on inductive interpretation of the Convention see Mik, C., Koncepcja normatywna prawa europejskiego praw człowieka [Normative Conception of the European Human Rights Law] (Comer 1994) p. 226-238Google Scholar.

³⁸ The possibility of modifying the declaration, provided by Art. 10 of Protocol No. 16, is necessary if the array of bodies authorised to request advisory opinions changes as a result of changes in domestic legal systems (especially regarding the competences or institutional setting of the judiciary).

³⁹ For more see M. Zieliński, Wykładnia prawa. Zasady, reguły, wskazówki [Interpretation of Law: Principles, Rules, Instructions] (Lexis Nexis 2012) p. 48 ff. See also Senden, H., Interpretation of Fundamental Rights in a Multilevel Legal System (Intersentia 2011) p. 7Google Scholar, and Letsas, G., A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford 2009)Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ For more on the model of application of the law see Wróblewski, J., The Judicial Application of Law (Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992)Google Scholar.

⁴¹ For example, a national court may request an opinion as to whether the Convention applies to a certain type of extraterritorial action of the state (territorial scope of application of the Convention) or to certain factual circumstances which are rooted in state actions from before the adoption of the Convention (temporal scope of application of the Convention), but cannot expect the ECtHR to determine whether a particular action of the state resulted in violation of an individual right or freedom.

⁴² The scope of advisory opinions under Protocol No. 16 is therefore separate from the scope of advisory opinions issued at the request of the Committee of Ministers under Art. 47-49 of the Convention. See also Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee of Ministers of 15 November 2006, CM(2006)203 para. 83; Reflection Paper, supra n. 15, para. 27.

⁴³ N. Pawłowska, ‘Wznowienie postępowania po korzystnym dla strony wyroku ETPC – glosa do postanowienia SN z 23.10.2008 r. (V CO 28/08)’ [Reopening of Proceedings after ECtHR Judgment Favourable to a Party: Commentary on Supreme Court of Poland Order of 23 October 2008 (Case V CO 28/08)], Europejski Przegląd Sądowy (2010) no. 2 p. 48-49; see also the proposal of A. Sledzińska-Simon, ‘Naruszenie prawa do sądu jako podstawa wzruszenia postępowania cywilnego z powodu nieważności – glosa do postanowienia SN z 17.04.2007 r. (I PZ 5/07)’ [Infringement of the Right to Trial as Grounds for Setting Aside Civil Proceedings for Invalidity: Commentary on Supreme Court of Poland Order of 17 April 2007 (Case I PZ 5/07)], Europejski Przegląd Sądowy (2009) no. 2 p. 42 ff.

⁴⁴ For more on the justification of this opinion, see M. Ziółkowski, ‘Obowiązek przestrzegania wyroków Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka w świetle art. 46 Konwencji o ochronie praw człowieka i podstawowych wolności oraz rezolucji Zgromadzenia Parlamentarnego Rady Europy z 26 stycznia 2011 r. 1787 (2011)’ [Obligation to Comply with Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the Light of Art. 46 of the Convention and Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1787 (2011) on Implementation of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights], in Wykonywanie wyroków Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka przez Sejm [Execution of ECtHR Judgments by the Sejm] (BAS 2012) p. 26-29.

⁴⁵ See e.g. ECtHR 30 June 2009, Case No. 32772/02, Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v Switzerland (no. 2), para. 86 (see also Randall, M. Hertig and X.-B. Ruedin ‘“Judicial Activism” et exécution des arrêts de la Court européenne des droits de l’homme’, 82 Revue Trimestrielle des droits de l’homme (2010) p. 421-443Google Scholar. But see ECtHR 11 May 2010, Case No. 29061/08, Steck-Risch et al. v Liechtenstein (decision on admissibility) and ECtHR 6 July 2010, Case No. 5980/07, Öcalan v Turkey (decision on admissibility)).

⁴⁶ For more see A. Paprocka, ‘Wpływ orzecznictwa ETPCz na rozumienie konstytucyjnych praw i wolności w Polsce – kilka uwag na marginesie orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego’ [The Influence of the ECtHR’s Jurisprudence on the Understanding of Fundamental Rights in Poland: A Few Remarks Related to the Constitutional Tribunal’s Case-Law] in M. Zubik (ed.), XV lat obowiązywania Konstytucji z 1997 r. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana Zdzisławowi Jaroszowi [15 Years of the 1997 Constitution’s Being in Force: Liber amicorum Dedicated to Zdzisław Jarosz] (Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 2012) p. 76-89, and literature cited there. See also the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland of 18 October 2004, Case P 8/04.

⁴⁷ Reflection Paper, supra n. 15, para. 2.

⁴⁸ Reflection Paper, supra n. 15, para. 30-31.

⁴⁹ Preamble Protocol No. 16. For more on the different meanings of subsidiarity under the Convention, see Christoffersen, J., Fair Balance: Proportionality, Subsidiarity and Primarity in the European Convention on Human Rights (Leiden-Boston 2009) p. 230-236CrossRefGoogle Scholar and 354-356.

⁵⁰ Reflection Paper, supra n. 15, para. 29-30; Explanatory Report, supra n. 25, para. 9.

⁵¹ In this sense, the role of opinions may be similar to that of pilot judgments in which the Court indicates the need to resolve systemic problems (for more see Garlicki, supra n. 8, p. 177-192; Leach, supra n. 8, passim; see also ECtHR 15 January 2009, Case No. 33509/04, Burdov v Russia (no 2), § 123-128). Current experiences indicate that pilot judgments can contribute to the effective solution of problems arising in a given national legal system, especially when they go hand in hand with actions taken by national courts (for more see Sadurski, supra n. 8, p. 397-453).

⁵² Explanatory Report, supra n. 25, para. 9.

⁵³ There is no need to refer to Art. 30 of the Convention because the conditions for submitting the case to the Grand Chamber are closely related substantively to the conditions under Art. 43(2) of the Convention (for more see L. Garlicki, note 8 to Art. 43, in Garlicki (ed.), supra n. 35, p. 335). An argument could be raised against analogous application of Art. 30 of the Convention that this only provides for an internal procedure of the Court, while Art. 43(2) of the Convention (just like Art. 1 in conjunction with Art. 2(2) of Protocol No. 16) refers to the request submitted by an external entity.

⁵⁴ Art. 2 (1) and (2) in conjunction Art. 1(1) of Protocol No. 16 can be reduced to the claim: the five-judge panel shall accept the request when the particular case includes an important question affecting the interpretation or application of the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention and its Protocols.

⁵⁵ See L. Garlicki, notes to Art. 43, in Garlicki (ed.), supra n. 35, p. 336.

⁵⁶ More on the obligation to give reasons for refusal of a request for an advisory opinion: Gragl, supra n. 23, p. 13.

⁵⁷ See ECtHR 12 July 2001, Case No. 25702/94, K. & T. v Finland, § 140.

⁵⁸ For more see Garlicki, supra n. 55, p. 335.

⁵⁹ For more about this concept see Mowbray, A., ‘An Examination of the European Court of Human Rights’ Approach to Overruling its Previous Case Law’, Human Rights Law Review (2009) no. 2 p. 193-198Google Scholar; Dzehtsiarou, K., ‘European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights’, German Law Journal (2011) no. 10 p. 1730-1745Google Scholar, and Paprocka, A., ‘Budowanie tożsamości europejskiej w orzecznictwie Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka’ [Building a European Identity in the Jurisprudence of ECtHR], Państwo i Prawo (2014) no. 12 p. 24-27Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ I. Kondak, note 5 to Art. 47-49, in Garlicki (ed.), supra n. 35, p. 418.

⁶¹ For more in the context of the ECtHR’s judgments, see Polish Constitutional Tribunal judgment of 15 July 2010, Case K 63/07, OTK ZU/3/A/2010/60, Polish Constitutional Tribunal judgment of 3 March 2005, Case P 8/03, OTK ZU/3/A/2005/20, and Gerards, supra n. 4, p. 635-636. For more on different aspects of being bound by Strasbourg standards, see also Krzyżanowska-Mierzewska, M., ‘The Reception Process in Poland and Slovakia’, in Keller and Stone-Sweet, supra n. 27, p. 543-548Google Scholar.

⁶² For more in the context of the ECtHR’s judgments see E. Łętowska, ‘Zapewnienie skuteczności orzeczeniom sądów międzynarodowych’ [Ensuring the Effectiveness of International Courts’ Judgments], in A. Wróbel (ed.), Zapewnienie efektywności orzeczeń sądów międzynarodowych w polskim porządku prawnym [Ensuring the Effectiveness of International Courts’ Judgments in the Polish Legal System] (Wolters Kluwer 2011) p. 48.

⁶³ For more on transcription of the Court’s judgments into the national legal order, see Keller and Stone-Sweet, supra n. 31, p. 682-688.

⁶⁴ For more see M. Ziółkowski, ‘Wyrok ETPCz jako orzeczenie stwierdzające niezgodność z prawem prawomocnego orzeczenia sądu cywilnego’ [ECHR Judgment as a Judicial Decision Declaring the Illegality of a Legally Final Civil Court Ruling], Europejski Przegląd Sądowy (2010) no. 8 passim.

⁶⁵ See accordingly Bodnar, A., ‘Res Interpretata: Legal Effect of the European Court of Human Rights’ Judgments for Other States Than Those Which Were Party to the Proceedings’, in Y. Haech and E. Brems (eds.), Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the 21st Century (Dordrecht 2014) p. 223-262Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ See accordingly Paprocka, supra n. 46, p. 80-85. Some authors emphasise that due to their nature, advisory opinions will strengthen the erga omnes effectiveness of the Court’s case-law (see e.g. Sicilianos, supra n. 3, p. 26).