1 Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG - Federal Administrative Court], Case No. 2 BvL 52/71, 37 BVerwGE 271 (May 29, 1986).Google Scholar

2 Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG - Federal Administrative Court], Case No. 2 BvR 197/83, 73 BVerwGE 339 (Oct. 22, 1986).Google Scholar

3 Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG - Federal Administrative Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2134/92, 89 BVerwGE 155 (Oct. 12, 1993) [hereinafter Maastrich decision].Google Scholar

4 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvE 2/08, 123 BVerfGE 267 (June 30, 2009) [hereinafter Lissabon decision]. For more on this, see Daniel Halberstam & Christoph Möllers, The German Constitutional Court Says “Ja zu Deutschland!”, 10 German L.J. 1241–58 (2009).Google Scholar

5 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvE 2661/06, 126 BVerfGE 286 (July 6, 2010) [hereinafter Honeywell decision].Google Scholar

6 The decision was delivered on 7 February 2014.Google Scholar

7 TFEU art. 267. For details on the preliminary ruling procedure according to Art. 267 TFEU, see Matthias Pechstein, EU-Prozessrecht 366 ff. (4^th ed. 2011); Alexander Thiele, Europäisches Prozessrecht 134 ff. (2007); Middeke, Andreas, Vorabentscheidungsverfahren, in Handbuch des Rechtsschutzes in der Europäischen Union 222 (Hans-Werner Rengeling, Andreas Middeke & Martin Gellermann eds., 3^rd ed. 2014).Google Scholar

8 See Thiele, Alexander, Das Mandat der EZB und die Krise des Euro 57 ff. (2013).Google Scholar

9 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 (Jan. 14, 2012) [hereinafter BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13].Google Scholar

10 See, e.g., Warnke, Markus, Die Vorlagepflicht nach Art. 234 Abs. 3 EGV in der Rechtsprechungspraxis des BVerfG (2004).Google Scholar

11 “Europäischer Verfassungsgerichtsverbund.” See Andreas Voßkuhle, Der europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund, 29 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1–8 (2010).Google Scholar

12 In comparison, the Lisbon decision was more than 150 pages long without any dissenting opinion.Google Scholar

13 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl. arts. 20, 23, 38, 79.Google Scholar

14 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 24.Google Scholar

15 Honeywell decision at 304 f.Google Scholar

16 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at paras. 33–54.Google Scholar

17 Pechstein, supra note 7, at 404; Alexander Thiele, Europarecht 186 (11th ed. 2014).Google Scholar

18 ECJ Case C-415/93, Bosman, 1995 E.C.R. I-4921 at para. 59; Case C-318/00, Bacardi-Martini, 2003 E.C.R. I-905 at para. 42.Google Scholar

19 See dissenting opinions of Judge Lübbe-Wolf, para 11 ff. and Judge Gerhardt, para 5 ff.Google Scholar

20 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at paras. 33–35.Google Scholar

21 Id. at paras. 36–44.Google Scholar

22 Id. Again, the two dissenting opinions explicitly oppose the statements of the senate regarding the duties of the German government bodies. They both believe that the actions brought before the Court are all in all not admissible as they deal with highly political questions (see further under C. I.).Google Scholar

23 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 49.Google Scholar

24 Id. at paras. 36, 42.Google Scholar

25 See under C. II., and also the dissenting opinion of Judge Gerhardt, para. 16.Google Scholar

26 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at paras. 55–100.Google Scholar

27 In this context the Court states in paragraph 70 that the OMT Program aims to neutralize the interest increases on government bonds of certain member states of the monetary union, that have emerged on the markets and that are a burden on the refinancing of these member states. The reference to the monthly bulletin of the ECB of September 2012, p. 7 and of October 2012, p. 7 f. in para 70 however cannot prove this alleged aim of the OMT Program. In fact, the ECB here makes clear, as she has always emphasized, that the OMT Program was initiated to restore the disturbed monetary transmission mechanism.Google Scholar

28 See TFEU art. 120 ff.Google Scholar

29 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at paras. 56–79.Google Scholar

30 Id. at paras. 80–83.Google Scholar

31 Id. at para. 82Google Scholar

32 Id. at para. 85. This statement, by the way, is the only one in the whole decision that refers to three opinions in the judicial literature. Borger, Vestert, The ESM and the European Court's Predicament in Pringle, 14 German L.J., 113, 119, 134 (2013); Alberto de Gregorio Merino, Legal Developments in the Economic and Monetary Union During the Debt Crisis: The Mechanisms of Financial Assistance, 49 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1613, 1625, fns. 36 & 1627 (2012); Lenaerts, Koen & Nuffel, Piet Van, No Bail Out, in Constitutional Law of the European Union 11–037 (Robert Bray and Nathan Cambien, eds., 2011). However, none of these opinions actually contain the indeed daring and hardly convincing statement of the Court. It remains more than remarkable that the Court obviously prefers to give false references instead of rethinking its own statement. In any case it would have been fairly easy to find statements in the literature that have exact the opposite opinion. Above this: Why the Court in the whole decision does not take a single German commentary of the European Treaties into account (such as the ones edited by Calliess & Ruffert, Streinz or Schwarze) or any relevant (economic) monograph where the problems regarding Art. 123 TFEU would be laid down in detail, remains absolutely unclear. See further under E.Google Scholar

33 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 96.Google Scholar

34 In its Lisbon decision, the Constitutional Court made clear that it had the competence to examine whether a European act violated the “Constitutional Identity of the Basic Law.” What this is supposed to mean, however, remains unclear and has thus rightly been criticized in the German literature. See Christian Calliess, Die neue Europäische Union nach dem Vertrag von Lissabon 267 ff. (2010); Calliess, Christian, “In Vielfalt geeint” – Wie viel Solidarität? Wie viel nationale Identität?, in Christian Calliess, Europäische Solidarität und nationale Identität 5 ff. (2013).Google Scholar

35 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 102.Google Scholar

36 See under E. and in detail, Thiele, supra note 8, at 58 ff.Google Scholar

37 The ECB could, for this reason, initiate a special treaty violation proceeding according to Art. 271 lit.d) TFEU against the Bundesbank before the ECJ.Google Scholar

38 See Pechstein, supra note 7, at 404 ff.; Middeke, supra note 7, at 249 ff.; Wegener, Bernhard, Art. 230 EGV, in EUV/EGV Kommentar, paras. 21 ff. (Christian Calliess & Mattias Ruffert, eds., 4th ed. 2011).Google Scholar

39 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl., art. 93 (a) No. 4a. For details on the constitutional complaint, see Schlaich, Klaus & Korioth, Stefan, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht 142 ff. (9th ed. 2012).Google Scholar

40 Schlaich, & Korioth, , supra note 39, at 151.Google Scholar

41 See Thiele, Alexander, Individualrechtsschutz vor dem Europäischen Gerichtshof durch die Nichtigkeitsklage 199 ff. (2006).Google Scholar

42 German citizens could also not file an action against the German Bundesbank if it acted as the ECB under the OMT Program.Google Scholar

43 See the dissenting opinion of Judge Lübbe-Wolff in para. 16 f. and dissenting opinion of Judge Gerhardt in para. 6 ff.Google Scholar

44 Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBl., art. 38 (1).Google Scholar

45 See Maastricht decision at 171 f.Google Scholar

46 See Lisbon decision at 330 ff.; 129, 124 (167 ff.).Google Scholar

47 For further references, see Calliess, supra note 34, at 238 ff.; Schlaich & Korioth, supra note 39, at 260 f.Google Scholar

48 See Lisbon decision.Google Scholar

49 See the dissenting opinion of Judge Lübbe-Wolff in para. 16 f. and dissenting opinion of Judge Gerhardt in para. 6 ff.Google Scholar

50 See under D. II.Google Scholar

51 See dissenting opinion of Judge Gerhardt in para. 6.Google Scholar

52 See dissenting opinion of Judge Lübbe-Wolff in para. 12.Google Scholar

53 In a strict sense, a referral would not be necessary even in the case of a qualified breach, as the applicants’ complaint would have to be granted no matter how the ECJ decides. However, the Constitutional Court has made clear that it would not deliver an ultra vires decision without asking the ECJ before. From a national perspective— and this is the relevant perspective—the referral is therefore necessary in this case.Google Scholar

54 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at paras. 39, 42.Google Scholar

55 See, e.g., Siekmann, Helmut, Missachtung rechtlicher Vorgaben des AEUV durch die Mitgliedstaaten und die EZB in der Schuldenkrise, in Europa als Rechtsgemeinschaft: Währungsunion und Schuldenkrise 101 ff. (Thomas Möllers & Franz-Cristoph Zeitler eds., 2013); Martin Seidel, Der Ankauf nicht markt- und börsengängiger Staatsanleihen, namentlich Griechenlands, durch die Europäische Zentralbank und durch nationale Zentralbanken – rechtlich nur fragwürdig oder Rechtsverstoß?, 21 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 521 (2010); Herrmann, Christoph, EZB-Programm für die Kapitalmärkte verstößt nicht gegen die Verträge: eine Erwiderung auf Martin Seidel, EuZW 2010, 21 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 645 ff. (2010); Thiele, supra note 8, at 58 ff.; Sester, Peter, Die Rolle der EZB in der europäischen Staatsschuldenkrise, 23 Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 80 ff. (2012); Ruffert, Matthias, The European Debt Crisis and European Law, 48 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1777 ff. (2011).Google Scholar

56 See, e.g., Calliess, Christian & Ruffert, Matthias, The German Commentaries of the European Treaties (4th ed. 2011); Jürgen Schwarze, EU-Kommentar (3rd ed. 2012); Carl-Otto Lenz & Klaus-Dieter Borchardt, EU-Verträge (6th ed. 2012). Helmut Siekmann also published a special commentary on the Monetary Union in 2013.Google Scholar

57 For a definition of price stability, see Thiele, supra note 8, at 27 ff.Google Scholar

58 For the relevance of the transmission mechanism for monetary policy in general and the special problems within the EMU, see Görgens, Egon, Ruckriegel, Karlheinz & Seitz, Franz, Europäische Geldpolitik 287 ff. (5th ed. 2008).Google Scholar

59 In fact, the Court seems simply to be confusing the objective (restoring the transmission mechanism) and the instruments with which the ECB intends to reach this objective (purchasing of government bonds to influence the interest increases). Both, however, have to be strictly separated.Google Scholar

60 Press Release, Monetary Developments in the Euro Area: June 2012 (July 26, 2012), available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pdf/md/md1206.pdf.Google Scholar

61 See Görgens, Ruckriegel & Seitz, supra note 58, at 327 ff. (regarding the special transmission problems within the EMU).Google Scholar

62 These problems were a result of certain “construction deficits” of the EMU. Marc Blyth, Austerity (2013) speaks of “glaring holes in its institutional design.” For an overview of these deficits, see Thiele, supra note 8, at 1 ff.Google Scholar

63 Reichlin, Lucrezia & Baldwin, Richard, Introduction, in Is Inflation Targeting Dead? Central Banking after the Crisis 10, 16 (Lucrezia Reichlin & Richard Baldwin eds., 2013).Google Scholar

64 Reichlin, & Baldwin, , supra note 63, at 16.Google Scholar

65 Thiele, supra note 8, at 17, 69. The ECB in fact was not the only central bank worldwide that felt it necessary to take “unorthodox” measures to fight the consequences of the financial crisis. See Thiele, supra note 8, at 12 ff.Google Scholar

66 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 73.Google Scholar

67 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 74.Google Scholar

68 Id. at para. 79.Google Scholar

69 In fact, if one wanted to follow the Court in the opinion that a measure taken is either economic or monetary policy, then one would have to come to the conclusion that it was the member states who acted out of their mandate when empowering the ESM to buy government bonds. Buying government bonds—at least up to now— has always been an instrument used by central banks and in this sense would have to be interpreted as monetary and not economic policy. The Court, however, obviously sees no reason to discuss this question.Google Scholar

70 ECJ, Judgment of 27.11.2012, Case C-370/12, Pringle, 2012 E.C.R. I-0000.Google Scholar

71 See, e.g., Sachverständigenrat, Stabile Architektur für Europa: Handlungsbedarf im Inland, Jahresgutachten 2012/2013 at para 143 ff. (2012), available at http://www.sachverstaendigenratwirtschaft.de/fileadmin/dateiablage/gutachten/ga201213/ga12_ges.pdf.Google Scholar

72 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 81.Google Scholar

73 Id. at para. 82.Google Scholar

74 Again, from its own perspective the Court should have asked whether the member states actually act economically when purchasing government bonds in the secondary market.Google Scholar

75 See Herrmann, supra note 55, at 810 (“tradiertes geldpolitisches Instrument”).Google Scholar

76 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 87 ff.Google Scholar

77 However, such formal mistakes are obviously hardly acceptable regarding the relevance of the whole referral.Google Scholar

78 See also Sester, supra note 55, at 85.Google Scholar

79 BVerfG, 2 BvR 1390/12 at para 174.Google Scholar

80 Thiele, supra note 8, at 73 f.Google Scholar

81 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 97.Google Scholar

82 Id. at para. 96.Google Scholar

83 Id. at para. 100.Google Scholar

84 If the Constitutional Court for example demands to leave an appropriate interval between the emission of the bonds and the purchase of these bonds by the ECB then what does “appropriate” mean? An hour, two hours, a day, a week or a month? And is this period always the same or does it depend on other circumstances as well? Without any normative basis these questions seem impossible to answer for the ECJ.Google Scholar