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Religious Tolerance, Pluralist Society and the Neutrality of the State: The Federal Constitutional Court's Decision in the Headscarf Case

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

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Some of the most magnificent achievements of human culture, from the Parthenon to Paradise Lost, have been inspired by religion and some of the worst atrocities of human history have been committed to worship its commands. In consequence, whenever questions of religion become part of the political and legal agenda of a society one might be very insecure about the solution of the problem but can be absolutely confident that the stakes are high and the discussions intense. This general observation about religious issues has gained a special dimension due to the events of September 11, 2001, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since then the role of religions in general and of Islam in particular is at the very core of central debates of global civil society and of the deliberations and actions of policy makers.

Type
Public Law
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 BVerfG, 2 BvR 1436/02, 24.9.03; available at: http://www.bverfg.de. There is another decision of the German Constitutional Court dealing with head scarves. The Federal Labour Court had ruled that it is impermissible to dismiss an employee in a department store because this employee wears a head scarf. The defendant had argued that he would incur financial losses because costumers were not accustomed to such a sight. The Federal Labour Court did not engage in a principled discussion of the role of fundamental rights like the freedom of religion in this case but argued simply that there was no evidence for the economic losses given. Compare BAG, 2 AZR 472/01, DB 2003, 830. The Federal Constitutional Court followed this argumentation, compare BVerfG, 1 BvR 792/03, 30.7.2003, available at: http://www.bverfg.de.Google Scholar

On the background of the head scarf issue and the divided opinion in German constitutional doctrine compare Stefan Huster, Die ethische Neutralität des Staates 143 – 144 (2002).Google Scholar

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6 Id. at. 255.Google Scholar

7 Id. at. 254.Google Scholar

8 More precisely from Art. 4.1, 3.3. Sentence 1, Art. 33.3 and 140 of the GG, the latter incorporating Art. 136.1, 136.4, Art. 137.1 of the Constitution of Weimar into German constitutional law.Google Scholar

9 BVerwG JZ 2002, 255.Google Scholar

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67 BVerfGE 93, 1 (20) rightly pointed out that such an understanding would be a profanation of its meaning.Google Scholar

68 Mill, J. S. in On Liberty rightly defended with this argument the necessity of civil rights even in democracies against Rousseauians’ ideas of the absolute reign of the democratic volunté générale.Google Scholar

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71 BVerfGE 88, 87 (96).Google Scholar

72 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, OJ L 180, 19.7.2000, p. 22.Google Scholar

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77 Compare e.g. BVerfG, supra, note 1, Rn 43 – 44; v. Campenhausen, Der heutige Verfassungsstaat und die Religion, in Handbuch des Staatskirchenrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 77 (Listl/Pirson eds, 2. ed., 1994). Stefan Huster, Die ethische Neutralität des Staates, (2002).Google Scholar

78 BVerfGE 41, 29 (49 et. seq.); 52, 223 (236 et. seq.).Google Scholar

79 Immanuel Kant, Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft 99, (Akademie Ausgabe, Bd. VI).Google Scholar

80 Id. at 98 et. seq., 170.Google Scholar