¹ See generally Heumann, Stefan, German Exceptionalism? The Debate About the German Foreign Intelligence Service (BND), in Privacy and Power: A Transatlantic Dialogue in the Shadow of the NSA-Affair 349, 352–56 (Miller, Russell A. ed., 2016); Matthias Schulze, Patterns of Surveillance Legitimization: The German Discourse on the NSA Scandal, 13 Surveillance & Soc'y 197 (2015) (describing and analyzing the reactions by the German Government, political parties, the media, and advocacy groups).Google Scholar

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³ Beschlussfassung und Bericht des 1. Untersuchungsausschusses nach Artikel 44 des Grundgesetzes [Report of the 1st Committee of Inquiry According to Article 44 of the Basic Law], Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen [BT] 18/12850 (Ger.) [hereinafter Report of the 1st Committee of Inquiry]. Non-official notes on public hearings are available at Überwachung, Netzpolitik.org, https://netzpolitik.org/category/ueberwachung/ (last visited July 15, 2018). Some documents are available at Bundestag Inquiry into BND and NSA, WikiLeaks, https://wikileaks.org/bndnsa/sitzungen/ (last visited July 15, 2018). See also Maik Baumgärtner et al., Spying Close to Home—German Intelligence Under Fire for NSA Cooperation, Spiegel Online (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/german-intelligence-agency-bnd-under-fire-for-nsa-cooperation-a-1030593.html; Germany Restarts Joint Intelligence Surveillance with US, DW Deutsche Welle (Jan. 9, 2016), http://www.dw.com/en/germany-restarts-joint-intelligence-surveillance-with-us/a-18968519.Google Scholar

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⁵ Georg Mascolo, Hans Leyendecker & John Goetz, Codewort Eikonal, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Oct. 4, 2014, at 6.Google Scholar

⁶ The Parliamentary Control Panel exercises overall control over the activities of the BND. Its members must be members of the Bundestag. The general competences of the Panel are regulated in a separate law. See Gesetz über die parlamentarische Kontrolle nachrichtendienstlicher Tätigkeit des Bundes [Kontrollgremiumgesetz] [PKGrG] [Act on the Parliamentary Control of Federal Intelligence Activities], July 29, 2009, BGBl. I at 2346, last amended by Gesetz [G], Jan. 5, 2017 BGBl. I at 17 (Ger.).Google Scholar

⁷ Unterrichtung durch das Parlamentarische Kontrollgremium, Öffentliche Bewertung des Parlamentarischen Kontrollgremiums gemäß § 10 Absatz 2 und 3 des Kontrollgremiumgesetzes zur BND-eigenen Steuerung in der strategischen Fernmeldeaufklärung [Notification by the Parliamentary Control Panel, Public Evaluation by the Parliamentary Control Panel According to § 10(2) and (3) of the Control Panel Act on the Operation of Selectors by the BND in the Field of Strategic Signals Intelligence], Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen [BT] 18/9142 (Ger.) [hereinafter Notification by the Parliamentary Control Panel].Google Scholar

⁸ See Meister, Andre, Secret Report: German Federal Intelligence Service BND Violates Laws and Constitution by the Dozen, Netzpolitik.org (Sept. 2, 2016), https://netzpolitik.org/2016/secret-report-german-federal-intelligence-service-bnd-violates-laws-by-the-dozen/. The full source document is reproduced at Andre Meister, Geheimer Prüfbericht: Der BND bricht dutzendfach Gesetz und Verfassung–allein in Bad Aibling (Updates) (Sept. 1, 2016), https://netzpolitik.org/2016/geheimer-pruefbericht-der-bnd-bricht-dutzendfach-gesetz-und-verfassung-allein-in-bad-aibling/#Sachstandsbericht.Google Scholar

⁹ Gesetz zur weiteren Fortentwicklung der parlamentarischen Kontrolle der Nachrichtendienste des Bundes [Act on the Further Development of Parliamentary Control of the Federal Intelligence Services], Nov. 30, 2016, BGBl. I at 2746 (Ger.); Gesetz zur Ausland-Ausland-Fernmeldeaufklärung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes [Act on the Collection of Foreign-Foreign Communications Intelligence by the Federal Intelligence Service], Dec. 23, 2016, BGBl. I at 3346 (Ger.). See generally Schaller, Christian, Detaillierte Regeln für die Auslandsüberwachung: Auch nach Reform des BNDGesetzes bleibt rechtlicher und politischer Klärungsbedarf [Detailed Rules for Foreign Surveillance: Even After the Reform of the BND Act There is Still Need for Legal and Political Clarification] Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik [SWP] SWP-Aktuell No. 66/2016 (2016), https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/-aktuell/2016A66_slr.pdf (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁰ In the intelligence community, the collection and exploitation of signals transmitted from communication systems is generally referred to as “communications intelligence” (COMINT), which is a subcomponent of the concept of signals intelligence (SIGINT).Google Scholar

¹¹ The new provisions on Ausland-Ausland-Fernmeldeaufklärung have been included as Sections 6 through 18 of the BND Act. See Gesetz über den Bundesnachrichtendienst [BND-Gesetz, BNDG] [Federal Intelligence Service Act] [BND Act], Dec. 20, 1990, BGBl. I at 2954, 2979, last amended by Gesetz [G], June 30, 2017 BGBl. I at 2097 (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹² BND Act §§ 6(3), 7(2), 9(2), (3), (5), 10(2), (3), 15(1)(lit. 1a).Google Scholar

¹³ Cooperation with foreign intelligence services and other foreign public authorities (ausländische öffentliche Stellen), including the collection and automated transfer of personal data, within the framework of Ausland-Ausland-Fernmeldeaufklärung is regulated in Sections 13 through 15 of the BND Act. The maintenance of shared data sets in cooperation with foreign public authorities is subject to Sections 26 through 30 of the BND Act.Google Scholar

¹⁴ See, e.g., Milanovic, Marko, Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age, 56 Harv. Int'l L.J. 81 (2015); Anne Peters, Privacy, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, and the Legal Limits on Extraterritorial Surveillance, in Privacy and Power: A Transatlantic Dialogue in the Shadow of the NSA-Affair 145 (Miller, Russell A. ed., 2016).Google Scholar

¹⁵ G.A. Res. 68/167 (Dec. 18, 2013); G.A. Res. 69/166 (Dec. 18, 2014); G.A. Res. 71/199 (Dec. 19, 2016). See also the corresponding resolution adopted by the U.N. Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/28/16 (Mar. 26, 2015).Google Scholar

¹⁶ G.A. Res. 68/167, pmbl. para. 8 (Dec. 18, 2013).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Id. at para. 4(c).Google Scholar

¹⁸ G.A. Res. 69/166, pmbl. para. 16 (Dec. 18, 2014).Google Scholar

¹⁹ G.A. Res. 71/199, pmbl. paras. 20, 22; para. 5(c) (Dec. 19, 2016).Google Scholar

²⁰ See, e.g., European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Surveillance by Intelligence Services: Fundamental Rights Safeguards and Remedies in the EU—Mapping Member States‘ Legal Frameworks 17 (2015) [hereinafter FRA, Mapping Member States‘ Legal Frameworks]. See also FRA, Surveillance by Intelligence Services: Fundamental Rights Safeguards and Remedies in the EU, Vol. II: Field Perspectives and Legal Update 29 (2017) [hereinafter FRA, Field perspectives and legal update].Google Scholar

²¹ European Comm'n for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Study No. 719/2013, Update of the 2007 report on the democratic oversight of the security services and report on the democratic oversight of signals Intelligence Agencies 11 (2015).Google Scholar

²² See, e.g., Zygmunt Bauman et al., After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact of Surveillance, 8 Int'l Pol. Sociology 121 (2014); Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect and Control Your World (2015).Google Scholar

²³ Bauman, supra note 22, at 122.Google Scholar

²⁴ Id. See also Report of the 1st Committee of Inquiry, supra note 3, at 219–35.Google Scholar

²⁵ Report of the 1st Committee of Inquiry, supra note 3, at 783–86.Google Scholar

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²⁷ Alan Rusbridger, The Snowden Leaks and the Public, The NY Review of Books (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/11/21/snowden-leaks-and-public/ (quoting Stewart Baker).Google Scholar

²⁸ FRA, Mapping Member States' Legal Frameworks, supra note 20, at 18–26. See also FRA, Field Perspectives and Legal Update, supra note 20, at 40–48.Google Scholar

²⁹ Council of Europe Comm'r for Human Rights, Democratic and Effective Oversight of National Security Services 23 (2015).Google Scholar

³⁰ For a German perspective, see Klaus Gärditz, Legal Restraints on the Extraterritorial Activities of Germany's intelligence Services, in Privacy and Power: A Transatlantic Dialogue in the Shadow of the NSA-Affair 401(Miller, Russell A. ed., 2016) [hereinafter Gärditz, Legal Restraints].Google Scholar

³¹ See, e.g., Matthias Bäcker, Strategische Telekommunikationsüberwachung auf dem Prüfstand [Strategic Surveillance of Telecommunications Under Scrutiny], 17 Kommunikation und Recht [K&;R] 556 (2014) (Ger.); Klaus Ferdinand Gärditz, Die Rechtsbindung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes bei Auslandstätigkeiten [Legal Obligations of the Federal Intelligence Service Concerning Activities Abroad], 48 Die Verwaltung 463 (2015) (Ger.) [hereinafter Gärditz, Rechtsbindung]; Klaus Ferdinand Gärditz, Die Reform des Nachrichtendienstrechts des Bundes: Ausland-Ausland-Fernmeldeaufklärung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes und Stärkung des Parlamentarischen Kontrollgremiums [The Reform of Federal Intelligence Law: The Collection of Foreign-Foreign Communications Intelligence by the Federal Intelligence Service and the Strengthening of the Parliamentary Control Panel], 132 Deutsches Verwaltungsablatt [DVBl] 525 (2017) (Ger.);Sven Hölscheidt, Das neue Recht des Bundesnachrichtendienstes [The New Law for the Federal Intelligence Service], 39 Juristische Ausbildung [JURA] 148 (2017) (Ger.); Christian Marxsen, Strategische Fernmeldeaufklärung: Neuerungen in den Kompetenzen des Bundesnachrichtendienstes [Strategic Surveillance: Innovations in the Competencies of the Federal Intelligence Service], 71 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung [DÖV] 218 (2018) (Ger.); Hans-Jürgen Papier, Beschränkungen der Telekommunikationsfreiheit durch den BND an Datenaustauschpunkten [Restrictions on the Freedom of Telecommunications by the Federal Intelligence Service at Data Exchange Points], 35 Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht [NVwZ] 1 (2016) (Ger.); Christian Schaller, Kommunikationsüberwachung durch den Bundesnachrichtendienst: Rechtlicher Rahmen und Regelungsbedarf [Surveillance of Communications by the Federal Intelligence Service: Legal Framework and the Need for Regulation] Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik [SWP] SWP-Studie No. 7/2016 (2016) (Ger.), https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/-2016S07_slr.pdf; Schaller, supra note 9.Google Scholar

³² For a comparative perspective, see, e.g., Miller, Russell A., A Rose by any Other Name? The Comparative Law of the NSA-Affair, in Privacy and Power: A Transatlantic Dialogue in the Shadow of the NSA-Affair 63 (Miller, Russell A. ed., 2016). See also Lachmayer, Konrad & Witzleb, Norman, The Challenge to Privacy from Ever Increasing State Surveillance: A Comparative Perspective, 37 U.N.S.W. L.J. 748 (2014) (Austl.); Reidenberg, Joel R., The Data Surveillance State in the United States and Europe, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 583 (2014); Ronald Sievert, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Compared with the Law of Electronic Surveillance in Europe, 43 Am. J. Crim. L. 125 (2016).Google Scholar

³³ David Cole & Federico Fabbrini, Bridging the Transatlantic Divide? The United States, the European Union, and the Protection of Privacy Across Borders, 14 Int'l J. Const. L. 220 (2016).Google Scholar

³⁴ For an overview, see FRA, Field Perspectives and Legal Update, supra note 20, at 43–8Google Scholar

³⁵ Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [Basic Law], translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/ [hereinafter Basic Law].Google Scholar

³⁶ On this subject, see Jan-Hendrik Dietrich, Of Toothless Windbags, Blind Guardians and Blunt Swords: The Ongoing Controversy About the Reform of Intelligence Services Oversight in Germany, 31 Intelligence & Nat'l Security 397 (2016); Miller, Russell A., Intelligence Oversight—Made in Germany, in Global Intelligence Oversight: Governing Security in the Twenty-First Century 257 (Goldman, Zachary K. & Rascoff, Samuel J. eds., 2016).Google Scholar

³⁷ On this subject, see Deeks, Ashley, An International Legal Framework for Surveillance, 55 Va. J. of Int'l L. 291 (2015); Milanovic, supra note 14.Google Scholar

³⁸ Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses [Artikel-10 Gesetz, G 10] [Act on Restricting the Privacy of Correspondence, Posts, and Telecommunications] [G10 Act], June 26, 2001, BGBl. I at 1254, 2298, last amended by Gesetz [G], Aug. 14, 2017 BGBl. I at 3202 (Ger.).Google Scholar

³⁹ Gesetz über den Bundesnachrichtendienst [BND-Gesetz, BNDG] [Federal Intelligence Service Act] [BND Act], Dec. 20, 1990, BGBl. I at 2954, 2979, last amended by Gesetz [G], June 30, 2017 BGBl. I at 2097 (Ger.).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses [Artikel-10 Gesetz, G 10] [Act on Restricting the Privacy of Correspondence, Posts, and Telecommunications] [G10 Act], Aug. 13, 1968, BGBl. I at 949 (Ger.).Google Scholar

⁴¹ Gesetz zur Ausland-Ausland-Fernmeldeaufklärung des Bundesnachrichtendienstes [Act on the Collection of Foreign-Foreign Communications Intelligence by the Federal Intelligence Service], Dec. 23, 2016, BGBl. I at 3346 (Ger.).Google Scholar

⁴² See generally Gärditz, Legal Restraints, supra note 30, at 402–04 (elaborating on the origins of German intelligence legislation).Google Scholar

⁴³ Christoph Gusy, Gesetz über den Bundesnachrichtendienst, in Sicherheitsrecht des Bundes 1261 (Wolf-Rüdiger Schenke, Kurt Graulich & Josef Ruthig eds., 2014) (illustrating the historical origins of the BND).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Id. at 1262.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Id. Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany art. 5(2), May 26, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 4251, 331 U.N.T.S. 327.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Ergänzung des Grundgesetzes [Draft Act Amending the Basic Law], Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen [BT] V/1879, at 12–3, 17 (Ger.) (summarizing the legal status of the Three Powers in Germany before the adoption of the Notstandsverfassung). Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Siebzehntes Gesetz zur Ergänzung des Grundgesetzes [Seventeenth Law Amending the Basic Law], June 24, 1968, BGBl. I at 709 (Ger.).Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Basic Law, art. 10(2)2: “If the restriction serves to protect the free democratic basic order or the existence or security of the Federation or of a Land, the law may provide that the person affected shall not be informed of the restriction and that recourse to the courts shall be replaced by a review of the case by agencies and auxiliary agencies appointed by the legislature.”Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses [Artikel-10 Gesetz, G 10] [Act on Restricting the Privacy of Correspondence, Posts, and Telecommunications] [G10 Act], Aug. 13, 1968, BGBl. I at 949 (Ger.). See generally Huber, Berthold, Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses, in Sicherheitsrecht des Bundes 1349–51 (Wolf-Rüdiger Schenke, Kurt Graulich & Josef Ruthig eds., 2014) (illustrating the evolution of the G10 Act).Google Scholar

⁵¹ See infra note 62 and accompanying text.Google Scholar

⁵² Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 100 BVerfGE 313 (Ger.). For a summary of this case, see Donald p. Kommers & Miller, Russel A., The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 414–15 (3d ed. 2012).Google Scholar

⁵³ Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses [Artikel-10 Gesetz, G 10] [Act on Restricting the Privacy of Correspondence, Posts, and Telecommunications] [G10 Act], June 26, 2001, BGBl. I at 1254, 2298, last amended by Gesetz [G], Aug. 14, 2017 BGBl. I at 3202 (Ger.).Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 65 BVerfGE 1 (44) (Ger.). See Infra notes 155, 160 and accompanying text.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Gesetz zur Fortentwicklung der Datenverarbeitung und des Datenschutzes [Act on the Further Development of Data Processing and Data Protection], Dec. 20, 1990, BGBl. I at 2954 (Ger.).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Some provisions contained in the BND Act are rather unspecific. The exact legal consequences of their application can be identified only in conjunction with the more comprehensive and detailed provisions of another law to which the BND Act extensively refers: Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit des Bundes und der Länder in Angelegenheiten des Verfassungsschutzes und über das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz [BVerfSchG] [Act on Cooperation Between the Federation and the Federal States in Matters Relating to the Protection of the Constitution, and on the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution], Dec. 20, 1990, BGBl. I at 2954, 2970, last amended by Gesetz [G], June 30, 2017 BGBl. I at 2097 (Ger.).Google Scholar

⁵⁷ BND Act § 1(2)1.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Gesetzesentwurf der Bundesregierung [Draft Act by the Federal Government], Bundesrat: Drucksachen [BR] 618/88, at 183 (commenting on BND Act § 1).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ See generally Fremuth, Michael Lysander, Wächst zusammen, was zusammen gehört? Das Trennungsgebot zwischen Polizeibehörden und Nachrichtendiensten im Lichte der Reform der deutschen Sicherheitsarchitektur [What Belongs Together Grows Together? The Principle of Separation Between Law Enforcement Authorities and Intelligence Services in Light of the Reform of German Security Architecture], 139 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts [AÖR] 32 (2014) (Ger.).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See Graulich, Kurt, Nachrichtendienstliche Fernmeldeaufklärung mit Selektoren in einer transnationalen Kooperation [Signals Intelligence and the Use of Selectors in Transnational Cooperation], Deutscher Bundestag, 1. Untersuchungsausschuss der 18. Wahlperiode [1st Committee of Inquiry of the 18th Legislative Period], Doc. MAT A SV-11/2 on A-Drs. 404, Oct. 23, 2015, at 44 (Ger.) [hereinafter Graulich Report] (summarizing the legal views of the BND). The position of the Federal Government is summarized in 100 BVerfGE 313 (338–39) (Ger.).Google Scholar

⁶¹ The notion “international telecommunications relations” in Section 5(1) of the G10 Act is interpreted by the Federal Government and the BND to include only cross-border communications to and from Germany, not communications where all participants are located abroad. See Gesetzesentwurf der Bundesregierung [Draft Act by the Federal Government], Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen [BT] 14/5655, at 18 (Ger.) (commenting on G10 Act § 5(1)1, 2); Antwort der Bundesregierung [Response by the Federal Government], Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen [BT] 17/9640, at 6 (Ger.) (summarizing the scope of application of the G10 Act).Google Scholar

⁶² In 1999, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the threats listed in the predecessor provision of Section 5(1) in the 1994 version of the G10 Act was sufficiently specific and precise. In the view of the Court, a further clarification of the conditions for taking surveillance measures was not possible due to the specific character of the tasks and working methods of the BND. See 100 BVerfGE 313 (372–73) (Ger.).Google Scholar

⁶³ G10 Act § 10(2), (4).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ G10 Act § 10(5).Google Scholar

⁶⁵ G10 Act § 11(2).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ G10 Act §§ 5(1), 14.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 34 BVerfGE 238 (245); 109 BVerfGE 279 (313); 120 BVerfGE 274 (335) (Ger.). See also infra note 147 and accompanying text.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ G10 Act § 5(2)2(lit. 2).Google Scholar

⁶⁹ G10 Act § 5a.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ G10 Act § 5(2)2(lit. 2), (2)3.Google Scholar

⁷¹ G10 Act § 5(2)2(lit. 1), (2)3.Google Scholar

⁷² Gesetzesentwurf der Bundesregierung [Draft Act by the Federal Government], Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen [BT] 14/5655, at 20 (Ger.) (commenting on G10 Act § 5(2)3).Google Scholar

⁷³ G10 Act § 6(1).Google Scholar

⁷⁴ G10 Act § 6(2).Google Scholar

⁷⁵ G10 Act § 12(2).Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Notification is excluded as long as it cannot be ruled out that the purpose of the measure would be jeopardized or as long as it is to be expected that such notification would have negative consequences for the wellbeing of the country. After twelve months without notification, the G10 Commission has to make a decision on the matter. See G10 Act § 12(2).Google Scholar

⁷⁷ G10 Act § 13.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ The G10 Commission was created by the G10 Act. Its organization and procedure are regulated in Section 15 of the G10 Act. The members of the Commission are appointed by the Parliamentary Control Panel. They are completely independent.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ The BND has always relied on Section 1(2)(1) of the BND Act, which merely defines its task in very general terms. See Antwort der Bundesregierung [Response by the Federal Government], Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen [BT] 17/9640, at 10 (Ger.) (summarizing the Federal Government's legal view); Gesetzesentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Draft Act by the Parliamentary Groups CDU/CSU and SPD], Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen [BT] 18/9041, at 1 (Ger.). See also 100 BVerfGE 313 (380) (Ger.) (summarizing the legal view of the BND). See also Bäcker, supra note 31, at 559–60 (criticizing the position of the Federal Government and the BND concerning Section 1(2)1 of the BND Act).Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See, e.g., Jörg Diehl & Annett Meiritz, BND darf künftig manchmal immer fast alles vielleicht [BND Is Perhaps Allowed to Do Almost Everything Sometimes Always], Spiegel Online (July 8, 2016), http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/bnd-reform-des-deutschen-geheimdienstes-im-eiltempo-a-1101891.html (quoting Nikolaos Gazeas).Google Scholar

⁸¹ Section 6(1) of the BND Act applies only to operations conducted by the BND from within German territory. An explanatory note on the draft legislation states that this is the case insofar as the systems employed by the BND are located on German soil. Outside Germany, the BND continues to operate solely on the basis of Section 1(2)(1) of the BND Act. With regard to such extraterritorial operations, the new Section 7 of the BND Act contains a lex specialis rule on the processing and use of personal data. See Gesetzesentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Draft Act by the Parliamentary Groups CDU/CSU and SPD], Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen [BT] 18/9041, at 22 (Ger.).Google Scholar

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⁸³ See id. at 24 (describing the use of filters for the purpose of sorting out protected G10 communications). See also Report of the 1st Committee of Inquiry, supra note 3, at 898–901.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ BND Act § 6(1)1.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ See Gesetzesentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Draft Act by the Parliamentary Groups CDU/CSU and SPD], Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen [BT] 18/9041, at 22 (Ger.) (commenting on BND Act § 6(1)).Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Notification by the Parliamentary Control Panel, supra note 7, at 5 (describing the character of the Auftragsprofil). Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 67 BVerfGE 100 (139); 110 BVerfGE 199 (214); 124 BVerfGE 78 (120); 131 BVerfGE 152 (206); 137 BVerfGE 185 (234) (Ger.).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 40 BVerfGE 141 (178); 55 BVerfGE 349 (365) (Ger.).Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvE 2/15, Oct. 13, 2016, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2016/10/-es20161013_2bve000215.html (Ger.).Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Id. at para. 127.Google Scholar

⁹¹ See Infra note 163 and accompanying text.Google Scholar

⁹² BND Act § 9.Google Scholar

⁹³ G10 Act § 10(4).Google Scholar

⁹⁴ BND Act § 9(1). Paragraph 2 stipulates that the use of search terms that directly lead to EU institutions or authorities of EU Member States require a separate order.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ G10 Act § 10(4).Google Scholar

⁹⁶ The order must identify only the relevant telecommunication network. See BND Act § 6(1)2, § 9(1)2 (lit. 2). But the notion “telecommunication network” is fairly broad under German telecommunication law. See Gesetzesentwurf der Fraktionen der CDU/CSU und SPD [Draft Act by the Parliamentary Groups CDU/CSU and SPD], Deutscher Bundestag: Drucksachen [BT] 18/9041, at 22–3 (Ger.) (commenting on this notion).Google Scholar

⁹⁷ BND Act § 9(3).Google Scholar

⁹⁸ BND Act § 10(4). In this case, as far as German nationals, domestic legal persons, or foreign nationals staying in Germany are concerned, the procedure for notification is the same as the procedure envisioned in Section 12 of the G10 Act.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ BND Act § 11.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ BND Act §§ 6(6), 10, 19, 20.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ The G10 Commission will only be involved in exceptional circumstances—if a measure of surveillance under Section 6(1) of the BND Act accidentally leads to the collection of data relating to German nationals, domestic legal persons, or foreign nationals staying in Germany (BND Act § 10(4)).Google Scholar

¹⁰² BND Act § 16.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ BND Act § 9(4). See also § 9(5).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Additional competences of the Independent Panel are provided by Section 15(3) of the BND Act.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ BND Act § 16(2).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ See, e.g., G10 Act § 7a(1)1(lit. 3).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ G10 Act § 7a(1)1(lit. 2). On the meaning of the term “Rechtsstaat”, which has no exact equivalent in the English language, see Kommers, supra note 52, at 48.Google Scholar

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¹⁰⁹ Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner/Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. (Oct. 6, 2011), http://curia.europa.eu.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], BVerfG, 1 BvR 966/09, 1 BvR 1140/09, Apr. 20, 2016, paras. 334–5, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/-DE/2016/04/rs20160420_1bvr096609.html (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹¹¹ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], BVerfG, 2 BvR 2735/14, Dec. 15, 2015, para. 62, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2015/12/-rs20151215_2bvr273514.html; BVerfG, 1 BvR 966/09, 1 BvR 1140/09, Apr. 20, 2016, para. 328, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/-DE/2016/04/rs20160420_1bvr096609.html (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹¹² G10 Act § 7a(1)2, (3)1.Google Scholar

¹¹³ G10 Act §§ 6(2), 7a(3)2–4.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ G10 Act § 7a(4).Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ G10 Act § 7a(5), (6).Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ Öffentliche Zeugenvernehmung [Testimony] Frau RDn Dr. H. F., Bundesnachrichtendienst, Deutscher Bundestag, 1. Untersuchungsausschuss der 18. Wahlperiode [1st Committee of Inquiry of the 18th legislative period], Stenographisches Protokoll der 16. Sitzung, vorläufige Fassung [Stenographic Transcript, 16th Session, preliminary version], Oct. 9, 2014, at 11, 29, 72, https://wikileaks.org/bndnsa/sitzungen/16/-WikiLeaks_Transcript_Session_16_from_German_NSA_Inquiry.pdf (noting that the BND considered itself bound in such cases only by the fundamental principles of the Rechtsstaat, in particular by the guarantee of human dignity, the prohibition on arbitrary action, and the principle of proportionality). See also Schaller, supra note 31, at 35–36 (summarizing the line of argument pursued by the BND).Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ Bäcker, supra note 31, at 559–60 (arguing that Section 1(2)1 of the BND Act could not serve as a legal basis for action within the scope of Article 10 of the Basic Law); Schaller, supra note 31, at 32. See also infra note 163 and accompanying text.Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ BND Act § 13(3), (5).Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ Section 15(1) of the BND Act contains additional safeguards for the protection of personal data of German nationals, EU institutions, authorities of EU Member States, and EU citizens, as well as for the protection of the national interests of the Federal Republic of Germany.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ BND Act §§ 26–30.Google Scholar

¹²¹ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvE 2/15, Oct. 13, 2016, para. 171, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2016/10/-es20161013_2bve000215.html (Ger.). In an earlier decision, the Court already stressed that an exchange of data served to maintain inter-State relations and the freedom of action of the Federal Government on the international plane. See BVerfG, 1 BvR 966/09, 1 BvR 1140/09, Apr. 20, 2016, para. 325, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2016/04/-rs20160420_1bvr096609.html (Ger.).Google Scholar

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¹²³ Id. at para. 174.Google Scholar

¹²⁴ See, e.g., Bryant, Nick, Spying Row: Merkel Urges US to Restore Trust at EU Summit, BBC News (Oct. 25, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24647602.Google Scholar

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¹²⁶ Notification by the Parliamentary Control Panel, supra note 7. According to the report, the BND stopped the operation of selectors relating to the listed institutions and persons in 2013.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ Id. at 8–14.Google Scholar

¹²⁸ Michael Götschenberg, BND hörte deutschen Diplomaten ab [BND Listened in on German Diplomate], tagesschau.de (Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/bnd-selektorenliste-103.html.Google Scholar

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¹³⁰ See supra note 12.Google Scholar

¹³¹ BND Act § 6(3)1.Google Scholar

¹³² BND Act § 6(3)2.Google Scholar

¹³³ Sections 10(3) and 15(1) of the BND Act provide that data which has been collected in violation of Section 6(3) of the BND Act must be immediately erased and may not be subject to an automated transfer to foreign intelligence services. Data that has been collected in accordance with Section 6(3) is subject to the same data protection standards as other data collected under Section 6(1), which are lower than those established by the G10 Act. See supra note 100.Google Scholar

¹³⁴ See also the procedural requirements established by Section 9(2), (5) of the BND Act.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ On the need for a transatlantic privacy agreement, see Cole & Fabbrini, supra note 33, at 233–37.Google Scholar

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¹³⁷ Id. at 1.Google Scholar

¹³⁸ Stefan Talmon, Tapping the German Chancellor's Cell Phone and Public International Law (Bonn Research Papers on Public International Law, Paper No. 3A/2013, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2352834.Google Scholar

¹³⁹ Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union makes clear that national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ For a parallel discussion under U.S. constitutional law, see Miller, supra note 32, at 90; Alec Walen, Fourth Amendment Rights for Nonresident Aliens, 16 German L.J. 1131 (2015). For a different perspective, see Lubin, Asaf, “We Only Spy on Foreigners”: The Myth of a Universal Right to Privacy and the Practice of Foreign Mass Surveillance, 18 Chicago J. Int'l L. 502 (2018) (making the case for certain legal differentiations in treatment between domestic and foreign surveillance).Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).Google Scholar

¹⁴² Cole & Fabbrini, supra note 33, at 228–33.Google Scholar

¹⁴³ For an overview, see Schwabenbauer, Thomas, Kommunikationsschutz durch Art. 10 GG im digitalen Zeitalter [Protection of Communication by Article 10 GG in the Digital Age], 137 Archiv des öffentlichen Rechts [AÖR] 1 (2012) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 67 BVerfGE 157 (172); 100 BVerfGE 313 (358); 106 BVerfGE 28 (36); 113 BVerfGE 348 (383); 120 BVerfGE 274 (307) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 115 BVerfGE 166, (183) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁶ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 100 BVerfGE 313 (359, 366); 125 BVerfGE 260 (309) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 34 BVerfGE 238 (245); 109 BVerfGE, 279 (313); 120 BVerfGE 274 (335–39) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ See supra note 67 and accompanying text.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁹ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 80 BVerfGE 367 (375) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁰ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁵¹ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 113 BVerfGE 348 (391); 120 BVerfGE 274 (337) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁵² Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 115 BVerfGE 166 (183) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁵³ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 120 BVerfGE 274 (308) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁴ Id. For a summary of this case, see Kommers, supra note 52, at 417.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁵ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 65 BVerfGE 1 (Ger.). See also Kommers, supra note 52, at 408.Google Scholar

¹⁵⁶ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 65 BVerfGE 1 (43) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁷ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 120 BVerfGE 378 (398) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁸ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 120 BVerfGE 274 (311–13) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁹ Id. at 303–14.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁰ See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 49 BVerfGE 89 (126) (Ger.); 83 BVerfGE 130 (142) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁶¹ On the meaning of the term “Rechtsstaat,” see Kommers, supra note 52, at 48.Google Scholar

¹⁶² Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 19 BVerfGE 342 (349) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁶³ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 65 BVerfGE 1 (46); 100 BVerfGE 313 (360); 110 BVerfGE 33 (53); 113 BVerfGE 348 (375); 120 BVerfGE 274 (316); 120 BVerfGE 378 (407) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁴ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 100 BVerfGE 313 (359–62) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁵ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 125 BVerfGE 260 (323) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁶⁶ Id. Google Scholar

¹⁶⁷ Id. at 324.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁸ Basic rights that apply only to German nationals include, e.g., the freedom of assembly (Article 8 of the Basic Law), the freedom of association (Article 9), and the freedom of movement (Article 11). With regard to the exercise of such freedoms, foreigners enjoy basic protection under Article 2(1), which guarantees a general freedom of action for every person.Google Scholar

¹⁶⁹ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 100 BVerfGE 313 (362–64) (Ger.).Google Scholar

¹⁷⁰ Id. at (338–39) (summarizing the position of the Federal Government).Google Scholar

¹⁷¹ Id. at 339.Google Scholar

¹⁷² Id. Google Scholar

¹⁷³ Id. at 363.Google Scholar

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¹⁷⁵ Id. at 363–64.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁶ Id. at 364.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁷ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 6 BVerfGE 290 (295). See also 57 BVerfGE 9 (23) (Ger.).Google Scholar

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¹⁷⁹ Gärditz, Legal Restraints, supra note 30, at 408.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁰ Id. at 409.Google Scholar

¹⁸¹ Id. at 409–15.Google Scholar

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¹⁸⁴ The Al-Skeini Judgment of 2011 provides an overview of the relevant jurisprudence on these matters. See Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, paras. 130–142 (July 7, 2011).Google Scholar

¹⁸⁵ Gärditz, Legal Restraints, supra note 30, at 411.Google Scholar

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¹⁸⁷ While States are generally prevented by international law from exercising their authority and enforcing their laws on the territory of other States (unless they are specifically entitled to do so), they are not prevented from enacting legislation that defines for their own agencies the scope and parameters for intelligence operations abroad. Theoretically, the German legislator could therefore also adopt provisions regulating the BND's engagement in such operations, which would further enhance legal certainty.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁸ Supra note 81.Google Scholar

¹⁸⁹ But see Gärditz, Legal Restraints, supra note 30, at 419 (doubting that the qualitative threshold for triggering protection by Article 10 of the Basic Law is reached when a measure of strategic surveillance merely scans metadata to reveal potential patterns without individualizing the participants).Google Scholar

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¹⁹⁶ Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] 66 BVerfGE 39 (62) (Ger.). See also Herdegen, supra note 178, n. 75.Google Scholar

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²⁰⁶ Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 18(1), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 (“Within the scope of application of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.”).Google Scholar

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