* Extended version of a presentation given at the Fifth Nordic Company Law Conference in October 2002 at the Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus, Denmark. The contributions to this conference will shortly be published in: Engsig Sørensen / Neville (editors), The Regulation of Companies.Google Scholar

¹ Hopt, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 1998, p. 96, 99.Google Scholar

² Proposal presented on June 30, 1970, O.J. 1970, C 124/1Google Scholar

³ For a comprehensive study (based on the proposal of 1975) see the contributions in Lutter (editor), Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft, 2^nd ed., 1978.Google Scholar

⁴ A comprehensive historical outline of this issue is given by Mävers, Die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, 2002.Google Scholar

⁵ Art. 137 of the 1970 proposal.Google Scholar

⁶ Art. 74a of the 1975 proposal, COM (75) 150 final. The origins of the three bench model are elaborated by Mävers, Die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer in der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft, 2002, p. 122 and 138 et seq.Google Scholar

⁷ See, for example, the opinion of Lindacher in: Lutter (editor), Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft, 2^nd ed., 1978, p. 10 and Hauschka, Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 1990, 85, 102, pointing out that it was unrealistic to expect European courts to find “general principles” of a European company law; whereas Ficker, liber amicorum Pieter Sanders, 1972, p. 37 et seq., and Raiser, Festschrift für Johannes Semler, 1993, p. 277, 282, expressed the more optimistic view that courts and legal academics would be capable of creating such “general principles” in case law.Google Scholar

⁸ Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE), OJ L 294/1 of 10 November 2001 The Regulation is available online at: http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/index.html Google Scholar

⁹ Council Directive 2001/86/EC of 8 October 2001 supplementing the Statute for a European company with regard to the involvement of employees, OJ L 294/22 of 10 November 2001. The Directive is available online at: http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/index.html Google Scholar

¹⁰ For the following see the provisions of Art. 2 of the Regulation.Google Scholar

¹¹ See, for an analysis of the issues concerning a Holding SE, Oplustil, Selected problems concerning formation of a holding SE (societas europaea), in: 4 German Law Journal No. 2 (1 February 2003), available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com.Google Scholar

¹² Annex I and Annex II to the Regulation contain a list of the different national types of companies falling into the categories of either public limited liability company (for Germany: Aktiengesellschaft) or private limited liability company (for Germany: Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung).Google Scholar

¹³ See below (D. II.) where the tasks of the national legislature are considered.Google Scholar

¹⁴ See Art. 8 para. 6 of the Regulation referring to Art. 59.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Case C-208/00, 5 November 2002. published in Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 2002, p. 2037 et seq. Available online at http://curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm. Commentaries e.g. by: Eidenmüller, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 2002, p. 2233 et seq.; Leible/Hoffmann, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 2002. p. 925 et seq.; Lutter, Betriebs-Berater (BB) 2003, p. 7 et seq.; Neye, Entscheidungen zum Wirtschaftsrecht (EWiR) 2002, p. 1003; Baelz/Baldwin, The End of the Seat Theory in European Company Law: The ECJ's Überseering Decision, in: 3 German Law Journal No. 12 (1 December 2002), available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com; Schanze/Jüttner, Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 2003, p. 30 et seq.; Zimmer, Betriebs-Berater (BB) 2003, p. 1 et seq.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Bundesgerichtshof, July 1^st 2002 (case no. II ZR 380/00) published in Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 2002, p. 1009. One may ask why the Bundesgerichtshof in one case referred to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling and in another case solved the same question itself thereby removing the basis for the first case. An explanation is, that the cases were dealt with by different chambers of the Bundesgerichtshof which did not contact each other.Google Scholar

¹⁷ For example Eddy Wymeersch, The transfer of the company's seat in European Company Law, Working Paper 2003-3 of the Financial Law Institute, Ghent University, Belgium, available at http://www.law.rug.ac.be/fli.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Case C-81/87, available online at http://curia.eu.int/en/content/juris/index.htm.Google Scholar

¹⁹ See no. 67 of the Überseering case, referring to Daily MailGoogle Scholar

²⁰ See for example Hirte, Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 2002, p. 1, 2; Hopt, European Banking and Financial Law Journal 2000, 465, 468 et seq.; Lutter, Betriebs-Berater (BB) 2002, p. 1, 3; Wiesner, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 2001, 397.Google Scholar

²¹ For an overview of the evolution of company law in the European Union see for example Hopt, International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 1999, p. 41 et seq.Google Scholar

²² Hommelhoff, Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 2001, p. 279, 285: ”kunstvoll aufgeschichtete Rechtsquellenpyramide“.Google Scholar

²³ See below (E.). For a general analysis of the applicable law and the determination of possible gaps: Brandt/Scheifele, Deutsches Steuerrecht (DStR) 2002, p. 547 et seq.; Casper, Festschrift für Peter Ulmer, 2003, p. 51 et seq.; Ch. Teichmann, Zeitschrift für Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrecht (ZGR) 2002, p. 383, 394 et seq.; Wagner, Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 2002, p. 985 et seq.Google Scholar

²⁴ A draft will be published end of February or beginning of March 2003 and discussed by Neye/Ch. Teichmann in: Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 2003, issue no. 4. Preceding proposals from academics were discussed by Brandt, Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 2002, p. 991 et seq. and Ch. Teichmann, Zeitschrift für Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrecht (ZGR) 2002, 383 et seq. as well as Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 2002, p. 1109 et seq.Google Scholar

²⁵ For a list of the instructions and options see Ch. Teichmann, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 2002, p. 1109 et seq.Google Scholar

²⁶ See below D.I.Google Scholar

²⁷ Available online at http://www.bmj.bund.de/gesetzgebungsvorhaben. Comments by Neye / Ch. Teichmann will be published in Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 2003, issue no. 4.Google Scholar

²⁸ See below D.II.Google Scholar

²⁹ The Directive has been analysed, inter alia, by: Heinze, Zeitschrift für Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrecht (ZGR) 2002, p. 66 et seq.; Herfs-Röttgen, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht (NZA) 2001, p. 424 et seq.; Pluskat, Deutsches Steuerrecht (DStR) 2001, p. 1483 et seq.; Henssler, Festschrift für Peter Ulmer, 2003, p. 193 et seq.Google Scholar

³⁰ This principle has already been applied with regard to the European Works Council (Council Directive 94/45/EC of 22 september 1994, available online at: http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/index.html). In the Directive on the European Company the primacy of negotiations follows from Art. 13 (2): “Provisions on the participation of employees in company bodies provided for by national legislation and/or practice, other than those implementing this Directive, shall not apply to companies established in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 and covered by this Directive.” The negotiating procedure provided for by Article 3 et seq. of the Directive therefore prevails over any national law on the participation of employees.Google Scholar

³¹ In Germany, employee representatives fear that the SE may be used to reduce the level of co-determination. Under the Regulation, however, this can only occur in rare cases. Analysing possible dangers to the German co-determination level: Nagel, Arbeit und Recht (AuR) 2001, p. 406 et seq.Google Scholar

³² For a discussion of this issue see also Hopt, European Banking and Financial Law Journal, 2000, p. 465, 474.Google Scholar

³³ For an economic analysis of the choices offered by the European Company: Blanquet, Zeitschrift für Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrecht (ZGR) 2002, p. 20, 34 et seq.; Wenz, Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 2003, issue no. 4 and Kallmeyer, Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 2003, issue no. 4.Google Scholar

³⁴ Also in this sense Bungert/Beier, Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht (EWS) 2002, p. 1, 9.Google Scholar

³⁵ See, again, Hopt, ZIP 1998, above, note 1Google Scholar

³⁶ For a recent criticism see Ulmer, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht (ZHR) 2002 (166), p. 271 et seq.Google Scholar

³⁷ See § 95 (1) Aktiengesetz: The maximum number of members of an advisory board may be 21 in companies with a legal capital of more than 10.000.000 Euros.Google Scholar

³⁸ See, for example, the analysis of the cases Enron and WorldCom by Schwarz/Holland, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 2002, p. 1661 et seq.; for further analysis of the issue see e.g.: Bhagat/Black in: Hopt//Kanda/Roe/Wymeersch/Prigge (ed.), Comparative Corporate Governance, 1998, p. 281 et seq.; Monks/Minow, Corporate Governance, 1995, p. 185 et seq.Google Scholar

³⁹ See for an economic analysis of co-determination Gerum/Wagner in: Hopt/Kanda/Roe/Wymeersch/Prigge (ed.), Comparative Corporate Governance, 1998, p. 341 et seq. Co-determination creates transaction costs, but it may as well reduce other costs, such as collective bargaining running and repeating at different levels. Compare the case of Renault announcing to close down of a factory in Belgium, without having informed their employees in advance (see Kolvenbach/Kolvenbach, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 1997, p. 695 et seq.). Employees felt taken by surprise and – successfully – started court actions against the decision to close down the factory. A prior discussion in an advisory board consisting also of employee representatives would have avoided such a conflict.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Trade unions seem to take the option to negotiate very seriously; see, for example, the analysis of Köstler, in: Theisen/Wenz (editors), Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft), 2002, p. 301 et seq.Google Scholar

⁴¹ In pursuance of Art 14 of the DirectiveGoogle Scholar

⁴² For a more detailed analysis of minority protection in the course of the foundation of an SE as well as in the case of a transfer of seat: Ch. Teichmann, Zeitschrift für Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrecht (ZGR) 2003, issue no. 3.Google Scholar

⁴³ §§ 15 and 29 Umwandlungsgesetz (Transformation Act).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Consequently, the merger resolution may not be challenged by minority shareholders on the grounds of an inadequate conversion ratio (§ 14 Transformation Act) or an inadequate cash compensation (§ 32 Transformation Act).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ For a more detailed analysis see Ch. Teichmann in: Theisen/Wenz (editors), Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft, 2002, p. 573, 584 et seq.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Some authors are of the opinion that the national legislature has to adopt provisions (Hommelhoff, Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 2001, p. 279, 284; Lutter, Betriebs-Berater (BB) 2002, p. 1, 4); others raise doubts (Bungert/Beier, Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht (EWS) 2002, p. 1, 3; Schulz/Geismar, Deutsches Steuerrecht (DStR) 2001, p. 1078, 1082) or read the Regulation as a mere option (Hirte, Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NZG) 2002, p. 1, 5; Vossius in: Widmann/Mayer (editors), Umwandlungsrecht, 65. update June 02, § 20 UmwG, no. 399, footnote. 1).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See Henssler, Festschrift für Peter Ulmer, 2003, p. 193, 208, and Ch. Teichmann, Zeitschrift für Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrecht (ZGR) 2002, p. 383, 446.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ For the development on the European level of a law of corporate groups see Forum Europaeum, Corporate Group Law for Europe, Zeitschrift für Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrecht (ZGR) 1998, 672 et seq. (= European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR), 2000, p. 165 et seq.) and the commentaries by Windbichler, EBOR 2000, p. 265 et seq. and Kluver, EBOR 2000, p. 287 et seq.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See Hommelhoff, Die Aktiengesellschaft (AG) 2002, issue no. 4; Maul in: Theisen/Wenz (editors), Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft, p. 399 et seq.; Ch. Teichmann, Zeitschrift für Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrecht (ZGR), 2002, p. 383, 444 et seq.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Art. L. 225-38 et seq. Code de commerce.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Art. 524 Code des sociétés.Google Scholar

⁵² As a provision of the German legislature this is not based on Art. 43 para. 1 of the Regulation (which offers an option only to introduce managing directors “under the same conditions as for public limited-liability companies that have registered offices within that Member State”) but on the general option of Art. 43 para. 4 (addressing Member States which do not know the one-tier system at all).Google Scholar

⁵³ The Vorstand of a German Aktiengesellschaft is, under the German law pertaining to public limited liability companies, appointed for a period of up to five years; any removal prior to the expiration of that period needs to be justified. The Aufsichtsrat may not give any instructions to the Vorstand.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See Art. 9 of the Regulation.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, 6^th edition, 1991, p. 370 et seq.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ In this sense apparently Brandt/Scheifele, Deutsches Steuerrecht (DStR) 2002, p. 547, 552, stating that a distinction between planned and unintended gaps was artificial with regard to the SE Regulation. They propose to look at the specific issue in question and to determine whether it could better be solved on the European level or on the national level.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ This view, however, is not shared by all in German literature. See, for example, Casper, Festschrift für Peter Ulmer, 2003, p. 51, 57: Art. 9 para. 1 lit. c) of the Regulation leaves no room for closing gaps by general principles of European company law.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ The following has also been elaborated in Ch. Teichmann, Zeitschrift für Gesellschafts- und Unternehmensrecht (ZGR) 2002, p. 383, 432 et seq. For selected questions related to the formation of a holding SE see also Oplustil, German Law Journal, http://www.germanlawjournal.com, Volume 4 No. 2 (1 February 2003).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Art. 31 para. 2 of the proposal of 1991; Art. 32 para. 3 of the proposal of 1989; Art. 32 in the proposal of 1975 and 1970.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Casper in: Festschrift für Peter Ulmer, 2003, p. 51, 61.Google Scholar

⁶¹ See the provisions of Art. 32 of the Regulation.Google Scholar

⁶² Assemblée général ordinaire and assemblé générale extraordinaire (see Guyon, Droit des Affaires, Tome 1, 11^th edition, 2001, p. 318 et seq.)Google Scholar

⁶³ See, Third Directive, 78/885/EEC (Habersack, Europäisches Gesellschaftsrecht, 2^nd edition, 2003, p. 194 et seq., also, available online at http://www.europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/index.html.)Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See above note 2.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ The expression of assistance to European Law given by national law (“EG-rechtliche Hilfestellung”) stems from Sonnenberger, Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, 3^rd edition, 1998, Internationales Privatrecht, Introduction, footnote 317.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Lutter in: Lutter (Hrsg.), Umwandlungsgesetz, 2^nd edition, 2000, § 1, notes 5 et seq.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ In the same sense Brandt/Scheifele, Deutsches Steuerrecht (DStR) 2002, p. 547, 554.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ § 23 (1) Aktiengesetz.Google Scholar