¹ See Manning, Alan, Monopsony in Motion: Imperfect Competition in Labor Markets (Princeton University Press ed. 2003).Google Scholar

² Hugh Collins, Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to Employment Protection Law, 10(3) Oxford J. Legal Stud. 353 (1990).Google Scholar

³ Companies, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk, make it possible to complete tasks through “crowdwork”—paying a number of people as little as $0.01 USD for a couple of minutes of labor —such as tagging pictures or doing translations online.Google Scholar

⁴ Agreements between Irish Actors' Equity SIPTU and the Institute of Advertising Practitioners in Ireland concerning the terms and conditions under which advertising agencies will hire actors. Competition Act 2002 (Competition Authority Decision No E/04/002 Case COM/14/03) (Ir.), https://www.ccpc.ie/business/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/04/E_04_002-Actors-Fees-Enforcement-Decision.pdf.Google Scholar

⁵ Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (Dutch Competition Authority 2007), Cao-tariefbepalingen voor zelfstandigen en de Mededingingswet: visiedocument (Collective labor agreements determining fees for self-employed and the competition law: a reflection document) (Neth.), http://docplayer.nl/23777662-Cao-tariefbepalingen-voor-zelfstandigen-en-de-mededingingswet.html.Google Scholar

⁶ Case C-413/13 FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2411.Google Scholar

⁷ As discussed below, the competition rules have always applied to the self-employed, however, this has never caused much question or debate because these self-employed were perceived as genuine entrepreneurs.Google Scholar

⁸ The etymology of the word freelance takes us back to the Middle Ages when it was used to refer to mercenary knights in possession of a horse and a lance, who would offer their services against payment to persons or states. See Oxford English Dictionary, http://www.oed.com/.Google Scholar

⁹ See infra Section 4 which discusses the concept of “undertaking” in EU competition law.Google Scholar

¹⁰ See Commission Recommendation concerning the definition of micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (EC), 2003 O.J (L124/36), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/new-sme-definition-user-guide-and-model-declaration. (which provides the following definition of an enterprise: “An enterprise is considered to be any entity engaged in an economic activity, irrespective of its legal form. This includes, in particular, self-employed persons and family businesses engaged in craft or other activities, and partnerships or associations regularly engaged in an economic activity”).Google Scholar

¹¹ Giedo Jansen, Self-Employment as Atypical or Autonomous Work: Diverging Effects on Political Orientations, 0(0) Socio-Econ. Rev. 1 (2016).Google Scholar

¹² Karin Schulze Buschoff & Claudia Schmidt, Adapting Labour Law and Social Security to the Needs of the “New Self-Employed” – Comparing the UK, Germany and the Netherlands, 19(2) J. Eur. Soc. Pol'y 147, 148 (2009).Google Scholar

¹³ Id. at 148.Google Scholar

¹⁴ A 2014 survey of 24 European countries shows that 14% of workers are self-employed. The highest numbers of self-employed individuals are in Southern and Eastern European countries, with 30% of the workforce in Greece being self-employed. Further, numbers are rapidly rising in the Netherlands and the UK. See Hatfield, Izzy, Self-employment in Europe, Inst. Pub. Pol'y Res. Report, 3, figure 2.1 on 8 (2015). The report uses data from Eurostat.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See Jansen, supra note 11, at 4, figure 1. See also van Stel, André, Wennekers, Sander & Scholman, Gerard, Solo Self-Employed Versus Employer Entrepreneurs: Determinants and Macro-Economic Effects in OECD Countries, EIM Research Report (2014), http://ondernemerschap.panteia.nl/pdf-ez/h201212.pdf.Google Scholar

¹⁶ The term is often linked to the work of Buschoff & Schmidt, supra note 12.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁸ Jansen, supra note 11.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Id at 22. Jansen's findings question traditional thinking about self-employed. Theories based on the understanding that self-employed are entrepreneurs predict that they would support more right-wing policies when it comes to labor protection, as their success would depend on the ability to easily hire and fire employees. Furthermore, self-employed supposedly exhibit a stronger preference for work autonomy and a lower preference for job security. Jansen tests these hypotheses empirically and finds that although solo self-employed generally prefer welfare policies to the right of the political spectrum, this is not true for those experiencing income and employment insecurity. Jansen concludes that “vulnerability affects self-employed workers and temporary employees in more or less similar fashion: greater insecurities strengthen left-wing political orientations and weaken right-wing political orientations.”Google Scholar

²⁰ Fabian Dekker, Self-Employed Without Employees: Managing Risks in Modern Capitalism, 38(4) Pol. & Pol'y 765, 768 (2010).Google Scholar

²¹ Collins, supra note 2 citing Industrial Relations in Britain 95–98 (GS Bain ed., Oxford 1983).Google Scholar

²² Collins, supra note 2, at 359–362.Google Scholar

²³ Judy Fudge, Blurring Legal Boundaries: Regulating for Decent Work, in Challenging the Legal Boundaries of Work Regulation 10 (Judy Fudge, Shae McCrystal & Kamala Sankaran eds.) (2012).Google Scholar

²⁴ Id. at 13.Google Scholar

²⁵ Case C-398/95 SETTG v Ypourgos Ergasias [1997] ECLI:EU:C:1997:282 affirmed in C-22/98 Becu and Others [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:419, [36].Google Scholar

²⁶ Green Paper on Modernising Labour Law to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century, COM (2006) 708 final (Nov. 22, 2006) (speaking of “persons posing falsely as self-employed workers to circumvent national law.”).Google Scholar

²⁷ See Comparative Report 2015: The Concept of worker Under Article 45 TFEU and Certain Non-Standard Forms of Employment, at 49 (Apr. 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?langId=en&docId=15476. See also Atypical Forms of Employment in the Aviation Sector (2015), https://www.eurocockpit.be/sites/default/files/report_atypical_employment_in_aviation_15_0212_f.pdf.Google Scholar

²⁸ Id. at 10, 46.Google Scholar

²⁹ Valerio De Stefano, The Rise of the “Just-In-Time Workforce”: On-Demand Work, Crowdwork and Labour Protection in the “Gig-Economy”, in International Labour Office, Inclusive Labour Markets, Labour Relations and Working Conditions Branch (2016) (Geneva: ILO, Conditions of work and employment series, No. 71).Google Scholar

³⁰ Moshe Marvit, How Crowdworkers Became the Ghosts in the Digital Machine, The Nation (Feb. 5, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/how-crowdworkers-became-ghosts-digital-machine/.Google Scholar

³¹ A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy, COM (2016) 356 final (June 2, 2016).Google Scholar

³² Antonio Aloisi, Commoditized Workers: Case Study Research on Labor Law Issues Arising from a Set of “On-Demand/Gig Economy” Platforms, 37(3) Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 653 (2016).Google Scholar

³³ See id.; See also Stefano, Valerio De, Non-Standard Workers and Freedom of Association: A Critical Analysis of Restrictions to Collective Rights from A Human Rights Perspective 1 (Working Paper CSDLE “Massimo D'Antona” INT-123/2015, 2015); De Stefano (2016) supra note 29; Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 479 (2016); Adrian Todolí-Signes, ‘Uber Economy’: ¿Employee, Self-Employed or a Need of a Special Employment Regulation? (2015) (SSRN Working Paper) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2703057.Google Scholar

³⁴ There are different approaches to define what constitutes a “worker.” Relevant questions include the notion of control—to what extent does the company control or is able to control the worker; the imbalance of power in the relationship between employer and employee; the extent of integration in the organization in the sense of bearing own commercial risk or not; the availability of entrepreneurial opportunities; the ownership of the tools necessary for production. For a detailed discussion from a US perspective, see Rogers, supra note 33, at 479–520. See also De Stefano (2016), supra note 29, at 6-10; Guy Davidov, Freelancers: An Intermediate Group in Labour Law?, in Challenging the Legal Boundaries of Work Regulation (Judy Fudge, Shae McCrystal & Kamala Sankaran eds.) (2012) at 171.Google Scholar

³⁵ Already in 1990, Hugh Collins spoke of a “crisis in legal concepts.” Collins, supra note 2, at 369.Google Scholar

³⁶ Jeremias Prassl & Martin Risak, Uber, TaskRabbit, & Co: Platforms as Employers? Rethinking the Legal Analysis of Crowdwork 37 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 619 (2016).Google Scholar

³⁷ See Rogers, supra note 33.Google Scholar

³⁸ Notable exceptions are Marc van der Woude, The Undertaking and its Employees; Some Reflections on an Ambiguous Relationship, in Liber Amicorum for M. Czucz 657 (Szeged 2016); Julian Nowag, The UBER-Cartel? UBER Between Labour and Competition Law, 3 Lund Student EU L. Rev. 95 (2016); Marina Lao, Workers in the “Gig” Economy: The Case for Extending the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 51 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1543 (2018).Google Scholar

³⁹ Adrian Chen, An Uber Labor Movement Born in a Laguardia Parking Lot, The New Yorker (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/an-uber-labor-movement-born-in-a-laguardia-parking-lot; UK–Deliveroo Workers Seek Workers' Rights and Union Recognition, Staffing Industry Analysts (November 8, 2016), http://www2.staffingindustry.com/eng/Editorial/Daily-News/UK-Deliveroo-workers-seek-workers-rights-and-union-recognition-39984.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See Challenging the Legal Boundaries of Work Regulation (Judy Fudge, Shae McCrystal & Kamala Sankaran eds.) (2012); see also Shae McCrystal, Organising Independent Contractors: The Impact of Competition Law, in Challenging the Legal Boundaries of Work Regulation at 171 (Judy Fudge, Shae McCrystal & Kamala Sankaran eds.) (2012). See also Buescher, Thomas, FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, Another Example of Why We Need to Take a Fresh Look at the Common Law Test for Independent Contractor Status, in ABA Labor Law Meeting (2010), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/labor_law/meetings/2010/2010_dll_buescher.authcheckdam.pdf; Camilo Rubiano, Precarious Work and Access to Collective Bargaining: What are the Legal Obstacles?, 5 (1) Int'l J. Lab. Res. 133, 144 (2013) (noting that in recent years competition authorities have actively targeted collective bargaining agreements covering the self-employed, and lists the Netherlands, and Denmark as examples).Google Scholar

⁴¹ Bruno Veneziani, Right of Collective Bargaining and Action (Article 28), in European Labour Law and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 53, 56 (Brian Bercusson ed., 2002) (noting that many national constitutions contain the right to collective bargaining and some provide an obligation for negotiation on specific issues with given regularity).Google Scholar

⁴² G.A. Res. 217(III) A, A Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at art. 23.4 (Dec. 10, 1948).Google Scholar

⁴³ G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, at art. 8 (Jan. 3, 1976) (protecting the right to collective bargaining and industrial action).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 11, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U. N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ See International Labour Organization Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, opened for signature July 9, 1948, CO 87 (entered into force July 4, 1950); see also International Labour Organization Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, opened for signature July 1, 1948, CO 98 (entered into force July 18, 1951).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ As decided in Case C-67/96 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:430.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Higher wages for workers would translate to higher prices or fewer quantities of the products produced by firms, thus negatively impacting consumer welfare.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ See Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (EU) No. 2014/104 of Nov. 26, 2014, 2014 O.J. (L. 349) (on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union); C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and Others [2001] ECLI:EU:C:2001:465.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ In the case of the term worker, the Court has held that ever since Case 75/63 Hoekstra v Bestuur der Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel en Ambachten [1964] ECLI:EU:C:1964:19; with respect to the notion of undertaking, since Case C-41/90 Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECLI:EU:C:1991:161. In Hoekstra, the Court established that the concept of worker, for the purpose of applying EU law, is an autonomous concept. In Höfner and Elser, the Court held that the concept of ‘undertaking’ for the purpose of EU competition law, is an autonomous concept, not limited to definitions of ‘undertaking’ in the domestic legal system.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Case C-256/01 Debra Allonby v Accrington & Rossendale College [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:18Google Scholar

⁵¹ Case C-256/01 Debra Allonby v Accrington & Rossendale College [2004] ECLI:EU:C:2004:18, [7], confirmed in Case C-413/13 FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2411, [35]Google Scholar

⁵² This notion of undertaking was first established in Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser and has been upheld ever since.Google Scholar

^{53 53} Case C-413/13 FNV Kiem, [18]. See also [19] in which the Court took into account the fact that in adopting the national provisions on competition, the Netherlands legislature explicitly aimed to harmonize its legislation with the European one. See also Case C-32/11 Allianz Hungária Biztosító and Others, EU:C:2013:160,[20].Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See Seanad Deb. (July 6, 2016) (Ir.), http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/. Statement by Minister for Jobs, Enterprise and Innovation, Ms. Mary Mitchell O'Connor:Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Tracey Lien, Lyft Settles Worker Misclassification Lawsuit for $12.25 Million, Los Angeles Times (Jan. 27, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-lyft-settlement-20160126-story.html; Mike Isaac, Judge Overturns Uber's Settlement with Drivers, The New York Times (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/19/technology/uber-settlement-california-drivers.html; but see Mr. Y Aslam, Mr. J Farrar, & Others v. Uber [2016], https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/judgments/mr-y-aslam-mr-j-farrar-and-others-v-uber/ (a London employment tribunal found Uber drivers to meet the criteria for “worker;” the London employment tribunal judgment is currently under appeal).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Circuit 2009). In the UK, Deliveroo couriers lost a case in which they pressed for the right to collective bargaining. However, the Central Arbitration Committee found that the workers were self-employed. See Butler, Sarah, ‘Deliveroo wins right not to give riders minimum wage or holiday pay’ (The Guardian, Nov. 14, 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/nov/14/deliveroo-couriers-minimum-wage-holiday-pay. The decision of the Committee—Case Number: TUR1/985(2016) Nov. 14, 2017—is available at https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/663126/Acceptance_Decision.pdf.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Case C-22/98 Becu and Others [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:419.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Case C-268/99 Jany and Others [2001] ECLI:EU:C:2001:616.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Case C-256/01 Allonby. Google Scholar

⁶⁰ C-22/98 Becu and Others [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:419; Case C-309/99 Wouters and others [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:98; Case C-413/13 FNV Kiem. Google Scholar

⁶¹ Case C-85/96 Martínez Sala [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:217, [31]. In this case the Court held that the definition of worker for the purposes of ex. Art. 48 EC (free movement of workers) could differ from the definition of “worker” for the purpose of ex. Art 51 EC (regarding powers of the Council to adopt measures related to social security of workers).Google Scholar

⁶² Case C-413/13 FNV Kiem, para. 34.Google Scholar

⁶³ Collins, supra note 2, at 369; Rogers, supra note 33.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Case C-67/96 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:28, [215].Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Buschoff & Schmidt, supra note 12, at 150.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Case C-413/13, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v. Staat der Nederlanden, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2411.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Id. Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Frans J.L. Pennings, Exceptie van de mededingingsbepalingen voor (schijn)zelfstandigen: de zaak FNV Kiem, 4 Nederlands tijdschrift voor Europees recht 111, 116 (2015).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Robert Booth, ‘There's No Compassion’: Hermes Cut Driver's Work as Wife was Dying: Peter Jamieson asked to switch delivery days to take his wife to hospital, but says company refused, then withdrew his work, The Guardian (Sept. 11, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/sep/11/hermes-driver-lost-rounds-asking-swap-days. According to the driver, contractor Hermes refused to give him future assignments because he did not fulfill the shifts he was assigned.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Homa Khaleeli, The Truth About Working for Deliveroo, Uber and the On-Demand Economy, The Guardian (June 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/jun/15/he-truth-about-working-for-deliveroo-uber-and-the-on-demand-economy. To quote from the article:Google Scholar

⁷¹ Sheelah Kolhatkar, Juno Takes on Uber, The New Yorker (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/10/10/juno-takes-on-uber. A driver notes that switching between the two apps is risky “because if you turned down an Uber pickup to take one from Juno your Uber rating might take a hit.”Google Scholar

⁷² See Case C-434/15, Asociación Profesional Elite Taxi v. Uber Sys. Spain SL, 2017 ECLI:EU:C:2017:981.Google Scholar

⁷³ Id. at paras. 51–52.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Id. at para. 54.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Id. at paras. 44–55 (the AG makes arguments related to the control exercised by Uber over its drivers, including use of ratings, control of prices, limited discretion, algorithm-based management); Id. at paras. 63–64 where the AG argues Uber drivers do not pursue independent economic activity).Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Aloisi, supra note 32, at 669.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ European Commission, A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy, supra note 31, at 12 (referring to the criteria in Jany). Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Id. Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Todoli-Signes, supra note 33, at 7.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Aloisi, supra note 32, at 671.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Fabian Dekker, Self-Employed Without Employees: Managing Risks in Modern Capitalism, 38(4) Pol. & Pol'y 765, 768 (2010).Google Scholar

⁸² Mies Westerveld, The Stepchild of Labour Law: The Complex Relationship Between Independent Labour and Social Insurance, Inaugural lecture at the University of Amsterdam (Dec. 2, 2011).Google Scholar

⁸³ Many independents have expressed their concern about the lack of protection from the platform and the fact that when serving a client, they find themselves “on their own.” Uber drivers, Handy cleaners, and Airbnb hosts have all expressed worry about their personal safety and their property. While some companies—such as Handy—practice blacklisting problematic customers who harass workers, their own responsibility does not seem to stretch far. See Khaleeli, supra note 70.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ See Uber, https://www.uber.com/en-AU/drive/vehicle-solutions/; Leslie Hook, Uber Hitches a Ride with Car Finance Schemes, Financial Times (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/921289f6-5dd1-11e6-bb77-a121aa8abd95. Nicole Arata, 5 Ways to Get a Car You Need to Drive for Uber or Lyft, USA Today (Jan. 8, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2017/01/08/5-ways-get-car-you-need-drive-uber-lyft/96214312/. According to discussions on the informal forum of Uber drivers, this is a way for Uber to create “indentured drivers”; see Uber & the Auto Loan Bubble, UberPeople.net, (last edited Aug. 24, 2016), https://uberpeople.net/threads/uber-the-auto-loan-bubble-an-analysis.98564/.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Case C-413/13 FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v Staat der Nederlanden [2014] Opinion of Advocate General Wahl ECLI:EU:C:2014:2215, [45].Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Mr. Y Aslam, Mr. J Farrar, & Others v. Uber [2016], para. 90, https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/judgments/mr-y-aslam-mr-j-farrar-and-others-v-uber/ Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Case C-268/99 Jany and Others. Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Under the Association Agreements at the time, they could not benefit from the free movement of workers provisions but could benefit from the freedom of establishment.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Case C-268/99 Jany and Others, [24], question 5.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy (CNSD) [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:303, [38].Google Scholar

⁹¹ For instance, the issue of working for a limited number of hours has been discussed by the Court with respect to the so called “zero hour” or “on-call” contracts. The Court has considered that the existence of such a contract could indicate an employment relationship, but that it is up to the national courts to determine this while taking into account the duration of activities and irregular nature. See Verschueren, Herwig, Being Economically Active: How It Still Matters, in Residence, Employment and Social Rights of Mobile Persons: On How EU Law Defines Where They Belong 187, 199 (Verschueren ed., Intersentia, 2016). In the Raulin case, the Court determined that work for limited hours could be an indication that the activity in question is of purely marginal or ancillary nature. See Case C-357/89 V. J. M. Raulin v Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen [1992] ECLI:EU:C:1992:87, [11–14].Google Scholar

⁹² Case C-107/94 P. H. Asscher v Staatssecretaris van Financiën (Asscher) [1996] ECLI:EU:C:1996:251, [25–26](emphasis added).Google Scholar

⁹³ A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy, supra note 31, at 13.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ O'Brien, Spaventa & de Coninck, supra note 27, at 27–29.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Fudge, supra note 23; Lynda Gratton, The Shift: The Future of Work Is Already Here (2011).Google Scholar

⁹⁶ A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy, supra note 31, at 11.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Gratton, supra note 95.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ See Rogers, Brishen, Redefining Employment for the Modern Economy, in American Constitution Society for Law & Policy 4 (Issue Brief Oct. 2016). See Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015).Google Scholar

⁹⁹ See e.g. Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavel Pavlov and Others v Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:428, [75]; Case C-475/99 Ambulanz Glöckner v. Landkreis Aüdwestpflaz [2001] ECLI:EU:C:2001:577, [19]; Case C-118/85 Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic [1987] ECLI:EU:C:1987:283, [7]; Case C-35/96 Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic (CNSD) [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:303, [36]; Case C-205/03 P Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN) v Commission of the European Communities [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:453, [25].Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Joined cases T-217/03 and T-245/03 Fédération nationale de la coopération bétail et viande (FNCBV) (T-217/03) and Fédération nationale des syndicats d'exploitants agricoles (FNSEA) and Others (T-245/03) v Commission of the European Communities (French beef) [2006] ECLI:EU:T:2006:391.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ 1978 O.J. (L 157) 15.6.Google Scholar

¹⁰² See 1985 O.J. (L 219) 17.8. (applying rules of competition to transport by rail, road, and inland waterways).Google Scholar

¹⁰³ 1976 O.J. (L 254/40) 17.9, at 45.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Case C-309/99 Wouters and others [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:98; C-35/99 Arduino [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:97.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 Pavel Pavlov and Others v Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:428.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ See Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:303, [37-38].Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Competition Act 2002 (Competition Authority Decision No E/04/002 Case COM/14/03) (Ir.), https://www.ccpc.ie/business/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2017/04/E_04_002-Actors-Fees-Enforcement-Decision.pdf (agreements between Irish Actors' Equity SIPTU and the Institute of Advertising Practitioners in Ireland concerning the terms and conditions under which advertising agencies will hire actors).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ See Case C-413/13 FNV Kiem; see also Dutch Competition Authority 2007 (Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit), Cao-tariefbepalingen voor zelfstandigen en de Mededingingswet: visiedocument (Collective labor agreements determining fees for self-employed and the competition law: a reflection document) (Neth.), http://docplayer.nl/23777662-Cao-tariefbepalingen-voor-zelfstandigen-en-de-mededingingswet.html.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Case C-22/98 Becu and Others [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:419, Case C-309/99 Wouters and others [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:98; Case C-413/13 FNV Kiem. Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy (CNSD) [1998] ECLI:EU:C:1998:303, [36].Google Scholar

¹¹¹ There exists so called de minimis exceptions from the competition rules. These are linked —particularly in the case of Article 101 TFEU—to the notion of “appreciability” of the restriction of competition and not to the concept of undertaking as such. See infra section D.I.Google Scholar

¹¹² Case C-217/05 Confederación Española de Empresarios de Estaciones de Servicio [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:784, [45]; Case C-413/13 FNV Kiem, [27].Google Scholar

¹¹³ Joined Cases 40/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 54/73 to 56/73, 111/73, 113/73 and 114/73 Suiker Unie and Others v Commission [1975] ECR 1663, [541]; Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy (CNSD), [37], Case C-413/13 FNV Kiem, [33].Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy (CNSD), [38].Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ Dutch Competition Authority 2007 (Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit), Cao-tariefbepalingen voor zelfstandigen en de Mededingingswet: visiedocument (Collective labor agreements determining fees for self-employed and the competition law: a reflection document) (Neth.), http://docplayer.nl/23777662-Cao-tariefbepalingen-voor-zelfstandigen-en-de-mededingingswet.html.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ C-67/96 Albany International BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:430; C-115/97 to C-117/97 Brentjens' Handelsonderneming BV v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de Handel in Bouwmaterialen (Brentjens) [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:434; C-219/97 Maatschappij Drijvende Bokken BV v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor de Vervoer- en Havenbedrijven (Drijvende Bokken) [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:437; C-222/98 Hendrik van der Woude v Stichting Beatrixoord (van der Woude) [2000] ECLI: EU:C:2000:475.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ Case C-413/13, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v. Staat der Nederlanden, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2411 (Dec. 4, 2014).Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ Case C-413/13, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v. Staat der Nederlanden, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2411 (Dec. 4, 2014).Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ Id. at para. 89.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ Id. at para. 92.Google Scholar

¹²¹ Case C-413/13, FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media v. Staat der Nederlanden, 2014 ECLI:EU:C:2014:2411 (Dec. 4, 2014). In the words of the Court:Google Scholar

¹²² See e.g. Rombouts, Sebastian, ‘European Court of Justice – 18/12/2014 – fnv Kunsten Informatie en Media v. Staat der Nederlanden’ International Labor Rights Case Law, Volume 1, Issue 2, pages 147–158; See also Ankersmit, Laurens, Albany Revisited: The Court Directs NCA to Carry a More Social Tune, European Law Blog (March 3, 2015), http://europeanlawblog.eu/?p=2695.Google Scholar

¹²³ Joost Huidijk, De toepasselijkheid van cao's op zelfstandigen: wat zegt het mededingingsrecht?, AKD Blog (April 16, 2015), http://blogs.akd.nl/2015/de-toepasselijkheid-van-caos-op-zelfstandigen-wat-zegt-het-mededingingsrecht/. The author—a lawyer practicing EU and competition law at a Dutch law firm—notes that there is much uncertainty over whether a self-employed worker will be considered “false self-employed” or genuine self-employed. See also Pennings, supra note 68.Google Scholar

¹²⁴ Importantly, the criteria are based on a comparison with what a typical worker does, but in many cases, there will be no immediately available comparison. The challenge is for those self-employed engaged in novel types of work for which no clear equivalents in terms of salaried labor exist. One could compare the work done by a regular worker under an employment contract and compare it to the work done by a substitute.Google Scholar

¹²⁵ In this case, the cartel would be vertical, so employers would also be liable if they enter into the agreement.Google Scholar

¹²⁶ Case C-413/13 FNV Kiem, Opinion of Advocate General Wahl, [63]. In his view, the distinction between self-employed and worker was workable, and despite the heterogenous nature of the class of self-employed he did not recommend carving out an exception.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ Id. at para. 64.Google Scholar

¹²⁸ For instance, in 2017, the British Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy and the UK Office for National Statistics released figures showing plummeting union membership over the past decades. The item made international news. See Topping, Alexandra, Union Membership has Plunged to an All-Time Low, Says DBEIS, The Guardian (June 1, 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/01/union-membership-has-plunged-to-an-all-time-low-says-ons. See also Kelly, Gavin, Trade Unions — Adapt to the Modern World or Die, Financial Times (June 1, 2017) https://www.ft.com/content/f65a8510-4626-11e7-8d27-59b4dd6296b8. According to data from Eurofound, between 2003 and 2008, ten Member States recorded an overall increase in union membership while 12 Member States recorded an overall decrease. According to the study, “Overall membership for all 97 trade union centres and sets of ‘other’ trade unions, for which data are available, declined by about 1.9% over the 2003–2008 period. In the EU15 [Members of the EU before 2004] and Norway, the decline in union membership stood at about 0.4%, while in the NMS [new member states] it amounted to around 10.6%.” See EurWork (European Observatory of Working Life), Trade Union Membership 2003–2008 (Report published on Sept. 21, 2009) https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/comparative-information/trade-union-membership-2003-2008#hd2.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ Green Paper on Modernising Labour Law to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century, supra note 26. The European Union has been striving to achieve “flexicurity”—a combination of flexible labor markets with a generous safety net and active labor policy to encourage employment.Google Scholar

¹³⁰ For an extensive discussion of the merits of a third category and a comparison of the experiences of Canada, Italy, and Spain with such a third category of rights; see Cherry, MA and Aloisi, A, “Dependent Contractors” in the Gig Economy: A Comparative Approach, 66 Am. U. L. Rev. 635 (2017).Google Scholar

¹³¹ Labor law professor Frans Pennings argues that the AG's approach is quite difficult for the national courts and, furthermore, of limited practical usefulness. It means that one has to be able to show the fact that in the absence of agreement replacing workers with independents has already taken place—a point in time at which a collective bargaining agreement is probably too late. See Pennings, supra note 68, at 114.Google Scholar

¹³² See Case C-123/83 Bureau national interprofessionnel du cognac v Guy Clair (BNIC v Clair) [1985] ECLI:EU:C:1985:33; Joined cases C-101/07 P and C-110/07 P Coop de France bétail et viande and Fédération nationale des syndicats d'exploitants agricoles (FNSEA) and Others v Commission of the European Communities [2008] ECLI:EU:C:2008:741.Google Scholar

¹³³ Case C-309/99 Wouters and others, [97].Google Scholar

¹³⁴ Id. at paras. 109–110.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy (CNSD) [1998].Google Scholar

¹³⁶ Case C-35/99 Arduino [2002] ECLI:EU:C:2002:97.Google Scholar

¹³⁷ Id. at para. 44.Google Scholar

¹³⁸ Case C-35/96 Commission v Italy (CNSD), [43].Google Scholar

¹³⁹ Some organizing, however, is taking place. A notable development in this respect is, for instance, the Ride Share Drivers United organization which seeks improvement of the conditions for Uber drivers. See RideShare Drivers United, AUS & USA, http://ridesharedriversunited.com/.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ Case C 5/69 [1969]. In it the Court held that: “[…] An agreement falls outside the prohibition in [Article 101] when it has only an insignificant effect on the markets, taking into account the weak position which the persons concerned have on the market of the product in question.” In this case, one of the parties had 0.08% market share of the Community market, 0.2% in Germany and 0.6% in Belgium and Luxembourg.Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ 2014 O.J. (C 291) 30.8 (European Commission, Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance Which do not Appreciably Restrict Competition Under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (De Minimis Notice).Google Scholar

¹⁴² See Case C-681/11 Bundeswettbewerbsbehörde, Bundeskartellanwalt v Schenker & Co. AG and Others (Schenker) [2013]. Importantly, the judgment went against an assurance, which had been issued by the Austrian competition authority that such an agreement would be exempt.Google Scholar

¹⁴³ For instance, self-employed without personnel in the Netherlands may enjoy exemption from the competition rules provided: (1) [T]hat they meet certain turnover criteria (5.5 million euros), and (2) that there are no more than 8 enterprises involved. We should stress, however, that an effect on cross-border trade is easily found in EU competition law, so it is to be doubted to what extent such national exceptions have any meaning in practice.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ See Commission White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, at 5, COM (1999), 101 final (April 28, 1999). See also Maher, Imelda, Competition Law and Transnational Private Regulatory Regimes: Marking the Cartel Boundary, 38(1) J. L. & Soc'y 119 (2011).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ NMa Fines Window Cleaners in The Hague for Cartel Activities, NMA News (Dec. 29, 2011), https://www.acm.nl/en/publications/publication/6721/NMa-fines-window-cleaners-in-The-Hague-for-cartel-activities/ (a Dutch language press release with a summary of the decision is available at https://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/6623/NMa-beboet-kartelafspraak-Haagse-glazenwassers/).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁶ The glass cleaner in question received a symbolic fine of 1 euro. See Samenvatting van het besluit van de NMa van, NMA News (Dec. 20, 2011), https://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/6623/NMa-beboet-kartelafspraak-Haagse-glazenwassers/.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ See, NMa geeft schoonmakers miljoenenboete, Nu.nl (Mar. 19, 2003), http://www.nu.nl/economie/122827/nma-geeft-schoonmakers-miljoenenboete.html (according to the article, the branch organization OSB numbered 650 cleaning business – for the most part, small undertakings).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁴⁹ Consider the VEBIC case which was subject to a preliminary reference before the Court of Justice. Case C-439/08 Vlaamse federatie van verenigingen van Brood- en Banketbakkers, Ijsbereiders en Chocoladebewerkers (VEBIC) VZW. [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:739 (the infringement in question was a price agreement between artisan bakers, ice-cream and chocolate makers in Belgium).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁰ The 2001 decision of the Irish Competition Authority restricting the possibility of freelance actors to bargain collectively has caused much outrage in Irish society, and multiple legislation attempts have since been made to address the issue of the right to collective bargaining for vulnerable self-employed, especially artists, musicians and freelance journalists. In 2010, a legislative proposal was made to amend the competition rules; however, the proposal was rejected because of concerns with compliance with the IMF/EU Financial Support program which did not allow for additional exemptions from competition law. Since then, two more attempts for legislative amendment have been made—in 2014 and 2016. Remarkably, in 2016, the proposal secured the support of all parties. See Seanad Deb. (July 10, 2014 & July 6, 2016) (Ir.), http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/; see also European Labor Law Network website, ‘ECJ Case C-413/13 (FNV Kunsten Informatie en Media)‘ <http://www.labourlawnetwork.eu/national_labour_law/implications_of_ecj_rulings/_implications_of_ecj_rulings/prm/191/v__detail/id__5332/category__17/index.html; Tim Dawson & Séamus Dooley, Irish Freelances Shorten the Road to the Promised Land, The Freelance Bulletin (July 7, 2016).Google Scholar

¹⁵¹ As argued by Brishen Rogers in Rogers, supra note 33, at 479.Google Scholar

¹⁵² Id. See also Collins, supra note 2; Green Paper on Modernising Labour Law to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century, supra note 26.Google Scholar

¹⁵³ Pietro Ichino, Collective Bargaining and Antitrust Laws: An Open Issue, 17 (2) Int'l J. Comp. Lab. L. & Indus. Rel. 185 (2001).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁴ See Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and Non-Food Supply Chain in Europe COM (2013) 37 final (Jan. 31, 2013); Jules Stuyck, Do We Need ‘Consumer Protection’ for Small Businesses at the EU Level?, in Varieties of European Economic Law and Regulation 359, 359–368 (Purnhagen & Rott eds., 2014); Victoria Daskalova, The Monopsony Paradox: Buyer Power and Enforcement of the EU Antitrust Provisions (PhD thesis, 2016); Martijn Hesselink, Unfair Terms in Contracts between Businesses, in Centre for the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series No. 2011/07, 1 (2011).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁵ See generally Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Better Functioning Food Supply Chain in Europe COM (2009) 0591 final (Oct. 28, 2009), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52009DC0591; European Competition Network Food Subgroup, ECN Activities in the Food Sector: Report on Competition Law Enforcement and Market Monitoring Activities by European Competition Authorities in the Food Sector (May 24, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/food_report_en.pdf; Communication from the Commission, Tackling Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food Supply Chain, COM (2014) 472 final (July 15, 2014).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁶ See e.g. The UK Groceries Code Adjudicator Act 2013, ch. 19 (Eng.), https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/19/pdfs/ukpga_20130019_en.pdf.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁷ A prominent example at the EU level is the code of conduct developed by European food and drink producers and supermarkets in the context of the Supply Chain Initiative endorsed by the European Commission. See Principles of Good Practice in vertical relationships in the Food Supply Chain (Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.supplychaininitiative.eu/about-initiative/principles-good-practice-vertical-relationships-food-supply-chain; see also European Commission, Code of Conduct, Vertical relationships in the Food Supply Chain: Principles of Good Practice, (Nov. 29, 2011), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/content/vertical-relationships-food-supply-chain-principles-good-practice-b2b-platform-0 (the code is accompanied by a business-to-business (B2B) Platform for enforcement of the principles).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁸ For a helpful overview of the varied legal landscape with respect to stricter rules aimed to address power imbalances in the food supply chain see Stefanelli, Justine & Marsden, Philip, Models of Enforcement in Europe for Relations in the Food Supply Chain, British Institute of International and Comparative Law (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.anilact.pt/documentos/hlf001.pdf; see also European Commission, Final Report of the Study on the Legal Framework Covering Business-to-Business Unfair Trading Practices (Feb. 26, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/retail/docs/140711-study-utp-legal-framework_en.pdf.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁹ Inspiration is drawn from Walker Smith, Regulation and the Risk of Inaction, in Autonomes Fahren: Technische, rechtliche und gesellschaftliche Aspekte 593–609 (Maurer et al ed.; Springer 2015) and his graph of regulatory quadrants which is adapted for the purpose of this paper.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁰ There is evidence that some companies have started introducing minimum requirements for fair treatment of their independent contractors. De Stefano refers to the Code of Conduct Paid Crowdsourcing to which three crowdwork platforms in Germany have already agreed and which is endorsed by the German Crowdsourcing Association. See Crowdsourcing Code of Conduct, http://crowdsourcing-code.com/; see also de Stefano, supra note 29, at 24.Google Scholar

¹⁶¹ See e.g. Fair Crowd Work, http://www.faircrowdwork.org/en (the website allows crowdworkers to check for the best online rates).Google Scholar

¹⁶² Hesselink, supra note 154; Stuyck, supra note 154.Google Scholar

¹⁶³ Collins, supra note 2, at 375–376.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁴ Antitrust for Small and Middle Size Undertakings and Image Protection from Non-Competitors (Pranvera Këllezi, Bruce Kilpatrick & Pierre Kobel eds., 2014).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁵ See Lang, Temple, Reprisals and Overreaction by Dominant Companies as an Anti-Competitive Abuse under Article 82(B), 29(1) Eur. Competition L. Rev. 13 (2008); see also Green Paper on Unfair Trading Practices in the Business-to-Business Food and Non-Food Supply Chain in Europe, supra note 154, at 7 and 17 discussing the so-called “fear factor”.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁶ See Cherry, Miriam A. & Antonio Aloisi, “Dependent Contractors” in the Gig Economy: A Comparative Approach, 66 Am. U. L. Rev. 635, 682–684 (2017).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁷ Currently, antitrust enforcement emphasizes consumer choice as part of a commitment to consumer welfare.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁸ See the blog for Uber drivers, Uber App and it[s] Effect on Cellular Data Usage, UberPeople.net (posts from June 16, 2016), https://uberpeople.net/threads/uber-app-and-it-effect-on-cellular-data-usage.24123/.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁹ See Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 4.5 (regulation on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).Google Scholar

¹⁷⁰ See René Joliet, Monopolization and Abuse of Dominant Position: A Comparative Study of the American and European Approaches to the Control of Economic Power (1970); see also Akman, Pinar, Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82EC, 29(2) Oxford J. Legal Stud. 267 (2009).Google Scholar

¹⁷¹ Labor purchasing is the classic example of a monopsony used in economics textbooks. See Manning, supra note 1.Google Scholar

¹⁷² One of the main concerns of drivers is the lack of transparency in compensation, for instance, with respect to bonuses. See Mohlmann, Mareike, Lior Zalmanson, & Ola Henfridsson, Who is Driving the Car? How do Uber Drivers Regain Control in the Face of Algorithmic Management, Presented at the 4^th International Workshop on the Sharing Economy held in Lund, Sweden (June 15, 2017).Google Scholar

¹⁷³ Media reports that Uber's car loans have the effect of tying people to the company. One reason for that is that Uber offers car loans to people with poor credit scores. This makes it difficult for those who signed up to leave the job, even in the face of falling compensation. Rebecca Smith, deputy director at the US National Employment Law Project, states in an interview for the Financial Times: “It is a car lease that comes from your employer and makes it impossible for you to leave your job before it is paid off.” See Hook, Leslie, Uber Hitches a Ride with Car Finance Schemes, Financial Times (Aug. 11, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/921289f6-5dd1-11e6-bb77-a121aa8abd95. In Australia, a driver deactivated from Uber's platform was left in debt and filed a court case against Uber. One of his car loans was via Uber. The case is currently under appeal. See AAP, WA Man Mike Oze-Igiehon Fails in Damages Claim Against Uber, PerthNow (Dec. 9, 2016), http://www.perthnow.com.au/news/western-australia/wa-man-mike-ozeigiehon-fails-in-damages-claim-against-uber/news-story/7b494ef5148af47582fdba35e7479fd5. Similar stories reported by Georgia Wilkins, Dumped Uber Driver Pleads for Explanation, The Age (May 21, 2016), http://www.theage.com.au/business/consumer-affairs/dumped-uber-driver-pleads-for-explanation-20160519-goz0dl?deviceType=text.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁴ See 1974 O.J. (L 29) 3.2 (General Motors Continental); 1975 O.J. (L 95) 9.4 (Chiquita); 1984 O.J. (L 207) 2.8 (British Leyland). For more recent decisions, see 2001 O.J. (L 331) (Deutsche Post AG – Interception of cross-border mail); 2001 O.J. (L 166) 1 (DSD); Case COMP/C-2/37.761; Euromax v/IMAX Decision of 25.03.2004; Case COMP/A.36.568/D3 – Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of Helsingborg.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁵ Case 26–75 General Motors Continental NV v Commission of the European Communities [1975] ECLI:EU:C:1975:150; Case C- 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European Communities [1978] ECLI:EU:C:1978:22; Case 226/84 British Leyland Public Limited Company v Commission of the European Communities [1986] ECLI:EU:C:1986:421; Case 30/87 Bodson v Pompes Funèbres des Régions Libérées [1988] ECLI:EU:C:1988:225; Case 395/87 Ministère Public v Jean-Louis Tournier [1989] ECLI:EU:C:1989:319 (SACEM I); Joined Cases 110/88, 241/88 and 242/88 François Lucazeau v SACEM and others [1989] ECLI:EU:C:1989:326 (SACEM II); Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Siver Line Reisebüro GmbH v Zentrale zur Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs e.V. [1989] ECLI:EU:C:1989:140; Case 298/83 Comité des industries cinématographique des Communautés européennes (CICCE) [1985] ECLI:EU:C:1985:150; Case C-323/93 Société Civile Agricole du Centre d'Insémination de la Crespelle v Coopérative d'Elevage et d'Insémination Artificielle du Département de la Mayenne [1994] ECLI:EU:C:1994:368, (Crespelle); Case C-242/95 G-T Link A/S v De Danske Statsbaner (DSB) [1997] ECLI:EU:C:1997:376; Case C-340/99 TNT Traco SpA v Poste Italiane SpA [2001] ECLI:EU:C:2001:281; Case C-385/07 P Der Grüne Punkt – Duales System Deutschland GmbH v Commission of the European Communities [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:456.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁶ For an early argument to this effect, see Joliet, supra note 170, at 243. On monopsony and the application of the EU competition rules to it, see Daskalova, supra note 154; More generally on monopsony, see Blair, Roger & Harrison, Jeffrey, Monopsony in Law and Economics (2010); specifically on the economics of monopsony in labor markets, see Manning, supra note 1.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁷ Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority), The Pros and Cons of High Prices (Swed.), http://www.konkurrensverket.se/globalassets/english/research/the-pros-and-cons-of-high-prices-14mb.pdf.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁸ See Report by the EAGCP on an Economic Approach to Article 82 (July, 2005), http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁹ Type I error stands for under-enforcement and type II stands for over-enforcement. The prevailing opinion is that under-enforcement is preferable to over-enforcement because over-enforcement tends to chill competition.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁰ See Lyons, Bruce, The Paradox of the Exclusion of Exploitative Abuse, CCP Working Paper 08-1, 1 (2007).Google Scholar

¹⁸¹ Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Texts, Cases, and Materials 573 (6^th ed. 2016); Alexandr Svetlicinii & Marco Botta, Article 102 TFEU As A Tool for Market Regulation: “Excessive Enforcement” Against “Excessive Prices” in the New EU Member States and Candidate Countries, 8(3) Eur. Competition J. 473, 473 (2012). Svetlicinii and Botta note, however, that the sentiment toward exploitative abuse is not shared by enforcers in the new Member States.Google Scholar

¹⁸² Id. at 567.Google Scholar

¹⁸³ See European Commission Press Release IP/17/1323, Antitrust: Commission Opens Formal Investigation into Aspen Pharma's Pricing Practices for Cancer Medicines (May 15, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1323_en.htm.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁴ The Court ruled to this effect in Joined Cases C-501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C-519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline v Commission [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:610; see the discussion in Victoria Daskalova, Consumer Welfare in EU Competition Law: What Is It (Not) About?, 11(1) Competition L. Rev., 133 (2015).Google Scholar

¹⁸⁵ Margrethe Vestager, Protecting Consumers from Exploitation, Speech at the Chillin' Competition Conference in Brussels, Nov. 21, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/protecting-consumers-exploitation_en; Margrethe Vestager, Setting Priorities in Antitrust, Speech at GCLC in Brussels, (Feb. 1, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/setting-priorities-antitrust_en.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁶ James Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law, 117(3) Yale L. J. 340 (2007).Google Scholar

¹⁸⁷ Case C- 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European Communities [1978] ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, [250–253].Google Scholar

¹⁸⁸ See Case 298/83 Comité des industries cinématographique des Communautés européennes (CICCE) [1985] ECLI:EU:C:1985:150; some indications are available in European Commission on Quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages Based on Breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2013 O.J. (C 167) 56.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁹ See Kirkwood, John, Collusion to Control a Powerful Customer: Amazon, E-Books, and Antitrust Policy, 69(1) U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 51 (2014).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁰ Id. at 52.Google Scholar

¹⁹¹ See e.g. Elliott, Larry, UK Minimum Wage Law ‘Should Cover More Self-Employed Workers’, The Guardian, (July 4, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2017/jul/04/uk-minimum-wage-self-employed-uber-resolution-foundation.Google Scholar

¹⁹² See PvdA wil minimumloon voor zzp'ers, RTL Nieuws, (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/geld-en-werk/pvda-wil-minimumloon-voor-zzpers.Google Scholar