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Corporate Governance and the Role of Investment Funds

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

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Since the mid-90\'s Germany has seen a whole range of laws on corporate governance: first and foremost the KonTraG, i.e. the law on control and transparency, followed by the NaStraG, i.e. the law on registered shares and the facilitating of proxy voting, then, more recently, the TransPuG, i.e. the law on transparency and disclosure, and - finally - the German Corporate Governance Codex issued by the Cromme Commission – and there is probably more to come during the next legislative period. What are the reasons for this striking increase in activity? What are the driving forces and is there a master plan behind these efforts?

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2002 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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