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The Constitutional Court's “Traditional Slaughter” Decision: The Muslims’ Freedom of Faith and Germany's Freedom of Conscience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

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With its Schaechten (traditional slaughter) decision from 15 January 2002, the First Senate of the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) nudged Germany further in the direction of an integrated, multi-cultural society. This theme alone, described by one commentator in the German press as the “explosive question of integration,” would be enough to demand our attention. According to this story-line, a modest and faithful immigrant butcher, quietly took-on a grave social evil (the illiberal oppression of his religion) and won. In so doing, he left Germany a better place.

Type
Letter
Copyright
Copyright © 2002 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

(1) 1 BvR 1783/99, 15 January 2002, http://www.bverfg.de.Google Scholar

(2) Geyer, Christian, Kein Opium fuers Tier, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, p. 41 (16 January 2002).Google Scholar

(3) Germany, as is often noted in German public life, is not an immigration state. See, FACTS ABOUT GERMANY (Press and Information Office of the Federal Government), 25 (1997) (“The Federal Republic of Germany is not an immigration country.”). This fiction is, incredibly, maintained by a semantic sleight-of-hand, in the form of draconian immigration and naturalization laws that neatly designate the nearly 10 million non-Germans living in Germany (many of whom, like the complainant in the present case, for more than twenty years) as Ausländer (foereigners) or Asylbewerber (asylum seekers).Google Scholar

(4) “The German Minister for Consumer Protection, Food and Agriculture, Renate Künast, said the decision was in fact ‘a victory for animal welfare’ … The Central Council of Muslims in Germany welcomed the decision as a further step toward the integration of Germany's approximately 3.2 million Muslims into the broader society.” Germany's Muslim Butchers Win Right to Slaughter Animals by Ritual Method, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Englsih Edition), p. 1 (16 January 2002). For other national versions of this plot, see especially, Jackie Robinson's integration of American professional baseball and Zinedine Zidane's hard-won prestige in France following his success leading the French national soccer club to the World Cup and European championships.Google Scholar

(5) The reference derives from Samuel P. Huntington's 1996 book of the same title (The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order).Google Scholar

(6) The unspoken, cruel irony of the history of the present legal struggle is the insistence, by the ordinary German courts, on the elevation of animal rights above the human rights (the free expression of religious and cultural values) of Germany's Muslim community.Google Scholar

(7) “In the 1980s and 1990s the overall trend in Islam has been in an anti-Western direction … [Muslims instead] stress the differences between their civilization and Western civilization, …” Samuel P. Huntington, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF THE WORLD ORDER, 213 (1996).Google Scholar

(8) As Prof. Jutta Limbach, President of the Federal Constitutional Court, remarked following the terrorist attacks on the United States: “We honor these victims best when we understand their deaths as a challenge to our shared, fundamental Western values; and we respond by championing these values. In this way, in our parting with these victims, we guarantee that every human matters.” Jutta Limbach, Every Human Matters – Comments on the Occasion of the Terrorist Attacks in America, 2 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 15 (15 September 2002), www.germanlawjournal.com.Google Scholar

(9) 1 BvR 1783/99, 15 January 2002, Para. 14, http://www.bverfg.de.Google Scholar

(10) 1 BvR 1783/99, 15 January 2002, Para. 14, http://www.bverfg.de.Google Scholar

(11) Uta Rasche, The Method of Slaughter, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (English Edition), p. 2 (16 January 2002).Google Scholar

(12) “Believers, eat of the wholesome things with which We have provided you and give thanks to God, if it is Him you worship. He has forbidden you carrion, blood, and the flesh of swine; also any flesh consecrated other than in the name of God.” (2:168, 173); “You are forbidden carrion, blood, and the flesh of swine; also any flesh dedicated to any other God.” (5:3); “Say: ‘I find nothing in what has been revealed to me that forbids men to eat of any food except carrion, running blood, and the flesh of swine – for these are unclean – and any flesh that has been profanely consecrated to the gods other than God.'” (6:145). The Koran's dietary rules are directly related to those of the Jews, with approving cross-references to Jewish dietary commands in the text itself: “All wholesome things have this day been made lawful for you. The food of those whom the Book was given [Jews] is lawful for you, and yours for them.” (5:5); “We forbade the Jews all animals with undivided hoofs and the fat of sheep and oxen, except what is on their backs and intestines and what is mixed with their bones. Such is the penance We imposed on them for their misdeeds.” (6:145). Citations to the Koran are from THE KORAN (N.J. Dawood trans., 1999).Google Scholar

The Torah, sets out these dietary rules: “This is a lasting ordinance for the generations to come, wherever you live: You must not eat any fat or any blood.” (Leviticus 3:17); “The Lord said to Moses, ‘Say to the Israelites: ‘(…)And wherever you live, you must not eat the blood of any bird or animal. If anyone eats blood, that person must be cut off from his people.'” (Leviticus 7:22–27); “Nevertheless, you may slaughter your animals in any of your towns and eat as much of the meat as you want, as if it were gazelle or deer, according to the blessing the Lord your God gives you (…) But you must not eat the blood; pour it out on the ground like water.” (Deuteronomy 12:15–16); “Do not eat any detestable thing. These are the animals you may eat: the ox, the sheep, the goat, the deer, the gazelle, the roe deer, the wild goat, the ibex, the antelope and the mountain sheep. You may eat any animal that has a split hoof divided in two and that chews the cud. However, of those that chew the cud or that have a split hoof completely divided you may not eat the camel, the rabbit or the coney (…) The pig is also unclean; although it has a split hoof, it does not chew the cud. You are not to eat their meat or touch their carcasses.” (Deuteronomy 14:18). Citations to the Old Testament are from THE LIFE APPLICATION BIBLE – NEW INTERNATIONAL VERSION (1991). The relationship between Islam and Judaism is not limited to dietary principles; despite the antagonistic nature of the contemporary relationship between the two faiths, there is a strong historic bond between them. As Karen Armstrong explains: “Muhammad had been greatly excited by the prospect of working closely with the Jewish tribes [in Medina], and had even, shortly before the hijrah [migration from Mecca to Medina] introduced some practices (…) to align Islam more closely with Judaism. His disappointment, when the Jews of Medina refused to accept him as an authentic prophet, was one of the greatest of his life (…) But some of the Jews in the smaller clans were friendly and enhanced Muhammad's knowledge of Jewish scripture.” Karen Armstrong, ISLAM: A SHORT HISTORY 14-15 (2000). Armstrong notes, even after the clear split in the theological and doctrinal directions of the two faiths, that the antagonism between Islam and Judaism is of relatively recent vintage: “The Muslims assumed that Islam was a religion for the descendants of Ismail, as Judaism was the faith of the sons of Isaac (…) [but] The Quran continued to revere Jewish prophets and to urge Muslims to respect the People of the Book [Jews]. Smaller Jewish groups continued to live in Medina, and later Jews, like Christians, enjoyed full religious liberty in Islamic empires. Antisemitism is a Christian vice. Hatred of the Jews became marked in the Muslim world only after the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 and the subsequent loss of Arab Palestine. Is it significant that Muslims were compelled to import anti-Jewish myths from Europe, (…)” Karen Armstrong, ISLAM: A SHORT HISTORY 18-19 and 26 (2000).Google Scholar

(13) Uta Rasche,The Method of Slaughter, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (English Edition), p. 2 (16 January 2002).Google Scholar

(14) “Ein warmbluetiges Tier darf nur geshlachtet warden, wenn es vor Beginn des Blutentzugs betaeubt worden ist.” (“A warm blooded animal may only be slaughtered if, before the beginning of the flow of blood, the animal is ansethesized.”) (Sect. 4a.1 Animal Protection Act) (Translation by the author).Google Scholar

(15) Uta Rasche,The Method of Slaughter, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG (English Edition), p. 2 (16 January 2002).Google Scholar

(16) The Court identified the following exceptions to the general anesthesia requirement of the Animal Protection Act: emergency slaughter, slaughter of fowl, killing animals in the course of a hunt and pest control. 1 BvR 1783/99, 15 January 2002, Para. 47, http://www.bverfg.de.Google Scholar

(17) “die zustaendige Behoerde eine Ausnahmegenehmigung fuer ein Schlachten ohne Betaeubung (Schaechten) erteilt hat; sie darf die Ausnahmegenehmigugn nur insoweit erteilen, als es erfordelich ist, den Beduerfnissen von Angehoerigen bestimmter Religionsgemeinschaften im Geltungsbereich dieses Gesetzes zu entsprechen, denen zwingende Vorschriften ihrer Religionsgemeinschaft das Schaechten vorschreiben oder den Genuss von Fleisch nicht geschaechteter Tiere untersagen (…)” Animal Protection Act, Sect. 4a.2(2) (Translation by the author).Google Scholar

(18) BVerwGE 99, 1.Google Scholar

(19) Section 4a.2(2) of the Animal Protection Act provides alternative bases for the application of the exception, one being the mandatory proscription of the methods of traditional slaughter and the other being the mandatory prohibition of eating meat from animals that have not been slaughtered according to the traditional methods. The Federal Administrative Court concluded, apparently without objection from the appellant, that only the second of these alternatives applied in the case. BVerwGE, 99, 1 (2) (“(…) nur der zweite als Grundlage fuer das Begehren der Klaegerin in Betracht.” [“(…) only the second is relevant to the appellant's case.]). (Translation by the author).Google Scholar

(20) BVerwGE 99, 1 (4). (“sunnitischen Zweig des Islam.”). (Translation by the author).Google Scholar

(21) BVerwGE 99, 1 (4). (Citations omitted). (Translation by the author). The definition of a “religious community” cited by the Federal Administrative Court is used in German Church-State jurisprudence: “Unter einer Religionsgemeinschaft wird in Staatskirchenrecht ein Verband verstanden, der die Angehoerigen ein und desselben Glaubensbekenntnisses – oder mehrerer verwandter Glaubensbekennntnisse – zu allseitiger Erfuellung der durch das gemeinsame Bekenntnis gestellten Aufgaben zusammenfasst (…) dass es sich bei der dort genannten Religionsgemeinschaft um eine Gemeinschaft handeln muss, die sich nach aussen eindeutig abgrenzt und nach innen in der Lage ist, ihre Mitglieder zwingenden Vorschriften zu unterwerfen.” (In Church-State law, a religious community is understood to be an association in which the members have one and the same confession of faith – or several related confessions of faith – brought together by the work of completely fulfilling the shared work of the faith (…) that it, by the term “religious community” as it is used, must refer to a community that is clearly distinct externally and that is in the position, internally, to subject its members to regulations.”). BVerwGE, 99, 1 (3-4). (Translation by the author).Google Scholar

(22) The Court used the phrase “individuelle Sicht“ (“individual perspective”) to characterize the subjective standard proffered by the appellant in that case. BVerwGE 99, 1 (5) (Translation by the author).Google Scholar

(23) BVerwGE 99, 1 (5) (“Fuer eine Relativierung im Sinne der Massgeblichkeit individueller religioeser Ueberzeugungen laesst dieser Wortlaut keinen Raum.”). (Translation by the author).Google Scholar

(24) BVerwGE 99, 1 (6).Google Scholar

(25) Article 4 of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law) reads: “(1) Freedom of faith and of conscience, and freedom to profess a religious or philosophical creed, shall be inviolable. (2) The undisturbed practice of religion shall be guaranteed.”Google Scholar

(26) BVerwGE 99, 1 (4). (“Der Begriff der Religionsgemeinschaft unterliegt jedenfalls der staatlichen Beurteilung nach aktueller Lebenswirklichkeit, Kulturtradition und allgemeinem wie auch religionswissenschaftlichem Verstaendnis.”) (Citations omitted). (Translation by the author).Google Scholar

(27) BVerwGE 99, 1 (8). (“Sie koennen sowohl auf Nahrungsmittel pflanzlichen Ursprungs und auf Fisch ausweichen als auch auf Fleischimporte zuruckgreifen, die aus Laender ohne Schaechtungsverbot stamen.”). (Translation by the author).Google Scholar

(28) BVerwGE 99, 1 (8).Google Scholar

(29) BVerwGE, 112, 227. See, Reinhard Mueller, Im Zweifel fuer die Minderheit, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, p. 12 (18 January 2002).Google Scholar

(30) Mueller, Reinhard, Im Zweifel fuer die Minderheit, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, p. 12 (18 January 2002).Google Scholar

(31) Article 2 of the Basic Law reads: “(1) Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law.”Google Scholar

(32) Article 3 of the Basic Law reads: “(1) All persons shall be equal before the law (…) (3) No person shall be favored or disfavored because of sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, faith, or religious or political opinions. No person shall be disfavored because of disability.”Google Scholar

(33) See, note 25, supra.Google Scholar

(34) Article 12 of the Basic Law reads: “(1) All Germans shall have the right freely to choose their occupation or profession, their place of work, and their place of training. The practice of an occupation or profession may be regulated by or pursuant to a law.”Google Scholar

(35) 1 BvR 1783/99, 15 January 2002, Para. 30, http://www.bverfg.de.Google Scholar

(36) 1 BvR 1783/99, 15 January 2002, Para. 32, http://www.bverfg.de.Google Scholar

(37) “The personality right is so broad in its phrasing that almost any content could be poured into it, and it could easily function as the first and last resort of constitutional arguments. Recognizing this, the Constitutional Court has sought to confine its reach. As a general rule, the personality clause is subordinate to those positive rights of liberty expressly mentioned in the Basic Law.” Donald P. Kommers, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 313 (1997).Google Scholar

(38) 1 BvR 1783/99, 15 January 2002, Para. 32, http://www.bverfg.de. (“Dem ist, auch wenn das Schaechten selbst nicht als Akt der Religionsausuebung verstanden wird, dadurch Rechnung zu tragen, dass der Schutz der Berufsfreiheit des Beswerdefuehrers aus Art. 2 Abs. 1 GG durch den speziellen Freiheits gehalt des Grundrechts der Religionsfreiheit aus Art. 4 Abs. 1 und 2 verstärkt wird.” [It must also be appreciated, even in the event that the traditional method of slaughtering livestock is not considered a protected exercise of religion, that the protection of the complainant's occupational freedom through Art. 2.1 of the Basic Law is enahnced by the freedoms promoted by the basic rights, particularly the right to religious freedom in Arts. 4.1 and 4.2 of the Basic law.]). (Translation by the author).Google Scholar

(39) “Proportionality plays a role similar to the American doctrine of due process of law. The Basic Law contains no explicit reference to proportionality, but the Constitutional Court regards it as an indispensable element of a state based on the rule of law. The court consistently invokes the principle of proportionality in determining whether legislation and other governmental acts conform to the values and principles of the Basic Law (…) applying an ends-means test for determining whether a particular right has been overburdened in the light of a given set of facts (…) the means used must be appropriate (Eignung)to the achievement of a legitimate end (…) the means used to achieve a valid purpose must have the least restrictive effect (Erforderlichkeit) on a constitutional value (…)” Donald P. Kommers, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 46 (1997).Google Scholar

(40) 1 BvR 1783/99, 15 January 2002, Para. 36, http://www.bverfg.de. In defining the relationship between humans and animals that gives rise to this responsibility the legislature used the German term Mitgeschoepf, which is here translated, although unsatisfactorily, as “living beings.” The term actually makes reference to the similarities between humans and animals, especially in light of the fact that they were “created” (Schoepfer) together. Significantly, the term does not depend on some notion of humankind's paternalistic responsibility for animals.Google Scholar

(41) 1 BvR 1783/99, 15 January 2002, Para. 39, http://www.bverfg.de. (Citing: Article 12 of the 10 May 1979 European Convention on the Protection of Livestock; and Article 5.1(c) of the European Council's Regulation of the Protection of Livestock at the Time of Slaughter or Killing [93/119/EC, 22 December 1993 Regulations].)Google Scholar

(42) 1 BvR 1783/99, 15 January 2002, Paras. 40-41, http://www.bverfg.de.Google Scholar

(43) 1 BvR 1783/99, 15 January 2002, Para. 42, http://www.bverfg.de.Google Scholar

(44) 1 BvR 1783/99, 15 January 2002, Para. 43, http://www.bverfg.de. (“voellige berufliche Umorientierung” [“complete occupational disorientation”]). (Translation by the author).Google Scholar

(45) See, note 27, supra.Google Scholar

(46) 1 BvR 1783/99, 15 January 2002, Para. 44, http://www.bverfg.de. (“Von ihnen zu verlangen, im Wesentlichen dem Verzehr von Fleisch zu entsagen, truege den Essgewohnheiten in der Gesellschaft der Bundesrepublik Deutschland nicht hinreichend Rechnung.”) (Translation by the author).Google Scholar

(47) 1 BvR 1783/99, 15 January 2002, Para. 47, http://www.bverfg.de.Google Scholar

(48) 1 BvR 1783/99, 15 January 2002, Para. 36, http://www.bverfg.de. For this point, the Court especially referred to the exception to the anesthesia requirement of the Animal Protection Act provided for Schaedlingsbekaempfungsmassnahmen (pest control).Google Scholar

(49) As outlined in Para. 6, supra, the two elements are: (a) membership in a religious community; and (b) mandatory rules of that community prohibiting the consumption of meat taken from animals not slaughtered in accordance with the traditional methods.Google Scholar

(50) Article 140 of the Basic Law incorporates Articles 136-139 and 141 of the Weimar Reichs Verfassung of 1919 into the Basic Law. For a discussion of the concept, in German constitutional law, of an oeffentlichrechtliche Koerperschaft (quasi-public body), see, Donald P. Kommers, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURSIPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 489-491 (1997). See, also, the discussion of the Constitutional Court's recent decision granting Jehovah's Witnesses quasi-public status in GERMAN LAW JOURNAL: From the Outside Looking In: The Jehovah's Witnesses’ Struggle for Quasi-Public Status Under Germany's Incorporation Law, 2 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 1 (15 January 2002), www.germanlawjournal.com; Federal Constitutional Court Hears Arguments in Church/State Case: Should the Jehovah's Witnesses be Granted Status as Quasi-Public Entity?, 1 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL 1 (15 October 2000), www.germanlawjournal.com.Google Scholar

(51) 1 BvR 1783/99, 15 January 2002, Para. 55, http://www.bverfg.de. (“Sei viel mehr ausreichend, dass der Antragsteller einer Gruppe von Menschen angehoert, die eine gemeinsame Glaubensueberzeugung verbindet”) (Citation omitted). (Translation by the author).Google Scholar

(52) 1 BvR 1783/99, 15 January 2002, Para. 55, http://www.bverfg.de.Google Scholar

(53) 1 BvR 1783/99, 15 January 2002, Para. 56, http://www.bverfg.de.Google Scholar

(54) 1 BvR 1783/99, 15 January 2002, Para. 57, http://www.bverfg.de.Google Scholar

(55) Geyer, Christian, Kein Opium fuers Tier, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, p. 41 (16 January 2002).Google Scholar