¹ J.H.H. Weiler, Un ‘Europa Cristiana. Un Saggio Esplorativo (2003) (Polish translation: J.H.H. Weiler, Chescijanska Europa. Kontytucyjny Imperializm Czy Wielokulturowosc? 102-104 (2003)). Also, see J.H.H. Weiler, In Defense of the Status Quo: Europe's Constitutional Sonderweg, in European Constitutionalism Beyond the State, 7, 8 (J.H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003)).Google Scholar

² See Kumm, Mattias & Comella, Victor Ferreres, The Future of Constitutional Conflict in the European Union: Constitutional Supremacy after the Constitutional Treaty, Jean Monnet Working Paper 5/04, 8-10, http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/04/040501-15.pdf.Google Scholar

³ See Bogdandy, Armin von, Doctrine of Principles, Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03, 41 (2003), http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/03/030901-01.pdf.Google Scholar

⁴ Case 6/60, Humblet v. Belgian State, 1960 E.C.R. 559, 569 (English special edition). The importance of this decision was lately reaffirmed by Jan Wouters, National Constitutions and the European Union, 27 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 25, 68 (2000). See also Bruno De Witte, “Retour à Costa”. La primauté du droit communautaire à lumière du droit internationale, 20 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit European 425, 426-7 (1984).Google Scholar

⁵ The Order of the Court of 22 June 1965, in Case 9/65, Acciaierie San Michele SpA v. High Authority of the ECSC, 1967 E.C.R. 27, 30 (English special edition).Google Scholar

⁶ Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 12 (English special edition).Google Scholar

⁷ Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585, 593-594 (English special edition).Google Scholar

⁸ See Jean Boulouis & R.M. Chevallier, Grands arrětes de la Cour de Justice des Communautes Europeennes 140 (6^th ed. 1994); Jan Wouters, National Constitutions and the European Union, 27 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 25, 66 (2000).Google Scholar

⁹ See especially Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, para. 3; Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, 1987 E.C.R. 4199, paras. 11-16.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm et al. v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E.C.R. 1, para. 6.Google Scholar

¹¹ Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, 1978 E.C.R. 629, paras. 17, 18.Google Scholar

¹² Id. at para. 18. See also Case 44/79, Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727, para. 14.Google Scholar

¹³ In the ECJ's opinion this obligation is valid even if these provisions were not actually applied, because their binding force would, in the Court's view, create a condition of uncertainty for citizens undertaking actions in trust law. See Case 167/73, Commission v. France, 1974 E.C.R. 359, paras. 41-48.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Wouters, Jan, National Constitutions and the European Union, 27 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 25, 67 (2000).Google Scholar

¹⁵ See, e.g., Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the European Commonwealth 97-122 (1999); Neil MacCormick, The New European Constitution. Legal and Philosophical Perspective 42-44 (2003). MacCormick does not, however, exclude international law as the normative basis of EU law. See also studies by J.H.H. Weiler in note 1; and by J.H.H Weiler & Ulrich R. Haltern, Autonomy of the Community Legal Order – Through the Looking Glass, 37 Harv. Int'l. L.J. 411 (1996).Google Scholar

¹⁶ See Schilling, Theodor, The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order: An Analysis of Possible Foundations, 37 Harv. Int'l. L.J. 389 (1996).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Wouters, Jan, National Constitutions and the European Union, 27 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 25, 34 (2000), speaks of “the large dependence of EU law on national constitutional law: without constitutional arrangements in the Member States there cannot be a European legal order.”Google Scholar

¹⁸ The argument is advanced by Anneli Albi & Elsuwege, Peter Van, The EU Constitution, National Constitutions and Sovereignty: An Assessment of a “European Constitutional Order,” 29 Eur. L. Rev. 741, 751 (2004). See Décision no. 2004-505 DC, Traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe case, Conseil Constitutionnel, (Nov. 19, 2004); available at www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2004/2004505/dc.htm. The Conseil Constitutionnel concluded that the Constitutional Treaty was an international treaty and its title was of no constitutional significance. Moreover, the primacy clause (Article I-6) in the view of the Conseil does not alter the nature of the Union or the scope of the primacy principle (item 13). For critical comment, see Editorial, A Pre-emptive Strike from the Palais Royal, 30 Eur. L. Rev. 1 (2005).Google Scholar

¹⁹ Neil MacCormick, The New European Constitution. Legal and Philosophical Perspective 47 (2003).Google Scholar

²⁰ Maduro, Miguel P., Europe and the Constitution: What if This Is As Good As It Gets?, in European Constitutionalism Beyond the State, 74, 98-101 (J.H.H. Weiler & Marlene Wind eds., 2003); Albi & Van Elsuwege, supra note 18, at 742.Google Scholar

²¹ Ewa Łętowska, Multicentryczność współczesnego systemu prawa i jej konsekwencje, 4 Panstwo I Prawo 3 (2005).Google Scholar

²² Pernice, Ingolf, Multilevel Constitutionalism in the European Union, in Whi-Paper 5/2002, available at http://www.whi-berlin.de/pernice-constitutionalism.htm; Franz C. Mayer, The European Constitution and the Courts. Adjudicating European Constitutional Law in a Multilevel System, Jean Monnet Working Paper 9/03, http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/03/030901-03.pdf.Google Scholar

²³ Philip Allott, The Health of Nations, Society and Law Beyond the State 179 (2002).Google Scholar

²⁴ The importance of this principle is also stressed by the ECJ despite its pro-Community approach. In particular, the ECJ opposes the infringement of the conferral principle through too great a latitude in interpreting the flexibility clause from Article 308 (ex Article 235) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. See Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1996 E.C.R. I-1759, para. 4. On the issue of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, see Gunnar Beck, The Problem of Kompetenz-Kompetenz: A Conflict between Right and Right in Which There Is No Praetor, 30 Eur. L. Rev. 42 (2005).Google Scholar

²⁵ It is advanced by Koen Lenaerts & Damien Gerard, The Structure of the Union according to the Constitution for Europe: the Emperor Is Getting Dressed, 29 Eur. L. Rev. 289, 301 (2004).Google Scholar

²⁶ Thus argued, e.g., by Amaryllis Verhoeven, The Europe Union in Search of a Democratic and Constitutional Theory 292 (2002); Albi & Van Elsuwege, supra note 18, at 755-759.Google Scholar

²⁷ Weiler, , supra note 1.Google Scholar

²⁸ An impressive collection of decisions of the national courts relating to Community law can be found in The Relationship Between European Community Law and National Law: The Cases (Andrew Oppenheimer ed., vol. I 1994 [hereafter: Oppenheimer I]; vol. II 2003 [hereafter: Oppenheimer II]).Google Scholar

²⁹ Mayer, , supra note 22, 29–30. Mayer does not exclude this in relation to courts in Belgium, Sweden, Austria, Portugal, and the UK as well as in relation to the courts of the new Member States. E.g., as stipulated by the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the Polish Constitutional Tribunal is the only arbiter of constitutionality of law binding in Poland. Its previous decisions indicate an amicable legal interpretation towards the process of European integration. Case K 15/04, In the judgment of 31 May 2004, OTK-A 5/2003, item 43 (2003), the Constitutional Tribunal indicated: ‘constitutionally correct and preferable is such interpretation of the law that serves to implement the constitutional principle of favouring the process of European integration and cooperation between States.’ However, in The Accession Treaty case of 11 May 2005 (K 18/04) the Polish Tribunal strongly emphasized the position of the Polish Constitution as the “supreme law of the State”. There is an English summary of the judgment, available at http://www.trybunal.gov.pl/eng/summaries/documents/K_18_04_GB.pdf.Google Scholar

³⁰ See, e.g., the judgment of the Spanish Constitutional Court, Electoral Law Constitutionality case (1991), Oppenheimer I 702, 704–705.Google Scholar

³¹ See “Le Ski” case (1971), Belgium, Cour de Cassation, Minister for Economic Affairs v. SA Fromagerie Franco-Suisse. Oppenheimer I 245, 266; Luxemburg, Conseil d'Etat, Bellion et al. v. Minister for the Civil Service, Oppenheimer I 668, 670.Google Scholar

³² Germany, BVerfG, Alfons Lütticke GmbH, BVerfGE 31, 145.Google Scholar

³³ Spain, Supreme Court, Canary Islands Custom Regulation, Oppenheimer I 694, 697; Ireland, Supreme Court, Crotty v. An Taoiseach et al., Oppenheimer I 599, 603 (opinion of Judge Finlay).Google Scholar

³⁴ BVerfG, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr – und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel (Solange I), BVerfGE 37, 271; BVerfG, Wünsche Handelsgesellschaft (Solange II) case (1986), BVerfGE 73, 339; BVerfG, Kloppenburg case (1987), BVerfGE 75, 223. The Bundesverfassungsgericht spoke of the “unwritten rule of primacy of Community law which has been inserted into the municipal legal order by laws approving the Community Treaties taken in conjunction with Article 24 (1) of the Basic Law.”Google Scholar

³⁵ Cour de Cassation, Administration des Contributions Indirects et Comité Interprofessionel des Vins Doux Naturels v. Ramel case (1970), Oppenheimer I 279, 283. The court gave those acts of secondary Community law “the force of international treaties;” Cour de Cassation, Administration des Douanes v. Société Cafés Jacques Vabre et Weigel et Compagnie case (1975), Oppenheimer I 287, 309–310. Regarding the EEC Treaty the court waived the requirement of reciprocity applied to other international agreements on account of the Treaty's established own procedure of dispute settlement in the event of failure to observe its provisions; Conseil d'Etat, Nicolo case (1989), Oppenheimer I, 335. Recently see Décision no 2004-496 DC of Conseil Constitutionnel, Loi pour la confiance dans l'économie numérique case, June 10, 2004, available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2004/2004496/2004496dc.htm). The Conseil Constitutionnel recognized that implementation of directives in the French legal system was based on the constitutional approval.Google Scholar

³⁶ Constitutional Court, Frontini v. Ministero Delle Finanze case (1973), Oppenheimer I 629, 634; Constitutional Court, Spa Grantial v. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato case (1984), Oppenheimer I 642, 646–647.Google Scholar

³⁷ Council of State, Banana Market case (1984), Oppenheimer I 576, 578; Council of State, Mineral Rights Discrimination case (1986), Oppenheimer I 581, 582; Council of State, Karella v. Minister of Industry case (1989), Oppenheimer I 584, 586.Google Scholar

³⁸ House of Lords, Factortame LTD v. Secretary of State for Transport case (1990) [judgment of Lord Bridge of Harwich], Oppenheimer I 882, 883.Google Scholar

³⁹ Court of Appeal of Coimbra, Cadima case (1986), Oppenheimer I 675, 679.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See, e.g. Kloppenburg case, supra note 34.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See, e.g. Spa Grantial case, supra note 36, at 648-650.Google Scholar

⁴² See, e.g., the decision of the Irish Supreme Court, Crotty case, supra note 33, at 600-603; the decision of the German BVerfG Maastricht Treaty Constitutionality case (1993), BVerfGE 89, 155; the decisions of the French Conseil de Constitutionnel, European Communities Amendment Treaty case (1970), Oppenheimer I 276; Treaty on European Union (Maastricht I) case (1992), Oppenheimer I 385; Treaty on European Union (Maastricht II) case (1992), Oppenheimer I 399; Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe case (2004), supra note 18; the decision of the Danish Supreme Court, Carlsen et al. v. Rasmussen case (1998), Oppenheimer II 175. In this context, of importance are also British decisions on account of the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty. See Regina v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Lord Rees-Mogg, Divisional Court (1993), Oppenheimer I 911.Google Scholar

⁴³ Mayer, , supra note 22, at 34-36, where the author speaks of ‘frictional phenomena.'Google Scholar

⁴⁴ BVerfG, Solange I, supra note 34; BVerfG, Solange II, supra note 34; BVerfG Banana Market Organization Constitutionality case (2000), BVerfGE 102, 147; Spa Granital, supra note 36; Fragd v. Amministrazione Delle Finanze Dello Stato case (1989), Oppenheimer 653, 657; Frontini, supra note 36, 640 (Italy); Aepesco case (1991), Oppenheimer 705, 706 (Spain); Carlsen et al. v. Rasmussen, note 42 (Denmark). See Mayer, supra note 22, at 29-32. Recently such reservations were also raised by the Spanish Constitutional Court in the Statement no. 1/2004 of 13 December 2004 where the Court stated that “the powers the exercise of which is transferred to the European Union could not, without a breach of the Treaty itself, be used as grounds for the European rulemaking the content of which would [be] contrary to the fundamental values, principles, or rights of our Constitution.” Quoted after Ricardo Alonso Garcia, The Spanish Constitution and the European Constitution: The Script for a Virtual Collision and Other Observations on the Principle of Primacy, 6 German Law Journal 1001, 1012 (2005).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ BVerfG, , Maastricht Treaty 1992 Constitutionality, supra note 42.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See, supra note 29.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See Maduro, , supra note 20, at 95-96.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Frowein observes in this context: ‘As long as the Community system has not developed into a federal structure, questions of sovereignty or final priority as to sources of law have to be kept in suspense,’ Jochen A. Frowein, Solange II, 25 CMLR 201, 204 (1988). Also, see Beck, supra note 24, at 67, who underlines that ‘the issue of Kompetenz-Kompetenz is part of the resultant catalogue of unanswered questions.'Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Such a postulate was voiced in reference to Article 8(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, which stipulates: ‘Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic of Poland.’ Stefan Hambura, Wyjście jest tylko jedno: zmiana konstytucji, RZECZPOSPOLITA of 27 May 2004, C2. For critical comments on this postulate see: Roman Kwiecień, Konstytucja zmian nie wymaga, RZECZPOSPOLITA of 2 June 2004, C2.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ See Schmid, Carl U., The Neglected Conciliation Approach to the ‘Final Arbiter’ Conflict, 36 CMLR 509, 512 (1999); Kumm/Comella (supra note 2), 24.Google Scholar

⁵¹ See especially case 314/85 Foto-Frost, supra note 9.Google Scholar

⁵² Schmid, , supra note 50, at 513-514; Mayer, supra note 22, at 38-40 (and literature on the subject given therein).Google Scholar

⁵³ BVerfG, Maastricht Treaty Constitutionality case, supra note 42. Also there and in the earlier judgment on Kloppenburg case, supra note 34. The BVerfG used the well-known term to denote the EC/EU Member States as ‘the masters of the Treaties.’ The sovereign status of the Member States has recently also been emphasized by the courts of other Members. See, e.g. the Danish Supreme Court's Carlsen et al. v. Rasmussen case, supra note 42; the Spanish Constitutional Court's Statement no.1/2004 case, supra note 44; the Polish Constitutional Tribunal's The Accession Treaty case, supra note 29.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See Obradović, Daniela, The Doctrine of Divisible Sovereignty in the Community Legal Order, in Studies on European Law, 26 (Michal Sewerynski ed., 1996).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty, supra note 15, at 132-142.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Allott, , supra note 23, at 176-179. See Abbi & Van Elsuwege, supra note 18 passim.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Lenaerts, Koen, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 Am. J. Comp. L. 205, 220 (1990).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ See Dashwood, Alan, States in the European Union, 23 Eur. L. Rev. 201, 202 (1998); Roman Kwiecień, Sovereignty of the European Union Member States: International Legal Aspects, in The Emerging Constitutional Law of the European Union – German and Polish Perspectives 339, 351-354 (Adam Bodnar et al. eds., 2003).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ ALAN DASHWOOD in WYATT & DASHWOOD'S EUROPEAN UNION LAW 151 (4^th edition 2000).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ In the Opinion 1/91, Draft agreement between the Community, on the one hand, and the countries of the European Free Trade Association, on the other, relating to the creation of the European Economic Area, 1991 E.C.R. I-6079, para. 21 (the ECJ stated that the Member States had “limited their sovereign rights in ever wider fields.”).Google Scholar

⁶¹ See e.g. the judgment of the Irish Supreme Court on Croty case, supra note 33.Google Scholar

⁶² Documents on European Union 285-286 (Anjo G. Harryvan & Jan Van Der Harst eds., 1997). A similar presentation of the problem is to be found in the French Constitution of 1958, where Article 88(1) states: “La République participe aux Communautés européennes et l'Union européenne, constituées d'Etats qui ont choisi librement, en vertu des traités qui les ont instituées, d'exercer en commun certaines de leurs compétences. Elle peut participer à l'Union européenne dans les conditions prévues par le traité établisant une Constitution pour l'Europe signé le 29 Octobre 2004,” available at http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/textes/c1958web.htm.Google Scholar

⁶³ Here especially worth noting is the first judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice – Case of the S.S. Wimbledon (Great Britain et al. v. Germany), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 25.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Such an understanding of State sovereignty is justified more broadly, e.g. Jerzy Kranz, Réflexions sur la souveraineté, in Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21^ST Century 183 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996); Roman Kwiecien, Suwerennosc Panstwa. Rekonstrukcja I Znaczenie Idei W Prawie Miedzynarodowym passim (2004).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Such a position was directly emphasized by the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in the Accession Treaty case. See, supra note 29.Google Scholar