¹ See also Ukrow, Jörg, Von Luxemburg lernen heißt Integrationsgrenzen bestimmen, Zeitschrift für Europarechtuche Studien 119, 122-23 (2014).Google Scholar

² 134 BVerfGE 366 [hereinafter OMT].Google Scholar

³ See also—while denying this to be the case—Ulrich Everling, Vorlagerecht und Vorlagepflicht nationaler Gerichte nach Art 177 EGV, in Vorabentscheidungsverfahren vor dem Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaft 11, 14 (Reichelt ed., 1998); Bergmann, Jan, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht in Europa, Europäische Grundrechtezeitschrift 620, 627 (2004).Google Scholar

⁴ See Ziller, Jacques, Le dialogue judiciare et la Cour de Karlsruhe, Revue Trimestrielle de DroitEuropéen 93, 95 (2010); Walter, Maya, Integrationsgrenze Verfassungsidentität—Konzept und Kontrolle aus europäischer, deutscher und französischer Perspektive, Zeitschrift für ausländisches Recht undVölkerrecht 177, 197 (2012); Ukrow, supra note 1, at 123.Google Scholar

⁵ See also Mayer, Franz C., Multilevel Constitutional Jurisdiction, in Principles of European Constitutional Law 399, 407 (Armin v. Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast eds., 2010).Google Scholar

⁶ Burkhard Heß, Die Einwirkungen des Vorabentscheidungsverfahrens nach Art. 177 EGV auf das deutsche Zivilprozeßrecht 108 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozessrecht 59, 75 (1995).Google Scholar

⁷ For an overview, see Wieser, Bernd, Vergleichendes Verfassungsrecht 120, 125 (2005).Google Scholar

⁸ 110 BVerfGE 141, 154-55 [hereinafter Kampfhunde]; 115 BVerfGE 276, 299 [hereinafter Winner Wetten].Google Scholar

⁹ See also Feige, Konrad, Bundesverfassungsgericht und Vorabentscheidungskompetenz des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 100 Archiv für öffentliches Recht 530, 539-50 (1975).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Kingreen, Thorsten, GRCh Art. 51 in EUV/AEUV Kommentar margin no. 12(Christian Calliess& Matthias Ruffert eds., 4th ed. 2011).Google Scholar

¹¹ Hillgruber, Christian, Die verfassungsprozessuale Dimension des Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)-Beschluss des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Juristische Arbeitsblätter 635, 636 (2014).Google Scholar

¹² 73 BVerfGE 339.Google Scholar

¹³ 89 BVerfGE 155.Google Scholar

¹⁴ 123 BVerfGE 267 [hereinafter Lissabon].Google Scholar

¹⁵ 126 BVerfGE 286 [hereinafter Honeywell].Google Scholar

¹⁶ 125 BVerfGE 260 [hereinafter Vorratsdatenspeicherung].Google Scholar

¹⁷ 133 BVerfGE 277 [hereinafter Antiterrordatei].Google Scholar

¹⁸ Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) [BVerfG], Mar. 18, 2014, 2 BvR 1390/12, http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20140318_2bvr139012.html.Google Scholar

¹⁹ This is the case in Austria and Poland, and Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia respectively. See Wieser, supra note7, 136–37.Google Scholar

²⁰ OMT at para. 1, para. 45; Lissabon at para. 336.Google Scholar

²¹ OMT at para. 1, para. 46.Google Scholar

²² Vorratsdatenspeicherung at para. 308. See also Kampfhunde at para. 156. If the statute did not conform to EU law, it would be inapplicable within Germany. Hence, a constitutional complaint would be inadmissible, as the statue was non-existent. However, as the statute might violate constitutional law and could therefore be void, a decision by the CJEU on the conformity with EU law would not be necessary (Art. 267(1) TFEU) for the outcome of the case. On the other hand, if the statute conforms to constitutional law, the BVerfG— due to its restricted standard of review—cannot rule on the merits of the case as far as the conformity with EU law is concerned, as it does not apply EU law and does therefore not have to answer a question concerning the interpretation of EU law. So, notwithstanding whether the statute conforms to EU law or not, the BVerfG cannot make a preliminary reference.Google Scholar

²³ OMT at para. 33. See also dissenting opinion by judge Lübbe-Wolff, at paras. 11–14.Google Scholar

²⁴ For a further analysis, see Lohse, Eva Julia, Die “Entscheidungserheblichkeit” gemäß Art. 267 Abs. 1 AEUV als Instrument des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zur Steuerung von Vorabentscheidungsersuchen, 4 Der Staat 633, 647–52 (2014).Google Scholar

²⁵ See dissenting opinion by judge Lübbe-Wolff, OMT at para.12. Similarly, see Franz C. Mayer, Zurück zur Rechtsgemeinschaft: Das OMT-Urteil des EuGH, NJW 1999, 2002 (2015).Google Scholar

²⁶ Case C–62/14, Gauweiler v. Deutcher Bundestag, paras. 18–31 (June 16, 2015), http://cura.europa.eu [hereinafter OMT Decision].Google Scholar

²⁷ See Malferrari, Luigi, Zurückweisung von Vorabentscheidungsersuchen durch den EuGH 163 (2002).Google Scholar

²⁸ Craig, Paul & Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law 488 (2011); Wegener, Bernhard, Art. 267, in EUV/AEUV Kommentar mar. no. 23 (Christian Calliess & Matthias Rufferteds., 4th ed. 2011; Schima, Bernhard, Das Vorabentscheidungsverfahren vor dem EuGH 75 (2004).Google Scholar

²⁹ See also Wegener, supra note 28, at mar. no. 34.Google Scholar

³⁰ See also Störmer, Rainer, Vorabentscheidungsersuchen nach Art. 177 EGV durch Landesverfassungsgerichte, 52 Neue Justiz 337, 339 (1998) (on the identical question about the restricted standard of review of the constitutional courts of the Lander).Google Scholar

³¹ See http://www.bverfg.de/organisation/gb2013/A-l-4.html.Google Scholar

³² See Lohse, supra note 24, at 6.Google Scholar

³³ Lissabon at para. 353; Honeywell at 304; Vorratsdatenspeicherung at 308; OMT at paras. 27–29.Google Scholar

³⁴ This was the case in Honeywell at para. 308, where the BVerfG cites Case C–144/04, Mangold, 2005 E.C.R. I-9981, paras. 77–78.Google Scholar

³⁵ Britz, Gabriele, Verfassungsrechtliche Effektuierung des Vorabentscheidungsverfahrens, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1313, 1317 (2012).Google Scholar

³⁶ The same can be said about other proceedings: the prohibition of an “unconstitutional” political party (NPD), while it does also run for elections for the European Parliament (104 BVerfGE 214 (218)). See Franz C. Mayer, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht und die Verpflichtung zur Vorlage an den Europäischen Gerichtshof, Europarecht 239, 254 (2002); a constitutional complaint concerning a German statute on the prohibition of the trade with dangerous dog breeds (Kampfhunde at para. 154), see Bergmann, supra note 3, at 626; a statute establishing a state monopoly on gambling premises, see Winner Wetten. Google Scholar

³⁷ Britz, supra note 35, at 1316.Google Scholar

³⁸ See also Bergmann, supra note3, at 626.Google Scholar

³⁹ For example, 82 BVerfGE 159 (195–96); BVerfG, EuGRZ 520 (2004).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) [BVerfG], Oct. 4, 2011, Case No. 1 BvL 3/08; see also 85 BVerfGE 191, (203–04) (the non-constitutional court has to decide whether a German statute is inapplicable due to its non-conformity with EU law. If it is not sure, it has to refer the question to the CJEU).Google Scholar

⁴¹ Similarly, Martinico, Guiseppe & Pollicino, Oreste, The Interaction between Europe's Legal Systems 80–81 (2012).Google Scholar

⁴² See Störmer, supra note 30, at 340.Google Scholar

⁴³ Winner Wetten at 298.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Case C–409/06, Winner Wetten, 2010 E.C.R. I–8015, paras. 59–61.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Lissabon at 353; Honeywell at 301-03; Vorratsdatenspeicherung at 307; OMT at para. 22.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Walter, supra note 4, at 184. Jurisdiction in these matters lies solely with the BVerfG. See Günter Hirsch, Europäischer Gerichtshof und Bundesverfassungsgericht – Kooperation oder Konfrontation?, NJW 2457, 2461 (1996).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Honeywell at 303; Lissabon at 354 (about the “EU-friendliness” and—simultaneously—the power of the BVerfG to decide in the last resort on ultra-vires-acts and on safeguarding the “identity” of the Grundgesetz in the course of European integration). “Identity-control” also requires a preliminary reference. See OMT at para. 27; see also Franz C. Mayer & Maya Walter, Die Europarechtsfreundlichkeit des BVerfG nach dem Honeywell-Beschluss, JURA 532, 540-41 (2011).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Vorratsdatenspeicherung at 306-07; Honeywell at 299.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Vorratsdatenspeicherung at 308–09.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Honeywell at 304.Google Scholar

⁵¹ For the term of “diffuse control of norms” (diffuse Normenkontrolle), see Wieser, supra note 7, at 121–24.Google Scholar

⁵² Similarly, Bergmann, supra note 3, at 626; Mayer, supra note 36, at 245.Google Scholar

⁵³ The standards in CILFIT (Case 283/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3415), ZuckerfabrikSüderdithmarschen (Case C–143/88, 1991 E.C.R. I–415), and Foto Frost (Case 314/85, 1987 E.C.R. 4199, para. 11) do also apply to the BVerfG. It has, however, never made clear whether it considers itself as a court of last instance in the meaning of Art. 267(3) TFEU or as a court simply permitted, but not obliged to refer, as it does not perceive itself as a court of instance, but a specialized constitutional court (see Mayer, supra note 36, at 250-51). As, on the other hand, it has recurred to the principles laid down in CILFIT (id. at para. 16) and to the doctrine of acte clair in BVerfG, 2 BvR 2/13 et al., Decision of 26 February 2014 (3%-Threshold), www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen, paras. 40–44, and Antiterrordatei at para. 90, it seems to justify a deviation from the obligation to refer under TFEU Article 267(3). See also Feige, supra note 9, at 534.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ But see Case C–399/11, Melloni, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (EuZW) 305, 308 (2013), paras. 55 ff., which gives rise to doubts, whether higher national standards can persist against supreme EU law despite the wording of Art. 53 EChFR.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Case C–594/12, Seitlinger, 2013 7–80J C 79, preliminary question 2.4. The AG has determined these questions as being unimportant, as long as a breach of EU fundamental rights can be stated (Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón at para.29, Joint Cases C–293/12 and C–594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd./Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and Seitlinger, (Apr. 8, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/). In its ruling on 8 April 2014, the CJEU likewise did not answer these questions as it found the directive to be in nonconformity with the EChFR (Digital Rights Ireland, Joint Cases C–293/12 and C–594/12, at para. 72).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Case C–301/06, Ireland/Parliament and Council, 2009 E.C.R. I–593, para. 57.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Vorratsdatenspeicherung at 307.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Id. at 309.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ See also Alexander Roßnagel, Neue Maßstäbe für den Datenschutz in Europa – Folgerungen aus dem EuGH-Urteil zur Vorratsdatenspeicherung, Multimedia und Recht 372, 375 (2014); Kühling, Jürgen, Der Fall der Vorratsdatenspeicherungsrichtlinie und der Aufstieg des EuGH zum Grundrechtsgericht, NVwZ 681, 685 (2014); Wolff, Heinrich Amadeus, Anmerkung zum Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofs vom 8.4.2014 zur Vorratsdatenspeicherung, Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 608, 609 (2014).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Kampfhunde at 156.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Winner Wetten at 299.Google Scholar

⁶² 3%-Threshold at paras. 40–44.Google Scholar

⁶³ Antiterrordatei para. 90.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Case C–617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, NVwZ 561, 562-63 (2013), para. 20.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Kubicki, Tobias, Akerberg Fransson, Deluxe 4-5 (2013).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Herrmann, Christoph, Luxemburg, wir haben ein Problem!, EuZW 161 (2014); Ukrow, supra note 1, at 121-22; rather skeptical Udo Di Fabio, Karlsruhe Makes a Referral, 15 German L.J. 107 (2014).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Fabio, Di, supra note 66, at 108.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ OMT at para. 44. Thereby the situation sketched in Mayer & Walter, supra note 47, at 541 has apparently materialized.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ OMT at paras. 102–03, 39.Google Scholar

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⁷¹ See dissenting opinion by Judge Lübbe-Wolff, OMT at paras. 17–24.Google Scholar

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⁷⁴ See Malferrari, supra note 27, at 182; Schima, supra note 28, at 76 (general or hypothetical question or no connection to the issue at stake).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Ruffert, Differently, supra note 72, at 374.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ OMT Decision at paras. 18–31.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Wendel, supra note 70, at 668; Ruffert, supra note 72, at 375; Herrmann, supra note 66, at 162.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ See on a similar decision by the Polish constitutional court Ziller, supra note 4, at 97. Very clearly, Ukrow, supra note 1, at 135–39.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ This is suggested by Mayer, supra note 25, at 2002.Google Scholar