¹ The following is a transcript of a presentation held at the 2013 Congress of Private Law Scholars in Würzburg. It remains faithful to the original style of the presentation. I wish to thank Jan Schröder, Jan Thiessen, Michael Stolleis and Marju Luts-Sootak for their advice, Joachim Rückert for the permission to use his highly instructive lecture materials and Carsten Fischer, Angelika C. Mohr, Michaela Moll, Susanne K. Paas, Jörg G. Schöpper, Christof Steinforth, Jacqueline Weertz, Miriam Wolter, and Eric Zakowski for their work on the manuscript.Google Scholar

² Essays: Hans Schulte-Nölke, neue juristischewochenschrift Wochenschrift 1705–10 (1996); Mathias Schmoeckel, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1697–705 (1996); Rolf Stüner, Juristenzeitung 741–52 (1996); Rudolf Wassermann, Deutsche Wohnungswirtschaft 270–72 (1996); Hans-Wolfgang Strätz, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Familienrecht 1553–67 (1998); Eberhard Wagner, Jura 505–15 (1999); Norbert Horn, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 40–46 (2000); Konstanze Plett & Sabine Berghahn, Barrieren und Karrieren: Die Anfänge des Frauenstudiums in Deutschland, 363–82 (Elisabeth Dickmann & Eva Schöck-Quinteros eds., 2000); see also the contributions in 200 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis (2000); monograph: Rolf Knieper, Gesetz und Geschichte: Ein Beitrag zu Bestand und Veränderung des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs (1996); edited volumes: Das deutsche Zivilrecht 100 Jahre nach Verkündung des BGB: Erreichtes, Verfehltes, übersehenes. Rostocker Tagung 11.–14. September 1996 (Armin Willingmann et al. eds., 1997); Auf dem Weg zu einem gemeineuropäischen Privatrecht: 100 Jahre BGB und die lusophonen Länder: Symposium in Heidelberg 29.–30.11.1996 (Erik Jayme & Heinz-Peter Mansel eds., 1997); 100 Jahre BGB – 100 Jahre Staudinger: Beiträge zum Symposion vom 18.–20. Juni 1998 in München (Michael Martinek ed., 1999); 100 Jahre BGB: Vortragsreihe der Juristischen Gesellschaft Hagen (Ulrich Eisenhardt ed., 2001); 100 Jahre Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – 50 Jahre Bundesgerichtshof (Karlmann Geiß & Hermann Lange eds., 2001); 100 Jahre BGB: das Bürgerliche Recht – von der Vielfalt zur Einheit: Vortragsreihe anläßlich einer Sonderausstellung des Landgerichts Flensburg zum 100. Geburtstag des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches (Gerd Walter ed., 2000); Das BGB und seine Richter, Ulrich Falk & Heinz Mohnhaupt eds., 2000).Google Scholar

³ Code civil, Colloque du Bicentenaire (Association Henri Capitant et al. eds., 2004).Google Scholar

⁴ 50 Jahre Bundesgerichtshof: Festgabe aus der Wissenschaft (Claus-Wilhelm Canaris et al. eds., 2000).Google Scholar

⁵ Bernhard Windscheid, Gesammelte Reden und Abhandlungen 70–80, Preface to § 1, Margin 9 (Paul Oertmann ed. 1904); on this: Reinhard Zimmermann, Historisch-Kritischer Kommentar Zum Bgb, preface to § 1 margin number 9 (vol. I, 2003).Google Scholar

⁶ Schulte-Nölke, supra note 2, at 9–21; Joachim Rückert, Historisch-Kritischer Kommentar Zum BGB, preface to § 1 (vol. I, 2003); even the debate on the BGB as a “monument” during the reform of the law of obligations was not so much powered by a sudden appreciation of the BGB but rather that the contemporaneous legislator was even less trustworthy than the historical one. See, e.g. Horst Heinrich Jakobs, Juristenzeitung 27–30 (2001).Google Scholar

⁷ Jan Thiessen, Jahrbuch Junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler 29–50 (Gundula Maria Peer & Wolfgang Faber eds., 2004) (compiling the most important notions).Google Scholar

⁸ Jan Schröder, Recht als Wissenschaft (2d ed. 2012); Joachim Rückert, Methodik des Zivilrechts – von Savigny bis Teubner 501–50 (Joachim Rückert & Ralf Seinecke eds., 2d ed. 2012) (showing modern overviews of the history of methodology).Google Scholar

⁹ Rudolf von Jhering, Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz 330-31 (1^st ed. 1884) (coining the term “conceptual jurisprudence”).Google Scholar

¹⁰ The notion of a conceptual jurisprudence has its own history. See Hans-Peter Haferkamp, Enzyklopädie zur Rechtsphilosophie (retrieved Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.enzyklopaedie-rechtsphilosophie.net/inhaltsverzeichnis/19-beitraege/96-begriffsjurisprudenz.Google Scholar

¹¹ For a compilation of relevant popular key phrases around 1900, see Jan Schröder, Festschrift für Ulrich Eisenhardt 125–37 (2007) (quoting reprint in Rechtswissenschaft in der Neuzeit 591 (Jan Schröder, ed., 2010)). See also HansPeter Haferkamp, Gedächtnisschrift für Valtazar Bogišić 301–13 (2011) (writing on various conceptions of a value for real life).Google Scholar

¹² Ernst Zitelmann, Die Gefahren des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches für die Rechtswissenschaft 14, 19–20 (1896).Google Scholar

¹³ Philipp Heck, Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung 1460 (1909); see also Sibylle Hofer, Juristische Schulung 113 (1999).Google Scholar

¹⁴ Rudolf Stammler, Theorie der Rechtswissenschaft 620–21 (1911).Google Scholar

¹⁵ Julius Binder, 19 Logos 32 (1929).Google Scholar

¹⁶ Karl Larenz, über Gegenstand und Methode völkischen Rechtsdenkens 11 (1938).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Helmut Coing, Die obersten Grundsätze des Rechts. Ein Versuch zur Neubegründung des Naturrechts (1947).Google Scholar

¹⁸ Karl Larenz, Richtiges Recht: Grundzüge einer Rechtsethik 12–23 (1979) (term inspired by Stammler).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Windscheid, supra note 5, at 111–12; analyzed in Ulrich Falk, Rechtshistorisches Journal 598–633 (1993).Google Scholar

²⁰ On early signs of a renunciation of traditional methodological concepts in favor of openly political decision making against the BGB in the judicature of the Oberstes Gericht (Supreme Court), see Hans-Peter Haferkamp, Zivilrechtskultur der DDR 15–50 (Rainer Schröder ed., vol. 2, 2000); Verena Knauf, Die Zivilentscheidungen des Obersten Gerichts der DDR von 1950-1958 (2007) (concerning the now-rejected application of general clauses); Jens Wanner, Die Sittenwidrigkeit der Rechtsgeschäfte im totalitären Staate: Eine rechtshistorische Untersuchung zur Auslegung und Anwendung des § 138 Abs. 1 BGB im Nationalsozialismus und in der DDR, 1996 (doctoral thesis) (believing this to be an eternal problem of “totalitarian” legal systems, Wanner commits a fallacy in this thesis); Hans-Peter Haferkamp, Historisch-kritischer Kommentar zum BGB § 138 n.27 (vol. I, 2003). On the situation of the somewhat less politically controlled lower courts, see Markovits, Inga, Gerechtigkeit in Lüritz (2006).Google Scholar

²¹ On this conference and the contested interpretations thereof after 1989, see Bernhardt, Ulrich, Die Deutsche Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft “Walter Ulbricht” 1948–1971, 118–23, 142–44 (1997); see also Michael Stolleis, Geschichte des Öffentlichen Rechts in Deutschland 289–304 (vol. 4, 2012).Google Scholar

²² Karl A. Mollnau, Recht im Sozialismus 69 (Gerd Bender & Ulrich Falk eds., 3^d ed., 1999) (quoting “Henceforth, methodology wasn't considered an important subject in the academic training of jurists anymore”).Google Scholar

²³ On methods of judicial control in the GDR, see Rottleuthner, Hubert, Einflußnahme Der Politik Auf Richter, Staatsanwälte und Rechtsanwälte 9–66 (Hubert Rottleuthner & Bundesministerium der Justiz eds., 1994); see generally Markovits, supra note 20; Rainer Schröder, Zivilrechtskultur Der DDR 29–44 (4th ed., 2008).Google Scholar

²⁴ The “Socialist idea of Law” demanded a certain partiality which did not mean studying Marx in private, but was instead a demand to arrive at a politically mandated decision. Polak's conception of jurisprudence as a political science proved influential. Nils Reichhelm, Die Marxistisch-Leninistische Staats- Und Rechtstheorie Karl Polaks, 97–104 (2002); Karl A. Mollnau, Recht im Sozialismus 59–195; Michael Stolleis, Sozialistische Gesetzlichkeit Staats-und Verwaltungsrechtswissenschaft In Der Ddr 28–42 (2009).Google Scholar

²⁵ Gregor Gysi, Thesen Zur Vervollkommnung Des Sozialistischen Rechts im Rechtsverwirklichungsprozeß (1975). Gysi paired the “Socialist Consciousness” required of judges — which served as an inhibitor of free judge-made law—with legal methodology, primarily marked by four levels of interpretation: lexical, systematical, teleological, and historical. Gysi's study draws heavily on Western German literature, using Kriele and Esser, but also on older texts like those by Fuchs, Düringer, Manigk, and Isay. I would like to thank Karin Raude for her advice. On Gysi's dissertation, see Jan Schröder, Rechtswissenschaft In Diktaturen 80–81 (2016).Google Scholar

²⁶ Hans-Peter Haferkamp, Psychologie Als Argument In Der Juristischen Literatur Des Kaiserreichs 215–23 (Mathias Schmoeckel ed., 2009).Google Scholar

²⁷ Hans-Peter Haferkamp, 115 Universität Zürich Archiv Für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie Beiheft 105, 105–20 (Marcel Senn & Daniel Puskás eds., 2008) (article from Kongress der Schweizerischen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie on June 15–16 2007).Google Scholar

²⁸ An overview can be found in Herbert Schnädelbach, Philosophie In Deutschland 1831–1933, at 219–32 (5th ed. 1994).Google Scholar

²⁹ Emil Lask, Gesammelte Schriften 316 (Eugen Herrigel ed., 1923) (quoting Emil Lask, Rechtsphilosophie (1905)). For an overview of the debate on teleology and causality, see Rickert, Heinrich, Die Grenzen Der Naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung 336–37 (2d ed. 1913). Rickert later rejected this terminology in Heinrich Rickert, Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft 101–09 (3d ed. 1915); Stammler spoke of a “teleological science,” Rudolf Stammler, Theorie Der Rechtswissenschaft 291 (1911).Google Scholar

³⁰ Alfried Krupp von Bohlen, Neukantianismus und Rechtsphilosophie 286 (Robert Alexy et al. eds., 2002).Google Scholar

³¹ Lask, supra note 29, at 307.Google Scholar

³² For an overview, see Funke, Andreas, Allgemeine Rechtslehre als juristische Strukturtheorie 126 (2004).Google Scholar

³³ Stefan Vogl, Soziale Gesetzgebungspolitik, freie Rechtsfindung und Soziologische Rechtswissenschaft bei Eugen Ehrlich (2003); Schröder, supra note 8, at 341.Google Scholar

³⁴ On this general subject, see Arthur Nußbaum: Die Rechtstatsachenforschung 9–17 (Manfred Rehbinder ed., 1968); Jochen Emmert, 19 Neue Deutsche Biographie 377 (1999); Jiro Rei Yashiki, 38 Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics 13, 13–30 (2010).Google Scholar

³⁵ Lask, supra note 29, at 277.Google Scholar

³⁶ Jan Schröder, Gesetzesauslegung und Gesetzesumgehung 49–51, 93–102 (1985) (referring to the philosophical context). Now, with a partly altered stance, see Schröder, supra note 11, at 585–98.Google Scholar

³⁷ Josef Kohler, Lehrbuch des Bürgerlichen Rechts 126 (vol. 1, 1904).Google Scholar

³⁸ Marietta Auer, Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 530 (2008) (writing on the astonishing liberties Heck grants the judge in these cases).Google Scholar

³⁹ Schröder, supra note 8, at 342. Recent intense debates suggest a renewed interest in subjective interpretation. See Holger Fleischer et al., Mysterium “Gesetzesmaterialien” 1–135 (2013) (including Holger Fleischer excerpt at 1–44, Jan Thiessen excerpt at 45–74, Christian Waldhoff excerpt at 75–93, Gerhard Hopf excerpt at 95–109, Ulrich Seibert excerpt at 111–126, and Frauke Wedemann excerpt at 127–135); see also Christian Baldus et al. in Gesetzgeber und Rechtsanwendung 5-231 (Frank Theisen et al. eds., 2013) (including Christian Meyer-Seitz excerpt at 29–41, Frank Theisen excerpt at 43–62, Walter Fischedick excerpt at 63–74, Ralph Alexander Lorz excerpt at 87–110, Stefan Schneider excerpt at 111–124; Peter Krebs & Stefanie Jung excerpt at 125–152, Tim Maxian Rusche excerpt at 153–166, Bernd Mertens excerpt at 167–174, Andreas Funke excerpt at 175–188, Chris Thomale excerpt at 189–194, Lena Kunz & Thomas Raff excerpt at 195–231).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Gustav Rümelin, Werturteile und Willensentscheidungen im Civilrecht 29 (1891). A jurist thus makes “decisions … which resemble the acts of will by which the legislator creates new law.” Rümelin welcomed the implications this had with regard to a new judicial authority and argued for an explicit allocation of this power to the Reichsgericht—as compensation for the possible abolition of legal custom as a source of law, which he feared. He referred to the Roman model of the praetor and seems to have been skeptical with regard to an “augmentation of parliamentary power.” Id. at 57.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Eugen Ehrlich, Die Lücken im Rechte (1888), reprinted in Eugen Ehrlich: Recht und Leben 80–169 (Manfred Rehbinder ed., 1976). This did not involve the “discovery” of the notion of gaps in the law, but merely a new and more liberal approach to filling these gaps. Schröder, supra note 8, at 373–88.Google Scholar

⁴² Schröder, supra note 11, at 572–87. According to Schröder, this phenomenon cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the so-called Free Law Movement. Schröder, supra note 8, at 338–41.Google Scholar

⁴³ Gerd Linneman et al., Deutsche Justizkritik 1890–1914, 134–50 (1989); Rainer Schröder, Festschrift für Rudolf Gmür 206–253 (1983).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ “Overwhelming,” according to Rainer Schröder, 19 Rechtstheorie 322 n.1 (1988) (delivering what is probably the most thorough analysis since 1983).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Schröder, supra note 43, at 204–24.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See Gnaeus Flavius (Hermann Kantorowicz), Der Kampf um die Rechtswissenschaft (1906), reprinted in Gnaeus Flavius (Hermann Kantorowicz), Rechtswissenschaft und Soziologie 34 (1962).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Cf. Ludwig Bendix, Die irrationalen Kräfte der zivilrechtlichen Urteilstätigkeit 230–31 (1927).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Schröder, supra note 43, at 207–18; Schröder, supra note 8, at 378.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Schröder, supra note 43, at 212–24.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Philipp heck, Gesetzesauslegung und Interessenjurisprudenz 13 n.32 (1942); see also Auer, Marietta, Zeitschrift für europäisches Privatrecht 524 (2008).Google Scholar

⁵¹ Jan Schröder, Festschrift für Picker 1315 (2010).Google Scholar

⁵² Lask, supra note 29, at 280.Google Scholar

⁵³ To clarify, it would be a fallacy to make assumptions about individual judicial decisions just by looking at methodological programs issued by academic jurisprudence. All attempts—“legal positivism of the Reichsgericht prior to 1914” and so on—to conceive of judicature as a mere implementation of a somehow unified method have hitherto failed. Judges made their decisions in a variety of ways: Sometimes objectively, sometimes subjectively, sometimes by simply excluding norms, sometimes accompanied by in-depth methodological justifications, sometimes by strictly adhering to “conceptual jurisprudence,” sometimes in a liberal manner reminiscent of the “Free Law School,” sometimes “just so.” Part of the reason for this is the fact that, ever since their frustrating experiences in the debates on Free Law, judges have all but ceased to take part in methodological discussions. Even today, the rare utterances on methodology issued by judges demonstrate the deep chasm between academic jurisprudence—with its highly differentiated and complex scientific methodology—and the everyday lives and methodological thoughts of many judges, in a chasm that has probably always existed. See generally Thomas Honsell, Historische Argumente im Zivilrecht (1982); Markus Klemmer, Gesetzesbindung und Richterfreiheit (1996); Das BGB und seine Richter (Ulrich Falk & Heinz Mohnhaupt eds., 2000); Thorsten Berndt, Richterbilder: Dimensionen richterlicher Selbsttypisierungen (2010); see also Joachim Rückert, Geisteswissenschaften zwischen Kaiserreich und Republik 267–313 (Knut Wolfgang Nörr et al. eds., 1994), Joachim Rückert, Festschrift für Sten Gagnér zum 3. März 1996 203–27 (1996); Jan Schröder, Zum Gesetzespositivismus des Reichsgerichts (2008), reprinted in Jan Schröder, Rechtswissenschaft in der Neuzeit 523-33 (2010).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ On Binder, see Dreier, Ralf, Rechtswissenschaft in Göttingen 435-55 (Fritz Loos ed., 1987).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ On Binder's supporters and his contemporaneous reception, see id. at 440.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Karl Larenz, Methodenlehre Der Rechtswissenschaft 103–10 (6th ed. 1991).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Summarized in Michael Stolleis, Geschichte Des öffentlichen Rechts In Deutschland 171-86 (vol. 3, 1999).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ In 1928, Alfred Manigk argued against Heck that “[t]he law is not primarily concerned with interests; it is only through morality that it receives its higher purposes, which it then, in turn, employs to solve matters of conflicting interests,” Alfred Manigk, Handwörterbuch der Rechtswissenschaft 314 (1928).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Paul Oertmann, Interesse und Begriff in Der Rechtswissenschaft 34 (1931). All in all, Oertmann was naturally rather skeptical of judicial value judgements. See Rüdiger Brodhun, Paul Ernst Wilhelm Oertmann 1865–1938, 350–65 (1999).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ On Rümelin's methodology, see generally Nikolas HaßLinger, Max von Rümelin 1861–1931 und die juristische Methode (2014)Google Scholar

⁶¹ See generally Max von Rümelin, Die Verweisungen des Bürgerlichen Rechts auf das Sittengesetz (1920).Google Scholar

⁶² See generally Max von Rümelin, Die Gerechtigkeit (1920).Google Scholar

⁶³ See generally Max von Rümelin, Die Billigkeit im Recht (1921).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See generally Max von Rümelin, Rechtsgefühl und Rechtsbewusstsein (1925).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See generally Max von Rümelin, Die bindende Kraft des Gewohnheitsrechts und ihre Begründung (1929).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Kurt Sontheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik 141–92 (1962). See generally Lepsius, Oliver, Die Gegensatzaufhebende Begriffsbildung (1st ed. 1993).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See the fundamental treatise by Joachim Rückert, 125 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte Germanistische Abteilung 199–255 (2008); Anke Sessler, Die Lehre von den Leistungsstörungen: Heinrich Stolls bedeutung für die Entwicklung des allgemeinen Schuldrechts 92 n.334 (1994) (discussing the quote by Heck).Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Philipp Heck, Grundriß Des Schuldrechts 473 n.1 (1929).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Heinrich Stoll, Festschrift für Heck 60–117 (1931), quoted from Winfried Ellscheid & Günter Hassemer, Interessenjurisprudenz 153–210 (1974).Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Id. at 60 n.13 & 68 n.35.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Id. at 67–68 (referencing, quite surprisingly, Walter Schönfeld).Google Scholar

⁷² Julius Binder, philosophie des rechts 282-83 (1925); see also Jakob, Eckart, Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie Julius Binders 40–47 (1995).Google Scholar

⁷³ Binder, supra note 72, at 448.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ On the contemporaneous influence of similar notions beyond Neo-Hegelianism, see Stolleis, Michael, Gemeinwohlformeln im Nationalsozialistischen Recht 39–75 (1974); Jan Schröder, Kollektivistische Theorien und Privatrecht in der Weimarer Republik am Beispiel der Vertragsfreiheit (1994), henceforth quoted from the reprint in Jan Schröder, Rechtswissenschaft in der Neuzeit 599–623 (2010).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Binder, supra note at 72, at 449.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Id. at 474.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Id. at 482.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ As early as 1919, Justus Wilhelm Hedemann—still in view of war time socialism—used his keen sense of the zeitgeist to identify the present as a time of a “subjugation of the individual … by an unchanging will of the community.” Justus Wilhelm Hedemann, das Bürgerliche Recht und die neue Zeit 12 (1919).Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Schröder, supra note 74, at 599.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See generally Dreier, supra note 54, at 435–55.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Binder, supra note at 72, at 1014 (criticizing Roderich von Stintzing & Ernst Landsberg, Geschichte der deutschen Rechtswissenschaft (vol. III. 2, 1910)).Google Scholar

⁸² Hans-Peter Haferkamp, Zeitschrift für Neuere Rechtsgeschichte 61–81 (2010).Google Scholar

⁸³ Walther Schönfeld, Die Geschichte Der Rechtswissenschaft im Spiegel der Metaphysik (1943), retitled Grundlegung Der Rechtswissenschaft (2d ed. 1951).Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Erik Wolf, GroßE Rechtsdenker der deutschen Geistesgeschichte (1st ed. 1939); Erik Wolf, Großße Rechtsdenker Der Deutschen Geistesgeschichte (2^d ed. 1944); Erik Wolf, Große Rechtsdenker der deutschen Geistesgeschichte (3d ed. 1951); Erik Wolf, Große Rechtsdenker der deutschen Geistesgeschichte (4th ed. 1963).Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Karl Larenz, Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie der Gegenwart (1931); Karl Larenz, Deutsche Rechtserneuerung und Rechtsphilosophie (1934); Karl Larenz, Sittlichkeit und Recht: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des deutschen Rechtsdenkens und zur Sittenlehre, in Reich und Recht in der Deutschen Philosophie (vol. 1, 1943); Karl Larenz, Rechtswissenschaft, in Methodenlehre (1st ed. 1960).Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Georg Dahm, Deutsches Recht (1st ed. 1944); Georg Dahm, Deutsches Recht: Die geschichtlichen und dogmatischen Grundlagen des geltenden Rechts (2d ed. 1951).Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Franz Wieacker, 12 Deutsches Recht 1440–43 (1942), reprinted in Franz Wieacker, Gründer und Bewahrer: Rechtslehrer der Neueren Deutschen Privatrechtsgeschichte (1959); Franz Wieacker, Rudolf von Jhering. Eine Erinnerung zu seinem 50. Todestage, reprinted in Franz Wieacker, Gründer und Bewahrer: Rechtslehrer der Neueren Deutschen Privatrechtsgeschichte (1959); Franz Wieacker, Wirklichkeit und überlieferung, in Vom Römischen Recht (Franz Wieacker ed., 1944); Franz Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Entwicklung (1st ed. 1952); Franz Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschen Entwicklung (2d ed. 1967); see also Franz Wieacker, Historiker des modernen Privatrechts (Okko Behrends & Eva Schumann eds., 2010).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ See Wieacker, supra note 87, at 181–212 (including Hans-Peter Haferkamp) (providing an overview of the confusing plurality of alleged positivisms).Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Traces of these notions can be found (for example) in Larenz, supra note 56, at 9–185.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Binder, supra note 15, at 32.Google Scholar

⁹¹ Id. at 30–35 (demonstrating that Binder's notions were almost Hegelian in this regard).Google Scholar

⁹² Binder, supra note 72, at 977.Google Scholar

⁹³ Id. at 983.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Id. at 406.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Id. at 406.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Id. at 994.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Id. at 886.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Cf. Bernd Rüthers, Wir denken die Rechtsbegriffe um 33–35 (1987); Joachim Rückert, Deutsche Rechtsgeschichte in der NS-Zeit 177–240 (Joachim Rückert & Dietmar Willoweit eds., 1995).Google Scholar

⁹⁹ Larenz, supra note 16, at 33.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Id. at 29.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ The antithesis was a mode of thought purely concerned with legal facts. Josef Esser, Wert und Bedeutung der Rechtsfiktionen 132 (2d ed. 1969) (referencing his teacher, Fritz von Hippel).Google Scholar

¹⁰² Josef Esser, Deutsche Rechtswissenschaft 69 (1942). This meant a “thorough consideration and interpretation of the social and economical relations, positions and judgments.” cf. Josef Esser, Schmollers Jahrbuch 95 (1942) (reviewing Lange & Hedemann).Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Heinrich Lehmann, 90 Jherings Jahrbücher 144 (1942); see also Andre Depping, Das BGB als Durchgangspunkt. Privatrechtsmethode und Privatrechtsleitbilder bei Heinrich Lehmann 1876–1963, 172–84 (2002). On the development of a concept of de facto contracts, see Lambrecht, Peter, Die Lehre vom faktischen Vertragsverhältnis 46–68 (1994).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Heinrich Lange, Die Entwicklung der Wissenschaft vom Bürgerlichen Recht seit 1933, 39 (1941).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Heinrich Lange, Zeitschrift der Akademie für deutsches Recht 924 (1936), first mentioned in Joachim Rückert, 125 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte Germanistische Abteilung 227 (2008).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ Bayerisches Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt 277 (1933); cf. Hans-Rainer Pichinot, Die Akademie für Deutsches Recht 9–10 (1981).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Pichinot, supra note 106, at 144–45.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ On the subject of expulsion and exile of German jurists between 1933 and 1945, see generally Leonie Breunung & Manfred Walther, Die Emigration deutschsprachiger Rechtswissenschaftler ab 1933 (vol. 1, 2013); Juristsuprooted. German-speaking émigré Lawyers in Twentieth-century Britain (Jack Beatson & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2004).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Expressed more cautiously by Werner Schubert, in Volksgesetzbuch: Teilentwürfe, Arbeitsberichte und sonstige Materialien 31 (Werner Schubert ed., 1988) (“Rarely has German jurisprudence concerned itself as thoroughly with questions of private law reforms and their systematics as in the period between 1933 and 1942.”).Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ Esser wasn't a member of the Academy. Nevertheless, he eagerly took part in the debates. See Esser, Josef, 148 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 121–46 (1943); Josef Esser, Deutsche Rechtswissenschaft 65–81 (1942); Josef Esser, Schmollers Jahrbuch 93–102 (1942).Google Scholar

¹¹¹ Schubert, supra note 109, at 33–36.Google Scholar

¹¹² See Rückert's analysis in Joachim Rückert, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1251–59 (1995); Maren Bedau, Entnazifizierung des Zivilrechts 23–24 (2004). See generally Kauhausen, Ilka, Nach der “Stunde Null“ (2007).Google Scholar

¹¹³ This position is excellently demonstrated by Jan Thiessen, Wirtschaftsrecht und Wirtschaftsrechtler im Schatten der NS-Vergangenheit, in Die Rosenburg. Das Bundesministerium der Justiz und die NS-Vergangenheit – eine Bestandsaufnahme 204-95 (Manfred Görtemaker & Christoph Safferling eds., 2013).Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ Bernd Rüthers, Die Unbegrenzte Auslegung 322–430 (7th ed. 2012).Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ Ralf Frassek, 111 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte Germanistische Abteilung 564–91 (1994).Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ Hans-Peter Haferkamp, Historisch-Kritischer Kommentar zum BGB § 242 nn.71–77 (vol. 2/1, 2007); see also Section V of this Article.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ Hans-Peter Haferkamp, Die heutige Rechtsmißbrauchslehre – Ergebnis Nationalsozialistischen Rechtsdenkens? 178–213 (1994).Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ Heinrich Lange, Juristische Wochenschrift 2859 (1933).Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ See Deyerling, Andrea, Die Vertragslehre im Dritten Reich und in der DDR während der Geltung des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches (1996).Google Scholar

¹²⁰ Lambrecht, supra note 103, at 5–17.Google Scholar

¹²¹ Matthias Zirker, Vertrag und Geschäftsgrundlage in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus 112–266 (1996); Rudolf Meyer-Pritzl, Historisch-kritischer Kommentar zum BGB §§ 313–14 nn.25–31 (vol. 2/2, 2007).Google Scholar

¹²² Jan Thiessen, Festschrift für Jan Schröder 187–219 (2013).Google Scholar

¹²³ Heinrich Lange, Liberalismus, Nationalsozialismus und Bürgerliches Recht 37 (1933).Google Scholar

¹²⁴ This, however, was not simply about judicial freedom. Between the demands of nationalist communal thinking and the ever-prevailing Führer principle, the judge's main concern was to reach a politically acceptable decision. These ambivalences of National Socialist legal thought are excellently illustrated in Hubert Rottleuthner, 18 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 28–33 (1983). On the limitations of the notion of Natural Law (Dietze et al.), see also Fabian Wittreck, Nationalsozialistische Rechtslehre und Naturrecht (2008).Google Scholar

¹²⁵ Binder, supra note 72, at 993.Google Scholar

¹²⁶ Lange, supra note 105, at 924.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ Heinrich Lange, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 251 (1943).Google Scholar

¹²⁸ Id. For context, see generally Sarah Schädler, ‘Justizkrise’ und ‘Justizreform’ im Nationalsozialismus 9-13 (2009); Werner Schubert, Festschrift für Jan Schröder 771-86 (2013); Dietmar Willoweit, Zeitschrift für neuere Rechtsgeschichte 276–77, 286–87 (1994).Google Scholar

¹²⁹ Schubert, supra note 109, at 331 (showing session protocol from May 26–27, 1941).Google Scholar

¹³⁰ In 1943, Lange opined that “professional training” was required to transform “vague and uncertain legal sensiblities” into “expert professional knowledge.” Lange, supra note 127, at 250.Google Scholar

¹³¹ Id. at 241–42.Google Scholar

¹³² Only a few core values of a National Socialist private law were undisputed. As enumerated by Lange in Lange, supra note 105: “The people, race, community, loyalty and honor and the basic tenet of law—communal interests have priority over individual interests.”Google Scholar

¹³³ Carl Schmitt, Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung 920 (1935); see also Hattenhauer, Hans, Festschrift für Rudolf Gmür 264-65 (1983).Google Scholar

¹³⁴ Schmitt, supra note 133, at 922.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ Id. at 923.Google Scholar

¹³⁶ Id. at 922.Google Scholar

¹³⁷ Justus Wilhelm Hedemann, in Volksgesetzbuch, supra note 109, at 472–76; id. at 541–50, 515–18 (with Heinrich Lehmann & Wolfgang Siebert); concerning Lehmann see the draft of the guiding principles in Depping, supra note 103, at 347.Google Scholar

¹³⁸ Justus Wilhelm Hedemann, in Volksgesetzbuch, supra note 109, at 541.Google Scholar

¹³⁹ General Rule 22 page 2, see Volksgesetzbuch, supra note 109, at 517.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ Heinrich Lehmann, quoted in Justus Wilhelm Hedemann, in Volksgesetzbuch, supra note 109, at 545.Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ Heinrich Lange, Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 208–09, 250 (1943), quoted in Heinrich Lehmann, in Volksgesetzbuch, supra note 109, at 662.Google Scholar

¹⁴² Cf. his draft of Title 7 of the People's Code concerning unjust enrichment, published in Volksgesetzbuch, supra note 109, at 150–52.Google Scholar

¹⁴³ Wilburg was not entirely clear about this. Walter Wilburg, Elemente des Schadensrechts IX (1941); Walter Wilburg, Entwicklung eines beweglichen Systems im bürgerlichen Recht 5 (1950) (“Placed into the legal norms themselves and their elements …. “); id. at 22 (question of legal technique); see also Ewald Hücking, Der Systemversuch Wilburgs 94 (1982). I would like to thank Susanne K. Paas for this information.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ Apart from his commentaries on the work of the Academy, Esser exerted his influence mainly through his book Josef Esser, Grundlagen und Entwicklung der Gefährdungshaftung (1941), in which he openly advocated a “reconstruction of our private law, id. at 1, 4 (preface).” Cf. Esser, supra note 110.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ Lange, supra note 127, at 218. Immediately following the publication of his seminal work, Wilburg became a member of the committee on damages, see Uta Mohnhaupt-Wolf, Deliktsrecht und Rechtspolitik 190 (2004). At the very least, he was more successful in his time than F. Bydlinski assumes, whose sole description of the years after Rabel reads like this: “In war time and during the reign of the National Socialists, this scholar [Wilburg], being unwilling to adapt and thus unpopular, was, among other things, forced to become a simple soldier in the Volkssturm.” Franz Bydlinski, 113 Juristische Blätter 776 (1991).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁶ Wilburg, Schadensrecht, supra note 143, at VIII. This quote should not be taken as indicative of Wilburg's political position as a whole; it is merely to demonstrate how his concept aligned with contemporaneous ideas.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ Mohnhaupt-Wolf, supra note 145, at 195–96.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ Id. at 191–204.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁹ Overview in Schröder, supra note 8, at 250–57.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁰ Cf. Funke, supra note 32, at 126–32.Google Scholar

¹⁵¹ Gottlieb Planck, Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch 20–21 (vol. 1, 1897); see also Rückert, supra note 6, preface to § 1 n.16; Stephan Meder, Gottlieb Planck und die Kunst der Gesetzgebung 37–48 (2010).Google Scholar

¹⁵² See, for example, Phillip Heck, who wanted to build a system based on decisions of conflicts and who avoided the term “principle” which, to him, embodied a conflation of norms and values. Phillip Heck, Begriffsbildung und Interessenjurisprudenz 58 (1932). This was also criticized by Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, Systemdenken und Systembegriff in der Jurisprudenz 38 (2^d ed. 1983); cf. Marietta Auer, Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht 517–33 (2008). On the general issue, see Schoppmeyer, Heinrich, Juristische Methode als Lebensaufgabe: Leben, Wirken und Wirkungsgeschichte Philipp Hecks (2001); Schröder, supra note 8, at 420–22, doesn't mention principles in the Wei mar debates either.Google Scholar

¹⁵³ Some authors did indeed approach this issue. Cf. Hans Carl Nipperdey, Die Grundrechte und Grundpflichten der Reichsverfassung, Preface (vol. 1, 1929) (taking his clue from his teacher Lehmann). On this, see Hollstein, Thorsten, Die Verfassung als Allgemeiner Teil 153–57 (2006); Heinrich Stoll, 76 Jherings Jahrbücher 193–206 (1926); Heinrich Stoll, Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung 278–83 (1933). The question of judicial review was primarily discussed among jurists of public law—in the late 1920s, this authority was accepted by a majority; the Reichsgericht autonomously implemented and expanded upon it during the 1920s. Cf. Schröder, supra note 8, at 322–26.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁴ Karl Larenz, Lehrbuch zum Allgemeinen Teil des Deutschen Bürgerlichen Rechts V (1967): The aim was to facilitate an understanding of positive law, to lay bare its innermost structure, by drawing attention to its basic principles. Naturally, it [a textbook for educational purposes] can only achieve this if it doesn't use positive law as its point of departure. It needs to be grounded in legal philosophy but it must always refer back to the law currently in force.Google Scholar

** On ethical personalism, as it was discussed by Larenz in an 80-page philosophical preface, see Kauhausen, supra note 112, at 113–26.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁵ Coing's work shows some remarkable similarities to the People's Code, even in the language he used, see Haferkamp, Historisch-kritischer Kommentar zum BGB, supra note 20, § 138 n.279. Of course, Coing didn't have much of a political affiliation with National Socialists and he wasn't a member of the Academy either; details can be found in Lena Foljanty, Recht oder Gesetz 176 (2013). Nevertheless, see also Folker Schmerbach, Das “Gemeinschaftslager Hanns Kerrl“ für Rechtsreferendare In Jüterborg 1933–1939, 127 (2008). In addition, Heinz Mohnhaupt, Rechtsgeschichtswissenschaft in Deutschland 1945 bis 1952, 97–128 (Horst Schröder & Dieter Simon eds., 2001); Kauhausen, supra note 112, at 28–50.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁶ Cf. the comparative analysis in Kauhausen, supra note 112, at 275–76 (“Free reign of the principle”).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁷ Wilburg himself did not use the term principle, which he seems to have considered as non-conducive to evaluation. His disciple Bydlinski did conflate Wilburg's “elements” with principles in Franz Bydlinski, Das Bewegliche System im geltenden und künftigen Recht 32 (1986).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁸ On this see Joachim Rückert, Gewohnheit Gebot Gesetz 181–220 (Nils Jansen & Peter Oestmann eds., 2011). Rückert references an early concept of evaluation proposed by Stampe in 1905 (Id. at 187–88) that, in the end, did not have much of an impact.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁹ Das Lüth-Urteil Aus (Rechts-)Historischer Sicht (Thomas Henne & Arne Riedlinger eds., 2005); Stolleis, supra note 21, at 216–46. See also the essays collected in Die Konstitutionalisierung der Rechtsordnung (Gunnar Folke Schuppert & Christian Bumke eds., 2000). For a critical perspective on the method employed by the Federal Constitutional Court, see e.g. Matthias Jestaedt, Grundrechtsentfaltung im Gesetz (1999). See also Thomas Vesting, 41 Der Staat. Zeitschrift für Staatslehre und Verfassungsgeschichte, Deutsches und europäisches öffentliches Recht 73–90 (2002).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁰ Christine Franzius, Bonner Grundgesetz und Familienrecht 66–68 (2005); id. at 140–42.Google Scholar

¹⁶¹ On this see Hollstein, supra note 153, at 305–19; Hollstein, Das Lüth-Urteil, supra note 159, at 249–69.Google Scholar

¹⁶² Alfred Hueck, Die Bedeutung des Art. 3 des Bonner Grundgesetzes für die Lohn- und Arbeitsbedingungen der Frauen 27 (1951).Google Scholar

¹⁶³ In the discussion following Hueck's speech at the 1951 conference of private law scholars, the majority of participants rejected Nipperdey's position, arguing instead “that constitutional rights have no immediate effect on legal transactions in private law which doesn't mean they shouldn't be considered in an evaluation based on Sections 138, 242, 826 BGB,” as reported in Juristenzeitung 734 (1951).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁴ See Günter Dürig, Juristische Rundschau 262 n.50 (1952) for a first direct reference to Hueck.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁵ For a compilation of the various contemporaneous positions in this debate see Vogt, Dieter, Die Drittwirkung der Grundrechte und Grundrechtsbestimmungen des Bonner Grundgesetzes 6–10 (1960).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁶ For an early discussion, see Günter Dürig, Juristenzeitung 199 (1953); Günter Dürig, 109 Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 341 (1953). Primarily, see Günter Dürig, Festschrift für Nawiasky 157–90 (1956).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁷ Cf. my analysis in Haferkamp, supra note 116, at § 242 n.57.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁸ Association of Judges at the Reichsgericht, Juristische Wochenschrift 90 (1924).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁹ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁷⁰ Schröder, supra note 8, at 316.Google Scholar

¹⁷¹ Reichsgericht [RG] [Supreme Court of the German Reich] Feb. 22, 1924, Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 320–26.Google Scholar

¹⁷² Walter Simons, Deutsche Juristen-Zeitung 243 (1924).Google Scholar

¹⁷³ This was also, in effect, Nörr's position. Knut Wolfgang Nörr, Der Richter zwischen Gesetz und Wirklichkeit: Die Reaktion des Reichsgerichts auf die Krisen von Weltkrieg und Inflation, und die Entfaltung eines neuen richterlichen Selbstverständnisses 30 (1996); Joachim Rückert, 30 Kritische Justiz 429–41 (1997).Google Scholar

¹⁷⁴ Ernst Fuchs, 1 Die Justiz 349 (1925/26).Google Scholar

¹⁷⁵ A compilation of cases can be found in Klemmer, supra note 53, at 41, 429. On bona fides as a concept in ordinary law—and its use against lawsuits based on binding legal norms —see Haferkamp, supra note 116, at § 242 nn.29–36. The proliferation of those cases can thus be seen as a symptom of a crisis caused by inflation rather than an indication of a “new” conception of § 242. See Rückert, supra note 173, at 429–41.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁶ RG, Jan 15, 1926, Juristische Wochenschrift 980-81 (1926) with a critical comment by Erich Molitor (articles 153 and 155 Weimarer Reichsverfassung are drawn upon for an interpretation of Sections 242, 138, 226, 826 of the BGB); in RGZ 128, 95–100, Section 138 BGB is said to demand that “human interactions be governed by a respect for those constitutional rights.” See Knut Wolfgang Nörr, Zwischen den Mühlsteinen 10 n.42 (1988).Google Scholar

¹⁷⁷ Term introduced by Jörn Ipsen, Die Grundrechte 143 (Franz Leopold Neumann et al. eds., vol. 2, 1954).Google Scholar

¹⁷⁸ Cf. Stolleis, supra note 57, at 220–26; Christoph Gusy, Die Weimarer Reichsverfassung 285 (1997); Matthias Ruffert, Vorrang der Verfassung und Eigenständigkeit des Privatrechts 9-10 (2001); Klaus Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1515–16 (Vol. III/1, 1988). Leisner's construction of a theory of an immediate third-party effect in Weimar involves an inaccurate stretching of historical fact. Walter Leissner, Grundrechte und Privatrecht 52–112, 223–40 (1960).Google Scholar

¹⁷⁹ Justus Wilhelm hedemann, Die Flucht in die Generalklauseln 72 (1933). This was written in 1932 (Id. at Preface). Google Scholar

¹⁸⁰ Id. at 73.Google Scholar

¹⁸¹ Heinrich Lange, Liberalismus, Nationalsozialismus und Bürgerliches Recht 5 (1933).Google Scholar

¹⁸² Id. at 7.Google Scholar

¹⁸³ Karl Larenz, Review of Justus Wilhelm Hedemann, 100 Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handelsrecht 378-82 (1934); see also Wegerich, Christine, Die Flucht in die Grenzenlosigkeit: Justus Wilhelm Hedemann (1878–1963) 148–49 (2004).Google Scholar

¹⁸⁴ Carl Schmitt, über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens 49 (2d ed. 1993).Google Scholar

¹⁸⁵ Id. at 48.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁶ Carl Schmitt, 62 Juristische Wochenschrift 2793-94 (1933).Google Scholar

¹⁸⁷ Id. at 2794.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁸ This did not keep him from adopting the National Socialist conception, see Wegerich, supra note 183, at 146–51.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁹ Franz Wieacker, zur rechtstheoretischen präzisierung des § 242 Bgb, 36 (1956).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁰ Justus Wilhelm Hedemann, Juristische Rundschau 131 (1950).Google Scholar

¹⁹¹ Landgericht Kleve [Regional Court] Jan. 31, 1947, Monatsschrift für Deutsches Recht [MDR] 18–19 (1947); Oberlandesgericht Kiel [Regional Appeal Court] Dec. 17, 1946, Monatsschrift für Deutsches Recht [MDR] 15–18 (1947); Landgericht Bonn [Regional Court] Dec. 4, 1946, Monatsschrift für Deutsches Recht [MDR] 53–54 (1947). I wish to thank Kristina Busam for her advice on this matter.Google Scholar

¹⁹² Verordnung [V] [Regulation] Nr. 92. Änderung des Gesetzes Nr. 51 der Militärregierung (Währung) vom 1. Juli 1947 Amtsblatt der Militärregierung in Deutschland Nr. 20, at 567.Google Scholar

¹⁹³ Fritz Koch, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 171 (1947).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁴ Id. at 171.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁵ Franz Scholz, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 81 (1950). Coing also stressed the continuing importance of Section 242 BGB because judges “are sworn to general principles of justice” even in the face of binding legal norms, Helmut Coing, 3 Süddeutsche Juristen-Zeitung 132 (1948).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁶ Heinrich Vollmer, Die Einwirkung Der Verordnung Nr. 92 Der Britischen Militärregierung betr. “änderung des Gesetzes Nr. 51 der Militärregierung (Währung)” und des “Erstes Gesetz zur änderung des Gesetzes Nr. 51 der Militärregierung“ der Amerikanischen Militärregierung auf bestehende Geldschulden, insbesondere auf durch Goldklausel gesicherte Forderungen 88 (1948).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁷ Cf. Foljanty, supra note 155, at 88–94.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁸ Hans Herrmann, Juristenzeitung 184 (1955).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁹ Wieacker, supra note 189, at 10–11.Google Scholar

²⁰⁰ Josef Esser, Juristenzeitung 521 (1953).Google Scholar

²⁰¹ Herbert Krüger, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 163–66 (1949).Google Scholar

²⁰² Id. at 164.Google Scholar

²⁰³ Id. at 166.Google Scholar

²⁰⁴ Id. at 163.Google Scholar

²⁰⁵ Hasso Hofmann rightly emphasizes this in Rechtsphilosophie nach 1945, 21–25 (2012).Google Scholar

²⁰⁶ Wolfgang Graf Vitzthum, in Das Lüth-Urteil Aus (Rechts-)Historischer Sicht, supra note 159, at 349–67; Hasso Hofmann, in Mensch – Staat – Umwelt 47–78 (Ivo Appel & Georg Hermes eds., 2008); for a clarification concerning the alleged influence of Smend, see Ruppert, Stefan, in Das Lüth-Urteil Aus (Rechts-)Historischer Sicht, supra note 159, at 327–48.Google Scholar

²⁰⁷ Günter Dürig, Grundrechte und Zivilrechtsprechung, in Festschrift Nawiasky 177 (1956).Google Scholar

²⁰⁸ Günter Dürig, Freizügigkeit, in Die Grundrechte 525 (Franz Leopold Neumann et al. eds., vol. 2, 1954).Google Scholar

²⁰⁹ Heinrich Lange, Juristische Wochenschrift 2859 (1933).Google Scholar

²¹⁰ Stolleis, supra note 57, at 218.Google Scholar

²¹¹ Id. at 227.Google Scholar

²¹² Uwe Diederichsen, 198 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 171–260 (1998).Google Scholar

²¹³ Werner Flume, in Festschrift zum hundertjährigen Bestehen des deutschen Juristentages 1860–1960, 135–238 (vol. 1, 1960). For a discussion of additional authors, see Kauhausen, supra note 112, at 206–08, 217–28; Joachim Rückert, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1251-59 (1995).Google Scholar

²¹⁴ The not entirely untainted Franz Wieacker is an exception, cf. the essays, Franz Wieacker, Industriegesellschaft und Privatrechtsordnung (1974). See also his astonishing reconsideration of the position he held on property law during the National Socialist period, Franz Wieacker, 5-6 Quaderni Fiorentini 841-59 (1976/77). For contrast, see his strongly relativist stance in Franz Wieacker, Privatrechtsgeschichte der Neuzeit 486–87, 514–16 (2d ed. 1967).Google Scholar

²¹⁵ For example, Hueck, Hefermehl, and Schmidt-Rimpler came across as decidedly apolitical to their students, cf. Thiessen, supra note 113, at 287 n.430.Google Scholar

²¹⁶ Knut Wolfgang Nörr, Die Republik der Wirtschaft. Part I: Von der Besatzungszeit bis zur Großen Koalition 5-18 (1999) (organized economical constitution). On jurisprudence, see Foljanty, supra note 155, at 235–46.Google Scholar

²¹⁷ Cf. Karl Larenz's “Rahmenbegriff,” see Larenz, Karl, in Beiträge zur europäischen Rechtsgeschichte und zum geltenden Zivilrecht. Festgabe für Johannes Sontis 129-48 (Fritz Baur et al., eds., 1977) (regarding the “framing concept”). For contrast, see Larenz, Karl, Grundfragen der neuen Rechtswissenschaft 225-60 (Karl Larenz ed., 1935).Google Scholar

²¹⁸ The continuity of the so-called Innentheorie (Theory of Immancence) established by Wolfgang Siebert (Verwirkung und Unzulässigkeit der Rechtsausübung (1934)) is an example. On the National Socialist notions of this doctrine see Haferkamp, supra note 117, at 200–09. See Palandt/Christian Grüneberg, § 242 n.38 (71st ed. 2012):Google Scholar

** The principle of good faith constitutes an immanent limitation of the content of every law (“Innentheorie”) …. If one exercises one's right or takes advantage of a legal position in breach of the principle of good faith, that action constitutes an inacceptable abuse of law …. If the relevant circumstances change, the exercise of a right in breach of good faith can become permissible again; by the same logic, a relevant situational change can render a hitherto permissible action abusive and thus illegal. § 242 thus makes legal content relative.Google Scholar

** While this, at first, seems to be a somewhat technical approach—which, of course, grants the judge an almost unlimited power to interfere in subjective rights—Johannes Friesecke explains it in its original political function in the 3^d edition, 1940: “This limitation of rights results from the idea that every subjective right also contains a duty.” The nature and content of this limitation “is not primarily defined by the morality of the contractual comrades (Vertragsgenossen) … but by the values and morality of the national community (Volksgemeinschaft).” Palandt/Johannes Friesecke, § 242 at 193 (3d ed. 1940). In the 9^th edition (1951), Bernhard Danckelmann adopted this idea of immanent duties in every subjective right and merely purified the language, speaking of “contractual parties” instead of “contractual comrades” and of “general moral principles” instead of Volksgemeinschaft. Palandt/Bernhard Danckelmann, § 242 n.197 (9th ed. 1951). As an explanation for the merely cosmetic amendment, he declared that whilst the terminology of the Reichsgericht in 1939—“communal spirit” and “Volksgemeinschaft”—may have been influenced by National Socialism, “the idea behind it has merit” (id.). In 1969, from the 28^th edition onwards, Helmut Heinrichs obliterated every trace of politics from this discussion—this remains true for the present—whilst the doctrine itself remained the same, Palandt/Helmut Heinrichs, § 242 (28th ed. 1969). In contrast, the idea of a “unity of rights and duties”—as an attack on the notion of constitutional rights as liberties against the state—is still openly discussed among constitutional jurists, cf. Otto Depenheuer, in Handbuch Der Grundrechte n.52 (Detlef Merten & Hans-Jürgen Papier eds., vol. 1, 2004).Google Scholar

²¹⁹ Overview in Bodo Pieroth & Tobias Aubel, Juristenzeitung 504-10 (2003); Maunz-Dürig/Christian Hillgruber, GG art. 97 nn.55–62 (52d ed. 2008).Google Scholar

²²⁰ In §§ 1-3 of his preliminary draft of the General Part, Gebhardt had still planned to include rules for interpretation, see generally Werner Schubert, Die Vorlagen der Redaktoren für die erste Kommission zur Ausarbeitung des Entwurfs eines Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuches, I Allgemeiner Teil 1 (1981). The first commission eventually doubted the “usefulness of an inclusion of such tenets of jurisprudence” in a codification, Die Beratung des Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuchs in Systematischer Zusammenstellung der unveröffentlichten Quellen, II Allgemeiner Teil 1193 (Horst Heinrich Jakobs & Werner Schubert eds., 1985).Google Scholar

²²¹ It was, in fact, a regrouping and decidedly not—as Schoppmeyer, supra note 152, at 232–37, believed—a birth; in this regard, Schoppmeyer was probably fooled by Larenz's legend. Larenz, supra note 56, at 119–85.Google Scholar

²²² On this, see Foljanty's analysis. Foljanty, supra note 155, at 188–204; see also Ulfrid Neumann, in Rechtswissenschaft in der Bonner Republik 145–87 (Dieter Simon ed., 1994); Hofmann, supra note 205, at 10–21; on Weinkauff see generally Daniel Herbe, Hermann Weinkauff (1894–1981) (2008).Google Scholar

²²³ Josef Esser, Einführung In Die Grundbegriffe Des Rechtes Und Des Staates 14 (1949).Google Scholar

²²⁴ Canaris, supra note 152, at 37, 39.Google Scholar

²²⁵ Harry Westermann, Wesen und Grenzen der richterlichen Streitentscheidung im Zivilrecht 20–25 (1955).Google Scholar

²²⁶ Harry Westermann, Interessenkollisionen und ihre richterliche Wertung bei den Sicherungsrechten an Fahrnis und Forderungen 14–24 (1954); see also Westermann, supra note 225, at 15–24.Google Scholar

²²⁷ Helmut Coing, Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie, from 1950 to the 5th edition in 1993 in the final chapter on “purpose and method”; on this Rückert, supra note 8, at 526–29.Google Scholar

²²⁸ Hollstein, supra note 153, at 305–19. For context, see discussion supra Part E.Google Scholar

²²⁹ See the comparative analysis in Kauhausen, supra note 112, at 83. For further studies focusing on Larenz, see id. at 111–26; on Boehmer, see id. at 168–77; on Lange, see Wolf, Wilhelm, Vom alten zum neuen Privatrecht: Das Konzept Der Normgestützten Kollektivierung in den zivilrechtlichen Arbeiten Heinrich Langes (1900–1977) 288–91 (1998); on Lehmann, see Depping, supra note 103, at 237–38.Google Scholar

²³⁰ Hans Welzel, Naturrecht und Rechtspositivismus, here quoted from the reprint in Naturrecht oder Rechtspositivismus 337 (Werner Maihofer ed., 1962). Foljanty discusses this as well. See Foljanty, supra note 155, at 196–203; Ralf Dreier, Zum Begriff der „Natur der Sache“ 35–82 (1965). For the long history of this argument, see Schröder, supra note 8, at 64–65, 265–68 (on the very similar resistance against a further development of the law by systemic deduction in the 19th century), 336–37.Google Scholar

²³¹ Gustav Radbruch, Gustav Radbruch Gesamtausgabe 229–54 (vol. 3, 1990). On this, see Neumann's comparative analysis, Ulfrid Neumann, Naturrecht Und Politik 83–86 (Karl Graf Ballestrem ed., 1993); Foljanty, supra note 155, at 198.Google Scholar

²³² Coing, supra note 227, at 92–93; on this Foljanty, supra note 155, at 183–85, 199.Google Scholar

²³³ Larenz, supra note 85, at 309.Google Scholar

²³⁴ Karl Larenz, Zur Beurteilung Des Naturrechts 31–32 (1947); see also Foljanty, supra note 155, at 200.Google Scholar

²³⁵ On this, see the analysis by Josef Kokert, Der Begriff Des Typus Bei Karl Larenz 95–119, 206-10 (1995); critically Bernd Hüpers, Karl Larenz – Methodenlehre und Philosophie des Rechts in Geschichte und Gegenwart 468–73 (2010). On the kinship between Larenz's conception of type and Binder's positions—and thus a completely different notion of type than Max Weber's—see Larenz, Methodenlehre, supra note 85, at 108.Google Scholar

²³⁶ Larenz, Methodenlehre, supra note 85, at 127.Google Scholar

²³⁷ Esser, supra note 101, at 132.Google Scholar

²³⁸ Id. at 135.Google Scholar

²³⁹ Id. at 28.Google Scholar

²⁴⁰ Josef Esser, Deutsche Rechtswissenschaft 69 (1942). This meant a “thorough consideration and interpretation of the social and economical relations.” See Esser, supra note 102 (reviewing Lange & Hedemann), at 95.Google Scholar

²⁴¹ Günter Haupt, über Faktische Vertragsverhältnisse (1941); see also Lambrecht, supra note 103, at 5–17.Google Scholar

²⁴² Haupt, supra note 241, at 11.Google Scholar

²⁴³ Josef Esser, Gedanken zur Dogmatik der „faktischen Schuldverhältnisse”, in Gedanken zur Dogmatik (1958), quoted from the reprint in Wege der Rechtsgewinnung 56 (Peter Häberle & Hans G. Leser eds., 1990). Esser expressed a different view in Josef Esser, review of Haupt, Schmollers Jahrbuch 230–34 (1942).Google Scholar

²⁴⁴ Esser, supra note 223, at 133.Google Scholar

²⁴⁵ Josef Esser, in Juristenzeitung 521–26 (1953); see also Kauhausen, supra note 112, at 266–68.Google Scholar

²⁴⁶ See Vogel, Stefan, Josef Esser – Brückenbauer zwischen Theorie und Praxis 12 (2009); see also Johannes Köndgen, Deutschsprachige Zivilrechtslehrer des 20. Jahrhunderts in Berichten ihrer Schüler 103–27 (Stefan Grundmann & Karl Riesenhuber eds., vol. 1, 2007).Google Scholar

²⁴⁷ Josef Esser, Grundsatz Und Norm In Der Richterlichen Fortbildung Des Privatrechts (1956); see also Vogel, supra note 246, at 65–92; Foljanty, supra note 155, at 216–17; Birgit Schäfer, in Methodik des Zivilrechts 261–84, supra note 8; Wolfgang Fikentscher, Methoden des Rechts 411–14 (vol. 3, 1976).Google Scholar

²⁴⁸ Foljanty, supra note 155, at 212–16.Google Scholar

²⁴⁹ Skeptically Larenz, supra note 85, at 126.Google Scholar

²⁵⁰ Josef Esser, Vorverständnis und Methodenwahl in der Rechtsfindung. Rationalitätsgarantien der Richterlichen Entscheidungspraxis (1970).Google Scholar

²⁵¹ On this Vogel, supra note 246, at 93–96; Monika Frommel, Die Rezeption der Hermeneutik bei Karl Larenz und Josef Esser 83–96, 207–30 (1981).Google Scholar

²⁵² Gustav Radbruch, Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft (1929), here quoted from the 11^th edition, Gustav Radbruch, Einführung In Die Rechtswissenschaft 166 (11th ed. 1964); Gustav Radbruch, 22 Archiv für Sozialgeschichte 355–70 (1906).Google Scholar

²⁵³ Hermann Isay, Rechtsnorm und Entscheidung 177–81 (1929).Google Scholar

²⁵⁴ Franz Bydlinski, Juristische Methodenlehre 23–24 (1991). Additional critical voices can be found in Vogel, supra note 246, at 115–34.Google Scholar

²⁵⁵ Larenz, supra note 56, at 122.Google Scholar

²⁵⁶ Id. at 121.Google Scholar

²⁵⁷ Michael Röhls, in Methodik des Zivilrechts 309–25 (on Wiethölter), supra note 8; Rückert, supra note 8, at 530.Google Scholar

²⁵⁸ See Rückert, supra note 8, at 531, as well as Alfred Rinken, Einführung in das juristische Studium § 15 (2d ed. 1991).Google Scholar

²⁵⁹ Concisely on this: Dieter Simon, Essays zur Periodisierung der deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte 160–67 (Martin Broszat ed., 1990).Google Scholar

²⁶⁰ Esser, supra note 247, at 97.Google Scholar

²⁶¹ Josef Esser, in Werte und Wertewandel in der Gesetzesanwendung 25–26 (Josef Esser & Erwin Stein, eds., 1966).Google Scholar

²⁶² Hans Ryffel, Rechtssoziologie 212 n.155 (1974).Google Scholar

²⁶³ Wolfgang Birke, Richterliche Rechtsanwendung und gesellschaftliche Auffassungen 41–59 (1968).Google Scholar

²⁶⁴ In particular, see the essays by Gunther Teubner, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann & Klaus Lüderssen, in Generalklauseln als Gegenstand der Sozialwissenschaften (Klaus Lüderssen ed., 1978).Google Scholar

²⁶⁵ Rolf Sack, in Wettbewerb in Recht und Praxis 7 (1985).Google Scholar

²⁶⁶ Alternativkommentar/Reinhard Damm, § 138 n.58 (1987).Google Scholar

²⁶⁷ Gunther Teubner, Standards und Direktiven in Generalklauseln 112 (1971).Google Scholar

²⁶⁸ Staudinger/Rolf Sack, BGB § 138 n.47 (12th ed. 2003).Google Scholar

²⁶⁹ Rüdiger Lautmann, Die Soziologie vor den Toren der Jurisprudenz (1971).Google Scholar

²⁷⁰ Gralf-Peter Calliess, Jahrbuch Junger Zivilrechtswissenschaftler 87 (Brigitta Jud & Thomas Bachner eds., 2000).Google Scholar

²⁷¹ See, however, Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, in 200 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 282–89 (2000), who attempts a degree of symbiosis between theories of material and procedural justice. In addition, see Wolfgang Fikentscher's concept of “Case Norms,” in Methoden des Rechts, 202–67 (vol. 4, 1977).Google Scholar

²⁷² The following names may suffice: Klug, Perelmann, F. Müller, Alexy, Kriele, U. Neumann, as well as Dworkin, Luhmann and Habermas who triggered important discussions. On the vibrant contemporary debates in public law, see e.g. Matthias Jestaedt, das Mag in der Theorie richtig sein … (2006); öffentliches Recht und Wissenschaftstheorie (Andreas Funke & Jörn Lüdemann eds., 2009); Was weiß Dogmatik? (Gregor Kirchhof et al. eds., 2011) and the essays in Veröffentlichungen Der Vereinigung Der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer (vol. 71, 2012).Google Scholar

²⁷³ Josef Esser, in Wege der Rechtsgewinnung 328–31, 363–96, 420–27 (Peter Häberle & Hans Georg Leser, eds., 1990).Google Scholar

²⁷⁴ Spiros Simitis, in 172 Archiv Für Die Civilistische Praxis 135 (1972).Google Scholar

²⁷⁵ Esser, supra note 247, at 6 (with reference to Wilburg).Google Scholar

²⁷⁶ Werner Flume, in Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 1497 (1994).Google Scholar

²⁷⁷ Heinrich Stoll, Die Lehre von den Leistungsstörungen. Denkschrift des Ausschusses für Personen-, Vereins- und Schuldrecht 32–35 (1936); see also Sessler, supra note 67, at 23–106 (Stoll's system before 1933), 106–99 (Stoll's system after 1933). For a discussion of the 1994 debates, see Thiessen, supra note 113, at 232 n. 135.Google Scholar

²⁷⁸ Dieter Rabe, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 1655 (1996). Previously on this debate Thiessen, supra note 113, at 232–33.Google Scholar

²⁷⁹ Ulrich Huber, in Gutachten und Vorschläge zur überarbeitung des Schuldrechts 699–702, 705–08 (Bundesminister der Justiz ed., vol. 1, 1981); see also id. at 908 (containing the bibliography, which features the entry “Stoll, memorandum” without any reference to National Socialism).Google Scholar

²⁸⁰ Flume, supra note 276, at 1500.Google Scholar