1 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html.Google Scholar

2 See, e.g., id. at para. 237.Google Scholar

3 Id. at para. 231.Google Scholar

4 Id. at para. 237.Google Scholar

5 Id. at para. 231.Google Scholar

6 Id. at paras. 346–50.Google Scholar

7 Id. at para. 335.Google Scholar

8 Id. at 191 (citing BVerfGE 73, 339 (376, 387); BVerfGE 102, 147, (164)).Google Scholar

9 Id. at para. 233 (citing, among others, 89 BVerfGE 155, 187 f., 192, 199).Google Scholar

10 Id. at para. 233.Google Scholar

11 Id. at paras. 298–99.Google Scholar

12 See, e.g., id. at para. 329.Google Scholar

13 See, e.g., id., at para. 316. See also, Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, art. 48(7) 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty] (general bridge clause); Lisbon Treaty art. 31(3) (CFSP bridge clause Council); Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, May 9, 2008, art. 81(3), O.J. C 115/47, at 78 (2008) [hereinafter TFEU] (family law); TFEU art. 153(2) (social rights); TFEU art. 192(2) (certain environmental provisions); TFEU art. 312 (2) (multi-annual financial framework); TFEU Art. 333(2) (enhanced cooperation).Google Scholar

14 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 413, available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html‥Google Scholar

15 Id. at paras. 319 and 413.Google Scholar

16 TFEU arts. 82(3) & 83(3).Google Scholar

17 TFEU art. 48(2).Google Scholar

18 Under Article 48 TFEU, the European Council may then terminate the legislative process, ask the Commission for a new proposal, or refer the matter back to Council to proceed with the legislative process. Under Articles 82 and 83 TFEU, the European Council may only refer the matter back to the Council after a unanimous vote and does not appear to have the option of requesting a new proposal from the Commission. Under Articles 82 and 83 TFEU, however, nine Member States, may also choose to proceed on the basis of the closer cooperation provisions of the Treaty.Google Scholar

19 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 400, available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html (emphasis added).Google Scholar

20 Id. at para. 237.Google Scholar

21 Id. at para. 237.Google Scholar

22 TFEU art. 352(1).Google Scholar

23 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 327, available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html‥Google Scholar

24 Id. at para. 328.Google Scholar

25 Id. at para. 241.Google Scholar

26 Id. at para. 255.Google Scholar

27 Id. at paras. 374–75.Google Scholar

28 Id. at para. 345.Google Scholar

29 Carl Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus (1923).Google Scholar

30 See Daniel Halberstam, The Bride of Messina: Constitutionalism and Democracy in Europe, 30 Eur. L. Rev. 775 (2005).Google Scholar

31 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 286, available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html‥Google Scholar

32 Id. at para. 407.Google Scholar

33 Gerhard Lehmbruch, Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat (3d ed. 2000); Fritz Scharpf, The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration, 66 Pub. Admin. 239 (1988).Google Scholar

34 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 287, available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html‥Google Scholar

35 Id. Google Scholar

36 See Möllers, Christoph, Staat als Argument 146 n.67 (2000).Google Scholar

37 This feeling seems to be rather common. See Christoph Möllers, Der vermisste Leviathan 44–47 (2008).Google Scholar

38 The closest book may be from Hans Peter Bull. See Hans Peter Bull, Die Staatsaufgaben nach dem Grundgesetz (2d ed. 1977).Google Scholar

39 For the development of traditional component state powers, see, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985); New York v. United States 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). In the context of U.S. federalism, the Supreme Court's substantive distinction between the areas of state and federal powers is notoriously undertheorized, as is the Court's procedural or organizational understanding of component state autonomy. See, e.g., Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering, in The Federal Vision 213 (Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Robert Howse eds., 2001).Google Scholar

40 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 252, available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html‥Google Scholar

41 The pioneering author may be Harold Laski. See Harold J. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (1924). But see also the works of Léon Duguit.Google Scholar

42 Krasner, Steven D., Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy 79–80 (1999).Google Scholar

43 See infra Part C.Google Scholar

44 Bateson, Gregory, Steps to an Ecology of Mind 159–338 (1999).Google Scholar

45 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 216, available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html‥Google Scholar

46 Id. at paras. 393–94.Google Scholar

47 See, e.g., Heribert Prantl, Verfassungsgericht zu Lissabon-Vertrag - Europäische Sternstunde, Süddeutsche Zeitung, July 1, 2009.Google Scholar

48 Putnam, Robert D., Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 Int'l Org. 427 (1988).Google Scholar

49 Bagehot, Walter, The English Constitution 69 (1967).Google Scholar

50 In addition to that, there is a certain irony in the fact that in other cases of foreign relations law the Court took just the opposite stance. In many cases regarding the parliamentary participation in the development of NATO, the Court did not only refrain to develop constitutional duties for parliamentary participation but, to the contrary, defined its constitutional limits. BVerfGE 68, 1; BVerfGE 104, 151.Google Scholar

51 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 409, available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html‥Google Scholar

52 Id. Google Scholar

53 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, art. 213(1)(3), 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33, 120 [hereinafter EC Treaty]; EC Treaty art., 222(2).Google Scholar

54 See supra Section B.Google Scholar

55 See Möllers, supra note 36, at Ch. 17.Google Scholar

56 Lisbon Case, BVerfG, 2 BvE/08 from 30 June 2009, para. 229, available at: http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html‥Google Scholar

57 Id. at para. 217.Google Scholar

58 Id. at para. 180.Google Scholar

59 Id. at para. 179.Google Scholar

60 Id. at para. 180. A source of these conceptual confusions may be found in the writings of one of the plaintiffs, Dietrich Murswiek, cf. Möllers, supra note 36, at 409–412.Google Scholar

61 BVerfGE 37, 271.Google Scholar

62 BVerfGE 102, 147.Google Scholar

63 There is one nice point in the opinion at paragraph 415. Article 1, § 4(3), cl. 3 of the Act Extending and Strengthening the Rights of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in European Union Matters provides that in formulating the German government's position with regard to the general bridge clause, the Bundesrat and Bundestag can each override the other's invocation of the veto. As the Court properly points out, however, only the Bundestag can override the Bundesrats suggestion of a veto. To allow the Bundesrat to override the Bundestag's veto, is a misunderstanding of German constitutional law. We could not agree more.Google Scholar