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Questions and Answers: Karlsruhe's Referral for a Preliminary Ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Karsten Schneider

Extract

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In the environment of ongoing endeavors to “rescue” the Euro, the Second Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) is meanwhile dealing with several constitutional complaints challenging matters that could be described as “the future of the German Bundesbank” and “the present and the past of the German Federal Government and the German Bundestag.” Or, to be more specific, the complainants currently challenge the prospective participation of the German Bundesbank in possible future implementations of the so called “OMT Framework” of 6 September 2012. They also argue that the German Federal Government and the German Bundestag “failed to act” regarding this OMT framework.

Type
Research Article
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 15 , Issue 2: Special issue - The OMT Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court , 01 March 2014 , pp. 217 - 239
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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2 The decision relates to the constitutional complaints of more than 11,000 complainants as well as to an application for a ruling in Organstreit proceedings (proceedings relating to disputes between constitutional organs).Google Scholar

3 See Press Release, 6 September 2012: Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transactions, European Central Bank (Sept. 6, 2012), http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html; European Central Bank, Monthly Bulletin September 7–12 (2012), available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/mobu/mb201209en.pdf.Google Scholar

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6 OMT Case, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 22.Google Scholar

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8 See id. at paras. 50–54.Google Scholar

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17 See Part. I.2.Google Scholar

18 See Schneider, supra note 5.Google Scholar

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28 See id. at paras. 17, 21, and 32.Google Scholar

29 See id. at paras. 26, 27, 29, and 31.Google Scholar

30 See id. at paras. 24, 25, and 26.Google Scholar

31 The new obligations can also be a subject of Organstreit proceedings. See id. at paras. 50 and 54.Google Scholar

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33 Greece Bailout Case, Case No. 2 BvR 987/10.Google Scholar

34 See id. at para. 113; ECB Monthly Bulletin, supra note 3 at 38–43.Google Scholar

35 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2661/06, 126 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 286 (July 6, 2010), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20100706_2bvr266106.html.Google Scholar

36 See id. The complainant in the Honeywell Case asserted a violation of its rights under Article 2.1 and Article 12.1 in conjunction with Article 20.3 and Article 101.1 sentence 2 of the Basic Law. Id. at para. 39.Google Scholar

37 OMT Case, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 53.Google Scholar

38 See Case, Greece Bailout, Case No. 2 BvR 987/10 at para. 113 and para. 118.Google Scholar

39 OMT Case, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 53.Google Scholar

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41 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvE 2/08, 123 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 267 (June 30, 2009), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.html, at paras. 240–41.Google Scholar

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43 OMT Case, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 53.Google Scholar

44 It is even hard to see how “unilateral usurpation of powers” is not just another name for “acting ultra-vires.” The FCC uses this expression considering the ECB's concept to be “meaningless and in any case not sufficiently workable.” See id. at para. 98.Google Scholar

45 The Second Senate has never before unanimously decided on the question of whether acts of European institutions and agencies are based on “manifest transgressions of powers”. Even Honeywell was handed down with 6–2 votes (no ultra-vires act). Justice Landau delivered a separate opinion pointing out: “The Senate majority places excessive requirements on the finding of an ultra-vires act on the part of the Community or Union bodies by the Federal Constitutional Court, and in this respect deviates from the Senate's judgment on the Treaty of Lisbon without any convincing reasons. It wrongly denies the existence of a transgression of competence on the part of the Court of Justice in the case of Mangold.” BVerfG, Case No. 2 BvR 2661/06 at para. 95 (Landau, dissenting).Google Scholar

46 OMT Case, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 13 (Lübbe-Wolff, dissenting).Google Scholar

47 See id. at para. 17 (Lübbe-Wolff, dissenting); id. at para. 7 (Gerhardt, dissenting).Google Scholar

48 Grundgesetz Für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], Dec. 25, 1992, BGBI. I at 2086, art. 23.1 (Ger.). “With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law. To this end the Federation may transfer sovereign powers by a law with the consent of the Bundesrat. The establishment of the European Union, as well as changes in its treaty foundations and comparable regulations that amend or supplement this Basic Law, or make such amendments or supplements possible, shall be subject to sections (2) and (3) of Article 79.” Id. Google Scholar

49 Grundgesetz Für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Grundgesetz] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23, 1949, BGBI. I, art. 59.2 (Ger.). “Treaties that regulate the political relations of the Federation or relate to subjects of federal legislation shall require the consent or participation, in the form of a federal law, of the bodies responsible in such a case for the enactment of federal law. In the case of executive agreements the provisions concerning the federal administration shall apply mutatis mutandis.” Id. Google Scholar

50 See Greece Bailout Case, Case No. 2 BvR 987/10 at para. 109; Schneider, supra note 5.Google Scholar

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53 See id. Google Scholar

54 Id. at 1.b (Leitsatz), para. 60.Google Scholar

55 See, e.g., Richter Hasenherz, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung, Feb. 9, 2014, at 20 (“Justice Milksop”).Google Scholar

56 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2661/06, 126 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 286 (July 6, 2010), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20100706_2bvr266106.html, at paras. 53–66.Google Scholar

57 An obiter dictum in the OMT Case expands on the Second Senate's options concerning the identity review (Identitätsrüge). OMT Case, Case No. 2 BvR 987/10 at paras. 102–03.Google Scholar

58 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvR 2661/06, 126 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 286 (July 6, 2010), http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20100706_2bvr266106.html, at para. 60.Google Scholar

59 See OMT Case, Case No. 2 BvR 987/10 at paras. 55–100.Google Scholar

60 See id. at paras. 56–83.Google Scholar

61 See id. at paras. 84–98.Google Scholar

62 See id. at para. 3.Google Scholar

63 See id. at para. 4.Google Scholar

64 See id. at para. 3 “These will be known as Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) and will be conducted within the following framework.”Google Scholar

65 See id. Google Scholar

66 See id. (“Conditionality”).Google Scholar

67 See id. Google Scholar

68 See id. Google Scholar

69 See id. Google Scholar

70 See id. (“Coverage”).Google Scholar

71 See id. Google Scholar

72 See id. Google Scholar

73 See id. (“Creditor treatment”).Google Scholar

74 See id. (“Sterilization”).Google Scholar

75 See id. (“Transparency”).Google Scholar

76 See id. at paras. 56–83.Google Scholar

77 See id. at paras. 84–98.Google Scholar

78 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvR 220/51, 1 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 97, 102–03 (Dec. 19, 1951); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvR 874/77, 58 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 81, 104–05 (July 1, 1981); Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvR 700/83, 68 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 376, 379–80 (Jan. 8, 1985).Google Scholar

79 OMT Case, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 at II.1.a.bb (emphasis added).Google Scholar

80 Id. at II.1.b (emphasis added).Google Scholar

81 Id. at paras. 99–100.Google Scholar

82 Id. at para. 99.Google Scholar

83 Id. Google Scholar

84 Id. at para. 100.Google Scholar

85 Id. Google Scholar

86 The ECB has declared its willingness to comply in the proceedings before the FCC.Google Scholar

87 OMT Case, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 100 (requirement 1).Google Scholar

88 See id. (requirement 2).Google Scholar

89 See id. (requirement 4).Google Scholar

90 See id. (requirement 5).Google Scholar

91 See id. (requirement 3).Google Scholar

92 Differing from OMT Case, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 100 (requirements 1, 2, 4, and 5).Google Scholar

93 See Part B. II. 1.Google Scholar

94 OMT Case, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 3 (“Creditor treatment”).Google Scholar

95 This “interpretation” would be in conflict with the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, Article 18.1, available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/legal/pdf/en_statute_2.pdf; the ESCB/ECB Statute forms an integral part of the primary law, see Article 51 and Article 1.3 TEU: “Open market and credit operations. In order to achieve the objectives of the ESCB and to carry out its tasks, the ECB and the national central banks may:Google Scholar

— operate in the financial markets by buying and selling outright (spot and forward) or under repurchase agreement and by lending or borrowing claims and marketable instruments, whether in euro or other currencies, as well as precious metals;

— conduct credit operations with credit institutions and other market participants, with lending being based on adequate collateral.”

96 Although there are famous “interpretations” to be found in the FCC's case law, e.g. “give notice not later than 48 hours before” has to be interpreted meaning “not in the case of spontaneous assemblies” Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 1 BvR 850/88, 85 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 69, 75 (Oct. 23, 1991).Google Scholar

97 OMT Case, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 3.Google Scholar

98 OMT Case, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 at II.2.b.bb.; it is an important detail that this translation is provided by the FCC, available at http://www.bverfg.de/entscheidungen/rs20140114_2bvr272813en.html.Google Scholar

99 See id. Google Scholar

100 See id. (emphasis added).Google Scholar

101 Id. (modified part emphasized).Google Scholar

102 Id. (corrected parts emphasized).Google Scholar

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104 OMT Case, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 at II.2.a.dd (emphasis added).Google Scholar

105 Id. at II.2.b.cc.Google Scholar

106 Id. at II.2.b.aa (emphasis added).Google Scholar

107 Id. (corrected parts emphasized).Google Scholar

108 Id. at para. 3 (“Coverage”); see ECB Monthly Bulletin, supra note 3.Google Scholar

109 The first sentence of the ruling is therefore not entirely correct, the FCC states: “The OMT Decision envisages that government bonds of selected Member States can be purchased up to an unlimited amount”; what the OMT framework envisages is not a purchase but the non-publication of an ex ante quantitative limit. See OMT Case, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 2.Google Scholar

110 See Part B.II.1.Google Scholar

111 Probably without both longest serving dissenting Justices, who might have left the court after twelve years in office. See Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz [BVerfGG] [Federal Constitutional Court Act], Aug. 11, 1993, BGBI I. at 1473, § 4.1 (Ger.).Google Scholar

112 OMT Case, Case No. 2 BvR 2728/13 at para. 53.Google Scholar