* O'Brien, Donal Cruise, A Versatile Charisma: the Mouride brotherhood 1967–1975, Archives européennes de sociologie, XVIII (1977), 84–106CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

(1) Worsley, Peter, The Trumpet Shall Sound (London, Paladin, 1970)Google Scholar. See Appendices A and B.

(2) The circularity of many of the explanations involving charisma has been noted by Ake, Claude, Charismatic Legitimationand Political Integration, Comparative Studies in Society and History, IX (1966), 1–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The very existence of a charismatic leader, suggests Ake, assumes the integration he being used to explain.

(3) See Worsley, , op. cit. p. 288Google Scholar, and Wilson, Bryan R., The Noble Savages: the primitive origins of charisma and its contentporary survival (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975), pp. 4–7Google Scholar.

(4) Mommsen, Wolfgang J. has argued that domination is a more accurate translation of Weber's Herrschaft than the more usual authority: The Age of Bureaucracy: perspectives on the political sociology of Max Weber (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1974), 72Google Scholar.

(5) Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation [TSEO] translated by Henderson, A.M. and Talcott, Parsons (New York, The Free Press, 1964), p. 359Google Scholar.

(6) The main features of Weber's ideal type are taken from Weber, ibid. Part III.

(7) Tucker, Robert C., The theory of Charismatic Leadership, Daedalus, XLVII (1968), p. 751Google Scholar.

(8) Beetham, David has pointed out that the term Weber used to describe the orientation of those subjected to charismatic domination is not Glaube (belief), but Hingabe (devotion or surrender): Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics (London, Allen and Unwin, 1974), p. 247Google Scholar.

(9) TSEO p. 364.

(10) Ibid. p. 367.

(11) See Gerth, Hans, The Nazi Party: its leadership and composition, American Journal of Sociology, XLV (1940), [517–41Google Scholar, and Dekmejian, Richard H. and Wirszomirski, Margaret J., Charismatic Leadership in Islam: the Mahdi of the Sudan, Comparative Studies in Society and History, XIV (1972), 193–214CrossRefGoogle Scholar

(12) See Gerth, , op. cit. p. 535Google Scholar: ‘The motives of those who join the party range from ardent belief and more or less rationalised conviction to an opportunistic adjustment to “new facts”, acquiescence, grumbling concession, and finally, mute adaptation for fear of legal or other disadvantages’. See also O'Dea, Thomas F., son the dilemma of mixed motivation in his essay, Sociological Dilemmas: five paradoxes of institutionalisation, in Tirya-Kian, Edward A. (ed.), Sociological Theory, Values and Sociocultural Change (New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 71–90Google Scholar.

(13) A point that is made by Wolpe, Harold, A critical analysis of some aspects of charisma, Sociological Review, XVI (1968), p. 310Google Scholar. Certain writers, on the other hand, have emphasised the essentially non ideological character of charismatic leadership. See especially Nyomarkay, Joseph, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1967)Google Scholar. Nyomarkay argues that although the charismatic leader may see himself as the instrument of an abstract ideal he cannot see himself as an agent of ideology, as this will always present some measure of constraint which ‘a charismatic leader of absolute authority cannot accept’. Ibid. p. 21. See also Dow, Thomas E. Jr, The Theory of Charisma, Sociological Quarterly, X (1969), 306–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Regarding Nyomarkay's point, one might observe that, in Hitler, he is dealing with an extreme case and that, in most movements, ideology will assume importance during the process of routinization. On this point see Schweitzer, Arthur, Theory of Political Charisma, Comparative Studies in Society and History, XVI (1974), p. [162Google Scholar.

(14) According to Stuart Schram, R., for example, Mao Tse-tung eventually lost the support of the majority of the Chinese Communist Party: Mao Tse-tungas a Charismatic Leader, Asian Survey, VII (1967), p. 386Google Scholar.

(15) See, for example,Roth, Guenther, Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism and Empire-building in the New States, World Politics, XX (1968), 194–206CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Williame, Jean-Claude, Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1972), Ch. 1Google Scholar; and Aristide Zollberg, R., Creating Political Order: the party states of West Africa (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1966), p. 141Google Scholar.

(16) Weber considered patrimonialism in a continuum with sultanism at one end and decentralised patrimonialism at the other. Sultanism is highly centralised, office- holders having little autonomy. Under decentralised patrimonialism, however, the office is virtually the private possession of its incumbent: Economy and Society: an outline of interpretive sociology, eds. Roth, Guenther and Wittich, Claus (New York, Bedminster Press, 1968), Vol. III, Ch. XIIGoogle Scholar.

(17) Roth, , however, wants to introduce a ‘modern’ form of patrimonialism, personal rulership, which is based solely upon material considerations, and does not require a belief in the ruler's personal qualifications: op. cit. pp. 195–6Google Scholar.

(18) TSEO p. 369.

(19) Much of the confusion in the literature stems from a failure to maintain a distinction between personal charisma, on the one hand, and the routinised charisma that is embedded in the roles and institutions of society, on the other. Weber himself was deficient in this respect. For a discussion of this issue see Worsley, ,op. cit. p. 325Google Scholar; and Oommen, T.K., Charisma, Social Structure and Social Change, Comparulership, rative Studies in Society and History, X (1967), 85–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

(20) See for example Balandier, Georges, Political Anthropology (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1972), Ch. VIIGoogle Scholar; Favret, Jeanne, Le traditionalisme par excès de modernité, Archives européennes de sociologie, VIII (1967), 71–93CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Rudolph, Lloyd, The Modernity of Tradition, in Bendix, Reinhard (ed.), State and Society (Boston, Little Brown, 1968)Google Scholar.

(21) Berger, Peter L., Charisma and Religious Innovation: the social location of Israelite prophecy, American Sociological Review, XXVIII (1963), 940–950CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Runciman, W.G., Charismatic Legitimacy and One-party Rule in Ghana, Archives europiéennes de sociologie, IV (1963), 148–165CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Beidelmann, T.O., Nuer Priests and Prophets, in Beidelmann, (ed.), The Translation of Culture (London, Tavistock Publications, 1971)Google Scholar.

(22) Dekmejian, and Wirszomirski, , op. cit., pp. 210–212Google Scholar.

(23) TSEO p. 360.

(24) Wolpe, , op. cit. p. 312Google Scholar.

(25) Dogan, Mattei, Le personnel politick, que et la personnalité charismatique, Revue française de sociologie, VI (1965), pp. 319–320Google Scholar.