Hostname: page-component-7bb8b95d7b-5mhkq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-09-12T07:12:38.403Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Transformation of the Hungarian Constitutional Court: Tradition, Revolution, and (European) Prospects

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Abstract

Core share and HTML view are not available for this content. However, as you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button.

The new Constitution and the new Act are changing the status of the Hungarian Constitutional Court by developing the Hungarian constitutional tradition, creating better collaboration between the Constitutional Court and the ordinary judiciary, and establishing an effective instrument for the protection of individual human rights. But the pattern of the Parliament reacting to the rulings of the Constitutional Court with constitutional amendments reduces the competences of the Constitutional Court. It is to be hoped that this process is coming to an end, because otherwise the achievement of the “paradoxical revolution of law” is endangered.

Due to the former extensive competences in terms of law review and its limited influence on ordinary jurisdiction, the status of the Constitutional Court caused problems. Because of the abstract nature of the procedures, the distance from the ordinary judiciary, and the power dilemma between the Constitutional Court and the Parliament respectively, the Government decided the main stream of its ruling up to 2012.

Now there are some important changes, especially the introduction of a widespread constitutional complaint. The abolition of the actio popularis is justified. The relationships between the state organs seem to be better clarified and adjusted. The European clause of the 1949/1989 Constitution, which was largely retained in the Fundamental Law, contains a fundamental concept, which is that the European Union is founded on strong sovereign Member States. On the other hand, the Fundamental Law strengthens Hungary's ties to Europe by making these an integral part of that law. As the Constitutional Court had not yet really applied the European Clause, it now has the opportunity to put these two concepts into practice and make them mutually compatible by enforcing them at a high level.

The discussions concerning the newest constitutional developments in Hungary mainly have their origin in the power struggle between the constituent majority of the Parliament and the Constitutional Court. It is not clear, however, how long this conflict will continue to be a matter falling solely within the national sovereignty of Hungary. Due to the parliamentary super-majority of the governing parties, the Constitutional Court is losing its power. Hungary is a unitary state; it is an open question whether there is any substitution needed to balance the power of the governing parties. Nevertheless, in spite of the substantial restrictions on reviewing the constitutionality of financial laws and the several amendments of the new Constitution, the Constitutional Court still plays a role in safeguarding democratic checks and balances. Indeed, it can have a positive impact on the European integration of Hungary. It has been granted new competences to guarantee constitutional unity within the Hungarian legal system and to complete the enforcement of individual rights. The Constitutional Court should make better use of its new granted competence to remedy any possible grievance entirely.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © 2014 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 See José Manuel Durão Barroso, Statement by President Barroso Following the Adoption of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism Reports for Romania and Bulgaria, Eur. Comm'n (July 18, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-565_en.htm.Google Scholar

2 See Calendar of Events: 92nd Plenary Session of the Venice Commission, Council of Europe, http://www.venice.coe.int/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2012).Google Scholar

3 See Venice Comm'n, Constitutional Issues in Romania: Government Emergency Ordinances, Parliament Decisions and Laws, Council of Europe Opinion No. 685/2012 (Sept. 5, 2012) (explaining the compatibility with Constitutional principles and the Rule of Law of actions taken by the Government and the Parliament of Romania in respect of other State institutions and on the Government emergency ordinance).Google Scholar

4 See Slavov, Atanas, Challenges to Constitutional Supremacy in a New Democracy: A Critical Study of Bulgaria 4 (Ctr. for Advanced Study Sofia, CAS Sofia Working Paper Series, 2011) (analyzing the Bulgarian constitutional system).Google Scholar

5 See Hugh, Edward, Hungary Is Headed for a Substantial Recession as Foreign Exchange Lending Seizes Up, A Fistful of Euros (Oct. 17, 2008), http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/hungary-is-headed-for-a-substantial-recession-as-foreign-exchange-lending-seizes-up/.Google Scholar

6 There are criticisms from experts. See generally Gábor Attila Tóth, Constitution for a Disunited Nation (2011); Gábor Halmai, Hochproblematisch, Ungarns neues Grundgesetz, 61.12 Osteuropa 145–156 (2011); Gábor Halmai et al., Gábor Attila Tóth Vélémény Magyarország alaptörvényéröl, 55.26 Elet és Irodalom 1 (2011), translated in Gábor Attila Tóth, Constitution for a Disunited Nation Appendix 455 (2011); Nóra Chronowski et al., What Questions of Interpretation May be Raised by the New Hungarian Constitution?, 6 Vienna J. on Int'l Const. L. 41 (2012); Eszter Kirs, Freedom and Responsibility in the New Constitutional System of Hungary, Revue Est Europa 73 (numéro spécial 1, 2012). But there is not only criticism. See Balázs Schanda, A New Constitution for Hungary, 7.2 Iustum Aequum Salutare 153–158 (2011); Grégor Puppinck & Alessio Pecorario, Memorandum of the Hungarian New Constitution, Eur. Ctr. for Law & justice (Apr. 25, 2011), available at www.eclj.org. A good compendium of critical and positive voices of international experts agree. See Joseph Károlyi Foundation & The French Institute, Une Constitution, pourquoi faire? Entre spécificités nationales et consensus Européen, Colloque international [What is the Purpose of a Constitution? Between National Identities and European Consensus, International Conference] (2013).Google Scholar

7 See Venice Commission, The Concerns of the European Commission Were Not Related to the Constitutional Court Per Se, Council of Europe, Opinion No. 720/2013, 012 (2013); Viviane Reding, Hungary and the Rule of Law-Statement of the European Commission in the Plenary Debate of the European Parliament, Eur. Comm'n (Apr. 17, 2013), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-324_en.htm?locale=en; Eur. Parl., Resolution on the Situation of Fundamental Rights: Standards and Practices in Hungary (July 3, 2013) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2013-0315&language=EN&ring=A7-2013-0229 (asking the Council to monitor the constitutional developments); Francis Delpérée et al., The Hungarian Government has Provided an International and a German Legal Expertise: Opinion on the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of Hungary (Mar. 1, 2013); Rupert Scholz, Rechtsgutachten zur Verfassungs-und Europarechtskonfomität der Vierten Verfassungsnovelle zum ungarischen Grundgesetz vom 11./25. März 2013 (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.mfa.gov.hu/NR/rdonlyres/13EE294A-2676-4BA2-A394-325A8B96A074/0/GT_025.PDF.Google Scholar

8 See Radvánszky, Anton, Grundzüge der Verfassungs- und Staatsgeschichte Ungarns 97 (1990).Google Scholar

9 See Brunner, Georg, Ungarn, in Verfassungen der kommunistischen Staaten 476, 477 (Georg Brunner & Boris Meissner eds., 1980); Imre Takács, Az alkotmány és az alkotmányosság fogalma, in Alkotmánytan 9, 27 (István Kukorelli ed., 1992).Google Scholar

10 See Bragyova, András, Az új alkotmány egy koncepciója 17–18 (1995); József Petretei, Magyar alkotmányjog I 70 (2002); Herbert Küpper, Die ungarische Verfassung nach zwei Jahrzehnten des Übergangs 8 (2007).Google Scholar

11 See Takács, supra note 9, at 39–40; Gábor Halmai, The Transformation of Hungarian Constitutional Law from 1985 to 2005, in The Transformation of Hungarian Legal Order 1985-2005 1 (Andras Jakáb et al. eds., 2007).Google Scholar

12 This fundamental concept survived and was later a decisive factor in the drafting of the constitution. See Bálint Ablonczy, Sur les Traces de la Constitution 26–27 (2012).Google Scholar

13 There was only a regulatory concept of the parliament. See Venice Commission, Opinion on the Regulatory Concept of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, CDL-INF002 (1996). The Secretariat of the parliamentary committee tried to reflect the process. See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] (Lamm Vanda ed., 1997).Google Scholar

14 There is an English translation. See Act XX of 1949: The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, Wolters Kluwer, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=190398.Google Scholar

15 Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court], Az Alkotmánybírósági Hatarozatai éves Könyvek [ABHek] 619-20 (1993). Note that the decisions of the Constitutional Court, which are not part of the Official Gazette, were published by an Edition of the Court until 2010.Google Scholar

16 See Brunner, Georg & László Sólyom, Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy: The Hungarian Constitutional Court (2000); Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, in Ungarn (1995); Gábor Spuller, Das Verfassungsgericht der Republik Ungarn 361-65 (2000) (containing an overall bibliography until 1998); Tamás Bán, Presentation de la Cour Constitutionelle de Hongrie, Cahiers du Conseil Constitutionnel n° 13 (2003), http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/nouveaux-cahiers-du-conseil/cahier-n-13/presentation-de-la-cour-constitutionnelle-de-hongrie.52031.html; Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Negotiations, International Sociology 18, 219 (2003); Halmai, supra note 11 at 5; Peter Kovács, Introduction à la Jurisprudence de la Cour Constitutionnelle de la République de Hongrie (2010); Oliver Lembcke & Christian Boulanger, Between Revolution and Constitution: The Roles of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, in Constitution for a Disunited Nation 269 (Gábor A. Tóth ed., 2012).Google Scholar

17 See Zoll, Andrzej & László Sólyom, Die Rolle der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, in Politischen Transformationsprozessen 36 (2002).Google Scholar

18 See id. at 34.Google Scholar

19 See Pokol, Béla, Aktivizmus és az Alkotmánybíróság, in Magyarország Politikai Èvkönyve 150-55 (Sándor Kurtán et al. eds., 1993); Aktivista Alapjogász vagy Parlamenti Törvénybarát, in Világosság 41-49 (1993); A Parlamentarizmus vita Elsö Fordulója Után, in Társadalmi Szemle 49-57 (1994); The Concept of Law. The Multi-Layered Legal System 78 (2001).Google Scholar

20 English translation available under http://www.venice.coe.int/ or http://www.mkab.hu/.Google Scholar

21 See Venice Commission, On Three Legal Questions Arising in the Process of Drafting the New Constitution, Council of Europe, Opinion No. 614/2011, 001 (Mar. 2011); On the New Hungarian Constitution, Council of Europe, Opinion No. 618/2011, 016 (June 2011); On Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court of Hungary, Council of Europe, Opinion No. 655/2012, 009 (June 2012). See Michael Newcity, Journal of Eurasian law (2011).Google Scholar

22 See Venice Commission, Remarks of the Hungarian Government on the Draft: Opinion on ACT CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court of Hungary, Opinion 665/2012 (June 13, 2012).Google Scholar

23 See European Parliament, Resolution of 5 July 2011 on the Revised Hungarian Constitution (July 5, 2011), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-0315+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.Google Scholar

24 See id. (illustrating that the green, liberal and socialist majority of the European Parliament overruled the conservative parties).Google Scholar

25 See Case C-294/83, Les Verts v European Parliament, 1988 E.C.R. 1017, at para. 23.Google Scholar

26 See Schorkopf, Frank, Recht der Europäischen Union, Kommentar, Art. 2 EUV, para. 9, in The Law of the European Union (Eberhard Grabitz et al. eds., 2012).Google Scholar

27 See id. at para 20.Google Scholar

28 Established in London on 5 May 1949 between the Governments of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Irish Republic, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Kingdom of Sweden, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Eur. Council, Statute of the Council of Europe (1949), http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/001.htm.Google Scholar

29 Venice Commission, On Three Legal Questions Arising in the Process of Drafting the New Constitution, Council of Europe, Opinion no. 614/2011, 001, para. 55 (2011).Google Scholar

30 See Spuller, , supra note 16, at 381–82.Google Scholar

31 See Petrétei, József, Magyar Alkotmányjog II Államszervezet 142–44 (2001); Péter Tilk, Az Alkotmánybíróság hatásköre és Mükõdése 17–21 (2002); Spuller, supra note 16, at 361–65.Google Scholar

32 See Spuller, , supra note 16, at 361.Google Scholar

33 See Venice Commission, supra note 29, at para. 63.Google Scholar

34 See id. at para. 59; László Sólyom & Georg Brunner, Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy. The Hungarian Constitutional Court (2000).Google Scholar

35 This is especially the case in environmental law because unlawful actions are affecting future generations more than individual interests. See Jerzy Jendroska, Citizen's Rights in European Environmental Law, 9 J. for Euro. Envtl. & Planning L. 1, 7190 (2012).Google Scholar

36 See Venice Commission, supra note 29, at para. 57.Google Scholar

37 See Venice Commission, On Individual Access to Constitutional Justice, Council of Europe, Study No. 538/2009, 039, para. 34 (Dec. 2010).Google Scholar

38 See 1989. évi XXXII. törvény a Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága (Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court) § 51; A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 24, § 4 (enforcing the need for a petition as a constitutional principle).Google Scholar

39 Therefore, the Constitutional Court can still state that the legislative organ failed to fulfill its legislative tasks issuing from its lawful authority, when it comes up during the scrutiny procedure of the ordinary constitutional review. See Act XXXII of the Constitutional Court § 46.Google Scholar

40 See Spuller, , supra note 16, at 119.Google Scholar

41 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 24, § 4.Google Scholar

42 See Spuller, , supra note 16, at 123.Google Scholar

43 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 24, § 7.Google Scholar

44 See 1989. évi XXXII. törvény a Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága (Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court); see Spuller, supra note 16, at 339.Google Scholar

45 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 57.1.Google Scholar

46 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 57.9.Google Scholar

47 “Igazságszólgatás.”Google Scholar

48 The Commissioner for Fundamental Rights includes all the functions of the former Ombudsmen.Google Scholar

49 See Venice Commission, On the Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court of Hungary, Council of Europe, Opinion No. 665/2012, 009, para. 25 (2012).Google Scholar

50 See Venice Commission, supra note 29, at para. 66.Google Scholar

51 See infra notes 52, 53.Google Scholar

52 See Az Alkotmánybírósági Hatarozatai (ABH) [Constitutional Court], Dec. 19, 2011, MK.12.20.166/2011, para III.1.Google Scholar

53 See Az Alkotmánybírósági Hatarozatai (ABH) [Constitutional Court], Dec. 28, 2012, MK.12.29.45/2012.Google Scholar

54 See Az Alkotmánybírósági Hatarozatai (ABH) [Constitutional Court], May 21, 2013, MK. 2.648/2013.Google Scholar

55 Critics from the Venice Commission. See Venice Commission, On the New Hungarian Constitution, Council of Europe, Opinion No. 618/2011, 016, para. 94 (2011).Google Scholar

56 See id. at para. 95.Google Scholar

57 See Säcker, Horst, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht 44 (1989).Google Scholar

58 Lately, , the rapporteur of one of the most important decisions, which nullified semi-constitutional provisions and caused an “outrage” of the ruling majority, was István Stumpf, and his appointment was supported by Fidesz. See infra note 122.Google Scholar

59 Although there were limits due to overruling tactics of the ruling majority. See Spuller, supra note 16, at 236.Google Scholar

60 See 1989. évi XXXII. törvény a Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága (Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court) § 57.10.Google Scholar

61 See id. § 39.1.Google Scholar

62 See id. § 34–35.Google Scholar

63 See Korioth, Stefan & Schlaich, Klaus, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht, paras. 31–36 (2012).Google Scholar

64 See Denkschrift des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [Memorandum of the Bundesverfassungsgericht] 27 June 1952, 6 Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts 144 (1957).Google Scholar

65 See 1949 Constitution § 19.1.Google Scholar

66 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 24.1; Act XXXII of the Constitutional Court § 2. In the former Act on Constitutional Court it was only mentioned in the Preface: “The Parliament enacts in order … to establish the supreme organ to protect constitutional order … followed law.”Google Scholar

67 See 1989. évi XXXII. törvény a Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága (Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court) § 50.1.Google Scholar

68 See Spuller, , supra note 16, at 276.Google Scholar

69 See 1989. évi XXXII. törvény a Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága (Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court) § 53.6.Google Scholar

70 See Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court § 67.2 lit. c.Google Scholar

71 See Az Alkotmánybírósági Hatarozatai (ABH) [Constitutional Court], Dec. 29, 1998, MK.I.2.42/1998; ABHek 532, 533 (1998).Google Scholar

72 See 1989. évi XXXII. törvény a Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága (Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court) § 4.Google Scholar

73 See id. at § 4; supra note 49 at para. 6. The Venice Commission welcomes this new guarantee.Google Scholar

74 See Tilk, Péter, Az Alkotmánybíróság az Alaptörvényben, in Közjogi Szemle 7 (2011).Google Scholar

75 See Klárá Fürész, Az Alkotmányvédö Szervezet, 35 Uni. of Budapest 19, 21 (1995); Spuller, supra note 16, at 359.Google Scholar

76 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 24, § 2.f.Google Scholar

77 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 6, § 2.Google Scholar

78 See Chronowski, Nora, Az Alkotmánybíráskodás Sarkalatos Átalakítása 08 (MTA Law Working Papers, 2014).Google Scholar

79 See Spuller, Gábor, Der Einfluss des Verfassungsgerichts der Republik Ungarn im Gesetzgebungsverfahren des ungarischen Parlaments, in 48 Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts 367, 386389 (Peter Haeberle ed., 2000). This abolishment was due to the liberal/social majority.Google Scholar

80 See supra note 49, at para. 25; see also Kriszta Kovács & Gábor Attila Tóth, Hungary's Constitutional Transformation, 7 European Constitutional L. Rev., 183, 201 (2011).Google Scholar

81 See Venice Commission, Remarks of the Hungarian Government, Council of Europe, 045, para. 45 (2012).Google Scholar

82 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 6, § 2; supra note 29 at para. 45.Google Scholar

83 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] ABHek 92, 317 (1992).Google Scholar

84 See Spuller, , supra note 79.Google Scholar

85 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] ABH, Jan. 4, 2013, MK.I.7.1/2013. Beforehand, some Election rules were scrutinized by the Venice Commission as well. See Venice Commission, Joint Opinion with the Council for Democratic Elections on the Act on the election of Members of Parliament of Hungary, Council of Europe, Opinion No. 662/2012, 012 (2012).Google Scholar

86 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court], Apr. 28, 2008, MK.61/2008; ABHek 546, 550 (2008).Google Scholar

87 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] May 8, 2012, MK.22/2012, para. 58.Google Scholar

88 See 1989. évi XXXII. törvény a Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága (Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court) § 23.1.Google Scholar

89 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 36.1.Google Scholar

90 See 1989. évi XXXII. törvény a Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága (Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court) § 37.1.Google Scholar

91 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. B, § 1.Google Scholar

92 See Spuller, , supra note 16, at 395.Google Scholar

93 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BverfG - Federal Constitutional Court], Case No. 2 BvB 2/51, 6 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 300, 304 (Mar. 21, 1957).Google Scholar

94 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. II(1).Google Scholar

95 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] ABHek 1990, 136, 137 (describing the most important rule of organization and action of the Hungarian state organization).Google Scholar

96 Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] May 8, 2012, Alkotmánybíróság határozat [ABH] 22/2012. (V. 11.) (English translation available).Google Scholar

97 See 1989. évi XXXII. törvény a Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága (Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court) art. 38(1) (Hung.).Google Scholar

98 évi CLI. törvény a Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága (Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court) § 25.Google Scholar

99 See Raisz, Aniko, A Constitution's Environment, Environment in the Constitution—Process and Background of the New Hungarian Constitution, Special Edition 1 Revue Est Europa 37, 56 (2012), http://www.est-europa.univ-pau.fr/est-europa-la-revue/recherche/recherche-par-pays/209.html.Google Scholar

100 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] May 6, 2011, ABH 35/2011. (V. 6.), pts. 1 and 3 (Hung.).Google Scholar

101 A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 24(2)(e).Google Scholar

102 See European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary, Opinion No. 720/2013, CDL-AD(2013) 012, para. 118 (June 17, 2013), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2013)012-e.Google Scholar

103 See Tilk, , supra note 31, at 91–92.Google Scholar

104 See Chronowski, Nóra, Tímea Drinóczi & József Petrétei, The Governmental System of Hungary, in Governmental Systems of Central and Eastern European Countries 299, 360 (Nóra Chronowski et al. eds., 2011); See infra note 246.Google Scholar

105 See Brunner, & Sólyom, supra note 16, at 83; see also Spuller, supra note 16, at 208-211.Google Scholar

106 See András Sajó, Contemporary Problems of the Judiciary in Hungary, in The Social Role of the Legal Profession (1993); Küpper, supra note 10, at 83.Google Scholar

107 See László Sólyom, To the Tenth Anniversary of Constitutional Review, in A Megtalált Alkotmány? A Magyar Alapjogi Bíráskodás Első Kilenc Éve (Constitution Found? The First Decade of Hungarian Constitutional Review on Fundamental Rights) (Gábor Halmai ed., 2000); Tilk, supra note 31, at 227-29.Google Scholar

108 See Zoll, & Sólyom, supra note 17, at 39.Google Scholar

109 See Tilk, , supra note 31, at 84; European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Study on Individual Access to Constitutional Justice, Opinion No. 538/2009, CDL-AD(2010)039rev., para. 212 (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2010)039rev-e.Google Scholar

110 See Spuller, , supra note 16, at 93-94.Google Scholar

111 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] Dec. 13, 2005, ABH 42/2005. (XI. 14.) (Hung.); Péter Paczolay, The Jurisdiction of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, Report for the Seminar: Models of Constitutional Jurisdiction, Ramallah, in Ramallah, CDL-JU(2008)040 (2008).Google Scholar

112 See Spuller, , supra note 16, at 382–85; See also Péter Paczolay, President of the Constitutional Court of Hungary in his Speech to the Hungarian Parliament (Mar. 22, 2011), in Special Edition 1 Revue Est Europa 205 (Edina Posa trans., 2012).Google Scholar

113 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 24(2)(c)–(d).Google Scholar

114 See Küupper, Herbert, Ungarns Verfassung vom Apr. 25, 2011 (Hungary's Constitution from Apr. 25, 2011) 167 (Frankfurt 2012).Google Scholar

115 See Opinion on Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court of Hungary, Opinion No. 665/2012, CDL-AD(2012)009, para. 26 (June 19, 2012), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2012)009-e.Google Scholar

116 See 2011. évi CLI. törvény a Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága (Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court) § 39(1) (Hung.) (“Unless otherwise provided for by this Act, the decisions of the Constitutional Court are binding on everyone.”); 2011. évi CLI. törvény a Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága (Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court) § 41(1) (Hung.) (“If the Constitutional Court, within the framework of proceedings specified in Sections 24 to 26, declares that any legal regulation in force or any provision thereof is contrary to the Fundamental Law, it shall annul the legal regulation or provision in whole or in part.”).Google Scholar

117 See 2011. évi CLI. törvény a Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága (Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court) § 43(4) (Hung.).Google Scholar

118 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 28.Google Scholar

119 Lóránt Csink & Schanda, Balázs, The Basic Law of Hungary: A First Commentary 304 (Lóránt Csink et al. eds., 2011).Google Scholar

120 évi CLI. törvény a Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága (Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court) § 43(3) (Hung.). The Venice Commission appreciates this provision. See European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court of Hungary, Opinion No. 665/2012, CDL(2012)037, para. 36 (May 29, 2012), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(2012)037-e.Google Scholar

121 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] June 17, 2013, ABH 13/2013 (VI. 17.) (points 2–3 and dissenting opinion of Béla Pokol, para. 148).Google Scholar

122 See Chronowski, Nóra, Tímea Drinóczi & József Petrétei, Multidimensional Protection of Universal Human Rights in Hungary, in The Universalism of Human Rights 371, 387 (Rainer Arnold ed., 2013).Google Scholar

123 In 1995, there were 390 new cases of ex-post control and 20 new cases of constitutional complaint. See The Constitutional Court of Hungary, Statistics (1995), http://www.alkotmanybirosag.hu/dokumentumok/statisztika.Google Scholar

124 See Spuller, , supra note 16, at 391.Google Scholar

125 See Kovács & Tóth, supra note 80, at 192–95.Google Scholar

126 See Law No. 119/2010.Google Scholar

127 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 7(1) (codified in The Fundamental Law of Hungary (2011) art. Q(2)).Google Scholar

128 See id.; Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] July 13, 2011, ABH 72/2006. (XII. 15.); Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 2006 ABHek 819, 861 (English translation available at http://mkab.hu/case-law/translations).Google Scholar

129 In contrast to the Constitutional Court of Romania, see Valentina Bărbăţeanu, The Influence of the Constitutional Jurisdictions on the Basic Laws, 2 Lex ET Scientia Int'l J. 137 (2012).Google Scholar

130 See Alkotmánybíróság határozat (ABH) [Constitutional Court] July 13, 2011, 61/2011. (VII. 13.).Google Scholar

131 See id. Google Scholar

132 See id. Google Scholar

133 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 37, § 4.Google Scholar

134 See Omega Spielhallen- und Autmatenaufstellungs-gmbH v. Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, CJEU Case C-36/02, 2004 E.C.R. 1-9609.Google Scholar

135 See Dupré, Catherine, Importing German Law: The Interpretation of the Right to Human Dignity by the Hungarian Constitutional Court, 46 Osteuroparecht 145 (2000).Google Scholar

136 See László Sólyom, The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Transition to Democracy: With Special Reference to Hungary, 18 Int'l Soc. 133, 145 (2003).Google Scholar

137 See Alkotmánybíróság határozat (ABH) [Constitutional Court] May 3, 2011, 37/2011 (V. 10.) chs. 3–4.Google Scholar

138 See Dupré, Catherine, Human Dignity: Rhetoric, Protection and Instrumentalisation, in Constitution for a Disunited Nation: On Hungary's 2011 Fundamental Law 143, 146 (Gábor Attila Tóth ed., 2012).Google Scholar

139 See Dupré, Catherine, La Dignité Humaine dans la Loi Fondamentale Hongroise de 2012 (Human Dignity in the Hungarian Fundamental Law of 2012), 1 Revue Est Europa 89, 95 (2012), http://www.est-europa.univ-pau.fr/images/archives/2012-Hongrie/catherine-dupre.pdf.Google Scholar

140 Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] May 21, 2013, II/648/2013, http://www.mkab.hu/download.php?h=492.Google Scholar

141 See infra note 142.Google Scholar

142 That is why the discussion as to whether the infringement procedure could concur with the EU Art 7 TEU Mechanism could be disregarded. Article 2 TEU contains no power-conferring provision, and so cannot be used as legal basis for a decision in the framework of an infringement procedure. See Alain Dashwood, Michael Dougan, Berry Rodger, Eleanor Spaventa & Derrick Wyatt, European Union Law 99 (2011).Google Scholar

143 See Treaty on European Union, Mar. 3, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 1, art. 4(2).Google Scholar

144 See Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Hervis Sport- és Divatkereskedelmi Kft. V. Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Közép-dunántúli Regionális Adó Föigazgatósága, CJEU Case C-385/12, (Sept. 5, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=140629&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=716328; CJEU Case HU 2011/4194 TAXU (discriminating special retail tax); CJEU Case HU 2012/2103 (discriminating special telecommunication tax), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-286_en.htm?locale=en.Google Scholar

145 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] § 37(4).Google Scholar

146 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 24(2).Google Scholar

147 See Dupré, Catherine, Human Dignity: Rhetoric, Protection and Instrumentalisation, in Constitution for a Disunited Nation: On Hungary's 2011 Fundamental Law 143, 160 (Gábor Attila Tóth ed., 2012).Google Scholar

148 See 2011. évi CLI. törvény a Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága (Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court) § 27. Section 27 of ACC provides:Google Scholar

In accordance with Article 24 (2) d) of the Fundamental Law, persons or organizations affected by judicial decisions contrary to the Fundamental law may submit a constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Court if the decision made regarding the merits of the case or other decision terminating the judicial proceedingsGoogle Scholar

a) violates their rights laid down in the Fundamental Law, andGoogle Scholar

b) the possibilities for legal remedy have already been exhausted by the petitioner or no possibility for legal remedy is available for him or her.Google Scholar

149 See 2011. évi CLI. törvény a Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága (Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court) § 41 (Hung.). Section 41 of ACC provides:Google Scholar

(1) If the Constitutional Court, within the framework of proceedings specified in Sections 24 to 26 declares that any legal regulation in force or any provision thereof is contrary to the Fundamental Law, it shall annul the legal regulation or provision in whole or in part.Google Scholar

(2) Paragraph (1) shall be applied subject to the exceptions and conditions set forth in Article 37 (4) of the Fundamental Law.Google Scholar

150 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. B(1).Google Scholar

151 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. N(1).Google Scholar

152 Some information and evaluation of the Hungarian economic measures can be found in: László Csaba, Growth, Crisis Management and the EU: The Hungarian Trilemma, 53 Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 116 (2013).Google Scholar

153 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] § 36(4).Google Scholar

154 See id. at art. 36(5).Google Scholar

155 See id. at art. 44(3).Google Scholar

156 See id. at art. 36(6).Google Scholar

157 See id. at art. 54(2).Google Scholar

158 See Dupré, Catherine, La Dignité Humaine dans la Loi Fondamentale Hongroise de 2012 (Human Dignity in the Hungarian Fundamental Law of 2012), 1 Revue Est Europa 89, 104 (2012), http://www.est-europa.univ-pau.fr/images/archives/2012-Hongrie/catherine-dupre.pdf.Google Scholar

159 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 3(3)(b).Google Scholar

160 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] Dec. 28, 2012, AB 45/2012. (XII. 29.), http://www.mkab.hu/letoltesek/en_0045_2012.pdf.Google Scholar

161 See The Act on the Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental Law (2011) art. 27.Google Scholar

162 The Venice Commission is very critical at this point. See European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court of Hungary, Opinion No. 665/2012, CDL(2012)037, para. 38 (May 29, 2012), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(2012)037-e.; Venice Commission, Remarks of the Hungarian Government on the Draft Opinion on ACT CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court of Hungary, Opinion 655/2012, CDL(2012)045, p. 8 (June 19, 2011), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL(2012)045-e.Google Scholar

163 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] Dec. 28, 2012, ABH 45/2012. (XII. 29.), http://www.mkab.hu/letoltesek/en_0045_2012.pdf (Hung.).Google Scholar

164 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] Dec. 28, 2012, 45/2012. (XII. 29.) über die partielle Verfassungswidrigkeit des Grundgesetz-Einführungsgesetz, http://www.mkab.hu/letoltesek/en_0045_2012.pdf (regarding the unconstitutionality and annulment of certain provisions of the Transitional Provisions of the Fundamental Law of Hungary); see also Herbert Küpper, Translation of Decision 45/2012 with Commentary, 54 Jahrbuch für Ostrecht 238–281 (2013).Google Scholar

165 See supra note 132.Google Scholar

166 See id. Google Scholar

167 See Pringle v. Ireland, CJEU Case C-370/12, paras. 30–37 (July 21, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-370/12. Reference the Supreme Court of Ireland for a preliminary ruling.Google Scholar

168 See European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary, Opinion No. 720/2013, CDL-AD (2013)012, paras. 81, 87 (June 17, 2013), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2013)012-e.Google Scholar

169 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 19, amend. IV, para. 2.Google Scholar

170 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] Mar. 3, 1992, ABH 11/1992. (III. 5.).Google Scholar

171 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] Feb. 16, 2004, ABH 3/2004. (II. 17.) IV. 1.4; Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] Mar. 11, 2008, 32/2008. (III. 12) V. 1.Google Scholar

172 See László Sólyom, supra note 107, at 139.Google Scholar

173 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 19, amend. IV, para. 2.Google Scholar

174 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 20(26).Google Scholar

175 See Delpérée, supra note 7.Google Scholar

176 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] June 17, 2013, ABH 13/2013. (VI. 17.) no. 28 (quoting 22/2012 V. 11) (Hung.).Google Scholar

177 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. R(3) (formulating this idea). This idea, set out in Venice Commission Opinion 720/2013 on the same day, was followed by the dissenting opinions of judges Imre Juhász and István Balsai, Nr. 202. See European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary, Opinion No. 720/2013, CDL-AD (2013)012, para. 99 (June 17, 2013), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2013)012-e. See also Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] June 17, 2013, ABH 13/2013. (VI. 17.) (Balsai, J., dissenting) (Juhász, J., dissenting).Google Scholar

178 See, e.g., Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] Dec. 28, 2012, ABH 45/2012. (XII. 29.), http://www.mkab.hu/letoltesek/en_0045_2012.pdf.Google Scholar

179 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 23/1994. (IV. 29.) (ABHek 94, 275).Google Scholar

180 European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Opinion on the Fourth Amendment to the Fundamental Law of Hungary, Opinion No. 720/2013, CDL-AD (2013)012, para. 144 (June 17, 2013), http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-AD(2013)012-e.Google Scholar

181 Tavares, Rui, MEP, Eur. Parl. Comm. of Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs, Draft Report on the Situation of Fundamental Rights: Standards and Practices in Hungary, 20 (May 2, 2013), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe/draft-reports.html#menuzone.Google Scholar

182 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] May 21, 2013, II/648/2013.Google Scholar

183 See Navracsics, Tibor, Min. of Admin. & Justice, Draft T/12015, 5 (Aug. 2013).Google Scholar

184 See Mark Dawson and Elise Muir, Hungary and the Indirect Protection of EU Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law, 14 German L.J. 1959 (2013).Google Scholar

185 See generally Hungarian Parliament's Public Information Center, http://www.parlament.hu.Google Scholar

186 See Galharague, , supra note 6.Google Scholar

187 See 1989. évi XXXII. törvény a Magyarország Alkotmánybírósága (Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court)§ 1(b).Google Scholar

188 See Schlaich, & Korioth, , supra note 63, at para. 358–69.Google Scholar

189 See László Blutman & Chronowski, Norá, Hungarian Constitutional Court: Keeping Aloof from European Union Law, 3 Vienna J. on Int'l Const. L., 329 (2011).Google Scholar

190 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] June 1998. 30/1998 (VI.25.), 234.Google Scholar

191 See European Agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the Other Part of the European Community, Hung.-Eur. Un. Member States, Dec. 16, 1991, available at http://www.1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3&param=9059.Google Scholar

192 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court]. 143/2010, VII. 14 (scrutinizing the Lisbon Treaty).Google Scholar

193 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 4/1997 (II.22.) (Bragyova, dissenting, favoring an ex-ante review). See András Bragyova, No New(s), Good New(s)?, in Constitution for a Disunited Nation 336, 346 (Gábor A. Toth, ed. 2012).Google Scholar

194 A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 24.1.Google Scholar

195 See 1989. XXXII § 42.2 (Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court) (Hung.).Google Scholar

196 See 1989. XXXII § 42.1 (Act XXXII of 1989 on the Constitutional Court) (Hung.).Google Scholar

197 The English translation delivered to the Venice Commission may be somewhat misleading. Actually the correct wording of section 42.2 should be:Google Scholar

If the Constitutional Court declares that such a legal regulation is contrary to an international treaty, with which the legal regulation promulgating the international treaty, according to the Fundamental Law, shall not be in conflict, it shall—in consideration of the circumstances and setting a time limit—invite the Government or the lawmaker to take the necessary measure to resolve the conflict within the time limit set.Google Scholar

There seems to be an unintentional mistake because the legal consequences of the competences of examination of conflicts with International Treaties and the ex-post review are confounded.Google Scholar

198 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court]. 143/2010, VII. 14. Cf. András Bragyova, No New(s), Good New(s)?, in Constitution for a Disunited Nation 336, 346 (Gábor A. Toth, ed. 2012); Nóra Chronowski, Tímea Drinóczi & Ildikó Ernst Hungary, International Law and Domestic Legal Systems 259, 265, 266 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2011).Google Scholar

199 Cf. Chronowski, Drinóczi & Ernst, , supra note 198, at 270.Google Scholar

200 Judge András Bragyova seems to be worried. See András Bragyova, No New(s), Good New(s)?, in Constitution for a Disunited Nation 336, 346 (Gábor A. Toth ed. 2012).Google Scholar

201 A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 23.I.Google Scholar

202 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. E.2.Google Scholar

203 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court], Case no. 2 BvR 197/83, 73, 339 (Oct. 22, 1986).Google Scholar

204 See Bragyova, , supra note 200, at 336, 348; Màrta Dezsö and Attila Vincze, Magyar alkotmányosság az európai integrációban 210–37 (2012).Google Scholar

205 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] Mar. 11, 2008. 32/2008, III.12., http://makab.hu/case-law/translations.Google Scholar

206 Second sentence: “… and made our country a part of Christian Europe.” Fourth sentence: “… our people have fought in defense of Europe … and … have enriched Europe's common values.”Google Scholar

207 See Eur. Consult. Ass. (Venice Comm'n), supra note 21, at para. 33.Google Scholar

208 See Bragyova, , supra note 200, at 349.Google Scholar

209 See Halmai et. al, supra note 6, at 486.Google Scholar

210 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. E.2.Google Scholar

211 The analysis of the European policy of the current government states a concept which is rather pragmatic and utilitarian than sentimental or nationalistic. See András Hettyei, Die Europa-Politik der Orbán Regierung, 53 Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 116–53 (2013).Google Scholar

212 See Karl-Peter Sommermann, Integrationsgrenzen des Grundgesetzes und europäischer Verfassungsverbund: Brauchen wir eine neue Verfassung? 708 (2013).Google Scholar

213 See Dezsö & Dezsö, supra note 204.Google Scholar

214 “The law of European Union may stipulate generally binding rules of conduct subject to the conditions set out in subsequent 2.” A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. E.3.Google Scholar

215 See Bragyova, , supra note 204, at 354.Google Scholar

216 See Dezsö & Dezsö, supra note 204, at 233–238.Google Scholar

217 See Bragyova, , supra note 200, at 349.Google Scholar

218 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 33/2012, VII. 17, available at http://mkab.hu/case-law/translations.Google Scholar

219 See Comm'n v. Hungary, CJEU Case C-286/12, para. 1 (Nov. 6, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?num=C-286/12.Google Scholar

220 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 45.1.Google Scholar

221 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 33/2012, VII. 17.Google Scholar

222 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 45.5.Google Scholar

223 Section 43.4 of the former Act on the Constitutional Court was legally very uncertain. See Spuller, supra note 16, at 193–198.Google Scholar

224 See Eur. Consult. Ass., Opinion on Act CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court of Hungary Adopted by the Venice Commission, 91st Sess., Doc. No. CDL-AD (2012)009 (2012).Google Scholar

225 Some lawyers stated in their Opinion on the Fundamental Law of Hungary. Gábor Halmai et. al, supra note 5, at 478.Google Scholar

226 See Eur. Consult. Ass. Study on Individual Access to Constitutional Justice, 85th Sess., Doc. No. CDL-AD (2010)039rev (2010).Google Scholar

227 Comm'n v. Hungary, CJEU Case C-286/12, para. 46 (Nov. 6, 2012), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?num=C-286/12.Google Scholar

228 See supra D. II. Relationship to Parliament.Google Scholar

229 Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court]. 72/2006, XII. 15.Google Scholar

230 See De Coster v. Collège des bourgmestre et échevins de Watermael-Boitsfort, CJEU Case C-17/00, 2001 ECR I-9445, para. 14 (preliminary ruling from the Collège juridictionnel de la Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, Belgium).Google Scholar

231 See supra D. I. Relationship to Ordinary JudiciaryGoogle Scholar

232 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 24.7.Google Scholar

233 See Presidente del Consiglio dei minstri v. Regione Sardegna, ECJU Case C-169/08, 2009 E.C.R. I-10821 (preliminary ruling from the Corte constitutionale, Italy).Google Scholar

234 See ECJ Case C-416/10 Krizan et al. v. Slovenská inšpekcia životného prostredia, ECJU Case C-416/10, (Jan. 15, 2013).Google Scholar

235 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] May 21, 2013, II/648/2013.Google Scholar

236 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 166/2011, XII.20. para. III.1.Google Scholar

237 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 43/2012, XII. 20. Para. 66–68 (concerning discrimination of non-marriage relationships).Google Scholar

238 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court]. 8/2011, II. 18. para. 6.Google Scholar

239 See K.M.C. v. Hungary, ECHR App. No. 19554/11, para. 46 (July 10, 2012).Google Scholar

240 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. 32.2.Google Scholar

241 See Magyar Keresztény Mennonita Egyház v. Hungary, ECHR Appl. Nos. 70945/11, 23611/12, 26998/12, 41150/12, 41155/12, 41463/12, 41553/12, 54977/12 and 56581/12, para. 53 (Apr. 8, 2014) http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/.Google Scholar

242 See supra D. V. 1. Legal Consequences.Google Scholar

243 In Austria, a country with almost the same size with a constitutional complaint, there were 359 pending cases, but in Hungary there were 3192. Cf. http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CP_Austria_ENG.pdf (last visited July 02, 2014); http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CP_Hungary_ENG.pdf (last visited July, 02, 2014).Google Scholar

244 E.g. Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] Mar. 31, 2005. 7/2005, III. 31; Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] July 14, 2010. 143/2010, VII. 14 (concerning the Lisbon Treaty).Google Scholar

245 Cf. Sájo, András, A “láthatatlan alkotmány” apróbetŭi: A magyar Alkotmánybíróság első ezerkétszáz napja, 35 Állam és Jogtudomány 42 (1993).Google Scholar

246 Cf. Chronowski, Drinóczi & Petrétei, supra note 104, at 313; Gábor Halmai, Interview with Bruce Ackermann, Fundamentum 51 (2003); Valentina Bărbăţeanu, The Influence of the Constitutional Jurisdictions on the Basic Laws, XIX-2 Lex ET Scientia International Journal 137 (2012).Google Scholar

247 Cf. Halmai, Gábor, Interview with Bruce Ackermann, Fundamentum 51 (2003); Nóra Chronowski, Tímea Drinóczi and József Petrétei, Multidimensional Protection of Universal Human Rights in Hungary, in The Universalism of Human Rights 371, 382 (Rainer Arnold, ed. 2013).Google Scholar

248 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 29/1997, IV. 29.Google Scholar

249 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 45/2012, XII.29.Google Scholar

250 “Dans chaque partie, la constitution n'est pas l'ouvrage du pouvoir constitué, mais du pouvoir constituant” (“At any way constitution is not the work of the constituted power but of the constituent power.”) Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, Qu'est-ce que le tiers état? 84 (1788).Google Scholar

251 Lembcke, & Boulanger, , supra note 16, at 294.Google Scholar

252 See Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] Feb. 26, 2013. 6/2013, III. 1 (concerning “the Right to Freedom of Conscience and Religion, and on the Legal Status of Churches, Religious Denominations and Religious Communities”).Google Scholar

253 See A Magyar Köztársaság Alkotmánya [Constitution of the Republic of Hungary] art. N.1.Google Scholar

254 The Venice Commission seems not to notice this fact. Eur. Consult. Ass., Opinion on the Concept Paper on the Establishment and Functioning of a Constitutional Assembly of Ukraine, 86th Sess., Doc. No. CDL-AD (2012)002, para. 92 (2011).Google Scholar

255 Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court] 4/1997, I. 22.Google Scholar

256 The president of the Constitutional Court is pleading for the Anglo-American way of interpretation the “historical constitution” and the “preamble” as well. The latter was criticized by the Venice Commission. See Eur. Consult. Ass. (Venice Comm'n), supra note 21.Google Scholar

257 Cf. Lembcke, & Boulanger, , supra note 16, at 299.Google Scholar

258 See Fazekas, Florá, A magyar alkotmánybíróság viszonya a közösségi jog elsőbbségéhez egyes tagállami alkotmánybírósági felfogások tükrében (Nov. 30, 2009) (unpublished PhD dissertation), www.doktori.hu/index.php?menuid=193&vid=3941 (last visited Dec. 20, 2012).Google Scholar

259 See Blutman, & Chronowski, , supra note 189, at 336; see László Keckés, EU-Jog és jogharmonizáció 931–32 (2009).Google Scholar

260 The European Commissions recently started the Revision of the EU legal framework on environmental inspections. Ideas of creating its own public agency with executive powers to monitor the implementation and enforcement of Environmental law by the Member States are strongly supported. Eur. Comm'n, Environment, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/legal/law/inspections.htm.Google Scholar

261 See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG – Federal Constitutional Court), Case No. 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92, 89 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] 155, part B 2 c5 (1993) (Ger.).Google Scholar

262 See Council of the Eur. Union, Council Conclusions on Fundamental Rights and Rule of Law and on the Commission 2012 Report on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Luxembourg (June 6–7, 2013), www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/137404.pdf.Google Scholar

263 Coreper, , Council Conclusions on Fundamental Rights and Rule of Law and on the Commission 2012 Report on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, para. 21 (Council of the Eur. Union, draft paper no. 10168/13, May 29, 2013) (containing the reasoning of the Council conclusions), register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/st10/st10168.en13.pdf.Google Scholar