1 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 1390/12 et al., Sept. 12, 2012 (Ger.) [hereinafter ESM & Fiscal Treaty case].Google Scholar

2 See also Daniel Thym, Des Kaisers neue Kleider, Verfassungsblog (Sept. 16, 2012), http://verfassungsblog.de/des-kaisers-neue-kleider/ and Christian Tomuschat, Anmerkung zum Urteil des BVerfG vom 12.09.2012, 22 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 1431 (2012).Google Scholar

3 Darnstädt, Thomas, Das überforderte Gericht, Spiegel Online (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/kommentar-zum-esm-urteil-das-ueberforderte-gericht-a-855377.html.Google Scholar

4 Notably, the following sections of the decision's grounds have not been translated yet: paragraphs 189–206 (scope of review for the temporary injunction procedure and admissibility); 223–238 (i.e., reform of Article 136 TFEU); and 280–219 (accompanying domestic legislation) and Fiscal Treaty). Furthermore, starting from paragraph 191, the numeration of the paragraphs in the English translation does not correspond to the numeration of the paragraphs in the official German version. Therefore, when quoting the decision, I will refer to both the paragraphs of the official German version and the preliminary English translation, e.g. para. 222 (DE) or 206 (EN prelim.). It should be noted that I will occasionally depart from this translation for the purpose of clarity.Google Scholar

5 See, e.g., Cerstin Gammelin et al., Vier Szenarien zur ESM-Entscheidung, Süddeutsche Zeitung (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/vier-szenarien-zum-esm-urteil-karlsruhe-spricht-europa-zittert-1.1464310-2.Google Scholar

6 If one can rely on a survey carried out on behalf of the German Press Agency (dpa) by YouGov, even a majority of German voters—54 percent—held the view that the BVerfG should issue temporary injunctions, cf. Mehrheit der Deutschen hofft auf Erfolg für Eurogegner in Karlsruhe, YouGov Deutschland (July 9, 2012), http://yougov.de/news/2012/09/07/mehrheit-der-deutschen-hofft-auf-erfolg-fur-euroge/.Google Scholar

7 Given the fact that Germany contributes slightly more than 27% of the capital, the ESM could not have entered into force without the ratification of Germany. See Article 48 in conjunction with Annex I and II TESM.Google Scholar

8 See President Andreas Voßkuhle, Mehr Europa lässt das Grundgesetz kaum zu, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung Online (Sept. 25 2011), http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/europas-schuldenkrise/im-gespraech-andreas-vosskuhle-mehr-europa-laesst-das-grundgesetz-kaum-zu-11369184.html (“I think the framework [for further European integration under the Basic Law, M.W.] is arguably largely exhausted.”); Peter M. Huber, Eine europäische Wirtschaftsregierung ist heikel, Süddeutsche Zeitung, (Sept. 19, 2011), available at http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/verfassungsrichter-huber-im-sz-gespraech-eine-europaeische-wirtschaftsregierung-ist-heikel-1.1145416.Google Scholar

9 European Council Decision, Mar. 25, 2011, EUCO 10/11, Annex II, at 21. Technically, this is a decision within the framework of the simplified revision procedure under Article 48 (6) TEU that only enters into force once approved by all (sic) Member States of the EU in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.Google Scholar

10 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, also known as the TSCG or the “Fiscal Compact”, signed on Mar. 2, 2012 by all EU Member States except the Czech Republic and the UK, available at http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/639235/st00tscg26_en12.pdf.Google Scholar

11 Declaration on the European Stability Mechanism, agreed on by the Contracting Parties to the TESM, Sept. 27, 2012, available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/132615.pdf.Google Scholar

12 Case No. 2 BvE 6/12.Google Scholar

13 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92, Oct. 12, 1993, 89 BVerfGE 155 paras. 58–63 (Ger.) [hereinafter Maastricht case]. For an early critique, see Christian Tomuschat, Die Europäische Union unter der Aufsicht des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Europäische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift (EuGRZ) 489 (1993).Google Scholar

14 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvE 2/08 et al., June 30, 2009, 123 BVerfGE 267 paras. 168–183, 210 (Ger.) [hereinafter Lisbon case]; see particularly Daniel Thym, In the name of Sovereign Statehood, 46 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1795, 1796–1797 (2009); Roland Bieber, An Association of Sovereign States, 5 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 391, 396 (2009).Google Scholar

15 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 987/10 et al., Sept. 7, 2011, 129 BVerGE 124 at para. 101 (Ger.) [hereinafter Greece & EFSF case] even with explicit reference to the critique. For this particular aspect, see Matthias Ruffert, Die europäische Schuldenkrise vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht, 46 Europarecht 842, 844–845 (2011).Google Scholar

16 In such a case, the Court tries to exclude, from an ex ante perspective, the worst case scenario by weighing the consequences that could arise in the event that a temporary injunction is not issued while the applications in the main proceedings were successful against the negative effects which would arise if the requested temporary injunction was granted but the underlying constitutional complaint later turned out to be unsuccessful. In other words, the Court does not carry out an analysis in substance yet.Google Scholar

17 See already Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No 2 BvQ 1/73, June 4, 1973, 35 BVerfGE 193, 196 f. [Basic Treaty case]. Cf. Tomuschat, supra note 2, at 1432.Google Scholar

18 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 192 (DE, not translated into EN).Google Scholar

19 This is a circumstance to be avoided particularly when a violation of the key principles protected by the eternity clause of Article 79 (3) of the German Basic Law is in question.Google Scholar

20 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 176.Google Scholar

21 See Alexander Lorz and Heiko Sauer, Ersatzunionsrecht und Grundgesetz, 65 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 573, 575 (2012).Google Scholar

22 On the transnational dimension of the national EU-related case law, see Mattias Wendel, Comparative Reasoning and the Making of a Common Constitutional Law—The Europe-Decisions of National Constitutional Courts in a Transnational Perspective, I-CON (2013), forthcoming. Google Scholar

23 Cf. the legal opinion of the German Federal Government, summarized in ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 169.Google Scholar

24 Herrmann, Christoph, Griechische Tragödie—der währungsverfassungsrechtliche Rahmen für die Rettung, den Austritt oder den Ausschluss von überschuldeten Staaten aus der Eurozone, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 413, 415–416 (2010); Ulrich Häde, Die europäische Währungsunion in der internationalen Finanzkrise—An den Grenzen europäischer Solidarität?, Europarecht 854, 859–860 (2010); Christian Calliess, Perspektiven des Euro zwischen Solidarität und Recht—Eine rechtliche Analyse der Griechenlandhilfe und des Rettungsschirms, Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien 270–274 (2011).Google Scholar

25 Distinctly Alberto de Gregorio Merino, Legal developments in the Economic and Monetary Union During the Debt Crisis: The Mechanisms of Financial Assistance, 49 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1613, 1629–1630 (2012).Google Scholar

26 See Ruffert, particularly, supra note 15, at 849, 852 with further references; Hannes Rathke, Von der Stabilitäts-zur Stabilisierungsunion: Der neue Art. 136 Abs. 3 AEUV, 64 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 753, 754, 758 (2011); Hanno Kube, Rechtsfragen der völkervertraglichen Eurorettung, Wertpapiermitteilungen 245, 247–248 (2012); more differentiated Ferdinand Wollenschläger, Völkerrechtliche Flankierung des EU-Integrationsprogramms als Herausforderung für den Europa-Artikel des Grundgesetzes (Art. 23 GG), 31 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 713, 716. For a distinguished non-German voice, see Jean-Victor Louis, Guest Editorial: The No-Bailout Clause and Rescue Packages, 47 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 971, 977–978 (2010).Google Scholar

27 For an in-depth analysis, cf. Calliess, supra note 24, at 256–74.Google Scholar

28 Case C-370/12, Pringle v. Ireland, Nov. 27, 2012 (not yet reported), paras. 45–76, 129–147, 184–185, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62012CJ0370&lang1=en&type=NOT&ancre=. See Andreas Fischer-Lescano and Lukas Oberndorfer, Fiskalvertrag und Unionsrecht, 66 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 9 (2013); Martin Nettesheim, Europarechtskonformität des Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus 66 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 14 (2013).Google Scholar

29 Id. at paras. 72–73, 184.Google Scholar

30 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at paras. 233–234 (DE, not translated into EN).Google Scholar

31 Id. Google Scholar

32 Id. Google Scholar

33 Id. at para. 236.Google Scholar

34 While the TESM entered into force on 27 September 2012 with the deposition of the German ratification certificate, the amendment of Article 136(3) TFEU has not yet entered into force (as of Nov. 27, 2012).Google Scholar

35 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 253 (DE), 222 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

36 Id. at para. 279 (DE), 248 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

37 Id. at para. 269 (DE), 238 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

38 Id. at paras. 240, 253, 259 (DE), 209, 222, 228 (EN, prelim.).Google Scholar

39 Id. at paras. 243–250 (DE), 212–219 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

40 Id. at para. 257 (DE), 226 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

41 Cf. Christian Calliess and Christopher Schoenfleisch, Wie das ESM-Urteil umgesetzt werden kann, Verfassungsblog (Sept. 13, 2012), http://verfassungsblog.de/wie-das-esmurteil-umgesetzt-werden-kann.Google Scholar

42 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, paras. 253, 259, 279 (DE), 222, 228, 248 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

43 Id. at para. 240 (DE), 209 (EN prelim.). The term “völkerrechtliche Erklärungen” [declarations under international law] might have also been used in a broader sense here.Google Scholar

44 Id. at paras. 253, 259 (DE), 222, 228 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

45 This cannot be dealt with in detail here. For further discussion see the comments of Matthias Ruffert, Ulrich Karpenstein and Oliver Sauer to Calliess & Schoenfleisch (note 41) and Tomuschat, supra note 2, at 1432.Google Scholar

46 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]. This provision arguably restates, at least partially, customary law, cf. Philippe Gautier, Article 2, in The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, Volume I, para. 1 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein, eds., 2011).Google Scholar

47 VCLT. See also the definition in the ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties (2011), at point 1.1 (“certain provisions of the treaty”).Google Scholar

48 Germany also issued a unilateral declaration, pointing to this joint declaration, deposited with the German instruments of ratification.Google Scholar

49 Cf. the comment of Ulrich Karpenstein to Calliess & Schoenfleisch, supra note 41 and Frank Schorkopf, “Startet die Maschinen”, 31 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 1273, 1275 (2012).Google Scholar

50 On this criterion, see Malcolm N. Shaw and Caroline Fournet, Article 62, in The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, Volume II paras. 4–5, 25–26 and 35 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein, eds., 2011).Google Scholar

51 For a critical assessment, see Ingolf Pernice et al., A Democratic Solution to the Crisis 100–103 (2012). For an in-depth analysis cf. Paul Craig, The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle, Politics and Pragmatism, 37 E.L. Rev. 231 (2012).Google Scholar

52 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 300 (DE, not translated into EN).Google Scholar

53 Id. at para. 311 (DE, not translated into EN).Google Scholar

54 Conseil constitutionnel [CC – Constitutional Council], decision No. 2012–653 DC, Aug. 9, 2012, at para. 32 (Fr.) [hereinafter French Fiscal Treaty case]. An English translation by the CC is available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/english/case-law/decision/decision-no-2012-653-dc-of-9-august-2012.115501.html.Google Scholar

55 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 311 (DE, not translated into EN), referencing para. 32 of the French Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 54.Google Scholar

56 Id. at para. 315 (DE, not translated into EN), referencing para. 25 of the French Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 54.Google Scholar

57 Maastricht case, supra note 13, at paras. 58–63; Lisbon case, supra note 14, at paras. 210, 246–260; Greece & EFSF case, supra note 15, at headnote 1 and paras. 98–104, 120–128; reiterated in ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at paras. 210–215 (DE), 194–199 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

58 Id. Google Scholar

59 Id. Google Scholar

60 Cf. already supra Part B(I).Google Scholar

61 See particularly the criticism by Daniel Halberstam and Christoph Möllers, The German Constitutional Court says “Ja zu Deutschland!”, 10 German L. J. 1241, 1249–1250 (2009); Christoph Schönberger, Lisbon in Karlsruhe: Maastricht's Epigones at Sea, 10 German L. J. 1201, 1208–1209 (2009); Martin Nettesheim, Die Karlsruher Verkündigung, Europarecht-Beiheft 101, 112 et seq. (2010).Google Scholar

62 See Wendel, Mattias, Permeabilität im europäischen Verfassungsrecht 85–91 (2011).Google Scholar

63 This stands in sharp contrast to the interdisciplinary discussion. See, e.g., Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union (Beate Kohler-Koch & Berthold Rittberger eds., 2007).Google Scholar

64 Lisbon case, supra note 14, at paras. 280–288; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvC 4/10, Nov. 9, 2011, 65 Die öffentliche Verwaltung 75 (2012), at paras. 118 et seq. with dissenting opinions of Reporting Judge Di Fabio and Judge Mellinghoff (Ger.) [Five Percent EP-Election Threshold case].Google Scholar

65 The frequently used “term transfer” is misleading because it suggests that supranational public authority is nothing more than a mere addition of derivated national competences. See Erich Kaufmann, Rechtsgutachten zum Vertrage über die Gründung der Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft und zum Deutschlandvertrage, in 2 Der Kampf um den Wehrbeitrag 42, 55 (Institut für Staatslehre und Politik Mainz ed., 1953).Google Scholar

66 Essentially, this is a fallback to classic intergovernmentalism, including the requirement of “unanimity.”Google Scholar

67 Lisbon case, supra note 14, at paras. 236, 245–247; see also Greece & EFSF case, supra note 15, at headnote 3 and paras. 121–128; ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at paras. 210–222 (DE), 194–206 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

68 For the different connotations of “responsibility for integration,” cf. Ulrich Hufeld, in Systematischer Kommentar zu den Lissabon-Begleitgesetzen 25, 33–35 (Andreas von Arnauld & Ulrich Hufeld, eds., 2011).Google Scholar

69 Lisbon case, supra note 14, at paras. 236, 245–247, also addressed to the other constitutional institutions.Google Scholar

70 Id. Google Scholar

71 In detail Mattias Wendel, Lisbon Before the Courts: Comparative Perspectives, 7 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 96, 114–120 (2011).Google Scholar

72 Lisbon case, supra note 14, at paras. 411–419. Only two categories of these provisions relate to the simplified (and insofar “dynamic”) amendment of EU primary law. The other categories, i.a., Article 352 TFEU, essentially relate to the legislative process at the EU level. The requirements of prior parliamentary approval were later implemented in the “Responsibility for Integration Act,” available in English at: http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/committees/a21/legalbasis/intvg.html. For a comment, see Martin Nettesheim, Die Integrationsverantwortung—Vorgaben des BVerfG und gesetzgeberische Umsetzung, 63 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 177 (2010).Google Scholar

73 Lisbon case, supra note 14, at paras. 252, 256.Google Scholar

74 Greece & EFSF case, supra note 15, at para. 121.Google Scholar

75 Id. at para. 103; see also Ruffert, supra note 15, at 844–845.Google Scholar

76 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at paras. 210–220 (DE), 194–204 (EN prelim.). To consider the Court's reference to the responsibility of integration, see id. at paras. 238, 282 (DE, not translated into EN).Google Scholar

77 Greece & EFSF case, supra note 15, at para. 125; see also ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 212 (DE); 196 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

78 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 228 (DE, not translated into EN).Google Scholar

79 See Kotzur, particularly Markus, Demokratie als Wettbewerbsordnung, 69 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 173, 192–193 (2010).Google Scholar

80 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvE 8/11, Jan. 28, 2012, 65 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1419 (2012), paras. 113 et seq. (Ger.) [hereinafter Special Parliamentary Committee case].Google Scholar

81 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvE 4/11, June 19, 2012, 31 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht 954 (2012), paras. 94 et seq., 107 (Ger.) [hereinafter ESM & Euro Plus Pact case].Google Scholar

82 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 237 (DE, not translated into EN). According to the Court, the requirement of ratification ensures that the entry into force of the TESM is preceded by parliamentary assent. Hence it is ensured that the legislator observes its parliamentary responsibility regarding the concrete design of the ESM.Google Scholar

83 Id. at paras. 314–319 (DE, not translated into EN).Google Scholar

84 However the Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und Deutschem Bundestag in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union [EUZBBG - Law on Cooperation Between the Federal Government and the German Bundestag in Matters Concerning the European Union], available at http://www.bundestag.de/htdocs_e/bundestag/committees/a21/legalbasis/euzbbg.html, was previously changed.Google Scholar

85 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at paras. 280–299. (DE, not translated into EN).Google Scholar

86 See Gesetz zur finanziellen Beteiligung am Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus [ESMFinG - Act on Financial Participation in the European Stability Mechanism], Sept. 13, 2012, §§ 4–6, available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/extrakt/ba/WP17/434/43458.html and Gesetz zu dem Vertrag vom 2. Februar 2012 zur Einrichtung des ESM [Act on the Treaty of Febr. 2, 2012, establishing the ESM], Sept. 13, 2012, Article 2 available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/extrakt/ba/WP17/434/43455.html.Google Scholar

87 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 287 (DE, not translated into EN).Google Scholar

88 Id. at para. 253 (DE), 222 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

89 Id. at para. 279 (DE), 248 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

90 The concept of parliamentary responsibility was, from the beginning, connected to the possibility of constitutional review, cf., expressly, Lisbon case, supra note 14, at para. 236.Google Scholar

91 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at paras. 216, 253, 271, 279 (DE), 200, 222, 240, 248 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

92 Id. at paras. 280, 290–293 (DE, not translated into EN).Google Scholar

93 Id. at para 215 (DE), 199 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

94 Austria (Article 23e); Belgium (Article 168); Bulgaria (Article 105 (3) and (4)); Czech Republic (Article 10b); Finland (§ 96); France (Article 88–4); Germany (Article 23 (2) in conjunction with the EUZBBG); Greece (Article 70 (8)); Hungary (Article 19); Lithuania (Article 3 of the EU constitutional act); Portugal (Articles 161 lit. n, 163 lit. f, 197 lit. i); Romania (Article 148 (5)); Slovenia (Article 3a (4)); Sweden (Chapter 10 § 6). For a comparative analysis, see Wendel, supra note 62, at 356–366; Philipp Dann, Parlamente im Exekutivföderalismus 190–198 (2004); Christoph Grabenwarter, Staatliches Unionsverfassungsrecht, in Europäisches Verfassungsrecht 121, 149–158 (Armin von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast, eds., 2d ed. 2009).Google Scholar

95 Concretized in §§ 4 et seq. of the EUZBBG, supra note 84.Google Scholar

96 ESM & Euro Plus Pact case, supra note 81.Google Scholar

97 Id. at para. 100.Google Scholar

98 Id. See also Wollenschläger, supra note 26, at 718.Google Scholar

99 However, see the Court of Justice, Pringle case, supra note 28, at para. 95, arguing that “the activities of the ESM do not fall within the monetary policy. …”Google Scholar

100 ESM & Euro Plus Pact case, supra note 81, at para. 135.Google Scholar

101 Id. at para. 145.Google Scholar

102 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 286 (DE, not translated into EN).Google Scholar

103 Id. Google Scholar

104 Id. at para 215 (DE), 199 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

105 For an explicit reference to Article 38(1), see id. at para. 254 (DE), 223 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

106 Id. at paras. 259 (DE), 228 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

107 Id. at para. 259 (DE), 228 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

108 Id. at para. 216 (DE), 200 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

109 Special Parliamentary Committee case, aupra note 80, at para. 13.Google Scholar

110 Id. at paras. 133–153. On 27 October 2011, the Court had already issued a temporary injunction prohibiting the exercise of the Bundestag's competences by the Sondergremium until the issuing of a decision in the main proceedings.Google Scholar

111 Id. at para. 150.Google Scholar

112 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 286 (DE, not translated into EN).Google Scholar

113 Id. at para. 294 (DE, not translated into EN).Google Scholar

114 Id. Google Scholar

115 Id. at paras. 297–299 (DE, not translated into EN). This may, for instance, concern decisions on material changes of the procedure and of the conditions of the ESM's capital calls.Google Scholar

116 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at paras. 213, 217, 222, 228, 234, 271 (DE), 197, 201, 206, 240 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

117 Greece & EFSF case, supra note 15, at para. 131; see also ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 216 (DE), 200 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

118 Id. Google Scholar

119 The best translation would probably be “margin of appreciation.” However, as this term is specifically associated with the doctrine developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), it shall not be used in this context.Google Scholar

120 Greece & EFSF case, supra note 15, at para. 132; ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at paras. 217, 228 (DE), 201, (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

121 Id. Google Scholar

122 Id. at para. 217 (DE), 201 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

123 Id. Google Scholar

124 Id. at paras. 222, 234 (DE), 206 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

125 Id. at para. 234 (DE, not translated into EN).Google Scholar

126 The fact that this qualification of Article 136(3) is questionable (see infra Part B.II.1.) has no bearing on the argument that the Court allows the legislator to take a political course which the Second Senate (or at least several of its Members) regards as being a fundamental adjustment.Google Scholar

127 Id. at para. 271 (DE), 240 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

128 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 222 (DE), 206 (EN prelim.) (emphasis added).Google Scholar

129 Greece & EFSF case, supra note 15, at paras. 128–129. For an early prediction that the ESM would in fact comply with constitutional standards, see Ruffert, supra note 15, at 852.Google Scholar

130 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 221 (DE), 205 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

131 Id. Google Scholar

132 See Maastricht case, supra note 13, at para. 151.Google Scholar

133 Cf. Bodin, Jean, Les six livres de la République—Book I, at 295, 306 and 309 (10th ed. 1593, reprint 1986).Google Scholar

134 Lisbon case, supra note 14, at para. 249.Google Scholar

135 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 220 (DE), 204 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

136 See particularly Halberstam & Möllers, supra note 61, at 1249–1250.Google Scholar

137 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], July 18, 2005, 113 BVerfGE 273 para. 180 (Lübbe-Wolff, J., dissenting) (Ger.) [European Arrest Warrent case]. For the historic background of the German eternity clause see, Matthias Herdegen, Article 79, in Grundgesetz—Kommentar paras. 63–69 (Theodor Maunz & Günter Dürig, eds., 66th ed. 2012).Google Scholar

138 Conseil constitutionnel [CC - Constitutional Council], decision No. 2003–469 DC, Mar. 26, 2003, paras. 2–3 (Fr.) [Decentralisation case], available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/download/cc2003469dc.pdf. According to Article 89(5) of the French constitution, the “republican form of government shall not be the object of any amendment.” That the Conseil constitutionnel shows extreme reluctance with regard to Article 89(5) of the French constitution is also illustrated by its Maastricht decisions, cf. Jacques Ziller, Sovereignty in France: Getting Rid of the Mal de Bodin, in Sovereignty in Transition 261, 271–272 (Neil Walker ed., 2003).Google Scholar

139 French Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 54, at paras. 4–8 and Conseil constitutionnel [CC - Constitutional Court], decision No. 2007–560DC, Dec. 20, 2007, at paras. 3–7 (Fr.) [Lisbon case]. An English translation is available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/root/bank/download/2007560DCa2007560dc.pdf.Google Scholar

140 Favoreu, Louis, La politique saisie par le droit 30 (1988).Google Scholar

141 For more details concerning the interpretation of eternity clauses by national constitutional courts in Europe, see Wendel, supra note 62, at 331–337.Google Scholar

142 According to Article 9(2) of the Czech constitution, the “substantive requisites of the democratic, law-abiding State may not be amended.” According to Article 1(1), the “Czech Republic is a sovereign, unitary and democratic, law-abiding State, based on respect for the rights and freedoms of man and citizen.”Google Scholar

143 Ústavní soud [Constitutional Court], case No ÚS 29/09, Nov. 3, 2009, para. 110 (Czech) [Treaty of Lisbon II case]. An English translation of the most important sections by Jan Komárek is contained in 6 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 345 (2009).Google Scholar

144 Id. at para. 111.Google Scholar

145 Id. Google Scholar

146 Id. at para. 113.Google Scholar

147 See e.g., Miguel Poiares Maduro, Contrapunctual Law: Europe's Constitutional Pluralism in Action, in Sovereignty in Transition 501, 530 (Neil Walker ed., 2003); Jan Komárek, European Constitutionalism and the European Arrest Warrant—in Search of the Limits of “Contrapunctual Principles”, 44 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 9, 38–40 (2007) within the context of the European Arrest Warrant cases.Google Scholar

148 The term “sovereignty” is mentioned only once in the context of the new Article 136(3) TFEU (para. 236). See the comment of Ingolf Pernice in The European (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.theeuropean.de/ingolf-pernice/12291-nach-dem-esm-urteil. For a different appraisal see Schorkopf, supra note 49, at 1274, arguing that the Court hereby adheres to its understanding of sovereignty as developed in the Lisbon judgment. For the concept of “sovereign statehood,” see the Lisbon case, supra note 14, at paras. 224, 228–229, 247–248, 263.Google Scholar

149 Lisbon case, supra note 14, at paras. 179, 232, 263. See the criticism by Matthias Jestaedt, Warum in die Ferne schweifen, wenn der Maßstab liegt so nah?, 48 Der Staat 496, 501, 512–513 (2009).Google Scholar

150 The logical fracture is that, according to the Court, the inner-systemic voter shall be entitled, by relying on Article 38(1) Basic Law, to become the guardian of the outer-systemic constituent power reflected in Article 146 Basic Law. See Lisbon case, supra note 14, at paras. 179–180.Google Scholar

151 For convincing arguments against this claim, see Tobias Herbst, Legale Abschaffung des Grundgesetzes nach Art. 146 GG?, 45 Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 33 (2012).Google Scholar

152 For a profound analysis of the Court's approach, see Martin Nettesheim, Wo “endet” das Grundgesetz? Verfassungsgebung als grenzüberschreitender Prozess, 51 Der Staat 313, 340–342, 349–355 (2012).Google Scholar

153 Lisbon case, supra note 14, at paras. 240–241; see also Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2661/06, July 6, 2010, at paras. 55–66 [Honeywell case]. For the concept of ultra vires acts cf. the in-depth analysis of Franz C. Mayer, Kompetenzüberschreitung und Letztentscheidung 67 et seq. (2000).Google Scholar

154 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 202 (DE, not translated into EN).Google Scholar

155 The Court addresses this issue within the context of admissibility.Google Scholar

156 See Greece & EFSF case, supra note 15, at para. 116.Google Scholar

157 Id. Google Scholar

158 See Ruffert, , supra note 15, at 847. Ruffert takes the view that an ultra vires review would have been admissible.Google Scholar

159 See Lisbon case, supra note 14, at para. 241; Honeywell case, supra note 153, at para. 55.Google Scholar

160 Honeywell case, supra note 153, at para. 60.Google Scholar

161 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.Google Scholar

162 Cf. Schorkopf, , supra note 49, at 1275.Google Scholar

163 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at para. 276 (DE), 245 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

164 Id. at paras. 277–278 (DE), 246–247 (EN prelim.).Google Scholar

165 Id. at para. 278 (DE), 247 (EN prelim.) (emphasis added). One should note that in the Pringle case, the Court of Justice did not address the acquisition of government bonds by the ECB, but by the ESM. See supra note 28, at paras. 140–141.Google Scholar

166 ESM & Fiscal Treaty case, supra note 1, at paras. 280, 290–293 (DE, not translated into EN).Google Scholar

167 Id. at paras. 297–299 (DE, not translated into EN). This may, for instance, concern decisions on material changes of the procedure and of the conditions of the ESM's capital calls.Google Scholar

168 Id. at para. 294 (DE, not translated into EN).Google Scholar