¹ Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen's Union v Viking Line ABP and Oü Viking Line Eesti, ECJ (2007), available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62005J0438:EN:HTML.Google Scholar

² Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet and Others, ECJ (2007).Google Scholar

³ See, e.g., The Laval and Viking Cases: Freedom of Services and Establishment V. Industrial Conflict in the European Economic Area and Russia (Roger Blanpain and Andrzej Marian Swiatkowski, eds., 2009).Google Scholar

⁴ “[C]ollective autonomy has a civilizing influence on labor relations. Denying collective autonomy means encouraging social violence.” Patrick Chaumette, Reflagging A Vessel In The European Market and Dealing With Transnational Collective Disputes: ITF & Finnish Seamen's Union V. Viking Line, 15 Ocean & Coastal L.J. 1, 19–20 (2010).Google Scholar

⁵ Guy Mundlak, De-Territorializing Labor Law, 3 Law & Ethics Hum. Rts. 188 (2009).Google Scholar

⁶ Inge Govaer, The Future Direction Of The E. U. Internal Market: On Vested Values And Fashionable Modernism, 16 Colum. J. Eur. L. 67 (2009/2010).Google Scholar

⁷ See, e.g., Norbert Reich, Free Movement v. Social Rights in an Enlarged Union – the Laval and Viking Cases before the ECJ, 2 GLJ, 125–161 (2008).Google Scholar

⁸ A.C.L. Davies, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ, 37 Indus. L.J. 126 (2008).Google Scholar

⁹ For a corporatist view of Laval, see: Alban Davesne, The Laval Case and the Future of Labour Relations in Sweden, Cahiers Europeen (2009), available at: http://www.cee.sciences-po.fr/fr/publications/les-cahiers-europeens/doc/81/raw Google Scholar

¹⁰ See, e.g., Susan George, Predictable Poverty: The Inevitable Legacy of a Neo-Liberal Europe, Transnational Institute (2008), available at: http://www.tni.org/article/predictable-poverty-inevitable-legacy-neo-liberal-europe.Google Scholar

¹¹ See: Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes Of The Wealth Of Nations 461 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) (trade as positive sum in cases of absolute advantage); David Ricardo, On The Principles Of Political Economy And Taxation (3d ed.) 132–34 (1821), reprinted in The Works And Correspondence Of David Ricardo, 132–34 (Piero Sraffa ed., 1953) (trade as positive sum even in cases of comparative advantage).Google Scholar

¹² Ronnie Eklund argues that the cases reach contradictory results; such appears to be true, however the cases are compatible from a teleological perspective as exposed here. See Ronnie Eklund, A Swedish Perspective On Laval, 29 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 551, 565–570 (2008). This fact, that the characterization of rights is - to some extent -malleable is seen in the anti-social dumping literature.Google Scholar

¹³ See, e.g., Uladzislau Belavusau, The Case Of Laval In The Context Of The Post-Enlargement Ec Law Development, 9 German L.J. 2279 (2008).Google Scholar

¹⁴ See: European Commission, Is Social Europe Fit for Globalisation?A study on the social impact of globalisation in the European Union, Center for European Policy Issues (2007), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_situation/docs/simglobe_fin_rep.pdf.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See, e.g., TFEU Articles 4(2)(b), (c); 5(3); 9; 14 inter alia. Google Scholar

¹⁶ Viking, note 1, para. 78.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Laval, note 2, para. 104.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Id., para. 105.Google Scholar

¹⁹ European Parliament resolution of 20 May 2010 on the contribution of the Cohesion policy to the achievement of Lisbon and the EU2020 objectives (2010), available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2010-0191.Google Scholar

²⁰ The Court speaks of the right to collectively organize labor, though in the cases it was in fact not merely labor organization but the collective actions of labor which were litigated. I use “right to strike” as a convenient shortcut for the right to collectively organize labor.Google Scholar

²¹ For a critical take on social democracy in Europe see generally John Monks, European Court of Justice (ECJ) and Social Europe: A Divorce based on Irreconcilable Differences?, 4 Social Europe Journal 22–26 (2009), available at: http://www.social-europe.eu/2009/04/european-court-of-justice-ecj-and-social-europe-a-divorce-based-on-irreconcilable-differences.Google Scholar

²² While unlikely a conscious attempt to avoid the pitfalls of American Lochnerism, in the last fifteen years the EC has reflexively taken a number of steps to recalibrate the relationship between social and economic rights, even as the Community continues to expand and consolidate its program of market integration. A central question looming over EC legal discourse is whether these developments have satisfactorily rebalanced the dynamics of Community law to accord proper deference to both social and economic considerations. In short, has the European Community experienced its own version of a “switch in time”? Ian H. Eliasoph, A “Switch In Time” for the European Community? Lochner Discourse and the Recalibration of Economic and Social Rights in Europe, 14 Colum. J. Eur. L. 467, 493 (2008).Google Scholar

²³ Id. Google Scholar

²⁴ See, e.g., Norbert Reich, Free Movement v. Social Rights in an Enlarged Union – the Laval and Viking Cases before the ECJ, 2 GLJ, 125, 125–161 (2008).Google Scholar

²⁵ See, generally, Schäfer, Armin and Simone Leiber, The double voluntarism in EU social dialogue and employment policy. In: Kröger, Sandra (ed.): What we have learnt: Advances, pitfalls and remaining questions in OMC research, 13 European Integration online Papers (EIoP) (2009), available at: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2009-009a.htm.Google Scholar

²⁶ See, e.g., Howard J. Wiarda, Corporatism and comparative politics: the other great “ism” 59 (1997).Google Scholar

²⁷ For a critical view of first generation corporatism outlining its linkage to fascism, see Thomas J. DiLorenzo, Economic Fascism, 44 The Freeman 6 (1994), available at: http://www.thefreemanonline.org/columns/economic-fascism/#.Google Scholar

²⁸ Joseph Martin Palacios, The Catholic social imagination: Activism and the just society in Mexico and the United States 44 (2007).Google Scholar

²⁹ The intellectual origins of the subsidiarity doctrine are found in Catholic social thought. There, too, we see theories of humanizing relations between labor and capital. See, Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (1891), available at: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum_en.html Google Scholar

³⁰ Christian Joerges, in Sozialstaatlichkeit In Europe? A Conflict-of-Laws Approach to the Law of the EU and The Proceduralisation of Constitutionalisation, 10 German L.J. 335 (2009) traces out the history of corporatist thinking in a succinct yet incisive and accessible way.Google Scholar

³¹ For critique of neo-corporatism as a resolution to the problems of labor-capital and Member States-E.U. governance, see Blanca P. Ananiadis, Globalization, Welfare and ‘Social’ Partnership, 3 Global Social Policy 213–233 (2003), available at: http://gsp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/3/2/213.Google Scholar

³² For an overview of transnational influences shaping neocorporatism, see Labor and an integrated Europe, 83, 87 (Lloyd Ulman, Barry J. Eichengreen, William T. Dickens, (eds.), 1993).Google Scholar

³³ On neocorporatism in the context of Eastern Europe, see Dorothee Bohle and Béla Greskovits, Neoliberalism, Embedded Neoliberalism, and Neocorporatism: Paths towards Transnational Capitalism in Central-Eastern Europe, West European Politics (2007), available at: http://econ.core.hu/doc/seminar/Bohle-Greskovits_WEP_Final.doc.Google Scholar

³⁴ For a hard-nosed look at trade's influence on war see: Dale C. Copeland, Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations, 20 International Security (1996).Google Scholar

³⁵ One of the defining documents of corporatism was Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno (1931), available at: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno_en.html.Google Scholar

³⁶ “[T]he economic constitution of the EC was the conscious expression of the post-war institutional compromise of ‘embedded liberalism.’ The compromise entailed the view that the wealth generating effects stemming from reductions or eliminations of trade barriers between modern welfare states served to enhance the redistributive capabilities and functions of such member states vis-à-vis the states’ own citizens. Thus would emerge a ‘virtuous cycle’ in which international free trade benefited the regulated welfare state and the welfare state, by protecting the losers of a free trade regime, made transnational free trade politically palatable.” Eliasoph (note 22), 479.Google Scholar

³⁷ Id., 479.Google Scholar

³⁸ Id., 471.Google Scholar

³⁹ See, e.g., Renewed social agenda: Opportunities, access and solidarity in 21st century Europe, COM, 10 (2008), available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0412:FIN:EN:PDF.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Dirk Rüffert, in his capacity as liquidator of the assets of Case C-346/06Objekt und Bauregie GmbH & Co. KG v Land Niedersachsen, (2006), available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62006J0346:EN:HTML.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Davies (note 8), 145.Google Scholar

⁴² Id., 148: there is a deep uncertainty within the EU about the role of the trade union movement. As the ECJ itself recognized, the Community has a social agenda as well as an economic one.”Google Scholar

⁴³ Eliasoph (note 22), 502–503: [T]he Court has developed the principles of Community citizenship and intra-Community solidarity to require host states to extend national benefits to migrants from other Member States. While this is likely to be a very consequential development, the ECJ's recent social rights activism is perhaps best demonstrated by the controversial decision of Mangold, which has been described as “the most startling employment law decision of that Court for the past thirty years.”Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See, e.g., Eric C. Christiansen, Adjudicating Non-Justiciable Rights: Socio-Economic Rights and the South African Constitutional Court, 38 Col H.R. L. Rev. 262 (2007), available at: http://www3.law.columbia.edu/hrlr/hrlr_journal/38.2/Christiansen.pdf.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Article 151 TFEU (ex Article 136 ECT) states in its entirety: The Union and the Member States, having in mind fundamental social rights such as those set out in the European Social Charter signed at Turin on 18 October 1961 and in the 1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, shall have as their objectives the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their harmonization while the improvement is being maintained, proper social protection, dialogue between management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment and the combating of exclusion.Google Scholar

To this end the Union and the Member States shall implement measures which take account of the diverse forms of national practices, in particular in the field of contractual relations, and the need to maintain the competitiveness of the Union economy. They believe that such a development will ensue not only from the functioning of the internal market, which will favour the harmonisation of social systems, but also from the procedures provided for in the Treaties and from the approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action.”Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Naturally, much of the scholarship about Viking and Laval centers on the interpretation and application of the general principle of proportionality in E.U. law. See, e.g., Alicia Hinarejos, Laval and Viking: The Right to Collective Action Versus Eu Fundamental Freedoms, 8 Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 714 (2008).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Viking (note 1), para. 9.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Laval (note 2), para. 34.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Id., para. 37.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Id. Google Scholar

⁵¹ Id., para. 38.Google Scholar

⁵² Davies (note 8), 136–137.Google Scholar

⁵³ Davies (note 8) provides the best “pro-labor” perspective on the cases.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Id., 130–131.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ 22 December 1986, applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport between Member States and between Member States and third countries.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Davies (note 8), 133.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Laval (note 2), para. 90.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Laval (note 2), para. 91; Viking (note 1), para. 44.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Laval (note 2), para. 101. ⁶⁰ Viking (note 1), para. 69.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Davies (note 8), 126: “Treaty provisions can have horizontal direct effect”.Google Scholar

⁶² See, Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in The New Law and Economic Development. A Critical Appraisal (David Trubek and Alvaro Santos, eds., 2006), available at: http://duncankennedy.net/documents/Photo%20articles/Three%20Globalizations%20of%20Law%20and%20Legal%20Thought.pdf.Google Scholar

⁶³ Viking (note 1), para 57: the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons and freedom to provide services would be compromised if the abolition of State barriers could be neutralised by obstacles resulting from the exercise, by associations or organisations not governed by public law, of their legal autonomy”.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Davies (note 8), 136.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Viking (note 1), para. 46.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Laval (note 2), para. 99.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Id., para. 101.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Id., para. 75.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Davies (note 8), 126.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Id., 141–143.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Laval (note 2), para. 111.Google Scholar

⁷² Joachim Rückert, Friedrich Carl von Savigny, the Legal Method, and the Modernity of Law, 11 Juridica International 55–57 (2006), available at: http://www.juridicainternational.eu/index/2006/vol-xi/friedrich-carl-von-savigny-the-legal-method-and-the-modernity-of-law.Google Scholar

⁷³ Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1349 (1982).Google Scholar

⁷⁴ For example legislative measure such as the Landesvergabegesetz, which does not itself fix any minimum rates of pay, [instead relying on voluntary compliance sanctioned with threat of fine for non-cooperation] cannot be considered to be a law, within the meaning of the first indent of the first subparagraph of Article 3(1) of Directive 96/71, which fixed a minimum rate of pay, as provided in Article 3(1)(c) of that directive. Case C-346/06, Dirk Rüffert, in his capacity as liquidator of the assets of Objekt und Bauregie GmbH & Co. KG, para. 24.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Laval (note 2), para. 84.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Viking (note 1), para. 34.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ Art. 46, EC Treaty, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:12002E046:EN:HTML.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Viking (note 1), para. 68.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Id., para 57.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Case C-346/06, Dirk Rüffert, in his capacity as liquidator of the assets of Objekt und Bauregie GmbH & Co. KG, para. 38–41.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Viking (note 1), para. 55.Google Scholar

⁸² Id., para. 58.Google Scholar

⁸³ Eliasoph (note 22), 467, 477.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ See, generally, Pierre Bourdieu, Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture (1990), with Jean-Claude Passeron (in French: La Reproduction. Éléments pour unethéorie du système d'enseignement (1970).Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Eliasoph (note 22), 477.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Aravind R. Ganesh, Appointing Foxes To Guard Henhouses: The European Posted Worker's Directive, 15 Colum. J. Eur. L. 123, 142 (Winter 2008/2009).Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Daniel Komo, Charlotte Villiers, Are Trends In European Company Law Threatening Industrial Democracy? 34 E.L. REV. 175–204 (2009).Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Elina Paunio, Beyond Predictability - Reflections on Legal Certainty and the Discourse Theory of Law in The EU Legal Order, 10 German L.J. (2009).Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Katherine Apps, Damages Claims Against Trade Unions After Viking And Laval, 34 E. L. Rev. 141–154 (2009).Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Christoph U. Schmid, A European Civil Code As A Building Block For A European Social Model? 35 E.L. Rev. 103–111 (2010).Google Scholar

⁹¹ Laval (note 2), para. 111.Google Scholar