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Controlling Uncertainty in Coalition Governments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 April 2023

Fabio Sozzi Open the ORCID record for Fabio Sozzi [Opens in a new window]
Fabio Sozzi*
Affiliation:
Department of Political and International Sciences, University of Genoa, Genoa, Italy
*
*Corresponding author. Email: f.sozzi380@gmail.com
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Abstract

Multiparty governments are based on delegation and compromises but, at the same time, coalition parties have at their disposal several legislative instruments to keep tabs on their partners. Whereas previous studies focused on policy divisiveness and issue salience as main factors able to explain parliamentary scrutiny, in this article we suggest uncertainty as a complementary factor. In particular, we theorize that the use of parliamentary questions (PQs) is a function not only of policy characteristics but also of actors involved in coalition governance. When ministers increase intra-coalition uncertainty, cabinet parties use PQs to extract information from ministers and to reduce uncertainty in policy implementation. Statistical analyses of all written and oral parliamentary questions in the Italian Chamber of Deputies between 2006 and 2018 support our main hypothesis that when intra-coalition uncertainty increases, coalition parties ask more questions of ‘hostile’ ministers.

Keywords

coalition governmentsparliamentary questionsuncertaintyparliamentsnew partiestechnocrats
Type
Article
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 59 , Issue 1 , January 2024 , pp. 91 - 108
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Government and Opposition Limited

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