1 B Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2004).

2 See the introduction to this special issue and the paper by H Culot.

3 PH Sand, “The Evolution of International Environmental Law” in D Bodansky and E Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2007) p 39.

4 Regarding the absence of standing of trees affected by climate change in a liability case, see Tribunal 1st instance Brussels, Klimaatzaak, 17 June 2021. However, there are exceptions in domestic law. See Art 2 of the Spanish law on Mar menor that confers this lagoon and its basin rights to protection, conservation, maintenance and, where appropriate, restoration (Law 3/2020, 27 July 2020, on the restauration and the protection of the Mar Menor (BOE n° 221, 17 August 2020, 70878)).

5 See Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in the Decision-Making Process, and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Art 9.

6 Considered as a sub-component of the rule of law in the 2004 UN Secretary-General report on the rule of law. According to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the principle of the separation of powers characterises the rule of law. See, to that effect, Case C-452/16 PPU, Poltorak [2016] EU:C:2016:858, para 35.

7 Considered as a sub-component of the rule of law in the 2004 UN Secretary-General report on the rule of law. See also European Commission for Democracy through Law, Rule of Law Checklist (Venice, 11–12 March 2016).

8 Case C-115/09, Trianel [2011] EU:C:2010:773, para 55.

9 M Pallemaerts, Toxic and Transnational Law (Oxford, Hart 2003) p 29.

10 2004 UN Secretary-General report on the rule of law; European Commission for Democracy through Law, Rule of Law Checklist (Venice, 11–12 March 2016).

11 Regarding the accessibility criterion, see Sunday Times v United Kingdom [1979] E.H.R.R. 245, 27, para 49.

12 2003 Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention on EIA in a Transboundary Context, Art 9.

13 1979 Convention on long-range transboundary air pollution, Art 4; Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Art 20.

14 Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Art 15.

15 UNECE Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context; CBD, Art 14; Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Art 4(3)(e); 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Art 8.

16 UNCLOS, Art 202; CDB, Art 16; Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Art 13.

17 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Art 8.

18 Protocol for the Prevention and Elimination of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft or Incineration at Sea, Art 5; Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-Based Sources and Activities, Art 6; Protocol for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution Resulting from Exploration and Exploitation of the Continental Shelf and the Seabed and its Subsoil, Art 4; CITES, Arts III–VI; Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the CBD.

19 1998 Protocol to the CLRTAP on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Art 5(b)(i); Barcelona Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Art (4)(b).

20 1994 Protocol to the CLRTAP on further reduction of sulphur emissions, Art 2(5)(a).

21 Protocol for the Prevention and Elimination of Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft or Incineration at Sea, Art 4; Protocol concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean, Art 6(b).

22 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, Art 7.

23 1979 Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, Art 6.

24 Art 5(2) REDD+.

25 CDB, Art 14.

26 Pallemaerts, supra, note 9, 27.

27 1991 Bamako Convention on the ban of the import to Africa and the control of transboundary movement and management of hazardous waste within Africa, Art 4(3)(f).

28 1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Art 2(5); 1998 Convention on the protection of the Rhine, Art 4; UN Convention to combat desertification, Art 3.

29 CBD, Arts 5 and 6(b).

30 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Art 9(2).

31 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants.

32 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.

33 See the Bonn Convention on Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild animals.

34 G Marin Duran, “Sustainable development chapters in EU free trade agreements: emerging compliance issues” (2020) 57(4) Common Market Law Review 1031–68.

35 See the various studies on non-binding norms in environmental law published in D Shelton (ed.), Commitment and Compliance (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2000) pp 121–242.

36 Pallemaerts, supra, note 9, 26.

37 The clearest illustration of the absence of binding effects of soft law instruments is the 1992 UN Non-legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests.

38 Paris Agreement, Art 4(4).

39 See, for instance, Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Art 3(1).

40 In accordance with this theory, the CJEU applies strictly the derogatory conditions of environmental obligations, be it with respect to birds and habitats protection (Case C-900/19, One Voice et LO [2021]), to the quality of surface waters (Case C-461/13, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland [2015] EU:C:2014:2324; Case C-525/20, Association France Nature Environnement [2022] EU:C:2022:16) or the placing on the market of genetically modified organisms (Case C-528/16, Confédération paysanne [2018] EU:C:2018:20) and active substances in pesticides (Case C-162/21, Pesticide Action Network Europe [2023] EU:C:2023:30, para 34).

41 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan) ICJ 2014, 31 March 2014.

42 Paras 51–97.

43 European Commission for Democracy through Law, Rule of Law Checklist (Venice, 11–12 March 2016).

44 Case C-504/19, Banco de Portugal and Others [2021] EU:C:2021:335, para 51 and the case law cited.

45 In imposing a duty of care on the Dutch authorities under Arts 2 (right to life) and 8 (right to privacy and family life) ECHR for the inadequacy of measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the Netherlands, the Dutch High Court relied not only on ECtHR case law but also on the UNFCCC, the customary principle of no harm, as well as non-binding international and EU climate policy instruments. See HR, Urgenda, 19/00135 [2019] ECLI: NL: HR: 2019: 2006.

46 Iron Rhine Railway (Belgium v Netherlands), PCA [2005] 27 RIAA, para 58.

47 LJ Kotzé, “Sustainable development and the rule of law for nature. A constitutional reading” in C Voigt (ed.), Rule of Law for Nature (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2012) p 134.

48 HC Bugge, “Twelve environmental challenges in environmental law” in C Voigt (ed.), Rule of Law for Nature (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2012) p 7. See, for instance, UN Agreement on the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Arts 2 and 3.

49 Principle 9 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.

50 European Commission for Democracy through Law, Rule of Law Checklist (Venice, 11–12 March 2016).

51 Administration Office of the US Courts, Overview – Rule of Law.

52 By way of illustration, discharges of pollutants from land-based sources into the Mediterranean Sea are subject to an authorisation. However, the Athens Protocol does not specify the emission values. See the 1980 Athens Protocol for the protection of the Mediterranean Sea against pollution from land-based sources, Art 6(3).

53 By way of illustration, the implementation of the 2015 Paris Agreement must “reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances” (Arts 2(2) and 4(1) and (3)).

54 T Bingham, “The Rule of Law” (2007) 66(1) Cambridge Law Journal 72.

55 See, to that effect, Case C-413/08 P, Lafarge v Commission [2010] EU:C:2010:346, para 94, and Case C-501/11 P, Schindler Holding and Others v Commission [2013] EU:C:2013:522, para 57.

56 T Bingham, The Rule of Law (London, Allen Lane 2010) p 63.

57 In the context of environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedures, the effective judicial review of a decision requiring or dispensing an EIA and the right to effective legal protection presuppose that the court to which the matter is referred and those seeking redress will have access to the statement of reasons for the contested decision. See AG Kokott Opinion in Case C-721/21 Eco Advocacy [2023] EU:C:2023:39, para 84.

58 See Case T-77/20, Ascenza Agro [2023] EU:T:2023:602, para 321.

59 Art 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

60 R Moules, Environmental Judicial Review (Oxford, Hart 2011) pp 261–71.

61 M Pâques, La sécurité juridique en droit administratif (Brussels, Larcier 2023).

62 2004 UN Secretary-General report on the rule of law; European Commission for Democracy through Law, Rule of Law Checklist (Venice, 11–12 March 2016).

63 D Lagasse, L’erreur manifeste d’appréciation endroit administratif : essai sur les limites du pouvoir discrétionnaire de l’administration (Brussels, Bruylant 1986).

64 See Case T-584/13, BASF Agro and Others v Commission [2018] EU:T:2018:279, para 94.

65 N de Sadeleer, EU Environmental Law and the Internal Market (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2014) pp 308–22.

66 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU), Art 47.

67 Case C-361/88, Commission v. Germany [1991] ECR 1-2567, para 16.

68 European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Strasbourg, August 2022) § 108, p 39.

69 Art 19(1), 2nd al. TEU.

70 Case C-873/19, Deutsche Umwelthilfe [2022] EU:C:2022:857, para 71. See N de Sadeleer, “Overview of the rule of law and recent developments in the European case law” (2024) 56(1) Revue de droit de l’Union européenne 10-45.

71 Aarhus Convention, Art 9(3) and (4). See Directive 2011/92/EU of 13 December 2011 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, Art 11(4).

72 Case C-427/07, Commission/Irland [2009] EU:C:2009:457; Case C-260/11, Edwards et Pallikaropoulos [2013] EU:C:2013:221, paras 25–28; Case C-530/11, Commission/United Kingdom [2014] EU:C:2014:67. See also Movement Ekoglasnost/Bulgaria, 15 December 2020, 31678/17.

73 Case C-530/11, Commission v. United Kingdom [2014] EU:C:2014:67.

74 Case C-167/17, Klohn [2018] EU:C:2018:833.

75 European Court of Human Rights, Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Strasbourg, August 2022) 66.

76 Case C-204/21, Commission v Poland [2023] EU:C:2021:834, para 234.

77 Case C-824/18, A.B. e.a. [2021] EU:C:2021:153, para 121.

78 Case C-216/21, AsociaÈ›ia « Forumul Judecătorilor din România » [2023] EU:C:2023:628, para 65.

79 Case C-64/16, 7 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses [2018] EU:C:2018:117, para 45.

80 Case C-791/19, Commission v Poland [2021] EU:C:2021:596.

81 Bingham, supra, note 56, 93. See Case C-216/18, L.M. [2018] EU:C:2018:586, para 64.

82 The weighing of interests can be unfavourable to conservation. For instance, in nature conservation “imperative reasons of overriding public interest”, including economic development, can override the protection of a Natura 2000 site. See Habitats Directive, Art 6(4).

83 N de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles (2nd edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2020) pp 413–14; C Voigt, “The principle of sustainable development” in C Voigt (ed.), Rule of Law for Nature (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2012) p 150.

84 The majority of the definitions of the rule of law refer only to the principles of equality and non-discrimination. However, according to the Venice Commission, the rule of law and human rights are interlinked. Even in common law, distinguished lawyers support the view that the rule of law entails the protection of fundamental rights. See Bingham, supra, note 54, 67.

85 For instance, although farmers’ rights, as they relate to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, are recognised in the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, the Contracting Parties agree that the responsibility for realising these rights rests with national governments (Art 9(2)).

86 See P Birnie et al, International Law & the Environment Development (3rd edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2015) pp 271–85.

87 See the paper by H Culot in this special issue.

88 Case Association des amis de Saint-Raphaël et Frejus v. France, 29 February 2000; Case Smits, Kleyn and Hal v. Netherlands, 3 May 2003; Case Balmer – Schafroth v. Switzerland, 26 August 1997; Case Athanassoglou and others v. Switzerland, 6 April 2000.

89 Case Taskin and others v. Turkey, 10 November 2004; Case Öneryiltiz v. Turkey, 30 November 2004; Case Lemke v. Turkey, 5 June 2007, para 53.

90 Decision Collectif national d’information et d’opposition à l’usine Melox – Collectif stop Melox and Mox v. France, 28 March 2006, para 4 (text only available in French).

91 ibid.

92 Case L’Erablière v. Belgium, 24 February 2009.

93 Kyrtatos v Greece, 41666/98, 22 May 2003, para 52.

94 N de Sadeleer, “Enforcing EUCHR Principles and Fundamental Rights in Environmental Cases” (2012) 81 Nordic Journal of International Law 39–74; see also de Sadeleer, supra, note 83, 114–22.

95 States are called upon to provide a normative framework “designed to provide effective deterrence against threats to the right to life”. See Taskin v Turkey, 10 November 2004, no 4611/99; Boudaïeva v Russia, 20 March 2008, 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 and 15343/02, para 158.

96 In Urgenda, the High Court of the Netherlands ruled that even though there is scientific uncertainty concerning the exact nature of the risks that any sea-level rise might have on the human population in the Netherlands over an extended period of time, the Dutch authorities are not relieved of their positive obligations to prevent such a risk from being realised. In case the occurrence of such environmental damage could entail a violation of fundamental rights protected under international law, there is no need for them to prove that the adoption of preventative measures would necessarily have made it possible to avoid that event from occurring. See N de Sadeleer, “The Hoge Raad judgment of 20 December 2019 in the Urgenda case: an overcautious policy for reducing GHG emissions breaches Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights” (2020) Elni Law Review 7–11.

97 R v. Home Secretary, ex. P. Simms (2000) 2 A.C. 115.

98 Case Guerra and others v. Italy, 19 February 1998, para 53. This provision “cannot be construed as imposing on a State … positive obligations to … disseminate information of its own motion”. See Case Roche v. United Kingdom, 19 October 2005, para 172.

99 Case Fadeyeva v. Russia, 9 June 2005, para 68; Case Kyrtatos v. Greece, 22 May 2003, para 52.

100 Case Kyrtatos v. Greece, 22 May 2003, para 53.

101 Art 24.

102 Art 11.

103 Resolution 76/300 of 28 July 2022, A/RES/76/300.

104 The Preamble of the Paris Agreement calls upon states to respect, promote and consider their respective human rights obligations when taking climate action.

105 AG Sharpston Opinion in Case C-204/09, Flachglas Torgau [2012] EU:C:2012:71, para 30.

106 In effect, public authorities find themselves called upon to arbitrate amongst divergent interests.

107 de Sadeleer, supra, note 83, 424.

108 For instance, the CJEU has consistently held that that the EU Aarhus Regulation implementing the Arhus Convention aims “to ensure a general principle of access to environmental information held by or for public authorities and … to achieve the widest possible systematic availability and dissemination to the public of environmental information”. Case C-442/14, Bayer CropScience and Stichting De Bijenstichting [2016] EU:C:2016:890, para 55.

109 CBD, Art 8; Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Art 9; 2003 Kiev Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention on EIA in a Transboundary Context, Art 8. See J Ebbesson, “Principle 10: Public Participation” in J Viñuales (ed.), The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2015) pp 287–309.

110 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Yakye Indigenous Community v Paraguay (Case 12.313).

111 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Centre for Minority Rights and Minority Rights Group v Kenya (2010).

112 Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria (2002), paras 54, 69.

113 Principle 4 of the Declaration on Environment and Development provides that “environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it”. See also Art 11 TFEU and Art 37 CFREU.

114 CFREU, Art 41.

115 See, inter alia, Case C-287/02 Spain v Commission [2005] ECR I-5093, para 37.

116 See, inter alia, C-349/07 Sopropé [2008] EU:C:2008:746, para 49.

117 de Sadeleer, supra, note 83, 135–364.

118 In accordance with Regulation 2020/2022 establishing a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget, cases of tax fraud, tax evasion, corruption and conflicts of interest must be effectively pursued by the investigation and prosecution services (Preamble 8). Whereas the causes of corruption in the environmental sector, in broad strokes, are like those of any other sector, lack of respect for the rule of law combined with weak governance, absence of transparency and poor enforcement make this sectoral policy particularly vulnerable to bribery, embezzlement and cronyism. This is the case for trafficking in threatened species and hazardous waste. Public servants in charge of environmental inspections and permitting systems are vulnerable to corruption.

119 Principle 5 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.

120 See, for instance, Aarhus Convention, Art 9.

121 T Marhaun, “The changing rule of the state” in D Bodanski et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2007) p 727.