¹ Christoph Schönberger, Der Indian Summer eines liberalen Etatismus: Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde als Verfassungsrichter, in Religion, Recht, Politik. Studien zu Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde 121, 121 (Hermann-Josef Große Kracht & Klaus Große Kracht eds., 2014).Google Scholar

² Because these judges are no longer active, I uniformly describe their views—even the views of those still living—in the past tense.Google Scholar

³ See Barak, Aharon, The Judge in a Democracy 177–78, 193 (2006).Google Scholar

⁴ Brennan, William J., Jr., Reason, Passion, and “The Progress of the Law,” 42 Rec. Ass'n B. City N.Y. 948, 974 (1987).Google Scholar

⁵ Id. at 974–75.Google Scholar

⁶ Id. at 975.Google Scholar

⁷ Brennan, William J., Jr., My Encounters with the Constitution, 26 Judges J. 6, 7 (1987).Google Scholar

⁸ Brennan, Reason, Passion, and “The Progress of the Law,” supra note 4, at 962.Google Scholar

⁹ Brennan, My Encounters with the Constitution, supra note 7, at 10.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Id. at 60.Google Scholar

¹¹ Id. at 9 (Brennan spoke of the constitution as a series of “substantive value choices.”).Google Scholar

¹² Albie Sachs, The Strange Alchemy of Life and Law 33 (2009).Google Scholar

¹³ Id. at 90–91.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Id.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Id. at 92.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Barak, The Judge in a Democracy, supra note 3, at 24.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Id. at 25.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Id. at 24.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Id. at x–xi.Google Scholar

²⁰ Id. at 21.Google Scholar

²¹ Id. at 43.Google Scholar

²² Id. at 51.Google Scholar

²³ See generally Barak, Aharon, Purposive Interpretation in Law (Sari Bashi trans., 2005); Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations (2012).Google Scholar

²⁴ See Barak, The Judge in a Democracy, supra note 3, at 88–89 (arguing that courts neither can nor should solve all societal problems, but “that the court has an important role in bridging the gap between law and society and in protecting the fundamental values of democracy, with human rights at the center”).Google Scholar

²⁵ Id. at 23 (quoting Rostow, Eugene V., The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 208 (1952)).Google Scholar

²⁶ Id. at 75. In the last lines of his book, Barak was more specific and more personal. “I view my office as a mission,” he said. “Judging is not a job. It is a way of life. Whenever I enter the courtroom, I do so with the deep sense that, as I sit at trial, I stand on trial.” Id. at 315.Google Scholar

²⁷ See id. at 177–79 (“The more non-justiciability is expanded, the less opportunity judges have for bridging the gap between law and society and for protecting the constitution and democracy.”).Google Scholar

²⁸ Id. at 193 (“I believe that my role as a judge is to bridge the gap between law and society and to protect democracy. It follows that I also favor expanding the rules of standing and releasing them from the requirement of an injury in fact.”).Google Scholar

²⁹ Id. at 198.Google Scholar

³⁰ Id. at 197.Google Scholar

³¹ Id. at 95.Google Scholar

³² Id. Google Scholar

³³ Id. at 96.Google Scholar

³⁴ Id. at 308.Google Scholar

³⁵ See id. at 112 (“[J]udges must display modesty and an absence of arrogance.”).Google Scholar

³⁶ See id. at 309–10 (discussing the need for judges to possesses certain traits, such as humility and the ability to listen to others).Google Scholar

³⁷ That is, one who sees.Google Scholar

³⁸ Felix Frankfurter, The Nomination of Mr. Justice Brandeis, New Republic, Feb. 5, 1916, reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court: Extrajudicial Essays on the Court and the Constitution 43, 44 (Kurland, Philip B. ed., 1970).Google Scholar

³⁹ Felix Frankfurter, Social Issues Before the Supreme Court, 22 Yale L. Rev. 479 (1933), reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 38, at 286, 288.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Id. at 305.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Felix Frankfurter, When Judge Cardozo Writes, New Republic, Apr. 8, 1931, reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 38, at 242, 246.Google Scholar

⁴² For example, on Brandeis: “[F]or years Mr. Justice Brandeis had been immersed in the intricacies which modern industry and finance have created for society and in the conflicts engendered by them. Hardly another lawyer had amassed experience over so wide a range and with so firm a grip on the details that matter.” Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 33 (1931), reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 38, at 247, 250 [hereinafter Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution]. And again, Brandeis “never flinches from stubborn reality. Facts, not catchwords, are his sovereigns.” Id. at 267. And on Cardozo: “[H]e rapidly gained the esteem of the bar and the bench of New York by his arguments and briefs, as counsel as well as referee, a functionary appointed by judges in specific cases, particularly those of a complicated commercial character, a field of law in which Cardozo especially excelled.” Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo, in XXII Dictionary of American Biography, reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 38, at 525. And again, “[E]ven the fullest reading of his opinions merely gives intimations of his depth of thought and beauty of character.” Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public Law, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 440 (1939), reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 38, at 401, 436 [hereinafter Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public Law].Google Scholar

⁴³ Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, supra note 42, at 263.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See Frankfurter, Felix, Mr. Justice Holmes: 8 March 1841–6 March 1935, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1279 (1935), reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 38, at 333, 334 (on Holmes); Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, supra note 42, at 247, 264, 270 (on Brandeis); Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Cardozo and Public Law, supra note 42, at 401, 405 (“Cardozo realized the essentially empiric character of government and the range of discretion implied by its activities.”). See also Frankfurter, Felix, Chief Justice Stone, Year Book of the American Philosophical Society (1946), reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 38, at 437, 437 (citing approvingly a statement of Chief Justice Stone: “It is not the function of this Court to disregard the will of Congress in the exercise of its constitutional power.”).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Frankfurter, The Nomination of Mr. Justice Brandeis, reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 38, at 22, 25.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Id. at 35.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See Frankfurter, The Nomination of Mr. Justice Brandeis, supra note 38, at 45 (“The difficulty is with the application of the principle, and the application involves grasp and imagination and contact with the realities of a modern industrial democracy. To the consideration of these very questions Mr. Brandeis has given his whole life.”).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Felix Frankfurter, Taft and the Supreme Court, New Republic, Oct. 27, 1920, Jan. 18, 1922, & Jan. 29, 1922, reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 38, at 49, 63.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Felix Frankfurter, Justice Holmes Defines the Constitution, 162 Atlantic Monthly 484 (1938), reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 38, at 377, 400.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Constitution, supra note 42, at 264–65. Frankfurter also praised Brandeis for being “mindful of the limited range of human foresight,” and for “practic[ing] humility in attempting to preclude the freedom of action of those who are to follow.” Id. at 270.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Frankfurter, Social Issues Before the Supreme Court, reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 38, at 243.Google Scholar

⁵² Frankfurter, The Nomination of Mr. Justice Brandeis, supra note 38, at 61.Google Scholar

⁵³ Id. at 59.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Id.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Felix Frankfurter, Twenty Years of Mr. Justice Holmes's Constitutional Opinions, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 909 (1923), reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 38, at 112, 135.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Id. at 114.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Felix Frankfurter & Fisher, Adrian S., The Orbit of Judicial Power, in The Business of the Supreme Court at October Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 577 (1938), reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 38, at 338, 339.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ See id. at 344 (“Needless clash with the legislature is avoided by construing statutes so as to save them ….”).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ See id. at 357 (“A disregard of settled doctrines of constitutional procedure dangerously borrows trouble.”).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Frankfurter, Justice Holmes Defines the Constitution, reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court supra note 38, at 390.Google Scholar

⁶¹ See Frankfurter, Felix, The Supreme Court, Aspects Am. Gov't (1950), reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 38, at 448, 453–54.Google Scholar

⁶² Felix Frankfurter, The Judicial Process and the Supreme Court, 98 Proceedings Am. Phil. Soc'y (1954), reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 38, at 496, 504.Google Scholar

⁶³ See Frankfurter, Felix, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, in Government Under Law (Sutherland, Arthur E. ed., 1956), reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 38, at 533, 557:Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See Frankfurter, Felix, The Zeitgeist and the Judiciary, 29 Survey 542 (Jan. 1913), reprinted in Felix Frankfurter on the Supreme Court, supra note 38, at 1, 3–7.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Id. at 5.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ See generally Feldman, Noah, Scorpions: The Battles and Triumphs of FDR's Great Supreme Court Justices (2010).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See Black, Hugo Lafayette, A Constitutional Faith xvi (1968) (“[T]he courts should always try faithfully to follow the true meaning of the Constitution and other laws as actually written, leaving to Congress changes in its statutes, and leaving the problem of adapting the Constitution to meet new needs to constitutional amendments approved by the people under constitutional procedures.”).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ See id. at 14 (“[C]onstitutional cases must be decided according to the terms of our Constitution itself and not according to judges' views of fairness, reasonableness, or justice.”).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ See id. at 24–42.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Id. at 42.Google Scholar

⁷¹ I am indebted to Guido Calabresi, Black's former law clerk, for this insight.Google Scholar

⁷² See Black, A Constitutional Faith, supra note 67, at 8–9 (“This view which I have of the Constitution does not render government powerless to meet new times, new circumstances, and new conditions. And I think that is exemplified most clearly by the Commerce Clause which gives Congress the broad, general power to regulate commerce.”).Google Scholar

⁷³ See id. at 10 (“This view is based on my belief that the Founders wrote into our Constitution their unending fear of granting too much power to judges.”).Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See id. at 11 (“I would much prefer to put my faith in the people and their elected representatives to choose the proper policies for our government to follow, leaving to the courts questions of constitutional interpretation and enforcement.”).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ See id. at 15–20.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ See id. at 18.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Id. at 19–20.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Id. at 44.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Id. at 50.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Id. at 63.Google Scholar

⁸¹ For a rare case in which the Court found that dignity was directly infringed, see Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 15, 2006, 115 Entscheidungen des Bundeverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 118.Google Scholar

⁸² Black, A Constitutional Faith, supra note 67, 44–45.Google Scholar

⁸³ See id. at 53 (“In giving absolute protection to free speech, I have always been careful to draw a line between speech and conduct.”).Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Id. at 8 (“[I]t is language and history that are the crucial factors which influence me in interpreting the Constitution—not reasonableness or desirability as determined by justices of the Supreme Court.”).Google Scholar

⁸⁵ See Scalia, Antonin, Religious Retreats, in Scalia Speaks: Reflections on law, Faith, and Life Well-Lived 144, 144 (Scalia, Christopher J. & Edward Whelan eds., 2017) (transcript of a speech given to Georgetown students in April 1998) (“I … detest the term ‘values,‘ which suggests to me a greater degree of inter -changeability than ought to exist—as though the principles that guide a man's life are something like monetary exchange rates, subject to change with the times.”).Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Antonin Scalia, American Values and European Values, in Scalia Speaks, supra note 85, at 29, 39 (transcript of a speech given at a Le Cercle meeting in Washington, D.C. in June 2007).Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Antonin Scalia, Natural Law, in Scalia Speaks, supra note 85, at 243, 246 (transcript of a speech given at the Dominican House of Studies in Washington, D.C. on January 7, 2016).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Antonin Scalia, Foreign Law, in Scalia Speaks, supra note 85, at 250, 255 (transcript of a speech given in 2006 at the American Enterprise Institute).Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Antonin Scalia, Judges as Mullahs, in Scalia Speaks, supra note 85, at 260.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Scalia, American Values and European Values, supra note 86, at 256.Google Scholar

⁹¹ Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 47 (1997). See also Scalia, Antonin, Interpreting the Constitution, in Scalia Speaks, supra note 85, at 188, 200 [hereinafter Scalia, Interpreting the Constitution] (transcript of a speech given in Parliament House in Sydney, Australia in August 1994):Google Scholar

⁹² See Lee v. Wiseman, 505 U.S. 577, 631–46 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defending the constitutionality of non-sectarian prayer at a public school graduation). Cf. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. Of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (“[The First Amendment] requires that the state be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary.”); Sch. Dist. Of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 218 (1963) (condemning the practice of school-sponsored Bible reading in public schools); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (ditto for school-sponsored prayer).Google Scholar

⁹³ See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607–30 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 468 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2626–31 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586–606 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).Google Scholar

⁹⁴ See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979–999 (1992) (Scalia, J. dissenting); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 532–37 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953–56 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).Google Scholar

⁹⁵ See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at 2626–31 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586–606 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636–53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).Google Scholar

⁹⁶ See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988) (holding that placing a viewing screen between defendant and child sexual assault victim violated defendant's confrontation clause rights); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 860–70 (1990) (Scalia J., dissenting).Google Scholar

⁹⁷ See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating criminal sanctions for the expressive burning of the American flag).Google Scholar

⁹⁸ See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (invaliding a local ordinance that criminalized hate speech).Google Scholar

⁹⁹ See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Com'n, 558 U.S. 310, 385–479 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Indeed, to exclude or impede corporate speech is to muzzle the principal agents of the modern free economy. We should celebrate rather than condemn the addition of this speech to the public debate.”).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ See U.S. v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 831 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“We have recognized that commercial entities which engage in ‘the sordid business of pandering’ by ‘deliberately emphasiz[ing] the sexually provocative aspects of [their nonobscene products], in order to catch the salaciously disposed,‘ engage in constitutionally unprotected behavior.”).Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (“The First Amendment contains the freedom-of-speech guarantee that the people ratified, which included exceptions for obscenity, libel, and disclosure of state secrets, but not for the expression of extremely unpopular and wrong headed views.”).Google Scholar

¹⁰² See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 302–310 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (upholding the constitutionality of a ban on nudity in public places); see also Scalia, Antonin, The Arts, in Scalia Speaks, supra note 85, at 43, 48 (transcript of a speech given at Juilliard School's Symposium on the Arts and American Society in New York City on September 22, 2005).Google Scholar

¹⁰³ See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 590–600 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (maintaining that the government may constitutionally withhold grants from offensive art). For an exposition of Scalia's views about the freedom of speech, and for his critique of Black's, see Scalia, Antonin, The Freedom of Speech, in Scalia Speaks, supra note 85, at 201 (transcript of a speech given at Wesleyan University in March 2012); see also Scalia, The Arts, in Scalia Speaks, supra note 85, at 43.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Scalia, Judges as Mullahs, in Scalia Speaks, supra note 85, at 47; see also Scalia, The Arts, in Scalia Speaks, supra note 85. The definite article in the title of the latter speech was definitely intentional.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ See Scott Bomboy, Justice Antonin Scalia Rails Again About Flag-Burning “Weirdos,” Constitution Daily (Nov. 12, 2015), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/justice-antonin-scalia-rails-again-about-flag-burning-weirdoes/(quoting Scalia at a Princeton event) (“If it were up to me, I would put in jail every sandal-wearing, scruffy-bearded weirdo who burns the American flag.”).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ Id.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Scalia, The Arts, in Scalia Speaks, supra note 85, at 48.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635–36 (2008).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ See, e.g., Wilkinson, J. Harvie III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 Va. L. Rev. 253, 254 (2009):Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Die Methoden der Verfassungsinterpretation: Bestandaufnahme und Kritik, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht 120, 152 (2011).Google Scholar

¹¹² Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Diskussionsbeitrag, 30 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer [VVDStRL] 162, 165 (1972).Google Scholar

¹¹³ Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Vorwort, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, supra note 111, at 9.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ Id. Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ Böckenförde, Die Methoden der Verfassungsinterpretation: Bestandaufnahme und Kritik, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, supra note 111, at 153; Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Begriff und Probleme des Verfassungsstaates, in Staat, Nation, Europa: Studien zur Staatslehre, Verfassungstheorie und Rechtsphilosophie 127, 138 (1999), translated in Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, The Concept and Problems of the Constitutional State [1997], in 1 Constitutional and Political Theory: Selected Writings 141 (Mirjam Künkler & Tine Stein eds., 2017) [hereinafter Böckenförde, Begriff und Probleme]; Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit: Strukturfragen, Organisation, Legitimation, in Staat, Nation, Europa, supra, at 157, 168, translated in Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Constitutional Jurisdiction: Structure, Organization, and Legitimation [1999], in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 115, at 186 [hereinafter Böckenförde, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit].Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ See, e.g., Böckenförde, Die Methoden der Verfassungsinterpretation: Bestandaufnahme und Kritik, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, supra note 111, at 123–27, 153; Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Schutzbereich, Eingriff, verfassungsimmanente Schranken: Zur Kritik gegenwärtiger Grundrechtsdogmatik, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, supra note 111, at 230, 256–57; Böckenförde, Diskussionsbeitrag, 30 VVDStRL, supra note 112.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ Böckenförde, Die Methoden der Verfassungsinterpretation: Bestandaufnahme und Kritik, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, supra note 111, at 256.Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ Id. at 153.Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ Id. at 256–57.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Anmerkungen zum Begriff Verfassungswandel, in Staat, Nation, Europa, supra note 115, at 141, 150 (1999).Google Scholar

¹²¹ Böckenförde, Diskussionsbeitrag, 58 VVDStRL 144, 148 (2000).Google Scholar

¹²² Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Grundrechte als Grundsatznormen. Zur gegenwärtigen Lage der Grundrechtsdogmatik, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, at 189, 219, translated in Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Principles: On the Current State of Interpreting Fundamental Rights [1990], in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 115, at 235.Google Scholar

¹²³ Id. Google Scholar

¹²⁴ Böckenförde, Die Methoden der Verfassungsinterpretation: Bestandaufnahme und Kritik, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, supra note 111, at 257.Google Scholar

¹²⁵ In these concerns, Böckenförde resembled Scalia, who bemoaned that fact that, as he saw it,Google Scholar

Antonin Scalia, Faith and Judging, in Scalia Speaks, supra note 85, at 148, 153 (transcript of a speech given at the Long Island Catholic newspaper's 30^th anniversary celebration in October 1992).Google Scholar

¹²⁶ See Bahners, Patrick, Im Namen des Gesetzes. Böckenförde, der Dissenter, in Voraussetzungen und Garantien des Staates 145, 152–57 (Reinhard Mehring & Martin Otto eds., 2014).Google Scholar

¹²⁷ Bundesverfassungsgericht, Jan. 5, 1958, 7 BVerfGE 198, 205.Google Scholar

¹²⁸ Bahners, Im Namen des Gesetzes. Böckenförde, der Dissenter, in Voraussetzungen und Garantien des Staates, supra note 126, at 177.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Zur Kritik der Wertbegründung des Rechts, in Recht, Staat, Freiheit 67, 73 (5th ed. 2013), translated in Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Critique of the Value-Based Grounding of Law [1990], in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 115, at 217.Google Scholar

¹³⁰ Id. at 78–79.Google Scholar

¹³¹ Id. at 85.Google Scholar

¹³² Id. at 217, 227.Google Scholar

¹³³ Id. at 84.Google Scholar

¹³⁴ Id. at 84, 86.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ Id. at 89.Google Scholar

¹³⁶ Id. at 227.Google Scholar

¹³⁷ Böckenförde, Die Methoden der Verfassungsinterpretation: Bestandaufnahme und Kritik, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht supra note 111, at 134; see also Böckenförde, Anmerkungen zum Begriff Verfassungswandel, in Staat, Nation, Europa, supra note 115, at 151.Google Scholar

¹³⁸ Böckenförde, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, supra note 115, at 181.Google Scholar

¹³⁹ Böckenförde, Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Principles: On the Current State of Interpreting Fundamental Rights [1990], in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 115, at 213.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ Id. at 235, 254.Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ Id. at 255.Google Scholar

¹⁴² Böckenförde, Critique of the Value-Based Grounding of Law [1990], in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 115, at 233.Google Scholar

¹⁴³ See, e.g., Böckenförde, Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Principles: On the Current State of Interpreting Fundamental Rights [1990], in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 115, at 198, 204, 211–16; Böckenförde, Die Methoden der Verfassungsinterpretation: Bestandaufnahme und Kritik, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, supra note 111, at 132–34, 146; Böckenförde, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, supra note 115, at 167.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ Böckenförde, Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Principles: On the Current State of Interpreting Fundamental Rights [1990], in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 115, at 255.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ Böckenförde, Die Methoden der Verfassungsinterpretation: Bestandaufnahme und Kritik, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, supra note 111, at 132–33.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁶ Id. at 132.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ Id. at 133.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁴⁹ Böckenförde, Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Principles: On the Current State of Interpreting Fundamental Rights [1990], in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 115, at 211.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁰ Id. at 252.Google Scholar

¹⁵¹ See generally Böckenförde, Die Methoden der Verfassungsinterpretation: Bestandaufnahme und Kritik, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, supra note 111.Google Scholar

¹⁵² Böckenförde, Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Principles: On the Current State of Interpreting Fundamental Rights [1990], in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 115, at 235.Google Scholar

¹⁵³ Id. at 240.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁴ Id. at 237.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁵ Schönberger, Der Indian Summer eines liberalen Etatismus: Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde als Verfassungsrichter, in Religion, Recht, Politik. Studien zu Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, supra note 1, at 122.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁶ Id. at 124.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁷ Bahners, Im Namen des Gesetzes. Böckenförde, der Dissenter, in Voraussetzungen und Garantien des Staates supra note 126, at 176–83.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁸ In 1976, in connection with the Court's silver anniversary, Böckenförde observed that the Court's status was “no longer questioned” and that it had “so to speak, consolidated itself.” Böckenförde, Die Methoden der Verfassungsinterpretation: Bestandaufnahme und Kritik, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, supra note 115, at 120.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁹ See generally Böckenförde, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, supra note 115; see also Böckenförde, Begriff und Probleme, supra note 115, at 134.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁰ Böckenförde, Anmerkungen zum Begriff Verfassungswandel, in Staat, Nation, Europa, supra note 115, at 155–56.Google Scholar

¹⁶¹ Id. at 156.Google Scholar

¹⁶² Böckenförde, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit – Strukturfragen, Organisation, Legitimation, in Staat, Nation, Europa, supra note 115, at 166, translated in Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Constitutional Jurisdiction: Structure, Organization, and Legitimation [1999], in 1 Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 115, at 192.Google Scholar

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¹⁶⁴ Böckenförde, Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Principles: On the Current State of Interpreting Fundamental Rights [1990], in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 115, at 220.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁵ Id. at 227.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁶ Böckenförde, Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Principles: On the Current State of Interpreting Fundamental Rights [1990], in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 115, at 259.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁷ Böckenförde, Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Principles: On the Current State of Interpreting Fundamental Rights [1990], in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 115, at 221.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁸ Böckenförde, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, supra note 115, at 168.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁹ Böckenförde, Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Principles: On the Current State of Interpreting Fundamental Rights [1990], in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 115, at 259.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁰ Id. at 221.Google Scholar

¹⁷¹ Id. at 265.Google Scholar

¹⁷² Böckenförde, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, supra note 115, at 180.Google Scholar

¹⁷³ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁷⁴ Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Organisationsgewalt und Gesetzesvorbehalt, 53 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1235, 1235 (1999).Google Scholar

¹⁷⁵ Böckenförde, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, supra note 115, at 182.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁶ Böckenförde, Die Methoden der Verfassungsinterpretation: Bestandaufnahme und Kritik, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, supra note 111, at 147.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁷ Böckenförde, Diskussionsbeitrag, supra note 112, at 162.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁸ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁷⁹ Böckenförde, Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Principles: On the Current State of Interpreting Fundamental Rights [1990], in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 115, at 190–91.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁰ Böckenförde, Diskussionsbeitrag, supra note 112, at 162–65.Google Scholar

¹⁸¹ Id. at 165.Google Scholar

¹⁸² Id. Google Scholar

¹⁸³ Böckenförde, Fundamental Rights as Constitutional Principles: On the Current State of Interpreting Fundamental Rights [1990], in Constitutional and Political Theory, supra note 115, at 257.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁴ Part of what Böckenförde objected to in objective, values-based rights jurisprudence was its lack of foundation in history and text. See id. at 190–91.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁵ Böckenförde, Schutzbereich, Eingriff, verfassungsimmanente Schranken: Zur Kritik gegenwärtiger Grundrechtsdogmatik, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, supra note 111, at 241–63.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁶ Id. at 241.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁷ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁸⁸ Cf. Bahners, Im Namen des Gesetzes. Böckenförde, der Dissenter, in Voraussetzungen und Garantien des Staates, supra note 126 at, 152–57.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁹ Böckenförde, Schutzbereich, Eingriff, verfassungsimmanente Schranken: Zur Kritik gegenwärtiger Grundrechtsdogmatik, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, supra note 111, at 242–54.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁰ Decision of the Second Senate's Vorprüfungsausschuß of 19 March 1984, 37 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 1293 (1984).Google Scholar

¹⁹¹ Böckenförde, Schutzbereich, Eingriff, verfassungsimmanente Schranken: Zur Kritik gegenwärtiger Grundrechtsdogmatik, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, supra note 111, at 253–55.Google Scholar

¹⁹² See Böckenförde, Ernst-Wolfgang, Das Grundrecht der Gewissensfreiheit, in Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie 200 (1991).Google Scholar

¹⁹³ Bundesverfassungsgericht, Jan. 13, 1987, 74 BVerfGE 102.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁴ Böckenförde, Schutzbereich, Eingriff, verfassungsimmanente Schranken: Zur Kritik gegenwärtiger Grundrechtsdogmatik, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, supra note 111, at 247.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁵ Id. at 247.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁶ Id. at 248.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁷ Id. at 250–51.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁸ Id. at 250.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁹ Id. at 253.Google Scholar

²⁰⁰ Id. Google Scholar

²⁰¹ Id. at 254.Google Scholar

²⁰² Scalia, The Arts, in Scalia Speaks, supra note 85, at 47; see also Scalia, The Freedom of Speech, in Scalia Speaks, supra note 85, at 202–12. The definite article in the title of the latter speech was definitely intentional. “Historical-genetic,” of course, is Böckenförde's term, not Scalia's.Google Scholar

²⁰³ See Emp't Div., Dept. of Hum. Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990):Google Scholar

²⁰⁴ Böckenförde, Schutzbereich, Eingriff, verfassungsimmanente Schranken: Zur Kritik gegenwärtiger Grundrechtsdogmatik, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, supra note 111, at 255.Google Scholar

²⁰⁵ Scalia, Interpreting the Constitution, in Scalia Speaks, supra note 85, at 195, 197.Google Scholar

²⁰⁶ Böckenförde, Schutzbereich, Eingriff, verfassungsimmanente Schranken: Zur Kritik gegenwärtiger Grundrechtsdogmatik, in Wissenschaft, Politik, Verfassungsgericht, supra note 111, at 258.Google Scholar

²⁰⁷ Id. at 261.Google Scholar

²⁰⁸ Id. at 261–62.Google Scholar

²⁰⁹ See my contribution, entitled “Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde in the History of the German Constitutional Court,” as well as the wonderful essays, cited above, by Christoph Schönberger and Patrick Bahners.Google Scholar

²¹⁰ See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht, Apr. 10, 1984, 67 BVerfGE 1, 21–25 (Böckenförde & Steinberger, J.J., dissenting); Apr. 24, 1985, 69 BVerfGE 1, 57–87 (Böckenförde & Mahrenholz, J.J., dissenting); June 22, 1995, 93 BVerfGE 121, 149–65 (Böckenförde, J., dissenting).Google Scholar

²¹¹ The most obvious example is the Second Senate's Maastricht judgment of 1993, in which the traces of Böckenförde's theory of democracy are striking. See Bundesverfassungsgericht, Oct. 12, 1993, 89 BVerfGE 155; see also Schönberger, Der Indian Summer eines liberalen Etatismus: Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde als Verfassungsrichter, in Religion, Recht, Politik. Studien zu Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, supra note 1, at 133–34.Google Scholar

²¹² See Schönberger, Der Indian Summer eines liberalen Etatismus: Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde als Verfassungsrichter, in Religion, Recht, Politik. Studien zu Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, supra note 1, at 126–28.Google Scholar

²¹³ Id.Google Scholar

²¹⁴ See Bahners, Im Namen des Gesetzes. Böckenförde, der Dissenter, in Voraussetzungen und Garantien des Staates supra note 126, at 181–83.Google Scholar

²¹⁵ See Schönberger, Der Indian Summer eines liberalen Etatismus: Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde als Verfassungsrichter, in Religion, Recht, Politik. Studien zu Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, supra note 1, at 131.Google Scholar