1 Sayigh, Yezid, ‘Armed Struggle and State Formation’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 26 (1997) p. 23 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Article 1 of the Declaration of Principles (DOP), entitled ‘Aim of the Negotiations’, defines the aims of the Oslo Process as follows: ‘The aim of the Israeli‐Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East Peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self‐Government Authority, the elected Council (“the Council”), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.’The Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area (The Cairo Agreement) of 4 May 1994 describes the transfer of powers and responsibilities of the Israeli Civil Administration to the PNA. Annex 2, Article 2. Both documents are distributed by the Israeli Information Center.

3 Stepan, A., Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988, pp. 3–6 Google Scholar. Polities represent the ways that people organize themselves for collective life.

4 The World Bank classifies an NGO as ‘any group that is independent from the government, and that has humanitarian and cooperative rather than commercial objectives’. The World Bank, The World Bank’s Partnership With Non‐Governmental Organizations, 1996, p. 4.

5 Gyimah‐Boadi, E., ‘Civil Society in Africa’, Journal of Democracy, 7:2 (1996) p. 124.Google Scholar

6 Poggi, G., Development of the Modern State, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1978, pp. 1–15 Google Scholar.

7 When referring to the International Donor Community, we consider those countries which have provided support to developing countries. In the Palestinian case, some twenty countries provide such support. The prominent supporters of the PNA in 1996, and at present, include the EU, which pledged $103.65 million, the European Investment Bank $97.5 million, Germany $49.18 million, japan $46.48 million, Netherlands $70.58 million, USA $74.46 million and the World Bank $90 million. Total pledges amounted to $869.79 million, with the bulk of the donor support coming from Western countries. See Partners in Peace– a joint publication of the World Bank and the UK which serve as the Secretariat of the Local Aid Coordination Committee – LACC, July 1996.

8 World Bank, op. cit., p. 1.

9 Shain, Y. and Linz, J. J., Between States: Interim Governments and Democratic Transitions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 14–21 CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The concept of ‘backward’ and ‘forward’ legitimacy was used by Giuseppe Di Palma in ‘Founding Coalitions in Southern Europe: Legitimacy and Hegemony’, Government and Oppsition, 15:2 (Spring 1990) pp. 162–89.

10 Linz, J. J. and Stepan, A., The Breakdown of Democracies, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, p. 17 Google Scholar.

11 Ibid.

12 Indeed, there are ideologies that elevate the state to its supreme position on a permanent basis and negate the separation of the state from the political and civil society, most prominently those of the fascist states of inter‐war Europe.

13 Yezid Sayigh, op. cit., p. 31.

14 Recently, the General Auditing Office (GAO) exposed significant waste and misuses of money ($205 million out of a budget of $557 million – or in dollar terms, $326 million). See Ohad Gozani, ‘Arafat Orders Inquiry into Allegations of Largescale Corruption’, The Daily Telegraph, 26 May 1997. The decision to publicize these corruption allegations could in fact serve as a means to weaken ministers and limit frustration with the President in the context of slow progress in Israeli‐Palestinian negotiations.

15 Rosenfeld, Stephen S., ‘A Mid‐East Puzzle: How to Produce a Palestinian Democracy’, The International Herald Tribune, 19 05 1997 Google Scholar.

16 Robinson, Glenn E., ‘The Growing Authoritarianism of the Arafat Regime’, Survival, 39:2 (1997) p. 51 Google Scholar.

17 Hilterman, J., Behind the Intifada: Labour and Women’s Movements in the Occupied Territories, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1991, pp. 13 Google Scholar and 209. Hilterman describes the importance of the NGO community in ‘out‐administering the enemy’. These NGOs provided a base for the economic, political and social infrastructure of Palestinian society.

18 Palestinian economic dependency on Israel, most notably the dependence of the Palestinian workforce on the Israeli labour market, has resulted in nearly three decades of intense interaction between the two communities.

19 Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, Public Opinion Poll, Poll 6, Question 3 (Page 2), on Palestinian Attitudes to Democracy, May 1995.79.6% of those surveyed answered positively when asked if they believed in democracy; 12.3% answered negatively.

20 Alexander Kerensky’s demise in Russia was to a large extent a result of his timidity in responding to the Bolshevik challenge. At the same time he was too quick to dismantle the Czar’s apparatus that was ready to submit itself, in a ‘legal‐rational’ fashion, to his authority. See Pipes, R., The Russian Revolution, New York, First Vintage Books, 1991, p. 321 Google Scholar.

21 Israeli history provides an interesting example, in that David Ben Gurion effectively disarmed all other military factions and integrated them into the newly formed IDF, thereby securing a monopoly over the means of violence.

22 Shain and Linz, op. cit., p. 31.

23 Articles 1 and 3 of the Declaration of Principles (DOP) election address Jerusalem, the Israel Information Center.

24 The elections are discussed in detail in Annex 2 (The Protocol Concerning Elections) of the Israeli‐Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gara Strip (Oslo Two Accord) signed on 28 September 1995 in Washington. Elections were held on 20 January 1996.

25 It is claimed that in Gaza there is one policeman for every 50 citizens. While such claims, made in informal interviews, may not be entirely accurate, they reflect the sense amongst many that security considerations have been exaggerated. Guy Bachor, Ha'aretz, 6 January 1997, reports that the Palestinian Security Forces number 50,000.

26 Usher, Graham, The Politics of Internal Security: The PA’s New Intelligence Services, Journal of Palestine Studies, 25:2 (1995) p. 24 Google Scholar.

27 According to the US State Department – 1995 Report on Human Rights Practices, there were credible reports that the Palestinian Police Force (PPF) mistreated and in some cases tortured detainees, and did not comply with proper arrest and detention procedures. International and local human rights groups widely criticized the establishment of a State Security Court to try security cases. They maintain that this court denies Palestinians the right to adequate legal defence and a fair and public trial. Five detainees died in the custody of Palestinian security forces in 1995. Moreover, there were numerous limitations on press freedoms, such as temporary closures of newspaper offices, confiscation of publications, and prohibition on distribution. Additional criticism has been launched by Betselem, an Israeli watchdog, Amnesty International, and a variety of Palestinian human rights watch groups.

28 See the US State Department – 1996 Report on Human Rights Practices. The 1996 report mentions four Palestinian deaths in custody, and as was the case in 1995, raises the continued overlap between the many security agencies and lack of clarity regarding mandates. Although only the civil police are authorized to make arrests, other security services were reported to have made such arrests. (See p. 12 of the report.).

29 According to the Interaction Study West Bank/Caza NCO Support Group Study, 1995, NGOs covered 60% of health care, 100% of rehabilitation care, all preschool education, significant elements of tertiary education, significant agricultural extension services, social and welfare services prior to the signing of the DOP. Zaucker Joachim, Griffel Andrew and Gubser Peter, Toward Middle East and Development International Assistance to the Palestinians and the Role of the NGOs during the Transition to Civil Society, Interaction West Bank/Gaza NCO Support Group Study, Interaction Occasional Paper, Interaction (American Council for Voluntary International Action), 1995. The provision of parallel services is instrumental in what Eqbal Ahmed (quoted in Hilterman), describes as out‐administering the occupation forces. Dakkak, Ibraham (in Abed, G., The Palestinian Economy: Studies in Development under Prolonged Occupation, London, Routledge, 1988, pp. 9–9 Google Scholar. describes the concept of ‘Summud Muqwan’ or resistance steadfastness which informed the policies and strategies of many Palestinian NGOs.

30 J. Hilterman, op. cit., p. 14.

31 Tamari, Salim, ‘Government and Civil Society’, Palestine, Jordan, Israel: Building a Base for Common Scholarship and Understanding in the New Era in the Middle East, Jerusalem, Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA), 1997 Google Scholar.

32 The Intifada (uprising) against Israeli Occupation erupted in December 1987, and this resistance effort was instrumental in promoting an Israeli public opinion favourable to political compromise. Moreover, on the Palestinian side it led to the adoption of a two‐station solution, i.e. a Palestinian State in West Bank and Gaza Strip, at the 19th Palestine National Council in Algiers.

33 Jordan was the sovereign authority in the West Bank prior to 1967, and continued to view itself as a contender for the territory for the following two decades.

34 Giacaman, George, ‘The Role of Palestinian NGOs in the Development of Palestinian Civil Society’ (unpublished, made available by the author), 1995, p. 2 Google Scholar.

35 Civil disobedience took diverse forms: general strikes, commercial strikes, a tax revolt (largely unsuccessful due to pressures exercised by the Civil Administration), the resignation of most local policemen, the institutionalization of PLO organizations in the Territories, and the establishment and consolidation of supreme councils for the entire West Bank. Its purpose was to demonstrate Israel’s inability to exercise control in many areas and to build an infrastructure for self‐government with a view to the establishment of a future Palestinian State. A. Shalev, ‘The Intifada: The Causes and Effects’, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Study Number 16 (1991).

36 Until this decision Jordan considered itself a contender for political control of the West Bank in a future peace settlement.

37 Muslih, Mohammad, ‘Palestinian Civil Society’, The Middle East Journal, 47:2 (1993) pp. 70–70 Google Scholar. Please note that this classification is but one of many classifications of the PNGO community. Zaucker Joachim, Griffel Andrew and Gubser Peter, (op. cit., pp. 18–19) for example, divide the NCO community into the following categories, Welfare Organizations, Professional Institutes, Development Organizations, Popular Organizations, Youth and Cultural Organizations, Cooperatives, Semi‐Public Institutions, Women’s Groups.

38 During the Gulf War the PLO backed the Iraqi aggression. The result of this bad political gamble was that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and many other donors suspended all financial support to the organization. The ensuing financial pinch, coupled with international diplomatic isolation, saw the organization reach an all time low. The Oslo Accord to a large extent saved this organization from impending collapse.

39 One indicator of this ‘blurring of boundaries’ in the Palestinian setting is the fact that many former NCO leaders have assumed positions in PA ministries while maintaining their NCO links. Such overlapping is particularly common amongst Fatah members.

42 Bachor, Guy, Ha’arets Newspaper, 6 01 1997 Google Scholar.

43 See Weinberger, Naomi, ‘The Palestinian National Security Debate’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 243 (1995)Google Scholar and Usher, Graharn, ‘The Politics of Internal Security: The PA’s New Intelligence Services’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 1995 Google Scholar.

44 In fact he was accused by his opponents of being Israel’s stooge and likened to General Lahad, head of Israel’s proxy South Lebanese Army. (See Weinberger, ibid. and Usher, Ibid.).

43 Darwish, Bassma‐Kodmani, ‘Arafat and the Islamists: Conflict or Cooperation’, Current History, 1996, p. 29 Google ScholarPubMed.

44 Tal, Lawrence, ‘Dealing with Radical Islam: The Case of Jordan’, The ISS Quarterly 1995) pp. 149–50Google Scholar.

45 Mishal, S. and Sela, A., ‘Hamas: A Behavioral Profile’, Tami Steinmetz Center Report No. 7 (1997) p. 5 Google Scholar.

46 Baily, Clinton, ‘Hamas: The Fundamentalist Challenge to the PLO’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Research Memorandum Number 19 ( 04 1992 ) p. 4 Google Scholar.

47 Another reason for the decline of the Palestinian left has been the worldwide erosion of Third‐worldism. Polls conducted by the Nablus‐based Center for Palestine Research and Study indicate that support for Hamas varies somewhat: 13.3% (8 October 1993), 15.6% (20 March 1994), 17.4% (17–19 November 1994), 8.1% (26 September–17 October 1996), 10.3% (12 April 1997).

48 To date Arafat has pursued a ‘National Dialogue’ with various opposition factions. He has attempted, unsuccessfully, to coax the political leadership into contesting the elections for the legislative council and has given ministerial posts to prominent Palestinians (Irnad Faloughi and Talal Sader) who are associated with Hamas. These efforts were designed to cause a rift between the political moderates and the more radical military wing of Hamas.

49 Israel never formally annexed the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with the exception of East Jerusalem. Israeli concerns were historically focused on security issues, and as such the Israel authorities were less inclined to interfere with civil society actors.

50 See Mishal and Sela, op. cit., for a detailed description.

51 Bishara, Rhani, PNCO Network Coordinator, Interview, 25 09 1996 Google Scholar.

52 For a detailed critique of the law, see Caza Centre for Human Rights, Study No. 3, 1995. Also see Cyimah‐Boadi (op. cit., p. 125) who refers to similar attempts in Botswana, Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe.

53 Dennis J. Sullivan, ‘Non‐Governmental Organizations and Freedom of Association – Palestine and Egypt: A Comparative Analysis’, PASSIA Studies, Jerusalem, PASSIA Institute, 1995, p. 3. If adopted in its current format, the NCO Law will give the PA full control over Palestinian civil society which houses the liberal opposition.

54 The PNGO Network was established in order to represent the interests of the NCO community vis‐a‐vis the PA, and at one stage comprised as many as 70 NGOs. Recently, additional networks, mostly Fatah affiliated, have been set up in competition with the PNGO network. This competition has largely been fuelled by the NCO fund of the World Bank.

55 See Partners in Peace, op. cit.

56 Interaction Study, op. cit., 1995.

57 World Bank Public Discussion Paper, ‘The Palestinian NCO Project’, World Bank, 1997.

58 This message has been conveyed to the authors in private discussions. A major manifestation of this concern for NGOs and civil society agents is the recent World Bank’s ‘Palestinian NCO Project’ initiative to support NCO activities. See World Bank Public Discussion Paper, ibid.

59 Robinson, Glenn E., ‘The Growing Authoritarianism of the Arafat Regime’, Survival, 39:2 (1997) p. 50 Google Scholar. Usher, Graham, Middle East International, 30 05 1997 Google Scholar, refers to the PAS General Auditing Office (GAO) leaked to the p on 24 May .

60 Usher, Graham, Middle East International, 30 05 1997 , p. 9 Google Scholar.

61 Shain and Linz, op. cit., pp. 14–15.

62 Di Palma, G., To Craft Democracies: An Essay in Democratic Transitions, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991, pp. 94–5Google Scholar.

63 Keely, Michael, ‘Peace Meets Pathology’, New York Times, 27 11 1994 , pp. 56–97 Google Scholar. See also ‘The State of Human Rights in Palestine – 2: The Judicial System’, Palestine Human Rights Monitor, 4 (August 1997), p. 4, published by the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group. This edition relates to Order No. 1, which was decreed from Tunis by Arafat, prior to his arrival. This decree stated that the legal system in place prior to Israeli Occupation will be in place (invalidating Israeli laws). This move established ‘the judicial authority of the courts as emanating from the new executive authority, and therefore was seen by many lawyers as a symbolic part of the transfer of responsibilities form Israel to the PA’.

64 In a Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) opinion poll, 75.5% of the respondents agreed that ‘there are some situations in which the Palestinian Authority is justified in breaking the constitution to protect the national interest’. Public Opinion Poll on Palestinian Attitudes towardc Democracy, JMCC Survey No. 6, Jerusalem, May 1995.

65 Amayreh, Khalid, Middle East International, 24 01 1997 , p. 18 Google Scholar.

66 Usher, Graham, Middle East International, 27 06 1997 , p. 4 Google Scholar.

67 Khalid Amayreh, op. cit., p. 18.

68 Amayreh, Khalid, Middle East International, 30 05 1997 , p. 9 Google Scholar. Also see the Palestine Human Rights Monitor, op. cit. Journalist Dauod Kuttab was held in custody from 20–27 May 1997.

69 Khalid Amayreh, op. cit., p. 19.

70 Programme of Cooperation for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 1988–1999, Gaza, Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories, 1997, p. 22.

71 It should be kept in mind that the ‘outside PLO leadership’ who are leading the PA in this transition period of state‐building operated in a clandestine, military environment that was not conducive to public debate. This ‘organizational culture’ that they brought with them affects the actual state‐building process and state‐civil society relations (the ‘outsiders’ mistrust the NCO community).

72 The bulk of the 725 candidates who ran for the elections (559) were independent candidates.

73 Glenn Rohinson has argued that these notable families, traditionally tools for Turkish, Jordanian and Israeli social control, are Arafat’s strategic partners in neutralizing the more independent grassroots leadership and the modern elites that emerged from the NCO community during the Intifada. See G. E. Robinson, Building a Palestinian State: The Incomplete Revolution, Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1997, pp. 179, 196. We are also indebted to one of the anonymous referees for reminding us of this important point.

74 Usher, Graham, Middle East International, 2 02 1996 Google Scholar.

75 Mishal and Sela, op. cit., p. 51.

76 Mishal and Sela, ibid.

77 Amayreh, Khalid, Middle East International, 2 02 1997 , p. 4 Google Scholar.

78 ‘The outcome was a clear‐cut victory for Yasser Arafat, confirming him as the undisputed leader of the Palestinians.’ Editorial, ‘A Genuine Milestone’, Middle East International, 2 February 1996.

79 Usher, Graham, Middle East International, 27 06 1997 , p. 3 Google Scholar.

80 Assad, Samar, ‘Palestinian Council Insist Arafat Names New Cabinet’, Washington Post, 1 08 1997 Google Scholar.

81 Adoni, Lamis, Middle East International, 2 02 1997 , p. 4 Google Scholar.

82 According to the Palestinian Human Rights Monitor, op. cit., pp. 4–5, only two of the laws passed thus far have been enacted. These include the Local Committee Council’s Election Law and the General Budget Law for 1997. The most important law awaiting the President’s signature is the Basic Law.

83 See chapter 1 of the Interim Agreement which relates to the Council. ‘Israeli‐Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip’, Jerusalem, The Israeli Information Center, 1995.

84 On the same day that the resolution calling for the dissolution of the cabinet was passed, two suicide bombers struck in Jerusalem’s Machaneh Yehuda market.

85 Chapter 3 (pp. 19–24) of the Interim Agreement addressed Legal Affairs. Article 17, which specifically addresses jurisdiction, considers the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit except for ‘issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, specified military locations, Palestinian refugees, borders, foreign relations and Israelis, and powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council’. Moreover, point 4a) of Article 18, which defines Legislative Powers of the Council, states that ‘Legislation, including legislation that amends or abrogates existing laws or military orders, this Agreement, or of any other agreement that may be reached between the two sides during the interim period, shall have no effect and shall be void ab initio.’ (See page 21.) Isrueli‐Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, ibid.

86 Human Rights Report for the Occupied Territories, US State Department, 1996, p. 14.

87 ‘Human Rights Report for the Occupied Territories’, ibid., p. 15.

88 Frederick M. Russillo (USAID Report, quoted in Office of the Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories (UNSCO) report, ‘Rule of Law Development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Survey and Status of the Development Effort’, Gaza, 1997, pp. 12–13.

89 ‘During the Intifada the logic of force was often the basis for judgment. Personal relations and factional concerns also ruled rather than customs, tradition and law.’ Samih Muhsen, ‘Should the Judiciary be Reformed? The Executive Authority Undermines Respect for the Judiciary’, People’s Rights, Beit Hanina, Land and Water (LAW), 1997, p. 22.

90 Rule of Law Development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Survey and Status of the Development Effort, UNSCO, op. cit., p. 18.

91 Samih Muhsen, op. cit., p. 23.

92 Palestine Human Rights Monitor, op. cit., p. 17.

93 People’s Rights, 1997, p. 27 (obtained from NDI – East Jerusalem).

94 The report of the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group and the publications of People’s Rights cite this case, and others.

95 Palestine Human Rights Monitor, op. cit., p. 2.

96 This remark was made at a meeting with the heads of UN agencies active in the Palestinian Territories and is quoted in the UNSCO Report entitled ‘Rule of Law Development in the West Bank and Caza Strip: Survey and Status of the Development Effort’, op. cit, p. 18.

97 Miller, Majorie, ‘Palestinian Democracy Faces a Roadblock in Arafat’, Los Angeh Times, 27 05 1997 Google Scholar and Turki, Fawz, ‘A Brutal Letdown for Palestinians Who Expected Democracy’, International Herald Tribune, 23 05 1997 Google Scholar.

98 Usher, Graham, Middle East International, 30 05 1997 , p. 10 Google Scholar.