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Render unto Caesar Just a Little Bit Longer: The Relationship between Constitutional Reforms and Executive Survival

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2021

Tofigh Maboudi Open the ORCID record for Tofigh Maboudi [Opens in a new window] ,
Ghazal P. Nadi Open the ORCID record for Ghazal P. Nadi [Opens in a new window]  and
Todd A. Eisenstadt Open the ORCID record for Todd A. Eisenstadt [Opens in a new window]
Tofigh Maboudi*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, Loyola University, Chicago, USA
Ghazal P. Nadi
Affiliation:
Interdisciplinary Honors Program, Loyola University, Chicago, USA
Todd A. Eisenstadt
Affiliation:
Department of Government, American University, Washington, DC, USA
*
*Corresponding author. Email: tmaboudi@luc.edu
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Abstract

Since the third wave of democracy, term limits have become a popular fixture of most constitutions intended to constrain the executive. Yet, recent constitutional reforms around the world show that presidents seeking re-election sometimes overturn the entire constitutional order to extend their power. What is the impact of these constitutional manipulations on the longevity of the executive in office? Using survival analysis of all political leaders and national constitutions from 1875 to 2015, this article demonstrates, for the first time, that when ‘authoritarian-aspiring’ presidents remove constitutional term limits, they increase their stay in office by more than 40%. Our findings contrast with a widely held position in the comparative authoritarian literature suggesting that dictators survive longer under institutional constraints. On the contrary, we argue that by removing constitutional barriers, rulers consolidate more power at the expense of their most ambitious allies and can stay in power longer.

Keywords

term limitsauthoritarian durabilityconstitutional manipulationinstitutional constraints
Type
Article
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 58 , Issue 3 , July 2023 , pp. 576 - 597
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Government and Opposition Limited

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