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Constitutional Reasoning and Political Deliberation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Cesare Pinelli

Extract

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In the recent Anglo-American scholarly debate, contrary to that of continental Europe, judicial review of legislation raises strong criticism for various aspects. Among these, I will examine the claim that legislators are better equipped than courts in constitutional reasoning, on the ground that the institutional settings and procedures affecting the former ensures a better protection of rights than those that characterize the judicial function. The following questions will be posed: Do legislators primarily deal with rights as such? Do they reason about rights, and in that case for which purposes? Are these purposes sufficiently similar to those affecting the judicial reasoning about rights? Why in most legal orders courts are bound to reason-giving? While answering these questions, I will outline the different meaning that consequentialist reasoning is likely to acquire, respectively, in representative assemblies and on the bench. I will then classify the kinds of juridical consequences, and of the corresponding premises, that might affect constitutional reasoning according to the different weight of judicial construction. Finally, I will attempt to demonstrate why the indeterminacy of principles on which constitutional reasoning is expected to rely should be viewed as enhancing, rather than as distorting, the insight of courts on the right at stake.

Type
Part A: Political Theory and Constitutional Reasoning
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 14 , Issue 8: Special Issue - Constitutional Reasoning , 01 August 2013 , pp. 1171 - 1181
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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