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Which Kind of Discretion in Constitutional Adjudication? A Discussion of Mher Arshakyan's The Impact of Legal Systems on Constitutional Interpretation: A Comparative Analysis: The U.S. Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

Federico José Arena

Extract

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In his paper The Impact of Legal Systems on Constitutional Interpretation: A Comparative Analysis: The U.S. Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court, Arshakyan carries out an interesting and detailed comparison between American and German constitutional courts by individualizing the properties shared by both courts and identifying the differences.

Type
Part B: Technique, Doctrine and Internal Logic of Constitutional Reasoning
Information
German Law Journal , Volume 14 , Issue 8: Special Issue - Constitutional Reasoning , 01 August 2013 , pp. 1337 - 1344
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

1 Arshakyan, Mher, The Impact of Legal Systems on Constitutional Interpretation: A Comparative Analysis: The U.S. Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court, 14 German L.J. 1297(2013).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Id. Google Scholar

3 Id. Google Scholar

4 Id. Google Scholar

5 Id. Google Scholar

6 Id. Google Scholar

7 See Carlos E. Alchourrón & Bulygin, Eugenio, Normative Systems (1971). The authors use the distinction to identify mainly three kinds of legal gaps.Google Scholar

8 See Arshakyan, , supra note 1.Google Scholar

9 See id. Google Scholar

10 Bobbio, Norberto, Giusnaturalismo e positivismo giuridico 101 (2d ed. 1972).Google Scholar

11 See Arshakyan, , supra note 1.Google Scholar

12 See id. Google Scholar

13 See Shapiro, Scott, The “Hart-Dworkin” Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed, in Ronald Dworkin 22–55 (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007). See also Eugenio Bulygin, El positivismo jurídico (2006).Google Scholar

14 Arshakyan, , supra note 1.Google Scholar

15 See Arshakyan, , supra note 1.Google Scholar

16 I set aside the normative version of the thesis because I do not see elements to ascribe it to Arshakyan.Google Scholar

17 Caracciolo, Ricardo, Discreción, respuesta correcta y función judicial, in El derecho desde la Filosofía 251–260 (2009). An English version of this article is available at http://www.law.yale.edu/intellectuallife/sela2000.htm.Google Scholar

18 Id. See also, Herbert L. A. Hart et al., The Concept of Law 124–47 (2d ed. 1994).Google Scholar

19 See Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously 31 (1978).Google Scholar