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Socio-economic Aspects of German Rearmament

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 July 2009

Gerhard Brandt
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Extract

The advent of a new branch of social research under the name of civil-military relations studies within the course of the last two decades may be taken as an indication that the relationship between military and civil institutions has become one of the crucial problem areas in highly developed industrial societies. Whether this state of affairs might be characterized in terms of an increasing militarization of industrial society, like the Garrison State theory implies, or on the other hand, as a permeation of military institutions by specific values of civil institutions, does not now seem to be clear. Very likely, the problem before us does not lend itself to clear-cut statements like these. Notwithstanding the complexity of the relationships involving the two subsystems and the divergence of interpretations by different students of civil military relations, there appears to be agreement that both military and civil institutions have lost some of their relative autonomy. Something like a reciprocal interpenetration of both subsystems, without precedent in the history of industrial societies, has taken place. Likewise, the reasons for changes in the relations between the two sectors seem to be beyond controversy. The question of national defense has become a crucial problem of industrial societies which has been traced back to changes in the traditional world balance of power on the one hand, and revolutionary advances of weapons technology on the other. Concentrated as they are in the hands of two overwhelming antagonists, modern weapons, because of their range and destructive power, are capable of dealing a decisive blow to the war potential of the opponent within a matter of hours. Consequently, the outcome of any conflict must be anticipated within its earliest phase; to put it another way, the antagonists have to be prepared to face a showdown at any moment or risk their own destruction. It is for this reason that the full deployment of the military potential before a conflict is even in sight has become a postulate of modern military policy (2). Yet, permanent mobilization, as it is required by a rational military policy in the atomic age, tends to call in question the very social order which it to be secured against outside aggression.

Type
Armed Forces and Society in Western Europe
Information
European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie , Volume 6 , Issue 2 , November 1965 , pp. 294 - 308
Copyright
Copyright © Archives Européenes de Sociology 1965

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References

(1) As for the causes behind the transformation of the international system and the world strategic situation see Aron, Raymond, Paix et guerre entre les nations (Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1962).Google Scholar

(2) This postulate has been formulated most succinctly by Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean in their, by now, classical text The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1961), particularly pp. 11–19.Google Scholar

(3) Changes in the power structure of highly industrial countries as well as in the policy-making process have been referred to by Morgenthau, Hans J., “Our Thwarted Republic: Public Power vs, the New Feudalism,” Commentary, XXIX (1960), 473–485Google Scholar: Kornhauser, William, “Power Elite” or “Veto Groups?”, in Lipset, Seymour M. and Lowenthal, Leo ed., Culture and Social Character (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1961), pp. 252–267.Google Scholar

(4) As for the place of private business in the power structure of Western Germany see Dahrendorf, Ralf, Demokratie und Sozialstruktur in Deutschland, Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie, I (1960), 80–100Google Scholar, and «Wandlungen der deutschen Gesellschaft der Nachkriegszeit, Herausforderungen und Antworten», Gesellschaft und Freiheit (München, Piper, 1961), pp. 300–320.Google Scholar Furthermore, Deutsch, Karl W. and Edinger, Lewis J., Germany Rejoins the Powers (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1959).Google Scholar

(5) The criteria of what might be called a rational armament policy within the alliance—“Adequacy of Effort”, “Economy of Effort”, “Equity of Effort”—have been adopted from Lincoln Gordon, Economic Aspects of Coalition Diplomacy—The Nato Experience, International Organization, X (1956), 529–543.Google Scholar

(6) The differentiation of “Forces Specialization” and “Materiel Specialization” as aspects of an interallied military division of labour has been proposed by Malcolm W. Hoag, The Economics of Military Alliance, in Hitch, and McKean, , op. cit. pp. 281–301.Google Scholar

(7) See in this connection the penetrating study of Osgood, Robert E., Nato—The Entangling Alliance (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1962).Google Scholar

(8) See McLaughlin, Walter H. Jr., Business Attitudes Towards Defense Policy during the Cold War, Honors Thesis, Harvard University, 1955.Google Scholar

(9) The concept of “Economic-Military Balance” has been introduced by Huntington, Samuel P. in The Common Defense, Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York, Columbia University Press, 1962)Google Scholar, to serve as an analytical category in interpreting the process of military policy-making.

(10) See Huntington, Samuel P., Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results, in Friedrich, Carl J. and Harris, Seymour E. eds., Public Policy, Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 41–86.Google Scholar

(11) It is in this connection that the concept of “Forces Specialization” becomes relevant. See above, p. 297–298.

(12) For the characteristics of “Bargaining” as compared with “Hierarchy” see Dahl, Robert A. and Lindblom, Charles E., Politics, Economics and Welfare (New York, Harper, 1953).Google Scholar

(13) The phrase is Oskar Morgen-Stern, 's in The Question of National Defense (New York, Random House, 1959), p. 255.Google Scholar Morgenstern's statements in this connection have been commented by Blackett, P. M. S., Studies of War (Edinburgh and London, Oliver and Boyd, 1962), pp. 145–146Google Scholar, and by Strachey, John, On the Prevention of War (London, Macmillan, 1962), pp. 120–122.Google Scholar