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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2014
This Article is Addressed to the Qufstion Which Has recently caught the attention of scholars of the role of elites in promoting, or conversely impairing, democracy. It is based on the thesis that when elites are separate and relatively autonomous from the political elite which is in government, this promotes democracy. Conversely, when elites are closely connected, this impairs proper democratidelectoral procedures. The paper marshals illustrative-empirical support for this thesis from the relations between two elites in one Westem-style democracy: the religious elite and the political elite of government parties in Israel. It traces the intricate connections between religious leaders and the leaders of the government. It shows that these damage the freedom of elections, and enfeeble Israeli democracy.
1 An elite is here defined as a group of people who wield power and influence on the basis of control of resources. A religious elite is a group of people who wield power and influence by virtue of their positions within a religion. Their basis of power lies first in symbolic resources, deriving from the religion they represent. Religious functionaries/leaders may also command personal resources of charisma. Such charisma may have its sources in their alleged affinity to the Almighty. Or else their charisma may flow from the special religious knowledge they are held to possess. They may also enjoy power on the basis of holding state appointments and their consequent control of state resources.
2 See, for example, Dye, Thomas R. and Zeigler, Harmon, The Irony of Democracy, 7th ed. Monterey, Cal., Brooks Cole, 1987, p. 4 Google Scholar; Higley, John, and Burton, Michael J., ‘The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns’, American Sociological Review, 54, 1989, pp. 17–32 CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Morlino, Leonardo, ‘Democratic Establishments’ in Baloyra, Enrique A. (ed.), Comparing New Democracies, Boulder, Westview, 1987.Google Scholar
3 Linz, Juan J., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978 Google Scholar; Lepsius, M. R., ‘From Fragmented Party Democracy to Government by Emergency Decree and National Socialist Takeover: Germany’ in Linz, Juan J. and Stepan, A. (eds), The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, pp. 34–79 Google Scholar; Here, John H. (ed.), From Dictatorship to Democracy, West port, Greenwood, 1982.Google Scholar
4 This includes control of material resources as well as appointments and promotions that cannot be affected from die outside. For a typology of resources see Etzioni-Halevy, Eva, The Elite Connection, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1993.Google Scholar
5 ibid.
6 In several Western democracies there are strong – though variegated – links between state and religion. A review of these links is beyond the scope of this article.
7 For the purpose of this analysis I have been aided by several sources. On the religious councils: Don-Yehia, Eliezer, Mosdet Datum Bama’arehet Hapolitit: Moazot Datiot Beyisrael (Religious Institutions in the Political Arena: The Religious Councils in Israel), Jerusalem, The Jerusalem Centre for Public and State Issues (Hebrew), 1988 Google Scholar; on the other religious elite and its place in the Haredi community: Friedman, Menahem, Hahevra Haharedit: Mekorot, Megamet Vetahalikim (The Haredi Society: Sources, Trends and Processes), Jerusalem, The Institute for Israel Studies (Hebrew), 1991 Google Scholar; Levy, Amnon, Hoharedim (The Haredis), Jerusalem, Keter (Hebrew), 1989 Google Scholar. On the ‘special’ political funds: Israel State Comptroller, Report for the Financial Year of 1984 and for the Financial Reports of 1983, 35, 1984 and Israel State Comptroller, Report for the Financial Year of 1985 and for the Financial Reports of 1984, 36, 1985.
8 The religious elite in Israel also includes the military rabbinate, a small number of rabbis who officiate in communities independently, rabbis of religious kibbutzim, a small number of non-orthodox rabbis, and leaders and representatives of other religions. These will not be touched upon in this article.
9 Etzioni-Halevy, Eva, Burcaucracy and Democracy, 2nd ed., London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985.Google Scholar
10 Cited in Rosen, Rami and Bar-Moha, Yossi, ‘Od 330 S’ganei Sarim’ (Another 330 Deputy Ministers), Ha’arete Supplement, 21 08 1992, p. 24 Google Scholar. The translation is my own. Mapai (the former name of the Labour Party) when previously in power, had inaugurated the system and applied it in a variety of settings and institutions.
11 op. cit.
12 Reported in Ha'aretz, 28 Dec. 1992. During half of the period to which this testimony refers, the new Labour government was already in office.
