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Political representation and the normative logic of two-level games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 2009

Deborah Savage  and
Albert Weale
Deborah Savage*
Affiliation:
Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester C04 3SQ, UK
Albert Weale
Affiliation:
Department of Government, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester C04 3SQ, UK
*
Email: djsava@essex.ac.uk
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Abstract

This paper develops the normative logic of two-level games linking international negotiation and domestic acceptability. The kernel of the logic is to be found in the claim that normatively governed relations involve agents simultaneously asking whether the expectations that they have under an agreement are reasonable given the expectations of others under that agreement. This normative logic mirrors the empirical logic that Putnam (1988) identified in his seminal account.

The normative logic is derived from a consideration of relevant concepts of representation, and in particular the concepts of authorization in international negotiation and accountability in domestic ratification. Rawls’ (1996) distinction between the reasonable and the rational is then deployed to state normative conditions of domestic acceptability as well as the obligations of fairness that states owe to one another. Two implications for democratic theory are drawn.

Keywords

two-level gamesrepresentationaccountabilityinternational negotiations
Type
Research Article
Information
European Political Science Review , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , March 2009 , pp. 63 - 81
Copyright
Copyright © European Consortium for Political Research 2009

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