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The Non-Execution Clause in the Relationship between the European Union (EU) and the African, Carribean and Pacific States (ACP)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

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It has became common for some States, international or regional organizations to establish a link between good governance, respect of human rights and the democratization of States. This idea is now a condition for development aid. Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the Lomé Convention between the European Community (EC) and African, Carribean and Pacific States (ACP) of 15 December 1989, revised at Maurice 4 November 1995, provides that the politics of development and cooperation are closely linked to the respect and the enjoyment of fundamental human rights, to the strengthening of the rule of law and good governance. In Paragraph 2, cooperation is established as an instrument for promoting the enjoyment of economic, social, politic and cultural rights. The democratic clause contained in Article 5 of the Lomé Convention, and for which the respect of human rights, democratic principles and rule of law are essential elements of this Convention, firstly favours the achievement of positive actions in this framework and dedicates these elements as topics of common interests and a matter of dialogue. The European Union has stressed its willingness to develop a positive approach to these essential elements, which are the bedrock of the EU-ACP relationship besides being fields of cooperation and Community support. For that purpose, the Cotonou Agreement signed on 23 June 2000 strengthens this approach in Paragraph 2 of Article 9. The EU clearly places these essential elements at the heart of its partnership and defines the shared values that underpin this kind of relationship. It is in the spirit of common commitment to the respect and promotion of universal values that this approach has been taken.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 2002 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

(1) See, for example, Verhoeven, Joe, “La communauté européenne et la sanction internationale de la démocratie et des droits de l'homme,” in Liber Amicorum- Mohammed Bedjaoui 771-790 (Emile Yakpo & Tahar Boumedra eds., 1999); Joan M. Nelson and Stephanie J. Eglinton, “Conditioned Aid and the Promotion and Defense of Democracy,” in Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in Americas 169-186 (Tom J. Farer ed., 1998),; Patrick McAuslan, “Good governance and Aid in Africa,” 40 Journal of African Law 168 (1996); Gordon D Cumming, “British aid to Africa: a changing agenda?” 17 Third World Quarterly 487 (1996); Peter Uvin and Isabelle Biagiotti, “Global Governance and the ‘New’ Political Conditionality,” Global Governance 377 (1996); Christopher Clapham, “Political conditionality and structures of the African state,” 25 Africa Insight 91(1995); Thomas Carothers, “Democracy Promotion Under Clinton,” 18 The Washington Quarterly 13 (1995); Tood J. Moss, “US Policy and Democratisation in Africa: the Limits of Liberal Universalism,” 33 The Journal of Modern African Studies 189 (1995); Yokabdjim N. Mandigui, “L'aide au développement et les droits de l'homme “, 6 RADIC 59 (1994); Pierre Célestin Ulimubenshi, “La problématique de la clause des droits de l'homme dans un accord de coopération économique: l'example de la Convention de Lomé,” 6 RADIC 253 (1994); Kofi Kumado, “An Analysis of the policy of Linking Development aid to the Implementation of Human Rights Standards,” The Review, No50 p. 23 (1993); Stephen P Riley, “Political adjustment or domestic pressure: democratic politics and political choice in Africa,” 13 Third World Quarterly 539 (1992).Google Scholar

(2) Theoretically, respect for these conditions was not interpreted as a prerequisite to the adhesion. But in practice, since the signature of the Cotonou Agreement, the EU has tried to make the essential elements of the new partnership agreement standards for adhesion. On 27 April 2000, Cuba decided to withdraw its candidature to accede to the ACP-EU new Partnership Agreement. The Minister of External Affairs of Cuba, Mr. Felipe Pérez Roque, explained this act by pointing to the support of the European Union countries for a motion against Cuba adopted at the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva on Tuesday 18 April 2000. The Cuban Minister considered that certain European Union countries “feel particularly hostile to our country's admission into the new ACP-EU Convention…” and that “insisting on the adherence application would only serve to expose ourselves as victims of unacceptable demands from the European Union…” Further, he explained that “the European Union made a request for its troika to visit Cuba… During the preparations for this visit, we could see that the European Union would indeed attempt to subject Cuba's admission into the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement to the performance of political, economic and social changes in Cuba, fully rejected by our country, in what is a flagrant interference in our domestic affairs.” According to the Cuban authorities, their country had been subject to discriminatory treatment that had never before been applied to other candidate countries. But Cuba is still open to dialogue with the EU and prepared to sign the Cotonou Agreement on condition that the EU refrains from imposing any prerequisite conditions on the country. At its meeting in Brussels, on 14 December 2000, the ACP Council of Ministers admitted Cuba as the 78th member of the ACP Group. Cuba thus became the first ACP member-state that does not participate in cooperation with the EU. This eventuality is not provided for by the Georgetown Agreement, which is the charter of the ACP Group. The Council's decision in Cuba's favour comes as a result of an amendment to the charter.Google Scholar

(3) Decision of the ECCJ of 3 December 1996 in Case C-268/94, Rec. 1996-12, pp.I-6214-6218; and specifically p.I-6217, par.27. On this topic, see the relevant remarks of Joe Verhoeven, “La Communauté européenne et la sanction internationale de la démocratie et des droits de l'homme,” in Liber Amicorum Mohammed Bedjaoui 786-788 (Emile Yakpo & Tahar Boumedra eds., (1999))Google Scholar

(4) For instance, it is the case of consultations between the European Union and the ACP on the political situation in Cǒte d'Ivoire, which began on 15 February 2001. At the end of consultations, the two parties agreed to extend the consultations for three months and to jointly assess the progress achieved at the end of that time. Press release 146b044e, 16 February 2001.Google Scholar

(5) These procedures are strongly inspired by the mechanism envisaged by Article 65 of the Vienna Convention on the treaties between international organizations or States and international organizations. It answers an essential concern, which is the guarantee of the stability of relations deriving from conventions. Thus, one could not speak about the introduction of a right to the suspension or the automatic or immediate denunciation of the international agreements.Google Scholar

(6) Blocking a 44.4 million Euro financing provision under the second tranche of the National Indicative Programme (NIP) under the 8th EDF; suspension of direct budget aid, which mainly affects structural adjustment and a food security programme; and exclusion of Haiti from the management of the left-over of the first tranche of the NIP under the 8th EDF. The European Union accused the government of Haiti of violating Article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement relating to Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance, invoking two arguments: a bad system for counting the votes of nine senators during the recent legislative elections in Haiti, and the intimidation exerted on opposition candidates at that time. During the consultations between the EU and Haiti held on 26 September 2000, the Haiti government observed that the criticized counting system was the one applied in the previous elections in Haiti, which were hailed as free and honest by the international community, and that government made all efforts to look for the authors of intimidation and other crimes perpetrated against high officials. The Government of Haiti complained that the “the European Union has not taken due account of the process of dialogue, which has been intensified in Haiti and has considerably progressed these past weeks.” Furthermore, Haiti has complained that “the European Union has ignored all the efforts underway in Haiti, by adopting sanctions barely a few days after the investiture of the new, democratically-elected President of Haiti.”Google Scholar

(7) Press release 146b042e, 5 February 2001.Google Scholar

(8) Press release 146b050, 17 March 2001. See also, ACP-EU 3170/01/fin. resolution on the situation in Haiti.Google Scholar

(9) Joe Verhoeven, op. cit., p.789.Google Scholar

(10) These sanctions adopted by the EU included suspension of military cooperation and arms sales; suspension of visits by members of military and intelligence services; visa restrictions for military and security forces (and their family members); a sports boycott; and suspension of development cooperation.Google Scholar

(11) The Working Group is to examine the following: a) the circumstances leading to the imposition of sanctions; b) what kind of sanctions were imposed; c) which countries, regional groupings or international organisations imposed sanctions; d) the aim of the sanctions; e) the impact of the sanctions on the mass of the population, sector by sector where appropriate; f) the impact of the sanctions on the policy-makers/governments. See, Working document 1 on the Working Group's mandate and Nigeria. DT/411/411175EN.doc. AP/2969.Google Scholar

(12) Joe Verhoeven, op. cit., p.790.Google Scholar

(13) The ACP-EU Joint Assembly, Resolution on the situation in Cǒte d'Ivoire, 20-23 March 2000, Abuja (Nigeria).Google Scholar

(14) ACP-EU 3168/01/fin. Resolution on the situation in Fiji, the Salomon Islands, paragraph 13.Google Scholar

(15) ACP-EU 3145/01/fi. Resolution on the political situation in the Comoros, E.Google Scholar

(16) Ibidem, E.4.Google Scholar