¹ The MEDEL-Association stated in their 2017 report titled La Justice en Europe: “Il n'y a plus de Justice en Turquie” (There is no more justice in Turkey), Magistrats Européens pour la Démocratie et les Libertés (MEDEL), La justice en Europe, medelnet.eu 29, 36 (May 23, 2017), www.medelnet.eu/images/2016/medel_report-2017.pdf.Google Scholar

² See Commission, European, A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, at 1f, COM (2014) 158 final (March 11, 2014) (describing an account of what the rule of law might consist of in detail).Google Scholar

³ For illustrative purposes: It must first be emphasized in this regard that the European Economic Community is a Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional charter, the Treaty.Google Scholar

Case 294/83, Les Verts v. Eur. Par., 1986 E.C.R. 1339, para. 23.Google Scholar

⁴ See Belcacemi & Oussar v. Belgium, App. No. 37798/13, para. 9 (July 11, 2017) (Spano, J., concurring) for a recent reminder of this principle.Google Scholar

⁵ Lech Morawski, A Critical Response, VerfBlog (June 3, 2017), http://verfassungsblog.de/a-critical-response/.Google Scholar

⁶ See Commission, European, supra note 2, at 2–5.Google Scholar

⁷ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 2, Feb. 7, 1992, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 13 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M%2FTXT [hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon].Google Scholar

⁸ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union pmbl., March 25, 1957, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1531083180270&uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT [hereinafter TFEU].Google Scholar

⁹ Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union pmbl., Dec. 12, 2007, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 391, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:12012P/TXT.Google Scholar

¹⁰ TFEU, supra note 8, art. 49.Google Scholar

¹¹ European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (as amended by protocols 11, 14) pmbl., Nov. 4, 1950, https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680063765.Google Scholar

¹² See Stafford v. U.K., App. No. 46295/99, para. 63 (May 28, 2002), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar

¹³ See Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. I-6677, paras. 38–39; Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi I v. Council & Comm'n, 2008 E.C.R. I-6351, para. 316; see also T. von Danwitz, The Rule of Law in the Recent Jurisprudence of the ECJ, 37 Fordham Int'l L. J., 1311ff (2014).Google Scholar

¹⁴ TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 7, art. 1.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Id. art. 3 (1).Google Scholar

¹⁶ See CJEU, Case C-168/13 PPU, Jeremy F. v Premier Ministre, ECLI:EU:C:2013:358 paras. 34–36.Google Scholar

¹⁷ CJEU, Opinion 2/13, Accession to the ECHR, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 168.Google Scholar

¹⁸ See Marek Świerczyński, Czarne Jastrzębie zadziobałty afrykańskiego kota. Polska armia nie kupi Caracali, Polityka.pl (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/1678208,3,czarne-jastrzebie-zadziobaly-afrykanskiego-kota-polska-armia-nie-kupi-caracali.read.Google Scholar

¹⁹ See Plucinska, Joanna, A Media Bill in Poland Sparks Concern over Press Freedom, TIME.COM (Dec. 31, 2015), http://time.com/4164787/poland-media-bill-press-freedom/.Google Scholar

²⁰ See Polens Parlament lehnt Abtreibungsverbot ab (Poland's parliament rejects abortion ban), Tagesschau.de (June 10, 2016, 1:37 PM), https://www.tagesschau.de/eilmeldung/polen-abtreibungsverbot-105.html.Google Scholar

²¹ See Venice Commission Report CDL-AD (2016) 001 (March 12, 2016); Venice Commission Report CDL-AD (2016) 026 (Oct. 14, 2016) (detailing an account and analysis of the events).Google Scholar

²² For example, an attendance quorum of eleven out of fifteen judges for certain decisions, the possibility for four judges to postpone any decision they are not satisfied with after an initial internal vote, and the required presence of the prosecutor general—who also happens to be the Minister of Justice—in order to hear certain types of cases.Google Scholar

²³ See Wyrok [Judgment] Trybunal Konstytucyjny [Polish Constitutional Tribunal] Dec. 3, 2015, K 34/15.Google Scholar

²⁴ Most of them were sworn in at a private ceremony at 1:30 am on December 3, 2015.Google Scholar

²⁵ For details on this procedure, see Matczak, Marcin, Poland's Constitutional Tribunal under PiS control descends into legal chaos, VerfassungsBlog.de (Jan. 11, 2017), http://verfassungsblog.de/polands-constitutional-tribunal-under-pis-control-descends-into-legal-chaos/.Google Scholar

²⁶ See Grzelak, Agnieszka, Sententia non existens—the future of jurisprudence of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal?, VerfassungsBlog.de (March 17 2017), http://verfassungsblog.de/sententia-non-existens-the-future-of-jurisprudence-of-the-polish-constitutional-tribunal/.Google Scholar

²⁷ See Const. of the Republic of Poland, ch. VII, art. 179.Google Scholar

²⁸ See id., art. 186 (2).Google Scholar

²⁹ See id., art. 187.Google Scholar

³⁰ See id., art. 186 (1).Google Scholar

³¹ See id., art. 45.Google Scholar

³² See id., art. 173.Google Scholar

³³ See id., art. 10.Google Scholar

³⁴ See Consultative Council of European Judges, opinion 10 paras. 8–14 (2007), https://rm.coe.int/168074779b.Google Scholar

³⁵ See Polish Nat'l Council of the Judiciary Draft Act, art. 1 (7) (Jan. 23, 2017).Google Scholar

³⁶ See id., art. 1 (14).Google Scholar

³⁷ See id., art. 1 (1). Google Scholar

³⁸ See id., art. 5.Google Scholar

³⁹ See Mikuli, Piotr, An Explicit Constitutional Change by Means of an Ordinary Statute? On a Bill Concerning the Reform of the National Council of the Judiciary in Poland, VerfassungsBlog.de (Feb. 23, 2017), http://verfassungsblog.de/an-explicit-constitutional-change-by-means-of-an-ordinary-statute-on-a-bill-concerning-the-reform-of-the-national-council-of-the-judiciary-in-poland/.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Zoll, DRiZ 2017, 14 (translation provided by the authors).Google Scholar

⁴¹ See Opinia [Opinion] Krajowej Rady Sadownictwa, Polish Nat'l Council for the Judiciary (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.krs.pl/pl/dzialalnosc/posiedzenia-rady/f,189,posiedzenia-w-2017-r/664,30-styczina/4595,opinia-krajowej-rady-sadownictwa-z-dnia-30-stycznia-2017-r-nr-wo-02-5316-ud-73.Google Scholar

⁴² See Siedlecka, Ewa, Prezes Sadu Naiwvzszego wzvwa sedziow do oporu, Wyborcza.pl (Jan. 30, 2017), http://wyborcza.pl/7,75398,21315772,prezes-sadu-najwyzszego-wzywa-sedziow-do-oporu-dramatyczne.html?disableRedirects=true.Google Scholar

⁴³ See Magistrats Européens pour la Démocratie et les Libertés (MEDEL), supra note 1, at 30–36.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See Opinion of the ENCJ Executive Board on the request of the Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa of Poland, European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) (Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.encj.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=228%3Aebpoland&catid=22%3Anews&lang=en.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Translation provided by the Polish parliament.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See Wyrok [Judgment] Trybunal Konstytucyjny [Polish Constitutional Tribunal] June 20, 2017, K 5/17.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See Const. of the Republic of Poland, ch. VII, art. 187 (3).Google Scholar

⁴⁸ See Kolanko, Michal, Niepewność PiS w sprawie reformy sądownictwa, Rzeczpospolita (June 20, 2017), http://www.rp.pl/Polityka/306199919-Niepewnosc-PiS-w-sprawie-reformy-sadownictwa.html#ap-1.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See Matczak, Marcin, How to Demolish an Independent Judiciary with the Help of a Constitutional Court, VerfassungsBlog.de (June 23, 2017), http://verfassungsblog.de/how-to-demolish-an-independent-judiciary-with-the-help-of-a-constitutional-court/.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ See Stanowisko Prezydium Krajowej Rady Sadownictwa, z dnia 20 czerwca 2017 r. w związku z wyrokiem skłtadu Trybunałtu Konstytucyjnego w sprawie K 5/17, Polish Nat'l Council for the Judiciary (June 20, 2017), http://krs.pl/pl/aktualnosci/d,2017,6/4841,stanowisko-prezydium-krajowej-rady-sadownictwa-z-20-czerwca-2017-r-w-zwiazku-z-wyrokiem-trybunalu-konstytucyjnego-w-sprawie-zgodnosci-z-konstytucja-rp-obowiazujacego-modelu-wyboru-czlonkow-krs.Google Scholar

⁵¹ See Polens Parlament stimmt für umstrittene Justizreform (Poland's parliament votes for controversial judicial reform), Spiegel Online (July 12, 2017), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/polen-parlament-stimmt-fuer-umstrittene-justizreform-a-1157478.html.Google Scholar

⁵² See Commission, Venice, Opinion CDL/AD 031 (Dec. 9, 2017); MEDEL, Krakow Declaration (Dec. 18, 2017), http://www.medelnet.eu/index.php/news/europe/408-krakow-declaration.Google Scholar

⁵³ See Commission, European, Recommendation of December 20, 2017 regarding the rule of law in Poland—Complementary to Commission Recommendations (EU) 2016/1374, (EU) 2017/146 and (EU) 2017/1520, paras. 22–26, C (2017) 9050 final (Dec. 20, 2017).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See id., at paras. 18–21; Venice Commission, supra note 52, at para. 32–95 for a detailed discussion.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ See Commission, Venice, supra note 52, at para. 19.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ See id., at paras. 20–23.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See id., at para. 26.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ See Commission, European, supra note 53, at para. 32.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ See generally Commission, Venice, supra note 21, for a detailed account of the events.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See Commission, Venice, supra note 21 at paras. 115–19.Google Scholar

⁶¹ See id. at paras. 115–119.Google Scholar

⁶² See Commission, Venice, CDL-STD 020, para. 21 (1997).Google Scholar

⁶³ See Commission, Venice, supra note 21, at para. 115–19.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Christian Davies, Poland is ‘on road to autocracy’, says Constitutional Court President, The Guardian (December 18, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/18/poland-is-on-road-to-autocracy-says-high-court-president.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See wPolityce.pl/TVP Info, Ziobro: Sądownictwo to nie jest kasta i państwo w państwie. Chcę zmienić to myślenie oraz przywrócić sądownictwo polskiemu społteczeństwu, Polityce (April 27, 2017), http://wpolityce.pl/polityka/337508-ziobro-sadownictwo-to-nie-jest-kasta-i-panstwo-w-panstwie-chce-zmienic-to-myslenie-oraz-przywrocic-sadownictwo-polskiemu-spoleczenstwu.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Speech given by Deputy Minister Warchol at the Polish Lawyers Congress on May 20, 2017 in Katowice; translation was provided by the Polish Judges Association (PJA) Iustitia. The author Sanders was present at the Congress.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ See MEDEL, La justice en Europe (2017), pages 30–36 (May 23, 2017), http://www.medelnet.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=380:la-justice-en-europe-quinze-systemes-judiciares-passes-au-crible-des-principes-fondametaux&catid=45:an-independent-judiciary&Itemid=61 for further details.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ See Consultative Council of European Judges, opinion 18 para. 44 (2015), https://rm.coe.int/16807481a1.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ See Consultative Council of European Judges & Consultative Council of European Prosecutors, SG/Inf 3rev, paras. 42–95 (2016), https://rm.coe.int/168066d624 Google Scholar

⁷⁰ See Commission, Venice, supra note 52, paras. 115–19.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Robert Stein, Rule of Law: What Does It Mean?, 18 Minn. J. Int'l L., 293, 302 (2009).Google Scholar

⁷² See The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).Google Scholar

⁷³ See European Commission Press Release IP/17/5367, Rule of Law: European Commission acts to defend judicial independence in Poland (Dec. 20, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5367_en.htm.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ See Armin Von Bogdandy et al., Reverse Solange—Protecting the Essence of Fundamental Rights Against EU Member States, 40 Common Mkt L. Rev., 489, 496–507 (2012); Steven Greer & Andrew Williams, Human Rights and the Council of Europe and the EU—Towards ‘Individual’, ‘Constitutional’ or ‘Institutional’ Justice?, 15 Eur. L. J., 462, 474 (2009).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ See Daniel Brössler & Alexander Mühlauer, Oettinger warnt Polen und Ungarn, Sueddeutsche (February 23, 2018), http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/eu-kommisar-oettinger-warnt-polen-und-ungarn-vor-kuerzungen-1.3879517.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Case C-192/18, European Comm'n v Rep. of Poland (pending) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1531710501971&uri=CELEX:62018CN0192.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ See Commission, European, supra note 73.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Case C-286/12, European Comm'n v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2012:687 (Nov. 6, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ See T. von Danwitz, supra note 13, at 1344.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See Kochenov, Dimitry, Biting Intergovernmentalism: The Case for the Reinvention of Article 259 TFEU to Make It a Viable Rule of Law Enforcement Tool, Rule, Hague J. L. 153 (2015).Google Scholar

⁸¹ See Carlos Closa et al., Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union 9ff (EUI Working Paper, RSCAS 2014/2015).Google Scholar

⁸² See Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117 (Feb. 27, 2018).Google Scholar

⁸³ Id., at para. 29.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ See Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson, ELI:EU:C:2013:105, para. 20 (May 7, 2013).Google Scholar

⁸⁵ See Case C-299/95, Kremzow v. Rep. Österreich, 1997 E.C.R. I-02629, para. 15; Case C-309/96, Daniele Annibaldi v. Sindaco del Comune di Guidonia, 1997 E.C.R. I-7493, para. 13.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ See O.J. (C 303)17-35 for explanations relating to the charter.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ See, e.g., Annibaldi, Case C-309/96 at paras. 20–23; CJEU, Case C-206/13, Cruciano Siragusa v. Regione Sicilia—Soprintendenza Beni Culturali, ECLI:EU:C:2014:126, paras. 29–35 (March 6, 2014); Case C-198/13, Víctor Manual Julian Hernández v. Puntal Arquitectura SL, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2055, paras. 45–48, (July 10, 2014).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ In the case at hand, the measures of salary cuts to the Portuguese Court of Auditors where part of a national scheme to meet the European requirements for reducing the Portuguese budget deficit, but they were in no way imposed or required by EU law and could therefore at best be considered to be European in their motivation only.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ See CJEU, supra note 82, at paras. 32 and 33.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ See id., at para. 35.Google Scholar

⁹¹ See id., at para. 34.Google Scholar

⁹² Id., at para. 32.Google Scholar

⁹³ See id., at para. 41–43.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ See Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA, 1978 E.C.R. 629, para. 21.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ TFEU, supra note 8, art. 267.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ See Case C-286/88, Falciola Angelo SpA v Comune di Pavia, 1990 E.C.R. I-191, para. 7.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 7, art. 2 & 19 (1) para. 2.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ See CJEU, supra note 82, at para. 37.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ See Buxbaum, Richard M., Article 177 of the Rome Treaty as a Federalizing Device, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1041 (1969).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ See Michal Ovádek, Has the CJEU just Reconfigured the EU Constitutional Order?, VerfassungsBlog.de (Feb. 28, 2018), https://verfassungsblog.de/has-the-cjeu-just-reconfigured-the-eu-constitutional-order/.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ See Closa, supra note 81, at 10.Google Scholar

¹⁰² See CJEU, supra note 82, at paras 41–43.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Id., at para 44.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ The other reforms of the ordinary judiciary in Poland also deserve special attention in this respect. See Commission, Venice, supra note 52, for a detailed analysis of these reforms in general.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ See generally Consultative Council of European Judges, opinion 10, supra note 34.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ See Commission, Venice, CDL-AD 004, at para. 28–32 (2010).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ See European Networks of Councils for the Judiciary, Councils for the Judiciary Report 2010–2011 (2011), https://www.encj.eu/images/stories/pdf/workinggroups/report_project_team_councils_for_the_judiciary_2010_2011.pdf.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ See, e.g., Eur. H.R. Rep. European Commission's Regular Report on Czech Republic's Progress towards Accession, at 22–24, SEC (2002) 1402 final (Oct. 9, 2002); Daniel Smilov, EU Enlargement and the Constitutional Principle of Judicial Independence, in Spreading Democracy & the Rule of Law 313, 323–25 (2006).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ See Council of Europe, Recommendation CM/Rec 12, paras. 26–29 (2010), https://rm.coe.int/1680702ca8.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ See Wittreck, Fabian, Beratungen der VdDStRL, 150 (2014); Michal Bobek & David Kosar, Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study in Judicial Councils in Central and Eastern Europe, 15 German L.J. 1258, 1262 (2015).Google Scholar

¹¹¹ See Volkov v. Urkaine, App. No. 21722/11 (January 09, 2013), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/; Mitrinovski v. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No. 6899/12 (April 30, 2014), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar

¹¹² See Stein, supra note 71, at 302.Google Scholar

¹¹³ See Hayek, Friedrich, The Origins of the Rule of Law, in The Constitution of Liberty 162, 168–73 (1960).Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ See Belilos v. Switzerland, 1988 Eur. Ct. H.R. 4, para. 64; Case C-17/00, François De Coster v. Collège des bourgmestre et échevins de Watermael-Boitsfort, 2001 E.C.R I-9445, para. 10; Case C-403/16, Soufiane El Hassani v. Minister Spraw Zagranicznych, ECLI:EU:C:2017:960, para. 40 (Dec. 13, 2017).Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ See Luhmann, Niklas, Legitimation durch Verfahren [Legitimacy by Procedure] 100–06 (9th ed. 2013).Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ Sandra Day O'Connor, Vindicating the Rule of Law: The Role of the Judiciary, 2 Chinese J. Int'l L., 1, 6f (2003).Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ See generally Judicial Independence in Transition (Seibert-Fohr ed., 2012).Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ See Commission, Venice, CDL-AD 028, paras. 44–50 (2007); Venice Commission, CDL-AD 004, para. 32 (2010).Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ See Council of Europe, Secretary General, 20 CM (2016) 36 final.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ See Consultative Council of European Judges, supra note 68, at paras. 15–20.Google Scholar

¹²¹ See id., at para. 25–26.Google Scholar

¹²² See id., at para. 27.Google Scholar

¹²³ See id., para. 28.Google Scholar

¹²⁴ See id., para. 29–31.Google Scholar

¹²⁵ See Commission, Venice, CDL-AD 007-e, para. 70ff (2013).Google Scholar

¹²⁶ See Commission, Venice, supra note 52, at para. 20.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ See Commission, European, supra note 53, at para. 32.Google Scholar

¹²⁸ See Commission, Venice, supra note 52, at para. 24.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ See id., at para. 22.Google Scholar

¹³⁰ See id., at para. 24.Google Scholar

¹³¹ See id., at paras. 28–31.Google Scholar

¹³² See Zoll, supra note 40, at 15.Google Scholar

¹³³ See Matzak, Marcin, The Rule of Law in Poland: A sorry Spectacle, VerfassungsBlog.de (March 1, 2018) https://verfassungsblog.de/the-rule-of-law-in-poland-a-sorry-spectacle/.Google Scholar

¹³⁴ See Morawiecki kritisiert deutsches Justizsystem (Morawiecki criticizes German justice system), Tagesschau.de (January 25, 2018), http://www.tagesschau.de/ausland/polen-justiz-103.html.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ This is the so-called “bureaucratic model.” Rudolf Wasserman, Der Politische Richter 96ff (1972).Google Scholar

¹³⁶ Ulrich Battis, Article 33 Gleichstellung als Staatsbürger, öffentlicher Dienst, in Sachs Grundgesetz rn. 24 (7^th ed. 2014); Papier, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 2585, 2591 (2002).Google Scholar

¹³⁷ See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 139 BVerfGE 19, paras. 59, 76; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] March 7, 2013, 2 BvR 2582/12 para. 15 [hereinafter Judgment of Mar. 7, 2013]; Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 24, 2014, 2 BvR 816/14 para. 10 [hereinafter Judgment of July 24, 2014].Google Scholar

¹³⁸ See Bundeslaufbahnverordnung [Federal Career Regulation], Feb. 12, 2009, para. 3, 48 I, 49 II, (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹³⁹ See Deutsches Richtergesetz [German Law on Judges], April 19, 1972, para. 46.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sept. 20, 2016, 2 BvR 2453/15 para. 19 [hereinafter Judgment of Sept. 20, 2016].Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ These are the judges of the Federal Court of Justice, the Federal Administrative Court, the Federal Labor Court, the Federal Social Court and the Federal Finance Court.Google Scholar

¹⁴² See Judgment of Sept. 20, 2016 at paras. 28, 32–35.Google Scholar

¹⁴³ Hans Joachim von Merkatz, Remarks at the Plenary Minutes of the Bundestag.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ See also Hillgruber, Christian, Article 98, in Grundgesetz Kommentar para. 48 (Theodor Maunz & Günter Dürig eds., 59th ed. 2010).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ Richterwahlausschuss [Judges Election Committee] Landesrecht Baden-Württemberg (LriStAG) §§ 46–61; Landesrecht Berlin (BerlRiG) §§ 9–18; Landesrecht Brandenburg (BrdRiG) §§ 12–25; Landesrecht Bremen (BremRiG) §§ 7–17; Landesrecht Hamburg (HambRiG) §§ 14–27; Landesrecht Hesse (HessRiG) §§ 8–24; Landesrecht Rhineland-Palatinate (RhPflRiG) §§ 14–24; Landesrecht Schleswig-Holstein (SHRiG) §§ 13–25; Landesrecht Thuringia (ThüRiG) §§ 13–25.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁶ See Const. Lower Saxony art. 51 (3); Const. of Saxony art. 79 (3); Const. of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern art. 76 (3); Const. of Saxony-Anhalt art. 83 (4).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ Landesrecht Baden-Württemberg (LriStAG) §§ 43 (5)–(6), 46.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ Landesrecht Thuringia (ThüRiG) § 14.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁹ Id. at § 13 (2).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁰ See Wittreck, Fabian, Die Verwaltung der Dritten Gewalt 126, 268ff, 392ff, 413ff, 502ff (2006).Google Scholar

¹⁵¹ See Ingo Müller, Furchtbare Juristen (7th ed. 2014) for a detailed account of the crimes of the National Socialist Judiciary.Google Scholar

¹⁵² The Parlamentarischer Rat (Parliamentary Council) was the West German constituent assembly in Bonn that drafted and adopted the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany.Google Scholar

¹⁵³ See Klaus-Berto von Doemming et al., 1 Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts (JÖR) 704f, 720 (1951) for this argumentation and the quotes used from the comments of members of the Parlamentarische Rat Greve, Katz, Rener, Schönfelder, Selbert, Stock, and Zinn.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁴ See Wittreck, supra note 150, at 71f, for details.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁵ See Stolleis, M., Rechtsordnung und Justizpolitik (Legal system and justice policy) 1945–1949, in FS Coing 385 (1982).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁶ See von Doemming, supra, note 153.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁷ Stefan Huster & Johannes Rux, Article 20, in Beck'scher Online-Kommentar GG para. 94ff (Volker Epping & Christian Hillgruber eds., 33d ed. 2017).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁸ See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 119 BVerfGE 331, para. 158;1 Grundlagen des Verwaltungsrechts § 6 para. 5 (Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem et al. eds., 2006); Grundgesetz: GG art. 20, para. 40 (Hans Hofmann et al. eds., 13th ed. 2014).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁹ See Huster & Rux, supra note 157, at paras. 61, 64; Gerd Reinschmidt, Zur Legitimationsfrage bei der Richterwahl (The question of legitimacy in the judicial election), Zeitschrift Fur Rechtspolitik [ZRP] 160, 161 (1972); Helmut K J Ridder, Empfiehlt es sich, die vollständige Selbstverwaltung aller gerichte im Rahmen des Grundgesetzes gesetzlich einzuführen? (Is it advisable to introduce the complete self-administration of all courts in the framework of the Basic Law?) Gutachten zum 40^TH DJT, Vol. I, 91, 125 (1953).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁰ Deutscher Juristinnenbund [German Association of Women Lawyers], section III, para. 1, https://www.djb.de/st-pm/st/st15-06/.Google Scholar

¹⁶¹ See Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Verfassungsfragen der Richterwahl [Constitutional Question of the Selection of Judges} 70 (1998).Google Scholar

¹⁶² See Klaus F. Gärditz, Opinion for the Bundestag Committee on Law and Consumer Protection, Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen [BT] 3 (Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.bundestag.de/blob/438098/2c33cac66cd5902cb2dfbaa8ebe32cb5/gaerditz-data.pdf.Google Scholar

¹⁶³ See Classen, Claus Dieter, Wahl contra Leistung? Zur Bedeutung des Leistungsprinzips bei durch Wahl zu besetzenden öffentlichen Ämtern, Juristenzeitung [JZ] 1009, 1013 (2002).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁴ See Wittreck, supra note 150, at 20; Claus Dieter Classen, Demokratische Legitimation im offenen Rechtsstaat 55 (2009); Martin Minkner, Die Gerichtsverwaltung in Deutschland und Italien 254f (2015).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁵ Monika Jachmann, Article 95, in Grundgesetz Kommentar para. 127 (Theodor Maunz & Günter Dürig eds., 59th ed. 2010).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁶ JÖRG ZÄTZSCH, RICHTERLICHE UNABHÄNGIGKEIT UND RICHTERAUSWAHL IN DEN USA UND DEUTSCHLAND [JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE SELECTION OF JUDGES IN THE USA AND GERMANY] 160ff (2000); BÖCKENFÖRDE, supra note 161, at 102ff.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁷ See Jachmann, supra note 165, at para. 127.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁸ Id., at para. 127; Dieter Brüggemann, Die Rechtsprechende Gewalt [The Judiciary] 135 (1962); K. Ipsen, Bündnisfall und Verteidigungsfall (Alliance and Defense), Die Öffentliche Verwaltung [DÖV] 468, 472 (1971).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁹ See Huster & Rux, supra note 157, at paras. 58–64; Wittreck, supra note 150, at 128f.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁰ See e.g.: Scheuner, Ulrich, Die Selbständigkeit und Einheit der Rechtspflege (Die Selbständigkeit und Einheit der Rechtspflege), Die Öffentliche Verwaltung [DÖV] 517, 520f (1953); Eduard Kern, Über die Mitwirkung von Richtern bei der Berufung von Richtern (About the participation of judges in the appointment of judges), Deutsches RICHTERZEITUNG [DRiZ] 301, 302 (1958); KLAUS STERN, 2 DAS STAATSRECHT DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [THE LAW OF the State of the Federal Republic of Germany] 404 (1980); Böckenförde, supra note 161 at 80ff.; See Wittreck, supra note 150, at 131.Google Scholar

¹⁷¹ See Consultative Council of European Judges, Opinion 1 para. 37 (2001).Google Scholar

¹⁷² See Bundesamt für Justiz [Federal Office for Justice], Zahl der Richter, Richterinnen, Staatsanwälte, Staatsanwältinnen und Vertreter, Vertreterinnen des öffentlichen Interesses in der Rechtspflege der Bundesrepublik Deutschland am 31. Dezember 2014 (Number of judges, judges, prosecutors, public prosecutors, representatives of the public interest in the administration of justice of the Federal Republic of Germany on 31 December 2014) (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.bundesjustizamt.de/DE/SharedDocs/Publikationen/Justizstatistik/Gesamtstatistik.pdf;jsessionid=AA55DE94411975B1219C8B4036755B4B.2_cid377?__blob=publicationFile&v=7.Google Scholar

¹⁷³ See Classen, supra note 163, at 1016.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁴ See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court], decision of the 2^nd Senate in case 2 BvR 2453/15, BVerfGE 143, 22–37, para. 31.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁵ See id., at para. 32.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁶ See id., at para. 35.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁷ See Oberverwaltungsgericht für das Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [Higher Regional Administrative Court for North Rhine Westphalia] June 21, 2017, 1 B 232/17 for a recent decision of this kind.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁸ See Judgment of Sept. 20, 2016, at para. 28; Classen, supra note 163, at 1016.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁹ See Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwGE] [Federal Administrative Court], 138 BVerwGE 102.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁰ See Eirik Holm&;yvik & Anne Sanders, A Stress Test for Europe's Judiciaries, VerfassungsBlog.de (Aug. 23, 2017), http://verfassungsblog.de/a-stress-test-for-europes-judiciaries; Anne Sanders, Ein Stress-Test der Rechtsstaatlichkeit (A stress test of the rule of law), Zeitschrift Fur Rechtspolitik [ZRP] 230 (2018); The Culture of Judicial Independence: Conceptual Foundations and Practical Challenges 15–68 (Shimon Shestreet & Christopher Forsyth eds., BRILL 2011). Gärditz mentions a “culture of institutional respect” as the reason for the successful work of the German FCC. Klaus F. Gärditz, Eine Verfassung gegen Krisen (Eine Verfassung gegen Krisen), Legal Tribune Online [Lto.de] (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.lto.de/recht/hintergruende/h/grundgesetz-krisen-schutz-verfassung/.Google Scholar

¹⁸¹ See Judicial Independence in Transition, supra note 117, at 515ff.Google Scholar

¹⁸² See, e.g., Drieschner, Frank, Plötzlich Richter (Suddenly judge), Zeit Online (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.zeit.de/2011/05/Bundesverfassungsgericht-Peter-Mueller.Google Scholar

¹⁸³ See Anna von Notz, Das Pippi-Langstrumpf-Prinzip: Ich mach' mir mein Verfassungsgericht (The Pippi Longstocking Principle: I make my constitutional court), Junge Wissenschaft (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.juwiss.de/de/53-2014/.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁴ According to Article 19 TEU, the Judges and Advocates General of the CJEU and the General Court are appointed for a renewable 6-year term.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁵ See Dumbrovsky, Tomas, The European Court of Justice after the Eastern Enlargement: An Emerging Inner Circle of Judges, in Boston 2011 EUSA Conference Papers 13 (Mar. 1, 2013), http://www.mwpweb.eu/TomasDumbrovsky/publication_2081.html.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁶ See id., at 16.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁷ See, e.g., Rasehorn, T., “Um die Bestenauslese” bei der Richterwahl—Eine Erwiderung (About the best selection for the judiciary - a response), 1 Recht und Politik [RuP] 29, 31 (2002).Google Scholar

¹⁸⁸ See also Klaus Gärditz & Maximillian Steinbeis, Die meisten Dinge die in Polen und Ungarn gelaufen sind könnten ohne weiteres auch hier passieren (Most things that happened in Poland and Hungary could easily happen here), VerfassungsBlog.de (Feb. 22, 2018), https://verfassungsblog.de/die-meisten-dinge-die-in-polen-und-ungarn-gelaufen-sind-koennten-ohne-weiteres-hier-auch-passieren/.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁹ See Holm&;yvik & Sanders, supra note 180.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁰ See CCJE, supra note 68, at para. 12.Google Scholar

¹⁹¹ Cf. Koen Lenaerts, How the ECJ Thinks, 36 Fordham Int'l L. J. 1302, 1306 (2013).Google Scholar

¹⁹² See CCJE, supra note 68, at para. 14ff (describing these concepts of judicial legitimacy first).Google Scholar

¹⁹³ See id., at para. 14.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁴ See id. at para. 14.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁵ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 47 BVerfGE 253 [273]; 77 BVerfGE 1 [40]; 60 BVerfGE 73; Andreas Voßkuhle & Gernot Sydow, Die demokratische Legitimation des Richters (The democratic legitimacy of the judge), Juristenzeitung [JZ] 673, 674 (2002); Heinrich Weber-Grellert, Eigenständigkeit und Demokratisierung der Justiz (Autonomy and democratization of the judiciary), Zeitschrift Fur Rechtspolitik [ZRP] 145, 146f (2003).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁶ See Wittreck, supra note 150, at 135ff for the legitimate troubles supposedly caused in this regard by the development of law by judges through case-law.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁷ In this sense, see Heusch, Article 97, in Grundgesetz: GG para. 15 (Hans Hofmann et al. eds., 13th ed. 2014).Google Scholar

¹⁹⁸ Special election systems, however, are in place in Switzerland.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁹ See C-SPAN/PSB Supreme Court Survey 2017, C-SPAN (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/scotussurvey2017/.Google Scholar

²⁰⁰ See Confidence in Institutions, Gallup (June 1–5 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx%5D.Google Scholar

²⁰¹ See Toobin, Jeffrey, The Oath: The Obama White House and The Supreme Court 226–29 (2012) for further anecdotal evidence.Google Scholar

²⁰² For example, Justice Elena Kagan received only five votes from Republican senators, while the confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch provoked the Republican majority to abolish the possibility for the opposition to filibuster a Supreme Court confirmation. In the end, Gorsuch was confirmed with a vote of 54:45 and only three democratic senators voted to confirm him.Google Scholar

²⁰³ See Consultative Council of European Judges, opinion 17 at para. 31ff (2014).Google Scholar

²⁰⁴ See Consultative Council of European Judges, opinion 3 at para. 22 (2002).Google Scholar

²⁰⁵ See Consultative Council of European Judges, supra note 68, at para. 17–19.Google Scholar

²⁰⁶ Steffen Detterbeck, Article 97 Unabhängigkeit der Richter, in Sachs Grundgesetz pt. 1 (7th ed. 2014).Google Scholar

²⁰⁷ See Consultative Council of European Judges, supra note 68, at para. 18.Google Scholar

²⁰⁸ See also Lenaerts, supra note 191, at 1306.Google Scholar

²⁰⁹ Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).Google Scholar

²¹⁰ Case C-402/05 P, Kadi v. Council of the European Union, Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro para. 45.Google Scholar

²¹¹ See Consultative Council of European Judges, supra note 68, at para. 20.Google Scholar

²¹² The Consultative Council of European Judges, for example, differentiates between judicial, explanatory, and criminal accountability: See Consultative Council of European Judges, supra note 68, at para. 26–33.Google Scholar

²¹³ See Case C-23/15 P, Comm'n v. Breyer, Opinion of Advocate General Bobek para. 77–145, for an interesting, though maybe impractical, initiative to render documents at the European Court of Justice more accessible.Google Scholar

²¹⁴ See Wittreck, supra note 150, at 131.Google Scholar

²¹⁵ See Section E. subsection II of this Article.Google Scholar

²¹⁶ See Commission, European, How Much do you Trust the Judiciary or the German Legal System?, TNS Infratest for the European Comm'n (Nov. 5–11, 2016), https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/153813/umfrage/allgemeines-vertrauen-in-die-justiz-und-das-rechtssystem/.Google Scholar

²¹⁷ See Commission, European, How much do you trust the political parties?, TNS Infratest for the European Comm'n (Nov. 5–11, 2016), https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/153820/umfrage/allgemeines-vertrauen-in-die-parteien/.Google Scholar

²¹⁸ For example, in 2008, 82% of Germans said they would distrust political parties with only 17% trusting them. See Infratest dimap, How much do you trust the political parties?, (June 2008), https://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/758/umfrage/vertrauen-zu-den-politischen-parteien/.Google Scholar

²¹⁹ According to a study by the Allensbach Institute in 2014, the FCC enjoys the trust of 86% of the population, while the Bundestag or the Bundesregierung are deemed substantially less trustworthy—58% and 50% respectively. See Roland Rechtsreport 2014, https://www.roland-rechtsschutz.de/unternehmen/presse_2/publikationen/publikationen.html).Google Scholar

²²⁰ See Wittreck, supra note 150, at 20; See Classen, supra note 163, at 55; Minkner, supra note 164, at 254f; Helmuth Schulze-Fielitz, Article 95, in 3 Grundgesetz pt. 24 (Horst Dreier ed., 2008); Jachmann, supra note 165, at para. 127.Google Scholar

²²¹ FCC, supra 158 para 158 (translation provided by the authors).Google Scholar

²²² See Klaus Ferdinand Gärditz, Reformbedarf bei der Bundesrichterwahl?, Zeitschrift für Beamtenrecht 325, 326 (2015).Google Scholar

²²³ Dirk Ehlers, Verfassungsrechtliche Fragen der Richterwahl [Constitutional Questions of the Selection of Judges] 40ff (1998); E.G. Mahrenholz, Darstellung im Überblick (Presentation at a glance), Niedersächsische Verwaltungsblätter [NDSVBl] 225, 234 (2003).Google Scholar

²²⁴ See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 4, 1998, 2 BvR 2555/96, para. 22.Google Scholar

²²⁵ See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] supra 158, para. 158.Google Scholar

²²⁶ See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 107 BVerfGE 59, para. 158.Google Scholar

²²⁷ See id., at para. 156.Google Scholar

²²⁸ See Mahrenholz, supra note 223, at 234.Google Scholar

²²⁹ See Huster & Rux, supra note 157, at para. 94.Google Scholar

²³⁰ See generally Consultative Council of European Judges, opinion 17 (2014).Google Scholar

²³¹ FCC, supra note 140 at para. 31.Google Scholar

²³² Id., para. 35.Google Scholar

²³³ See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court] 119 BVerfGE 331, para. 22.Google Scholar

²³⁴ See Henri de Waele, Not quite the Bed that Procrustes Built, in Selecting Europe's Judges 28f (M. Bobek ed., 2015).Google Scholar

²³⁵ See Jean Marc Sauvé, Selecting the European Union's Judges, in Selecting Europe's Judges 79 (M. Bobek ed., 2015).Google Scholar

²³⁶ See id. at 83. After an unfavorable opinion issued by the Article 255 Panel—which occurred in a remarkable 20% of cases for candidatures for a first term of office—no appointment ensued.Google Scholar

²³⁷ See Gärditz, supra note 162, at 7.Google Scholar

²³⁸ See Darbyshire, Penny, Sitting in Judgment 95ff (2011) for experiences with the British Judicial Appointment Committee; see Report of the Independent Advisory Board for Supreme Court of Canada Judicial Appointments, Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, http://www.FJA-CMF.GC.CA/scc-CSC/establishment-creation-eng.html for the Independent Advisory Board for the Supreme Court of Canada Judicial Appointments.Google Scholar