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What's in a name that which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet? Reflections on ECJ's Trade Mark Case Law
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
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Shakespeare's famed citation “What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet” may be one of the most used quotations in contemporary literature. It serves to provide guidance in reviewing ones assessment of new perspectives on a given topic. The implications of the quotation induce the reader to feel concordant with the assumption that whatever name a given phenomenon is accorded, it is of little importance because the objects are similar and hence there is no reason to emphasise a peripheral and meaningless concept such as a name and the idea which it embraces. By contrast, intellectual property rights, and therein trademark law, is conceptually based on the assumption that a verbal mark, figure or colour of a given good or service need to be protected since these immaterial notions give rise to patrimonial rights conferred to the owner of the registered trademark. A well known slogan or figurative mark is capable of having significant commercial value as demonstrated in the recent dispute between Apple and Cisco concerning the right of the former to use the trademark iPhone. However, it is important to note that the essential raison d'ětre of trademark law is not only to confer patrimonial rights to a legal or natural person and thus prevent an abusive use by a third party, but essentially to guarantee the origin of goods or services to the consumer and hence enable him, without any danger of confusion, to distinguish the goods or services from others which have another origin. Having said that it should also be noted that traditional trademark theory is perceived on the assumption that trademarks serve to minimize the likelihood of consumer confusion and prohibits the use of a trademark with regard to competing or similar goods only. However the “dilution theory” challenges this approach to trademark law as it also disseminates the postulate to prohibit the use of certain famous and/or characteristic trademarks on non-competing goods on the ground that such use dilutes and possibly erodes a given trademark's commercial value and its hold on the consumer.
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References
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