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The Protection of Peacekeepers and International Criminal Law: Legal Challenges and Broader Protection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Abstract

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The concern for the safety and security of personnel involved in peacekeeping missions has grown in the last two decades, mainly because of the increased risks deriving from deployment in volatile environments and mandates comprising multiple tasks. This article provides an overview of the developments of international law regarding the protection of peacekeepers, with a special focus on international criminal law and its role in enhancing the safety of the personnel and objects involved in peacekeeping missions. Indeed, starting in 2008, international and hybrid tribunals have issued their first decisions and judgments against individuals indicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity in connection with attacks against peacekeepers.

After an analysis of the legal regimes established by the 1994 Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel and by international humanitarian law, the article examines the relevant international criminal law provisions and their application and interpretation by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the International Criminal Court. It is argued that the application of the specific war crime of attacking peacekeepers, introduced for the first time in the Rome Statute in 1998, presents particular challenges, but it has also led to the punishment of a broader range of offences against peacekeepers. Furthermore, the application of this crime may contribute to the broadening of the range of punishable offences under the more general war crime of attacking civilians, thus leading to the enhancement of the protection of civilians.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © 2010 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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