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From the Hammock onto the Trampoline

Workfare Policies in the U.S. and their Reception in Germany

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

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For a long time now the German labor market has been deep in the throes of a crisis. The search for ways out has become the leading topic of political debate, at the latest since the election year 2002, with the main emphasis centering round concepts for activation programs. These concepts have been under international academic discussion for several years. In some countries they have meanwhile been put into practice, for instance within the scope of the sweeping welfare reform carried out in the United States (U.S.) in the mid-nineties under the slogan “from welfare to work”.

Type
Public Law
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 This metaphor was used for the idea of an activating welfare state by Bodo Hombach, in: Aufbruch - Die Politik der Neuen Mitte, 2nd edition, Munich 1998, p. 199.Google Scholar

2 An overview is provided by Ivar L⊘demel/Heather Trickey, “An Offer You Can't Refuse” – Workfare in international perspective, Bristol/GB 2000.Google Scholar

3 Cf. Bundesrats-Drucksache 52/02, dated 23 Jan. 2002.Google Scholar

4 For a comment on this initiative in its early phase, cf. Graser, Aufgewärmtes aus der Armenküche, Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik 10/01, p. 1250 ff.Google Scholar

5 A brief overview of the economic structure of that region is provided by Wisconsin's department of commerce under http://commerce.state.wi.us/MT/MT-FAX-0703.html#24; it not only emphasizes the great abundance of natural resources, as well as the successful agricultural and tourism sectors, but also refers, for instance, to the acclaimed university system and the fast growing services sector – fields that fit less what might be the cliché prevailing in Germany.Google Scholar

6 Literature on the Wisconsin model is meanwhile available in vast quantities. For a brief overview from the U.S. perspective, cf. Jason Turner, Wisconsin Works, Working Paper No. 75 of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, June 2002. Details on the reform, in particular its core program “Wisconsin Works” (“W-2”), are best accessed through the Internet on the web site of the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development (http://www.dws.state.wi.us). For a comprehensive evaluation, cf. the report, likewise available on this web site, by the “2001-2002 Joint Legislative Audit Committee” entitled “An Evaluation: Wisconsin Works (W-2) Program”, April 2001.Google Scholar

7 For an example of the reform's reception in Germany, cf. Uwe Wilke, Sozialhilfe in den USA, Die Reform in Texas und Wisconsin, Frankfurt/M. 2002; also cf. Holger Backhaus-Maul (ed.), Von der Sozialhilfe in die Erwerbsarbeit – Die Welfare Reform in den USA als Vorbild?, Frankfurt/M. 1999; regarding its standing in the international context, cf. as an example L⊘demel/Trickey, note 2.Google Scholar

8 From among the daily press reports of the time, cf. Volker Hagemeister, “Chance aus zweiter Hand”, p. 10 of FAZ of 8 Aug. 2001; Jonas Viering, “Koch rennt offene Türen ein”, p. 7 of SZ of 22. Aug. 2001; as well as ibid. Wolfgang Koydl, “Vorbild mit Fehlern”; and ibid. “Das Arbeitslosengeld senken”, Interview with Gert Wagner; Stephan Articus, “Faulenzerei oder falsche Strukturen?”, p. 12 of FAZ of 22 Aug. 2001; Peter Müller, “Im Land der gnadenlosen Wohltäter”, Dossier, pp. 912, in: Die Zeit No. 36 of 30 Aug. 2001; Waltraud Schelkle, “Wisconsin ist nicht überall”, p. 46 of FAZ of 3. Sept. 2001.Google Scholar

9 Cf. FAZ of 15 Aug. 2001. Since then this phrase, which obviously seems to be very good publicity, is encountered continually; cf., for instance, the citation by Hessian government spokesman Dirk Metz in: “Wisconsin-Modell soll schnell umgesetzt werden”, FAZ of 13 Jan. 2003.Google Scholar

10 For a bibliographical reference to this formula frequently used by Clinton, cf. Manfred Hammel, Ein Ende des “New Deal” - Die lange Geschichte der Sozialhilfereform, p. 34 ff., in: Backhaus-Maul, note 7, p. 92, and note 137 cited there.Google Scholar

11 First, cf. Hesse's initiative submitted to the Bundesrat, note 3; subsequently, the initiative of the CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag, Drucksache 14/8365 of 26 Feb. 2002; and finally, the renewed initiative to the Bundesrat on 1 Nov. 2002, Drucksache 812/02.Google Scholar

12 A widespread slogan under which the U.S. welfare reform of the mid-nineties was propagated by both political camps was: “the end of welfare as we know it”; for further details, cf. Graser, Dezentrale Wohlfahrtsstaatlichkeit im föderalen Binnenmarkt?, Berlin 2001, p. 133 (with further substantiation).Google Scholar

13 Extensive illustration is provided by Wilke, note 7, p. 21 ff.; Hammel, note 10; particularly from the perspective of Wisconsin, cf. Jason Turner, note 6, pp. 46.Google Scholar

14 The “welfare reform” was one of the central issues in the presidential election campaign in 1996. For more details on the significance of the subject in discussions of the time, see Hammel, note 10, p. 85 ff.; Graser, note 12, pp. 133, 166 ff.Google Scholar

15 The program was called AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) and dates back to the time of the New Deal. Under the reform it was renamed and is now entitled TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families); for an outline, cf. Graser, note 12, p. 157 ff. (AFDC), p. 167 ff. (TANF).Google Scholar

16 Comprehensive empirical material on this subject is found in the so-called Green Books issued by the Committee on Ways and Means of the U.S. House of Representatives. They comprise up-to-date overviews on matters of social policy, which are compiled every two years for the members of Congress. Cf. in particular Green Book 1994, p. 1108 ff.; Green Book 1996, p. 1177 ff.; Green Book 1998, p. 537 ff. An authentic portrayal of the problem from U.S. perspective is delivered by the following citation from Gillespie, Ed/Schellhas, Bob (eds.), Contract with America: The Bold Plan by Rep. Newt Gingrich, Rep. Dick Armey and the House Republicans to Change the Nation, New York, 1994, p. 75. The authors begin by citing an often stated objection to the reform and then seek to refute it: “Myth: Cutting off a meager check for a welfare mom will not deter teenage pregnancy. – Fact: Republicans understand one important thing ignored by most Democrats – incentives affect behavior. Currently, the federal government provides young girls the following deal: Have an illegitimate baby and taxpayers will guarantee you cash, food stamps, and medical care, plus a host of other benefits. As long as you don't work, we'll continue giving you benefits worth a minimum of $12,000 per year … It's time to change the incentives and make responsible parenthood the norm and not the exception.” This view of the problem was by no means confined to political programmatic literature. For an example from academic debate, cf. Brinig, Margaret/Buckley, F.H.: Welfare Magnets: The Race for the Top, 5 Supreme Court Economic Review 141-177 (1997).Google Scholar

17 A detailed depiction of the measures at federal level is provided by Green Book 1998, note 16, p. 397 ff., which also supplies an overview of their further elaboration by the constituent states, p. 514 ff. From among the German-language sources, cf. as an example Hammel, note10; for particulars on elaboration at individual state level, cf. as an example the study on Texas and Wisconsin by Wilke, note 7.Google Scholar

18 With reference to the “model state” of Wisconsin, cf. Elvira Giebel-Felten, preface to Jason Turner, note 6, p. 2.Google Scholar

19 For quantitative substantiation regarding U.S. developments, see Günther Schmid/Bernd Reissert/Gert Bruche, Unemployment Insurance and Active Labor Market Policy - An international comparison of financing systems, Detroit 1992, pp. 185, 196, 211. For more recent data, cf. as an example, Christian Schubert, “Mehr Geld für die Armen – und mehr Ungleichheit”, in: FAZ of 8 Jan. 2003.Google Scholar

20 Regarding cooperative federalism in U.S. social policy in general and, in particular, with a view to the programs under review here, cf. Graser, note 12, p. 133 ff.Google Scholar

21 A comprehensive overview is provided in Green Book 2000, note 16, p. 378 ff. According to calculations set forth there, Wisconsin ranks third behind Idaho and Wyoming with a reduction of nearly 74%.Google Scholar

22 The figure refers to the period between January 1993 and November 1999 and was published by the U.S. Department of Labor under http://www.dol.gov./dol/_sec/public/media/reports/20mill/main.htm.Google Scholar

23 For instance, cf. the sources cited above in note 16 (Gillespie und Brinig); for an extensive portrayal of the U.S. discussion, cf. Hammel, note 10, p. 78 ff.; also see the depiction by Graser, note 12, p. 177 ff.Google Scholar

24 For a comparison of the differing perceptions of the problem, cf. Thomas Gebhardt/Herbert Jacobs/Stephan Leibfried, Sozialhilfe und “Globalisierung” – Die nationale politische Thematisierung von Sozialhilfepolitik in Deutschland und den USA, p. 151 ff., in: Backhaus-Maul, note 7.Google Scholar

25 For an overview on the structure of minimum protection benefits in the U.S., cf. Graser, “Job-Wunder” in den USA – Arbeits- und sozialrechtliche Rahmenbedingungen, RIW 2000, 603 ff., 609 f.; in greater detail, id., note 12, p. 150 ff.Google Scholar

26 It is quite another question, though, whether more should be done with regard to childcare arrangements in order to enable single parents to enter the labor market.Google Scholar

27 Regarding the concept of so-called family allowance, the CDU supplies information in the Internet under http://www.cdu.de/projekt21/familie/familie.pdf.Google Scholar

28 Since its low of 3.9% in October 2000, the unemployment rate has been rising at a near continuous pace and was last reported at 6% for December 2002; cf. the web site of the U.S. Department of Labor: http://www.dol.gov.Google Scholar

29 Regarding the instability of such low-skill employment relations, cf. a recent study by Pamela Loprest, Making the Transition from Welfare to Work, p. 17 ff., in: Alan Weil/Kenneth Finegold, Welfare Reform – The Next Act, Washington D.C. 2002, notably p. 22; also see Graser, “Job-Wunder”, note 25, p. 612 (with further substantiation).Google Scholar

30 Also cf. the press release by the U.S. Department of Labor, note 22.Google Scholar

31 In particular, cf. the data provided by Pamela Loprest, Families Who Left Welfare: Who Are They And How Are They Doing?, Discussion Papers 99-02 of the Urban Institute (available under http://www.newfederalism.urban.org).Google Scholar

32 In particular, cf. Barbara Ehrenreich, Nickel and Dime(d): On (Not) Getting By in America, New York 2001; in German: “Arbeit poor” – Unterwegs in der Dienstleistungsgesellschaft, Munich 2001. Also, a significant part of the documentary film by Michael Moore, Bowling for Columbine, deals with this subject.Google Scholar

33 For more details, see Graser, note 25, p. 610 (with further substantiation).Google Scholar

34 Particulars relating to its computation and amount are provided in Green Book 2000 (note 16), p. 1281 f.Google Scholar

35 For details on this federal regulation, cf. Green Book 1998, note 16, p. 496; a further significant feature is that several constituent states have adopted even stricter regulations on maximum duration of receipt; cf. the overview, ibid., p. 515 ff.Google Scholar

36 Only recently has this central element of U.S. labor market policy, introduced several years ago, found appropriate notice in Germany; for a very recent depiction, cf. above all Bruno Kaltenborn/Lars Pilz, Kombilöhne im internationalen Vergleich, IAB Werkstattbericht 10/2002, notably p. 9 ff.; also see Hans-Werner Sinn/Christian Holzner/Wolfgang Meister/Wolfgang Ochel/Martin Werding, Aktivierende Sozialhilfe – Ein Weg zu mehr Beschäftigung und Wachstum, ifo Schnelldienst 9/2002, notably pp. 16 ff., 24 f.Google Scholar

37 Regarding the total volume of EITC, cf. Sinn et al., ibid., p. 17 (with figures for 1999). Federal expenditure on the AFDC Program had last risen to about 24 billion dollars in 1996; cf. Graser, note 12, p. 157. Subsequent rises were ruled out with the reform.Google Scholar

38 Cf. Green Book 2000 (note 16), p. 809 (figures for 1999).Google Scholar

39 For an initial brief overview on the childcare situation in the U.S., cf. Uwe Wilke, note 7, p. 57 ff.; a survey on the current state of investigation into the effects of the reform on the living circumstances of the children impacted by it is presented by Martha Zaslow/Kristin Anderson Moore/Kathryn Tout/Juliet P. Scarpa/Sharon Vandivere: How Are Children Faring under Welfare Reform?, p. 79 ff., in: Weil/Finegold, note 29; explicit reference is made there to the fact that the status of investigation, notably as regards smaller children, is highly deficient (p. 98). The little information available sounds alarming. Thus the results of a survey published in 1999 show that 40% of the activated former welfare recipients were not successful in making sufficient arrangements for the care of their children; cf. Loprest, note 31. Beyond this, one must rely on individual case descriptions. An especially oppressive portrayal is given in the above-cited documentary film by Michael Moore (note 32). It includes the story of a six-year-old boy who shot a fellow school-mate. Shortly before, he and his mother, an activated “welfare mom” with two low-paid jobs, had been forced to move out of their old apartment because she could no longer afford the rent.Google Scholar

40 For precise figures, of which only a rough outline can be presented in the following, cf. the much more detailed information provided by the German Federal Statistical Office – Statistisches Bundesamt, SOZ Bestand 2001, Tabelle E 6.1, “Empfänger(innen) laufender Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt außerhalb von Einrichtungen”.Google Scholar

41 For data on a quantitative comparison of wage differentials in Germany and the U.S., see note 61 below and the attendant remarks.Google Scholar

42 Apart from this, some doubt that the German labor market could become much more “absorbing” through the creation of a low-wage sector; cf. note 63 below and the attendant remarks.Google Scholar

43 Thus the underlying tenor of the reform proposal submitted by the ifo Institute (cf. note 36 above).Google Scholar

44 For a detailed investigation into these negative effects, see the paper by the executive board (Bundesvorstand) of the largest German labor union ver.di, Aktivieren als Zauberformel – Zur Kritik der ifo-Studie “Aktivierende Sozialhilfe. Ein Weg zu mehr Beschäftigung und Wachstum”, Wirtschaftspolitische Informationen, June 2002, p. 5 ff.Google Scholar

45 On a closer look, however, this “universality” is not that universal after all, as is shown notably by the special regulations governing asylum-seekers under the Law concerning benefits to asylum-seekers – “Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz”.Google Scholar

46 “Gesetz über eine bedarfsorientierte Grundsicherung im Alter und bei Erwerbsminderung” (Law concerning need-oriented basic protection in old age and in the event of reduced earning capacity) of 26 June 2001, BGBl. I pp. 1310, 1335, as amended by the Law of 27 April 2002 (BGBl. I p. 1462).Google Scholar

47 This Commission, named after its Chairman Peter Hartz, was appointed by the federal government to develop reform proposals in some areas of labor market policy.Google Scholar

48 Cf. Hartz, Peter et al., Moderne Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt, p. 127 ff.Google Scholar

49 Regarding the clauses pertaining to experimentation in favor of the individual German states, cf. in particular Arts. 1 II, 2 II, and 3 II of the draft.Google Scholar

50 Cf. Graser, note 12, p. 166 ff.Google Scholar

51 Cf. note 9 above.Google Scholar

52 Cf. substantiation of the draft – Begründung des Entwurfes, sub. A. Allgemeiner Teil.Google Scholar

53 Cf. Art. 2 II Nos. 6, 7 of the draft.Google Scholar

54 The draft of the statute itself uses the term “Vermittlungsagenturen” (placement agencies), while the explanatory notes refer to job centers; thus cf. Begründung, sub. A., No. 1; according to more recent press reports, they are meanwhile called “Job-Offensiv-Center” in Hessian “pilot projects”; cf. FAZ of 18 Dec. 2002: “Hessen will schon jetzt Job-Center einrichten”.Google Scholar

55 For an international overview, cf. Jochen Clasen/Grant Duncan/Tony Eardley/Martin Evans/Pascal Ughetto/Wim van Oorschot/Sharon Wright, Towards Single Gateways? – A cross-national review of the changing roles of employment offices in seven countries, ZIAS 2001, p. 43 ff.Google Scholar

56 Cf. the provisions under § 421d SGB III (Book III of the German Social Code) as well as under § 18a BSHG (German Federal Social Assistance Act), which were incorporated through the “Gesetz zur Verbesserung der Zusammenarbeit zwischen Arbeitsämtern und Trägern der Sozialhilfe” (Law concerning the improvement of cooperation between employment offices and social assistance authorities) of 20 Nov. 2000, BGBl. I, p. 1590.Google Scholar

57 This by no means applies only to the draft of the “Offensiv-Gesetz” but equally to the so-called “Job-AQTIV Gesetz” of 10 Dec. 2001, BGBl. I p. 3443, which had been enacted shortly before and had a similar ring to it. For a comprehensive discussion of the new regulations and how they originated, cf. Jürgen Kruse/Irene Zamponi, Das neue Recht der Arbeitsförderung, Baden-Baden 2002.Google Scholar

58 The mandate is reprinted in Peter Hartz et al., note 48, pp. 1216.Google Scholar

59 Cf. Hartz, Peter et al., note 48, Vorwort (Preface), p. 5.Google Scholar

60 Cf. Hartz, Peter et al., note 48, in particular “Modules” 5, 7, 9 and 12.Google Scholar

61 Regarding these figures, cf. Matthew Finkin, Die Bedeutung des Arbeitsrechts für die Wirtschaftsleistung in Deutschland aus Sicht der USA, RdA 2002, pp. 333 ff., 335 (with further substantiation).Google Scholar

62 For a recent example, see Sinn et al., note 36, p. 49, who over the “medium term” would expect an increase in employment of 6%, or 2.3 million jobs, through the implementation of their pertinent proposal.Google Scholar

63 For a recent example, see Finkin, note 61, p. 343, who in turn refers to a study by Freeman/Schettkat from 2000, who foresee very few job-creating effects through an approximation of German wage differentials to U.S. levels.Google Scholar

64 For an up-to-date review of the current state of opinion, see Günther Schmid, Wege in eine neue Vollbeschäftigung, Frankfurt/M. 2002, p. 47 ff.Google Scholar

65 For instructive comments, cf. Michael Kittner/Thomas Kohler, Kündigungsschutz in Deutschland und den USA, BB 2000, Supplement 4 to Issue 13; confirming these views, Finkin, note 61, p. 340; the differences are further relativized, beyond the scope cited in these sources, through the use of experience rating in assessing the employers’ contribution under U.S. unemployment insurance, an aspect frequently neglected in labor law literature; for details, cf. Graser, “Experience rating” in der Arbeitslosenversicherung – Der U.S.-amerikanische Sonderweg beim Schutz bestehender Arbeitsverhältnisse, ZIAS 1999, p. 48 ff.Google Scholar

66 Worthy of note in this context is a recently published study which shows the tax burden in Germany to be quite low by international comparison, whereas the burden of non-wage labor costs is relatively high; cf. SZ of 20 Jan. 2003, pp. 1, 6.Google Scholar

67 For a review of current data, see Finkin, note 61, p. 335 f. Finkin bases the figures cited here on a study by the Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft using 1999 data.Google Scholar

68 This is also pointed out by Finkin, ibid. For detailed data, notably with regard to supplementary pension schemes, see Graser, Gesetzliche Alterssicherung und ihre Reformperspektiven in den USA, p. 263 ff., in: Hans-Joachim Reinhard (ed.), Demographischer Wandel und Alterssicherung – Rentenpolitik in neun Europäischen Ländern und den USA im Vergleich, Baden-Baden 2001.Google Scholar

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70 A comprehensive overview is provided by Jürgen Kruse, Das Krankenversicherungssystem der USA – Ursachen seiner Krise und Reformversuche, Baden-Baden 1997.Google Scholar

71 Cf. ibid., p. 96, regarding this estimate, which even by today's standards must be considered a cautious one.Google Scholar

72 Cf. Graser, , notes 12, 25.Google Scholar

73 Cf. the “Gesetz zum Einstieg in die ökologische Steuerreform” (Law regulating the start into the ecological tax reform) of 24 March 1999 (BGBl. I p. 378).Google Scholar

74 For an example of this demand, cf. this years’ expert opinion by the “Sachverständigenrat für die Konzertierte Aktion im Gesundheitswesen”, Finanzierung, Nutzenorientierung und Qualität, available in the internet under http://www.svr-gesundheit.de/gutacht/gutalt/gutaltle.htm, notably p. 140 ff.; cf. also Andreas Brandhorst, Auswirkungen auf die gesetzliche Krankenversicherung, p. 40 ff. (41), in: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (ed.), “Zukunft der Arbeit V – Demographische Entwicklung – Chancen für neue Generationen- und Geschlechterverhältnisse”, Dokumentation Nr. 21, Berlin 2002, available in the internet under http://64.4.22.250:88/cgi-bin/linkrd?_lang=DE&lah=2883d8a0e90fba221310ef74bf8b69be&lat=1044303631&hm___action=http%3a%2f%2fwww%2eboell%2ede%2fdownloads%2farbeit%2fZukunftArbeit5%2epdf“\t”_blank.Google Scholar

75 The federal executive board of the labor union ver.di also points this out, note 44, p. 12.Google Scholar

76 Data on the U.S. federal budget are available under http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget; comparative data for the Federal Republic of Germany are presented on the web site of the federal ministry of finance; cf. http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Finanz-und-Wirtschaftspolitik/Bundeshaus-halt-.433.htm.Google Scholar

77 A possible example here could be the aforementioned problem of wage differentials – that is, if the creation of a low-wage sector were actually decided, but in the end proved those right who considered its potential employment effects in Germany to be minor because a corresponding demand for labor was lacking in the first place.Google Scholar