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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2014
THE MEDITERRANEAN POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY FORMS an important part of its general external policy. Since this paper can, therefore, be considered as a case study, it is worth trying to define at the outset the concept of ‘external policy’. The Treaties did not delegate to the common European institutions any of the powers of foreign policy-making traditionally exercised by the nation state, but the granting of wholesale economic competences and the consequential obligation of evolving a common commercial policy ensured that the Community would come into direct contact with non-member states. Through its diplomatic relations with other countries, the Community has become an actor on the international stage, whilst the scope of its external relations has frequently exceeded that of purely commercial policy. It is both meaningful and useful to consider the Community as exercising an external policy – a kind of half-way house to full foreign policy.
1 Legally there is not one Community, but three resulting from separate treaties and sharing common institutions. In this paper ‘Community’ will be synonymous with EEC and reference to the Treaty of Rome means the EEC treaty.
2 The Community has formal diplomatic relations with about one hundred third countries, but in most cases it has only exercised the right of passive legation i.e. it receives ambassadors, but rarely appoints them.
3 On the Community's general external relations, see Henig, S, ‘The External Relations of the European Community’, PEP/RIIA., London, 1971 Google Scholar.
4 The treaty also included declarations of intent to establish associations with some former colonies which were already independent ‐ Libya, Morocco, Tunisia. At the time of signature, Algeria was part of France.
5 Although Iran is not formally a Mediterranean country, relations with the Near East involve similar political and economic problems. Some consideration will be given to this agreement since it played a part in the evolution of Mediterranean policy.
6 All industrial goods and her most important agricultural exports. Other agricultural items would depend on the progress of harmonization, see below.
7 The Community retained the right to make only limited changes without Greek approval.
8 As an associate Turkey would no longer be considered a third country, so that Greece would have no veto rights on any tariff benefits she received. On this and other negotiations see S. Henig, op. cit.
9 Not the same as reductions which would have been permanent. A tariff suspension ‐ in this case they were mostly by 20% ‐ was formally temporary, pending the next round of general Gatt talks in which it could be negotiated as a concession against counter‐concessions by other suppliers.
10 Generally the Community's tariff schedule has sought to limit the number of different items. In this case sub‐headings, such as different kinds of bathing costumes, were created, so that concessions could be made for Israel without giving too much for nothing to other suppliers.
11 i.e. apart from Community members and associates.
12 However she was also interested in the question of an Austrian association to which her attitude was hostile so long as no measures were taken to curb Tyrolese terrorists.
13 Harvests, quality and taste are at least equally important. During the 1960s and in the absence of preferential treatment Israel increased her share of the Community market, whilst that of Algeria fell markedly. For full details see S. Henig, ‘The External Relations of the European Community’, op. cit.
14 Since it is doubtful if limited price reductions would cause any increase in demand, and the producer countries would hardly be likely to come together and charge higher prices as this would involve agreement between Algeria and Israel!
15 The present agreement with Spain also makes an optional provision for this reduction to be increased from 60 to 70%. All the agreements contain some exceptions to the general arrangements for industrial produce ‐ absence of any concession, reduced rate or tariff quotas. This is in contrast to Greece where there are no exceptions on the industrial side to the rule of free entry.
16 Thus the agreement with Israel granted an overall tariff reduction of 42% (i.e. allowing for exceptions) reducing the barrier facing her exports from a notional average 7.5% to 4%. in contrast the Israeli reduction of just over 16% reduced the average barrier facing Community goods from a notional 42% to 36%. In absolute terms, therefore, the price of the average Community goods in Israel would drop by more than the price of the Israeli goods inside the Community.
17 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
