1 Not confined to the Falklands/Malvinas. Before that the military intervened in Bolivian politics and in Central American politics in ways and for aims strongly contradicting the longstanding stance of deploring the intervention by any state in the internal affairs of any other state and of deploring the existence of nondemocratic regimes, as well as opposing US interventionism.

2 See Stepan, Alfred, The Military in Politics, Changing Patterns in Brazil, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1971, p. 265.Google Scholar

3 The coverage of the British media after the election of 30 October constitutes an unreserved welcome.

4 In the sense that they are economic or social.

5 See 681 Rouqué, Alain, Pouvoir militaire et Société Politique en Republique Argentine, Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1978, esp. p. 681 Google Scholar, available in Spanish as Poder militar y sociedad política en la Argentina, I. hasta 1943 and II. 1943‐1973, Buenos Aires, Emecé, 1982, Cf. (II), pp. 367 and 382.

6 If it is accepted that between 1928 and 1966 Argentine political parties disagreed with each other in non‐consensual ways, the installation of the military regime of 1966–73 ushered in a new era of compromise and pluralism. The erstwhile foes, Radicalism and Peronism, agreed to call for elections jointly and their pressure was successful. Before Perón made his valedictory return in 1973 the FREJULI alliance that propelled Peronism into power that year was itself a major exercise in compromise. After Perón returned in 1973 an unprecedentedly ‐ and exemplary – good relationship sprang up between the then leader of the Radicals, Dr Ricardo Balbín, and Gen. Perón. However, the unwillingness of Sra Perón to continue to build consensus caused the 1976 coup. In 1981 the ‘desarrollistas’ and the Radicals agreed to form an ‘understanding’ to coerce the military into elections. The Peronists joined in the multi‐party understanding along with other minor parties, the Intransigents and the Christian Democrats.

7 Compare the suggestive ‐ but diffuse and appallingly written ‐ chap. II of Modernization…, pp. 53–96, with the crisper definition on p. 6 of ‘Reflections…’, in the version published by the Latin American Research Review. The version in Collier, D. (ed.), The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, Princeton U. P., New Jersey, 1979 Google Scholar, includes a list of eight characteristics of the BA state, aimed, says O’Donnell, at distinguishing the BA state from other forms of authoritarian states. Cf. by the same author, ‘Tensions…’ in D. Collier, op. cit., pp. 292–4.

8 Paraphrased from G. O’Donnell, ‘Tensions in the Bureaucratic‐Authoritarian State’, pp. 292–3, in D. Collier, op. cit. O’Donnell’s last book, 1966‐1973, triunfos denotas y crisis, el estado burocráico autoritario, Buenos Aires, Editorial de Belgrano, 1982, contains essentially the same characterization, cf. pp. 60–61.

9 For a fuller discussion of the short‐term reasons for each military intervention, cf. Makin, G. A., ‘The Military in Argentine Politics, 1880‐1982’, Millennium, Journal of International Studies, vol. 12, no. 1, Spring 1983 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

10 See Oroná, Juan V., La Revolución del 6 de Septiembre, Buenos Aires, 1966 Google Scholar; and, by the same author, La logia militar que derrocó a Yrigoyen, Buenos Aires, 1966. A wealth of documents is transcribed by Oroná revealing that the military began conspiring in 1922 for purely military reasons and formed a secret lodge which successfully pressured President Alvear and then decided to dissolve. However, Yrigoyen’s reelection in 1928 brought the lodge and its contacts into action and, it is conclusively shown, the logia 25 de mayo organized the first intervention of the military in Argentine politics. Orona’s style – decidedly military – and some of his views are of less interest than the documents, papers and minutes transcribed.

11 See Stepan, op. cit., esp. pp, 86, 93–5, 97, 134 and 185 for the ‘sense of systemic crisis’ necessary, according to him, for a successful coup. See p. 116 for the equally necessary consensus among officers.

12 See A. Rouquié, op. cit. (Spanish translation), vol. II, p. 385.

13 Interview with Dr Raú Alfonsín, Paris, January 1983.

14 Interviews with General Alberto Numa Laplane, Buenos Aires, September/October 1980 and April 1983.

15 See Clanín and La Nación, 4 March 1983.

16 For a series of statements by all members of the political spectrum that reform was necessary, including Dr Alfonsín and Dr Luder, see Ambito Financiero, 7 April 1983, and reporting the DYN agency survey on the subject, see Clarí, La Nación and La Prensa of 14 April 1983, which also contained Nicolaides’s views on the subject. The debate continued in Convicción, La Voz and Ambito Financiero of 21 April 1983 and in Clarín 22 April 1983.

17 See Claín, La Nación and La Prensa, 21 April 1983.

18 Interviews, Buenos Aires, September and October 1980, April/June 1982 (telephone) and Buenos Aires, April 1983.

19 One of the most conservative and powerful associations of the landowning sector.

20 Interview, Buenos Aires, November 1980.

21 See Linz, Juan, ‘Crisis Breakdown and Re‐Equilibration’, in The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, jointly edited with Stepan, A., Baltimore, London, Johns Hopkins U. P., 1978, p. 91 Google Scholar; also by Linz, ‘Spain and Portugal: Critical Choices’, in Landes, D. S. (ed.), Western Europe: the Trials of partnership, D. C. Heath, Lexington, Mass., 1977 Google Scholar.

For O’Donnell’s views on time and changes in political leadership, see ‘Notas para el estudio de procesos de democratización política a partir del estado burocrático autoritario’, Desarrollo Ecónhico, no. 86, vol. 22, July‐September 1982.

22 Predicted in interviews by Dr A. F. Robledo and Dr O. Albrieu, Buenos Aires, April 1983.

23 See Gramsci, Antonio, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, trans. by Hoare, Quintin and Smith, Geoffrey Nowell, London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1971, pp. 210, 152 and 211 Google Scholar.