I would like to thank Russell Miller and Völker Röben for their comments and criticisms on and additions to an earlier draft of this comment, as well as Melanie Fourie and Agatha Atkins, whose excellent research assistance has become indispensable to me. Thanks also to my colleague André van der Walt, with whom I discussed many of the ideas expressed here at various occasions, and whose comparative work on constitutional property protection forms the basis of this comment.Google Scholar

Sec. 39 of the Final Constitution provides that “[w]hen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum - (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law and (c) may consider foreign law.” The text of both the Interim Constitution and the 1996 Constitution is available online at http://www.constitution.org.za/.Google Scholar

It is interesting to note that Sec. 39(para. 1)(c) FC does not give the court an injunction to consider foreign law, as is the case with international law in Sec. 39(para. 1)(b) FC. Despite fears that foreign case law might not be a safe guide to the interpretation of the bill of rights, many of the Constitutional Court's decisions contain extensive comparative analyses of constitutional law. See e.g. S v. Makwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC), par. 36-37; Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC), par. 26; and judgment of ACKERMANN J in Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 (3) SA 786 (CC).Google Scholar

The perseverance of Roman-Dutch legal principles in South African law during the time between 1910 and 1990 is – at least partly – linked to underlying political considerations, e.g. the nationalist motive to rid the pure (erroneously called) “civil” law in South Africa from English infiltration or “pollution,” á la German pandectism J. Du Plessis, The promises and pitfalls of mixed legal systems: the South African and Scottish experiences (1998) 9 Stellenbosch Law Review (Stell LR) 340; R. Zimmermann Synthesis in South African Private Law: Civil Law, Common Law and Usus Hodiernus Pandectarum (1986) 103 South African Law Journal (SALJ) 265. Insofar as the historical approach to law enjoyed support in South Africa during this time, the influence of French socio-legal philosophy, for example the propagation of Stammler's ideas with regard to law and changing social conditions by the likes of Saleilles, Charmont and Demogue (See W.J. HOSTEN, A.B. EDWARDS ET.AL., INLEIDING TOT DIE SUIDAFRIKAANSE REG EN REGSLEER (1995) 207 ff.) which conceded the relativism of juristic ideals and acknowledged that the past could not provide all the materials for a critical approach to law, was rather limited in South Africa at the beginning of and throughout the twentieth century. Although much has been written about the growth and development of the South African law during this time, and the influence of the various strands of reception on the development of an independent legal culture, literature is strangely silent on the matter of how much the law was in fact defined by the political ideals of the governing class. Only towards the end of this period, in expectation of the reform of the constitutional and political dispensation, and with the advent of a new generation of lawyers and academics, the severe influence of apartheid on the laws of the land would enjoy more explicit critical analysis.Google Scholar

Waal, J. De, A Comparative Analysis of the Provisions of German Origin in the Interim Bill of Rights (1995) South African Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 1 – 3; M. Chaskalson The Problem with property: thoughts on the constitutional protection of property in the United States and the Commonwealth (1993) 9 South African Journal for Human Rights (SAJHR) 336; J. Murphy, Property rights and judicial restraint: a reply to Chaskalson (1994) 10 South African Journal for Human Rights (SAJHR) 388, 392; A.J. Van der Walt, Towards a theory of rights in property: exploratory observations on the paradigm of post-apartheid property law (1995) 10 SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPR/PL) 336; G. van Maanen, Ownership as a Constitutional Right in South Africa – Articles 14 & 15 of the Grundgesetz: the German Experience (1993) Recht & Kritiek, 74 – 95; A.J. Van der Walt, Comparative Notes on the Constitutional Protection of Property Rights (1993) Recht & Kritiek, 263-297; D.G. Kleyn, The constitutional proptection of property: a comparison between the German and the South African appraoch (1996) 11 SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPR/PL) 402-445.Google Scholar

See J. FEDTKE, DIE REZEPTION VON VERFASSUNGSRECHT (2000) and J. De Waal, A Comparative Analysis of the Provisions of German Origin in the Interim Bill of Rights 1995 South African Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 1 ff.Google Scholar

See the discussion of J. FEDTKE, DIE REZEPTION VON VERFASSUNGSRECHT (2000) 329 - 333.Google Scholar

Sec. 121 - 123, text online at http://www.constitution.org.za/1993cons.htm Google Scholar

Sec. 28 (Property): (1) Every person shall have the right to acquire and hold rights in property and, to the extent that the nature of the rights permits, to dispose of such rights. (2) No deprivation of any rights in property shall be permitted otherwise than in accordance with a law. (3) Where any rights in property are expropriated pursuant to a law referred to in subsection (2), such expropriation shall be permissible for public purposes only and shall be subject to the payment of agreed compensation or, failing agreement, to the payment of such compensation and within such period as may be determined by a court of law as just and equitable, taking into account all relevant factors, including, in the case of the determination of compensation, the use to which the property is being put, the history of its acquisition, its market value, the value of the investments in it by those affected and the interests of those affected.Google Scholar

Sec. 25 (Property): (1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. (2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application - (a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and (b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court. (3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including - (a) the current use of the property; (b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property; (c) the market value of the property; (d) the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and (e) the purpose of the expropriation. (4) For the purposes of this section - (a) the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's natural resources; and (b) property is not limited to land. (5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. (6) A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress. (7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress. (8) No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination, provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is in accordance with the provisions of section 36(1). (9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6).Google Scholar

J. FEDTKE, DIE REZEPTION VON VERFASSUNGSRECHT (2000) 336 - 341 provides an overview of the different drafts of the final property clause that were considered in the course of 1995 and until the approval of the Final Constitution.Google Scholar

Sec. 25(1) and (4) FC.Google Scholar

Sec. 25(3) FC.Google Scholar

Sec. 25(5) to (8) FC.Google Scholar

I.e. the drafts of 9.10.1995 and 19.10.1995; as well as the second refined working draft of 9.11.1995.Google Scholar

E.g. the Democratic Party's Party Submission 25.10.1995.Google Scholar

E.g. J. Murphy, The Ambiguous Nature of Property Rights (1993) Journal for Juridical Science (JJS), 35 – 66; M. Chaskalson, The Problem with Property: Thoughts on the Constitutional Protection of Property in the United States and the Commonwealth (1993) 9 South African Journal for Human Rights (SAJHR) 388 - 411; J. Murphy, Property Rights and Judicial Restraint - A Reply to Chaskalson (1994) 10 South African Journal for Human Rights (SAJHR) 385 - 398; M. Chaskalson, The Property Clause: Sec. 28 of the Constitution (1994) 10 South African Journal for Human Rights (SAJHR) 131 - 139; J. Murphy, Interpreting the Property Clause in the Constitution Act of 1993 (1995) 10 SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPR/PL) 107 - 130; A.J. Van der Walt, Notes on the Interpretation of the Property Clause in the New Constitution (1994) 57 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg (THRHR) 181 - 203.Google Scholar

Eg Transkei Public Servants Association v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others 1995 (9) BCLR 1235 (Tk) 1246 et seq.Google Scholar

Chaskalson, M., The Problem with Property: Thoughts on the Constitutional Protection of Property in the United States and the Commonwealth 1993 South African Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 388 remarks that the case law of English speaking jurisdictions will exercise a dominant influence over the development of South African constitutional law because “most South African lawyers share my limitations [ie the ‘inability to read any international languages other than English']”. However, the “language barrier” argument holds true only partially. The abstract and deductive reasoning processes characteristic of the Romanic legal families of the European continent have frequently been used in South African constitutional law and private law for comparison. Cf J. Murphy, Property rights and judicial restraint: a reply to Chaskalson (1994) 10 South African Journal for Human Rights (SAJHR) 386. Moreover, J. De Waal, A Comparative Analysis of the Provisions of German Origin in the Interim Bill of Rights (1995) South African Journal on Human Rights (SAJHR) 1 - 2 n 1 points out that South African legal scholars are “particularly well situated to benefit from the Basic Law and the Federal Constitutional Court's jurisprudence because so many have made use of scholarships to become familiar with the German language and legal system.” These scholarships refer inter alia to financial support from the DAAD and BMW, as well as the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation and the Max Planck Institutes in Germany. However, traditionally it was mainly the scholars from Afrikaans-oriented universities that maintained relations with the law faculties on the European continent, while English-speaking public-law scholars tended to turn rather to the universities of the United States, Canada and Australia. The consequent gap that has developed between Afrikaans- and English-orientated constitutional literature can only be closed with renewed (and continued) interest by both groups of scholars in the possibilities offered by both the continental and the Anglo-American systems. The value of African legal systems as sources for legal comparison should also be kept in mind.Google Scholar

Van der Walt, A.J., Notes on the Interpretation of the Property Clause in the New Constitution (1994) 57 Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg (THRHR) 192 et seq.Google Scholar

Van der Walt, A.J., The Impact of the Bill of Rights on Property Law (1993) SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPR/PL) 305 n 27.Google Scholar

FEDTKE, J., DIE REZEPTION VON VERFASSUNGSRECHT (2000) 342.Google Scholar

A.J.van der Walt, The Impact of the Bill of Rights on Property Law (1993) SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPR/PL) 315. In Germany, the treatment of the values of individual freedom and social justice, through application of constitutional principles and the provisions of Art. 14 GG, have resulted in a clear-cut framework within which the interests of the individual property owner can be weighed against those of the community at large. Thus, German law provides a good example of how the fundamental values of individual freedom and social justice interact in the development of a unique constitutional framework for property protection. This framework could be important in the South African context. Under the new constitutional order, the legal system will be confronted with the question as to which of these values should enjoy precedence in situations where both are at stake and compete with each other.Google Scholar

Sec. 25(2)(a) read with Sec. 25(4)(a) FC.Google Scholar

Van der Walt, A.J., Moving towards recognition of constructive expropriation: Steinberg v South Peninsula Municipality 2001 (4) SA 1243 Forthcoming (2002) Stellenbosch Law Review (Stell LR).Google Scholar

VAN DER WALT, A.J., CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES – A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1999) 19.Google Scholar

Van der Walt, A.J., Moving towards recognition of constructive expropriation: Steinberg v South Peninsula Municipality 2001 (4) SA 1243 Forthcoming (2002) Stellenbosch Law Review (Stell LR).Google Scholar

Van der Walt, A.J., Compensation for excessive or unfair regulation: A comparative overview of constitutional practice relating to regulatory takings (1999) 14 SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPR/PL) 277.Google Scholar

VAN DER WALT, A.J., CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES – A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1999) discusses the treatment of this issue in a number of jurisdictions, notably Australia (51 ff.), the Council of Europe (104 ff., 111 ff.), Germany (143 ff.), India (216 ff), Ireland (237ff.), Switzerland (364 ff.), the United States (400ff.) and others.Google Scholar

Van der Walt, A.J., Compensation for excessive or unfair regulation: A comparative overview of constitutional practice relating to regulatory takings (1999) 14 SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPR/PL) 273-331 has undertaken a much more extensive comparative analysis of constructive expropriation than the attempt in this contribution.Google Scholar

Amendment V: “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, […] nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.”Google Scholar

Amendment XIV, Sec. 1: […] “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” See, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County 482 U.S. 304 (1987); JEROME A. BORRON AND C. THOMAS DIENNES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL (1999) 181.Google Scholar

Van der Walt, A.J., Compensation for excessive or unfair regulation: A comparative overview of constitutional practice relating to regulatory takings (1999) 14 SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPR/PL) 282.Google Scholar

Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v DeBenedictis 480 US 470 (1987).Google Scholar

Cf Dolan v City of Tigard 114 S Ct 2309 (1994).Google Scholar

This summary is based on the more extensive work of A.J. VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES – A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1999) 417-440.Google Scholar

Van der Walt, A.J., Compensation for excessive or unfair regulation: A comparative overview of constitutional practice relating to regulatory takings (1999) 14 SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPR/PL) 280-281 relying on Miller v Schoene 276 US 272 (1928)Google Scholar

Cf Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff 467 US 229 (1984).Google Scholar

Van der Walt, A.J., Compensation for excessive or unfair regulation: A comparative overview of constitutional practice relating to regulatory takings (1999) 14 SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPR/PL) 281.Google Scholar

Van der Walt, A.J., Compensation for excessive or unfair regulation: A comparative overview of constitutional practice relating to regulatory takings (1999) 14 SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPR/PL) 281.Google Scholar

Various theories have been developed on the manner in which the complex relationship between the public-purposes requirement for exercises of the police power and the takings issue must be treated. Cf the discussion of A.J. Van der Walt, Compensation for excessive or unfair regulation: A comparative overview of constitutional practice relating to regulatory takings (1999) 14 SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPR/PL) 283. Ever since the decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922), it has been accepted that once it is recognised that a taking “goes too far”, the burdensome effects of the regulation, rather than the public purpose it serves are the most important considerations.Google Scholar

Regulations imposed for the narrow police-power function of protecting public safety and health are treated as “pure” exercises of the police power, not requiring compensation, whereas regulations reaching beyond the strict confines of public safety and health may be subject to the compensation requirement in the takings clause even though they satisfy - in a broader sense - the public purpose and due process requirements. The latter regulations can be legitimate even though not directly related to protection of public health or safety, but will require compensation if their effects on property owners are too severe. Hadacheck v Sebastian 239 US 394 (1915), Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 (1922).Google Scholar

Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council 505 US 1003 (1992), Prune Yard Shopping Center v Robins 447 US 74 (1980); Yee v City of Escondido 503 US 519 (1992).Google Scholar

Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council 505 US 1003 (1992).Google Scholar

Hodel v Irving 481 US 704 (1987).Google Scholar

SINGER, J.W., PROPERTY LAW: RULES POLICIES AND PRACTICES (1993) 1228-1230. A.J. Van der Walt, Compensation for excessive or unfair regulation: A comparative overview of constitutional practice relating to regulatory takings (1999) 14 SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPR/PL) 285-286.Google Scholar

BVerfGE 50, 290, 344. Cf also H.J. PAPIER in GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR (T. Maunz & G. Dürig eds) (1990) vol II par 1-6, par 18; R. WENDT in GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR (M. Sachs ed.) (1996) 485.Google Scholar

Art. 14 GG: (1) (1) Das Eigentum und das Erbrecht werden gewährleistet. (2) Inhalt und Schranken werden durch die Gesetze bestimmt. (2) (1) Eigentum verpflichtet. (2) Sein Gebrauch soll zugleich dem Wohle der Allgemeinheit dienen. (3) (1) Eine Enteignung ist nur zum Wohle der Allgemeinheit zulässig. (2) Sie darf nur durch Gesetz oder auf Grund eines Gesetzes erfolgen, das Art und Ausmaß der Entschädigung regelt. (3) Die Entschädigung ist unter gerechter Abwägung der Interessen der Allgemeinheit und der Beteiligten zu bestimmen. (4) Wegen der Höhe der Entschädigung steht im Streitfalle der Rechtsweg vor den ordentlichen Gerichten offen. The official English translation of this text reads: (I) (1) Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed. (2) Their substance and limits shall be determined by law. (II) (1) Property entails obligations. (2) Its use should also serve the public interest. (III) (1) Expropriation shall only be permissible in the public interest. (2) It may only be ordered by or pursuant to a law which determines the nature and extent of compensation. (3) Compensation shall reflect a fair balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected. (4) In case of dispute regarding the amount of compensation recourse may be had to the ordinary courts. Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Foreign Affairs Division (1994). Numbering of the individual sentences added.Google Scholar

BVerfGE 25, 112, 117; BVerfGE 50, 290, 340; BVerfGE 52, 1, 29.Google Scholar

BVerfGE 58, 137 (Pflichtexemplar); B. PIEROTH & B. SCHLINK, GRUNDRECHTE (1998), m.n. 934-935.Google Scholar

Eg BVerfGE 24, 367; BVerfGE 42, 263; BVerfGE 58, 300, 339ff.Google Scholar

Eg. the examples from case law mentioned at note 50 above.Google Scholar

BVerfGE 25, 112, 117; BVerfGE 50, 290, 340; BVerfGE 52, 1, 29.Google Scholar

Specifically listed in Art. 14 III 1-3 GG.Google Scholar

Art. 14 III 1 GG expressly stipulates that expropriation is only possible in the public interest. The legislature must, with regard to this question, determine what is meant by “public weal.” This involves a consideration of the proportionality principle (Verhältnismäßigkeit) and is intimately connected with the constitutionality test. See BVerfGE 24, 367 (Deichordnung), 404. Therefore, a Legalenteignung will be tested against the question whether or not legislature has defined the public weal correctly. An Administrativenteignung will again be tested against the question whether or not the public interest has been served correctly by the executive. B. PIEROTH & B. SCHLINK, GRUNDRECHTE (1998), m.n. 942.Google Scholar

H.J. PAPIER in GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR (T.Maunz & G. Dürig eds) (1990) vol II par 447.Google Scholar

BVerfGE 24, 367 (Deichordnung), 405; BVerfGE 74, 264 (Boxberg), 283; A.J. VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES – A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1999) 129.Google Scholar

“Man kann finale Grundrechtseinwirkungen, die als solche vom Hoheitsträger als ‘Griff’ in den grundrechtlichen Bereich gewollt sind, von sonstigen Grundrechtseinwirkungen gleichen Effekts unterschieden, die dann also ‘eingriffsgleich’ wirken.” P. LERCHE in HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS V (J. Isensee & P. Kirchhof eds.) (1989) m.n. 50.Google Scholar

An infringement is direct if it follows from a state-created objective, if it puts into effect a situation created by the state, or if it would result in a responsibility for the state. BGHZ 92, 34, 41 ff.Google Scholar

I.e., if an individual right holder (Sonderopfer) suffers because the general borderlines on the limitation of individual rights have been crossed and the curtailment would be of a unreasonable and unbearable intensity (hinreichende Intensität).Google Scholar

Schoch, F., Die Haftung aus enteignungsgleichem und enteignendem Eingriff (1990) Juristische Ausbildung Jura 141.Google Scholar

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PIEROTH, B. & SCHLINK, B., GRUNDRECHTE - STAATSRECHT II ED (1991), m.n. 1019a. For further examples, see BGHZ 37, 44 (forest fire resulting from artillery shooting exercises); BGHZ 97, 369 (traffic noise infringing on the rights of landowners); etc.Google Scholar

BVerfGE 24, 367 (Deichordung).Google Scholar

BVerfGE 24, 367, 418; IPSEN in, VERHANDLUNGEN DER TAGUNG DER DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTSLEHRER (Von Hippel, Ipsen & Voigt et. al. eds.) (1952) 96 ff.; B. BRYDE in GG KOMMENTAR (I. Von Münch & P. Kunig eds.) (1992) m.n. 87 ff. R. WENDT in GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR (M. Sachs ed.) (1996) m.n. 167. BVerfGE 25, 112; BVerfGE 58, 300; BVerfGE 84, 361.Google Scholar

BVerfGE 47, 268, 287.Google Scholar

B. BRYDE in GG KOMMENTAR (I. Von Münch & P. Kunig eds.) (1992) m.n. 89; B. PIEROTH & B. SCHLINK, GRUNDRECHTE (1998) m.n. 939.Google Scholar

BVerfGE 58, 300.Google Scholar

MAURER, H., ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT, (11th ed. 1997) par 26 m.n. 88 definesGoogle Scholar

MAURER, H., ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT, (11th ed. 1997) Par 26 m.n. 1.Google Scholar

BGHZ 90, 17, 29ff. See H. MAURER, ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT, (11th ed. 1997) par. 26 m.n. 87 for an analysis of the true basis of the claim.Google Scholar

Cf the discussion of the relevant passages from BVerfGE 58, 300 in H. MAURER, ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT, (11th ed. 1997) par 26 m.n. 96 ff.Google Scholar

MAURER, H., ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT, (11th ed. 1997) par 26 m.n. 108 explains: “Vergleicht man beide Rechtsfiguren, dann zeigt sich, daß es beide Male um Beeinträchtigungen des Eigentums geht, die normalerweise als Inhaltsbeschränkungen entschädigungslos hinzunehmen sind, aber ausnahmsweise zu besonderen und unzumutbaren Belastungen führen und dann einen Ausgleich bzw. eine Entschädigung fordern.” Google Scholar

The idea of financially balancing out an excessive legislative regulation of property in order to avoid unconstitutionality of a specific action, was first raised by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1981 (BVerfGE 58, 137). Since this decision, the idea was developed into an independent concept mainly by the administrative courts and the Federal Court of Justice. Cf BVerwGE 77, 295; BGHZ 102, 350, 359 ff., BVerwGE 80, 184, 191 ff, BGHZ 121, 328, 332 ff etc.Google Scholar

VAN DER WALT, A.J., CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES – A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1999) 143.Google Scholar

In this context, the use of so-called salvatorische Entschädigungsklauseln, in the sense of provisions affording remuneration for disproportionate exercise of the state's powers rather than compensation for the expropriatory effects of a particular action, is characteristic. Cf Maurer par 26 m.n. 83 and 63.Google Scholar

Van der Walt, A.J., Compensation for excessive or unfair regulation: A comparative overview of constitutional practice relating to regulatory takings (1999) 14 SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPR/PL) 288.Google Scholar

This statement is questionable as far as equalization payment is envisaged by the legislature and/or administrative organ that will apply the particular regulation, and afforded only where other exceptional measures for the individuals detrimentally affected cannot viably be implemented. See the explanation of H. MAURER, ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT, (11th ed. 1997) par 26 m.n. 84 ff.Google Scholar

MAURER, H., ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT, (11th ed. 1997) par 26 m.n. 109 indicates that the only possibility for the continued existence of the idea of enteignende Eingriff is an interpretation in terms of which this concept provides for a residual sphere of detriment due to legislative infringement, not covered by the notion of Ausgleichspflichtige Inhaltsbestimmung, such as accidental damage (Zufall- oder Unfallschäden).Google Scholar

See B. BRYDE in GG KOMMENTAR (I. Von Münch & P. Kunig eds.) (1992) m.n. 56 ff., 100-108; contra H.J. PAPIER in GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR (T.Maunz & G. Dürig eds) (1994) m.n. 377, 406 ff., 687 ff. The German Federal Court of Justice is, in terms of Art. 14 III 4 GG, the court of final instance in questions regarding the amount of compensation to be paid. This court is of the opinion that concepts of enteignende Eingriff and enteignungsgleiche Eingriff should remain intact. BGHZ 90, 17 at 20; BGHZ 91, 20 at 26 ff. See also BGH NVwZ 1986, 76 at 78; H. MAURER, ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT, (11th ed. 1997) m.n. 87 ff. For an exposition of the different solutions to this discussion, see W.H. Von Heinegg & U.R. Haltern, Keine Angst vor Art 14 GG! (1993) Juristische Schulung - Zeitschrift für Studium und Ausbildung (JuS) 215-217.Google Scholar

1997 11 BCLR 1489 (CC).Google Scholar

Sec. 21 (para.1) of the Insolvency Act: “The additional effect of the sequestration of the separate estate of one of two spouses who are not living apart under a judicial order of separation shall be to vest in the Master, until a trustee has been appointed, and, upon the appointment of a trustee, to vest in him all the property (including property or the proceeds thereof which are in the hands of a sheriff or a messenger under a writ of attachment) of the spouse whose estate has not been sequestrated (hereinafter referred to as the solvent spouse) as if it were property of the sequestrated estate, and to empower the Master or trustee to deal with such property accordingly, but subject to the following provisions of this Sec‥” The remaining subsections of Sec. 21 of the Insolvency Act provide for the interests of the solvent spouse to be safeguarded in certain ways. Property of the solvent spouse may be released by the trustee in certain circumstances.Google Scholar

This case was heard in terms of the Interim Constitution, in which Sec. 28 provided a constitutional property guarantee comparable to Sec. 25 of the 1996 Constitution.Google Scholar

Harksen v Lane 1997 11 BCLR 1489 (CC) par. 33 (Zimbabwe): Hewlett v Minister of Finance 1982 (1) SA 490 (ZSC); Davies v Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development 1997 (1) SA 228 (ZSC); Harksen v Lane 1997 11 BCLR 1489 (CC) par. 34 (India): HD Vora v State of Maharashtra 1984 AIR 866 SC, 869.Google Scholar

Harksen v Lane 1997 11 BCLR 1489 (CC) par. 32, 33, 34.Google Scholar

VAN DER WALT, A.J., CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES – A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1999) 338.Google Scholar

See A.J. Van der Walt & H. Botha, Coming to grips with the new constitutional order: critical comments on Harksen v Lane NO (1998) SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPR/PL) 21-22 for a discussion of the authority.Google Scholar

VAN DER WALT, A.J., CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES – A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1999) 338-339.Google Scholar

Harksen v Lane 1997 11 BCLR 1489 (CC) par. 35.Google Scholar

See A.J. Van der Walt & H. Botha, Coming to grips with the new constitutional order: critical comments on Harksen v Lane NO (1998) SA Publiekreg / Public Law (SAPR/PL) 17-41.Google Scholar

This oversight was due probably to the applicant's heads of argument, which did not raise this issue in the course of the proceedings. Instead, the applicant chose to build her attack only upon averments that the vesting amounted to an expropriation. A.J. VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES – A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1999) 337-339.Google Scholar

2001 (4) SA 1243 (SCA).Google Scholar

At 1245 E.Google Scholar

At 1245 F-H.Google Scholar

At 1246 B-C.Google Scholar

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At 1248 A-B.Google Scholar

At 1249 E-F.Google Scholar

A quo decision per CONRADIE J 2001 (3) SA 310 (C); Constitutional Court per ACKERMANN J 2002 (7) BCLR 702 (CC).Google Scholar

Sec. 114 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964.Google Scholar

In order to enforce payment of unpaid customs duties and penalties, the South African Revenue Service (SARS), acting in terms of s 114 of the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964, detained certain movable property in the possession (physical control) of two tax debtors, Lauray Manufacturers CC and Airpark Halaal Cold Storage CC. Property is detained on the premises of the debtor, as opposed to it being attached and removed for safekeeping by the creditor. Accordingly, A.J. Van der Walt, Negating Grotius – The Constitutional Validity of Statutory Security Rights in Favour of the State: First National Bank t/a Wesbank v Commissioner of the South African Revenue Service 2001 (7) BCLR 715 (C), (2001) 17 South African Journal of Human Rights (SAJHR) 86-113 indicates that “detaining” the property therefore establishes a statutory fictitious pledge, as opposed to the statutory pledge or lien created by attachment and removal. Lauray was paying off a considerable amount in outstanding duties and penalties in monthly installments. To obtain security for the debt, SARS detained (among others) a vehicle belonging to FNB t/a Wesbank (FNB), who had reserved ownership as security for a credit agreement involved in financing the purchase of the vehicle. Upon the provisional winding up of Lauray, the SARS recovered just a fraction of the debt, and it therefore wanted to sell the detained vehicles to recover part of the outstanding balance. The tax debt of Airpark constituted an outstanding amount of customs duty. As security for this debt, SARS detained two vehicles on the premises of Airpark, both belonging to FNB, in terms of a credit agreement. When Airpark defaulted in paying off this debt in monthly installments as agreed, SARS attached the vehicles and removed them to a government warehouse for safekeeping prior to their intended sale in execution.Google Scholar

Apart from the constitutional challenge to s 114 of the Customs and Excise Act on the basis of the constitutional property clause, the provision was also challenged on the basis that the administrative collection of customs duty, without a court pronouncing on liability, was arguably in conflict with s 34 of the interim Constitution or s 22 of the 1996 Constitution. In the Constitutional Court it was pointed out (par [25]) that the 1996 Constitution is applicable to both aspects of the dispute.Google Scholar

Sec. 25(1) of the South African Constitution protects property by providing that no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and that no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. Sec. 25(2) deals explicitly with expropriation of property, providing that expropriation may only occur in terms of law of general application (a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and (b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court.Google Scholar

Par 73 of the decision: “If the deprivation is not arbitrary, the Sec. 25(1) right is not limited and the question of justification under Sec. 36 does not arise”.Google Scholar

Par 74 - 103.Google Scholar

Cf par 102.Google Scholar

See par [64]-[73], and par [105]-[117].Google Scholar

See par [114].Google Scholar

Park-Ross v Director: Office for Serious Economic Offences 1995 2 SA 148 (C), 160F-H.Google Scholar

Murphy, J., Property rights and judicial restraint: a reply to Chaskalson (1994) 10 South African Journal for Human Rights (SAJHR) 386.Google Scholar

ZIMMERMANN, R. & VISSER, D. in SOUTHERN CROSS (R. Zimmermann & D. Visser eds.) (1996) 24-28.Google Scholar

WET, E. DE, CONSTITUTIONAL ENFORCEABILITY OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS (1996) 133.Google Scholar

Murphy, J., Property rights and judicial restraint: a reply to Chaskalson (1994) 10 South African Journal for Human Rights (SAJHR) 388.Google Scholar

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