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The Jenkins Commission and the Implications of Electoral Reform for the UK Constitution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

Iain McLean
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Extract

THERE ARE TWO MAIN CONCEPTIONS OF ‘REPRESENTATION’ IN democratic theory, and they are not wholly compatible. All democratic electoral systems implicitly appeal to one or the other conception of representation. Therefore, the nature of an ideal electoral system is an essentially contested question. Furthermore, the mathematics of social choice sets severe limits on what an electoral system — any electoral system — can achieve. Though the implications of social choice are not so nihilistic as some would have us believe, they are relevant and serious.

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Articles
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Government and Opposition , Volume 34 , Issue 2 , April 1999 , pp. 143 - 160
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1999

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References

1 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. (CD‐Rom), ‘represent’, senses 2a and 8a.

2 Sophisticated defences of the plurality rule along these lines include W. H. Riker, Liberalism against Populism, San Francisco, W. H. Freeman, 1982, p. 113; Pinto‐Duschinsky, M., ‘Send the Rascals Packing’, Times Literary Supplement, 25 09 1998, pp. 10–12.Google Scholar For a sophisticated attack, see Report of the Independent Commission on the Voting System, Chairman Lord Jenkins of Hillhead, London, The Stationery Office 1998, Cm 4090‐I, paras 33–8.

3 Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. (CD‐Rom), ‘represent’, sense 6a.

4 Mirabeau: in Nohlen, D., ‘Two Incompatible Principles of Representation’, in Lijphart, A. and Grofman, B. (eds), Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives, New York, Praeger, 1984, pp. 83–9Google Scholar, quoted at p. 89; my translation. Adams: in Pitkin, H., The Concept of Representation, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967, p. 60 Google Scholar. For fuller discussion see McLean, I., ‘Forms of Representation and Systems of Voting’ in Held, D. (ed.), Political Theory Today, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991, pp. 172–96.Google Scholar

5 Labour Party National Executive Committee, The Plant Report: a Working Party on Electoral Reform (Chairman, Lord Plant of Highfield) London, The Guardian, 1991; Labour Party, Second Interim Report of the Working Party on Electoral Systems, London, Labour Party, 1992; Labour Party, Report of the Working Party on Electoral Systems, London, Labour Party, 1993; and see the symposium on the Plant Report (especially articles by Plant and Lamport), Representation, special issue ‘Plant in Retrospect’, 33:2 (1995).

6 Scottish Constitutional Convention, Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right: Presented to the People of Scotland by the Scottish Constitutional Convention on the 30th day of November 1995, Edinburgh, SCC, 1995, pp. 22–3.

7 Jenkins Report, para. 8.

8 Entry‐level summaries include Riker, Liberalism against Populism; McLean, I., Democracy and New Technology, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989 Google Scholar; M. Dummett, Voting Procedures, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984 and his Principles of Electoral Reform, Oxford University Press, 1997. The most useful intermediate book is Kelly, J. S., Social Choice Theory, Berlin, Springer‐Verlag, 1987.Google Scholar

9 For explanations of the original proofs, see any of the entry‐level books on social choice listed above. The original proofs cited are in Arrow, K. J., Social Choice and Individual Values, New York, John Wiley, 2nd edn, 1963 Google Scholar; Gibbard, A., ‘Manipulation of Voting Schemes: a General Result’, Econometrica, 41 (1973), pp. 587–601 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; M. Satterthwaite, A., ‘Strategy‐proofness and Arrow’s Conditions’, journal of Economic Theory, 10 (1975), pp. 187–217 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McKelvey, R. D., ‘General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models’, Econometrica, 47 (1979), pp. 1085–111CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schofield, N., ‘Generic Instability of Majority Rule’, Review of Economic Studies, 50 (1983), pp. 695–705.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10 Except that the chaos theorems are not as general as was thought when they were first proved.

11 See Dummett, Principles of Electoral Reform, pp. 99–103, on what this means and why it matters.

12 None of the methods of electing the Mayor of London put up in the Government’s 1997 consultation paper is Condorcet‐efficient (New Leadership for London: The Government’s Proposals for a Greater London Authority: A Consultation Paper, London, The Stationery Office, 1997, Cm 3724, p. 10). Not surprisingly, therefore, neither is the method chosen.

13 For most of these cases see Upset, S. M. and Rokkan, S. (eds), Party Systems and Voter Alignments, New York, The Free Press, 1967, pp. 30–3Google Scholar; for Australia, McLean, I., ‘E. J. Nansons, Social Choice, and Electoral Reform’, Australian journal of Political Science, 31:3 (1996), pp. 369–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 379; for New Zealand, Boston, J. et al., From Campaign to Coalition: the 1996 MMP Election, Palmerston North, The Dunmore Press, 1997 Google Scholar.

14 For more detail, see McLean, I., ‘The Semi‐Detached Election: Scotland’ in King, A. (ed.), New Labour Triumphs: Britain at the Polls, Chatham, NJ, Chatham House, 1997, pp. 145–75Google Scholar; Mitchell, J., ‘The Evolution of Devolution: Labour’s Home Rule Strategy in Opposition’, Government and Opposition, 33:4 (1998), pp. 479–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

15 Jenkins, Roy, Mr Balfour’s Poodle: An Account of the Struggle between the House of Lords and the Government of Mr Asquith, London, Heinemann, 1954; 2nd ed., Collins, 1968 Google Scholar; Jenkins, Roy, Asquith, London, Collins, 1964 Google Scholar; Jenkins, Roy, Gladstone, London, Macmillan, 1995.Google Scholar

16 Jenkins Report, p. v.

17 Jenkins considers the ‘weighted vote’ surely for the sole purpose of getting in the following (para. 89): ‘whether they would carry these numbers round their necks or on their backs, rather like prize bulls at an agricultural show, is not clear, but what is clear is that there would be great problems if one of these vote‐heavy beasts were… permanently to lumber off across the floor. There would inevitably be the most excited attempts to re‐corral him.’

18 The academic evidence to Jenkins is in the supplementary volume Cm 4090‐II or, more conveniently, in the Web version at . Those unable to access the site directly can reach it by following links from, selecting ‘Organisation Index’, and clicking on ‘Independent Commission on the Voting System’.

19 Lipsey, D., ‘How We Made up our Minds’, Economist, 31 10 1998 , pp. 30–1Google Scholar.

20 ; Cm 4090‐I, paras 40–3.

21 Ibid., Butler consensus report, and evidence of P. Dunleavy and H. Margetts; Cm 4090‐I, paras 81–5 and Annex A.

22 Jenkins Report, Recommendations 1 and 2.

23 On the properties of d’Hondt allocations, see Taagepera, R. and Shugart, M. S., Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1989, pp. 32, 112–16Google Scholar.

24 Jenkins Report, Recommendation 15.

25 Fifth Report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life: The Funding of Political Parties in the UK, Chairman, Lord Neill of Bladen, Cm 4057‐I or, ch. 11.

26 Bogdanor, V., Devolution, Oxford University Press, 1979, pp. 51–2.Google Scholar

27 McLean, I., ‘Are Scotland and Wales Over‐represented in the House of Commons?’, Political Quarterly, 66 (1995), pp. 250–68.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

28 Ibid; also McLean, I. and Butler, D. (eds), Fixing the Boundary: Defining and Redefining Single‐Member Electoral Districts, Aldershot, Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1996.Google Scholar