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Legislative aims and the Kantian supranational court: A comment on Alec Stone Sweet and Clare Ryan, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 December 2020

WOJCIECH SADURSKI Open the ORCID record for WOJCIECH SADURSKI [Opens in a new window]
WOJCIECH SADURSKI*
Affiliation:
University of Sydney, Sydney Law School, Australia
*
Email: wojciech.sadurski@sydney.edu.au
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Abstract

In my short comment on the new book by Alec Stone Sweet and Clare Ryan, I claim that the European Court of Human Rights does not take the ‘legitimacy of state goals’ step in its proportionality analysis seriously enough, relegating all its hard intellectual work to the next step: necessity scrutiny. What is puzzling about Stone Sweet and Ryan’s book is that this observation about the ECtHR hardly registered in the book’s argument, even though a Kantian perspective seems to be quite hospitable to a consideration of the scarcity of goal scrutiny in ECtHR case law.

Keywords

Convention jurisprudenceEuropean Court of Human RightsKantproportionality analysissupranational court
Type
Symposium/Special Issue Manuscript
Information
Global Constitutionalism , Volume 9 , Issue 3 , November 2020 , pp. 515 - 522
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

1 Sweet, A Stone and Ryan, C, A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Kant, Constitutional Justice, and the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Weinrib, EJ, ‘Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason’ (1987) 87 Columbia Law Review 494 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Grey, TC, ‘Serpents and Doves: A Note on Kantian Legal Theory’ (1987) 87 Columbia Law Review 588 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 See (n 2) 482.

5 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3b04.html>.

6 Sadurski, W, ‘European Court of Human Rights in Pursuit of Public Reason? A Study of Lost Opportunities’, in Public Reason and Courts, edited by Langvatn, SA, Kumm, M and Sadurski, W (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

7 HADEP and Demir v Turkey, Judgment, ECHR Appl. no. 28003/03, 14 December 2010.

8 See (n 5); see also (n 7) para 43.

9 See (n 7) para 44.

10 Ibid, para 50.

11 Ibid, para 68.

12 Ibid, para 79.

13 Ibid, para 81.

14 Ibid, para 82.

15 Perinçek v Switzerland, Judgment, ECHR Appl. no. 27510/08, 17 December 2013.

16 Ibid, para 75.

17 Ibid, para 126.

18 Ibid, para 73.

19 Ibid, para 75.

20 Ibid, para 129.

21 Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v Ireland, Judgment, ECHR Appl. no, 14234/88 and 14235/88, 29 October 1992.

22 Ibid, para 61.

23 Ibid, para 63.

24 Ibid, para 63.

25 Ibid, paras 64–80.

26 See (n 5).

27 See (n 1) 63–67.

28 Ibid, 64.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid, 67.

31 Eisenberg, T, ‘Reflections on a Unified Theory of Motive’ (1978) 15 San Diego Law Review 1148 Google Scholar.