In a bargaining process, there are factors impacting the outcome (i.e. gain versus loss). Of the important factors is the informational asymmetries between bargainers which could provide a more powerful position for whom has information that the other partner has not as well as magnitude of resource.

Thus, in a modified two-round, 4 trials (different magnitudes) bargaining paradigm, we investigated deception in children when there is no chance of deception revelation (first round) and when there is a chance of deception revelation (second round).

One hundred and forty one healthy schoolchildren (90 boys and 51 girls) between age of 7 and 12 participated in the current study. We designed a modified version of the bargaining paradigm based on the experimental design by members of the junior faculty workshop in the conflict management division at the 1995 academy of management meetings in Vancouver, BC. Variables included earning amount, deception frequency, real generosity and pretend generosity.

Using paired-samples T-test we showed that there were significant differences between two rounds in earning amount, deception frequency and real generosity. We administered separate one-way ANOVA with repeated measure on 4 different conditions (bank amounts. We found that, the main effect of condition was significant for real generosity (in both round), for pretend generosity (in first round) and for deception amount (in both round).

We found that revelation (reputation concerns) decreases deception and increases generosity. Moreover, lesser magnitudes increase generosity and decrease deception and vice versa.

The author has not supplied his/her declaration of competing interest.