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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2014
Global market integration is widely perceived as presenting a major challenge to the sustainability of many national economic regulatory systems. There is far less agreement, however, about precisely how these pressures feed into the politics of reform and reshape national public policy. This article will seek to cast light on this relationship by identifying four influential ‘models of linkage’ between global pressures and regulatory change. It will then comparatively assess their capacity to elucidate the progress of shareholder protection reform in Germany and Italy. While no single model proves fully satisfactory, it will be argued that the weaknesses of two of them can be largely overcome through a process of refinement and integration.
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