² The term ‘leadership deficit’ was articulated by Nippon Keidanren chairman Okuda Hiroshi. See Samuels, Richard J., ‘Generational Change and Japanese Leadership’, in Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Asia Program Special Report, 117 (January 2004), p. 16.Google Scholar

³ See Masaru Fujimoto, ‘Prodigy Foiled in US Quest: Yoshida Shoin's Failed Escape Cost the Shogunate Dear, Too’, Japan Times, 1 June 2003.Google Scholar

⁴ The job distribution of MSJ graduates in 2005 was: 44 per cent in politics, 28 per cent in business and management, 18 per cent in think tanks, academia, mass communications and NGOs, and 10 per cent in other sectors, http://www.mskj.or.jp/how/shinro.html, accessed 21 February 2006.Google Scholar

⁵ ‘Shusho 5 nin haishutsu sodai yubenkai 100 nen: seikai de no sonzaikan ni kageri’ (Five Prime Ministers Appeared Successively from 100-year-old Waseda Debating Club: Sense of Existence in the Political World Being Clouded), Asahi Shimbun, 9 November 2002. On the influence of the Waseda Debating Club see also ‘Leaders Honed Skills in Waseda Debating Society’, Mainichi Daily News, 17 April 2000, , accessed 5 February 2003.Google Scholar

⁶ Gerald Curtis notes: ‘If one looks back on the political system of Japan as it operated during the height of the so-called “55 system”, in the 1960s and 1970s, it is clear that Japan had a succession of effective leaders…. We know that leaders like Prime Ministers Ikeda, Sato, and Tanaka were very effective; although by most definitions someone like Prime Minister Sato, with his almost total lack of charisma, would hardly be regarded as a strong leader. Strength, however, depends on a leader being able to operate effectively within a particular environment. In other words, what may make for a strong leader at one point in history may make for a very weak leader at a different time.’ See Gerald Curtis, ‘Commentary: Political Leadership in Japan’, in Gil Latz and Koide Izumi (eds), Challenges for Japan: Democracy, Finance, International Relations, Gender, Tokyo, International House of Japan, 2003, p. 166.Google Scholar

⁷ These three prime ministers who hailed from the Yubenkai had shortcomings much worse than a lack of eloquence: Takeshita was embroiled in various political scandals and led to much public distrust towards the LDP and politics in general; Obuchi was known as the ‘king of debt’ as the Japanese state's financial deficits mounted when his administration resorted to massive and wasteful public works to stimulate the sluggish economy; and Mori appeared to be completely ignorant of solving the problems of the ‘lost decade’ and his incompetence and fumbles dragged the LDP down to new depths of unpopularity in public opinion.Google Scholar

⁸ A journalist noted that in the 2003 Lower House elections, only 18 politicians who hailed from the Waseda University Debating Club were elected, in contrast to 26 from the MSJ. Thus, ‘the MSJ has become the number one brand name in the political world’. See ‘Matsushita seikei juku no kenkyu’ (The Research on the MSJ), Foresight, 1 (January 2004), p. 76.Google Scholar

⁹ Matsushita Konosuke is often regarded as a ‘god of management’ in Japan.Google Scholar

¹⁰ According to the institute,‘Discouraged and constrained by conventional models and means of political reform, Mr Matsushita conceived the MIGM to combat the vanity and mediocrity of 20th century leadership through a long-term strategy, which entailed an avant-garde approach to education, designed to foster a more profound change for Japan and her relationship to the world…. The essence of MIGM is a Jeffersonian extension of citizen education, preparing a new breed of leaders for public service.’ The mission statement is: ‘Seeking philosophies and policies to realize an ideal Japan in the 21st century, and training people to promote them’, Matsushita Institute of Government and Management, unpublished mimeo, May 2002.Google Scholar

See ‘Educating for Leadership’, in John P. Kotter, Matsushita Leadership: Lessons from the 20th Century's Most Remarkable Entrepreneur, New York: Free Press, 1997, pp. 225–34. See also Takashi Oka, ‘Where Japan's Next Leaders Grow’, Christian Science Monitor, 15 August 2002, , accessed 30 January 2003. According to Oka, Matsushita gave a US$100 million endowment from his personal fortune to establish the school.

¹¹ According to a MSJ graduate who prefers to remain anonymous, Matsushita realized the importance of politics because he personally experienced the disaster of the Second World War. He implied that bad political leaders led Japan down the road to war, catastrophe and defeat. The MSJ graduate quoted Matsushita: ‘If a country has excellent leaders, she can prosper. However, if the country does not have them, she will fall and perish.’Google Scholar

¹² Comment by Sakurai Masahiko, manager of administration, MSJ, author interview, 22 May 2002.Google Scholar

¹³ On Matsushita Konosuke's intention to establish a second conservative party, see the Japan Communist Party's newspaper Akahata (Red Flag), 24 December 1992. Seki Kiyoshi, principal and president of MSJ, confirmed this fact. Author interview with Seki Kiyoshi, 22 May 2002. See also ‘Matsushita seikei juku no kenkyu’ (The Research on the MSJ), Foresight, 2 (February 2004), pp. 92–5.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Hosokawa Morihiro, former governor of Kumamoto, was a member of the MSJ's board of trustees before he went on to form the JNP and subsequently became the prime minister in a non-LDP government.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Thanks to Seki Kiyoshi for various statistics concerning the MSJ and explanations about his institute. Information about MSJ graduates and the JNP in the 1993 general elections came from Okada Kunihiko, former managing director of MSJ and a member of the institute's board of trustees. Author interview with Okada Kunihiko, 4 October 2002.Google Scholar

¹⁶ For a succinct analysis of the various political parties that emerged and collapsed during the 1990s, see J. A. A. Stockwin, Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Japan, London and New York, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ozawa and his followers formed the Liberal Party (Jiyuto) in 1998. It split in 2000 and those that remained with Ozawa formed the Conservative Party (Hoshuto).Google Scholar

¹⁸ ‘Matsushita Shinto no kanosei o hitei’ (Deny the Possibility of a Matsushita New Party), Sankei Shimbun, 5 September 2004.Google Scholar

¹⁹ The MSJ notes: ‘In selecting its students, the Institute seeks applicants worthy of leadership, who demonstrate fortitude in character, initiative, and vision. It seeks those students who demonstrate a possession of sunao, a Japanese concept of a mind and character capable of accepting life in a constructive way, able to see things as they are without prejudice or preconceived ideas’, Matsushita Institute of Government and Management, mimeo in English, May 2002.Google Scholar

²⁰ Ibid.Google Scholar

²¹ Some MSJ Diet members are disciplined enough to make weekly speeches to commuters at train stations at 6.00 a.m. to demonstrate their sincerity and woo political mass support. Many MSJ politicians are also reputed to be knowledgeable about policy-making. Obviously, such qualities of physical endurance and policy expertise are also found in other non-MSJ politicians. But these qualities seem to be the hallmark of many MSJ graduates. On the policy-making competence of MSJ politicians, see for example the accounts by two MSJ Diet members: Ito Tatsuya, ‘Information Technology: New Policy Issues and the Role of Politicians’ and Maehara Seiji, ‘Toward a Fundamental Review of Public Works’, both in Gerald L. Curtis (ed.), Policymaking in Japan: Defining the Role of Politicians, Tokyo, Japan Center for International Exchange, 2002, pp. 62–86 and 87–100.Google Scholar

²² Mulgan, Aurelia George, ‘Japan's “Un-Westminster” System: Impediment to Reform in a Crisis Economy’, Government and Opposition, 38: 1 (2003), pp. 73–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²³ An example of a politician who was a former Upper House member before becoming a governor was Hosokawa Morihiro, subsequently founder of the JNP and prime minister.Google Scholar

²⁴ Author interview with mayor Yamada Hiroshi, 20 June 2002.Google Scholar

²⁵ For an overview of Yamada's priorities and political style, see his interview in Tokyo no Jichi, 39 (December 2000), pp. 16–23.Google Scholar

²⁶ Yamada Hiroshi, ‘Ku to iu seido wa jidai okure’ (The Ward System is out of Date), Sankei Shimbun, 5 May 1999.Google Scholar

²⁷ See ‘Zenkoku ni hirogaru suginami ku reji bukoro zei no hamon’ (Suginami Ward's Plastic Bag Tax and its Ripple Effect in the Whole Country), Shogyokai (July 2002), pp. 98–107. For Yamada's opinion pieces on an environmental tax, see ‘Nihon haijme no honkaku tekina kankyo zei’ (Japan's First Serious Environmental Tax), in Senkei Keizai, 2427 (15 April 2002), p. 3 and ‘Reji bukurozei: sakugen ni kisei to yudo ga hitsuyo’ (Plastic Shopping Bag Tax: Regulation and Guidance for Reduction Are Necessary) Asahi Shimbun, 18 April 2002. Yamada said: ‘It was a first. Suginami could propose a local tax independently from the central government, at a time when politicians are reluctant to push an added tax burden on voters…. I think it is important for the people to understand they must shoulder certain costs if they strive for an ideal society.’ See ‘Maverick Suginami Mayor Likes to Stir Things Up’, Japan Times, 17 July 2003.Google Scholar

²⁸ An estimated 1,500 to 1,700 metric tonnes of plastic bags were discarded annually in Suginami ward before the tax was imposed. See Yumiko Suzuki, ‘Tokyo Ward Mayor Looks for Success in Uniqueness’, Nikkei Weekly, 21 February 2001.Google Scholar

²⁹ See Yamada Hiroshi, ‘Reiji bukurozei no imi ga rikai sareta suginami jichitai no kozo kaikaku wa honmono’ (The Understanding of the Shopping Bag Tax by the Suginami Municipal Government's Structural Reforms is Genuine), Politico (June 2002), p. 28.Google Scholar

³⁰ ‘Ta shi to no chowa o yusen’ (Prioritizing Reconciliation with Other Cities), Asahi Shimbun, 21 March 2001.Google Scholar

³¹ See ‘Suginami byo gomi shisetsu to sokan’ (The Correlation between the Suginami Disease and Waste Facilities), Tokyo Shimbun, 9 September 1999 for a detailed analysis of the Suginami illness and Yamada's response.Google Scholar

³² ‘Suginami byo ga nakunaru hi made’ (Until the Day the Suginami Disease is Eradicated), Tokyo Shimbun, 30 September 1999.Google Scholar

³³ Yamada intimated that he conceived the environmental tax on plastic bags after he had to grapple with the problem of waste disposal and the polluting rubbish plant in his ward. See Yamada, ‘Reiji bukurozei no imi ga rikai sareta suginami jichitai no kozo kaikaku wa hommono’, p. 28.Google Scholar

³⁴ ‘Suginami byo taisaku: kucho 10 nen inai chukeijo haishi’ (Suginami Disease Counter Measures: Mayor to Abolish Rubbish Facility within 10 Years), Tokyo Shimbun, 28 May 2000.Google Scholar

³⁵ For Nakada's background, see: ‘Hiroshi Nakada: Mayor of the city of Yokohama: Profile & Political History’, http://www.city.yokohama.jp/se/mayor/profile.en.html, accessed 28 January 2004.Google Scholar

³⁶ The media reported: ‘Home Affairs Minister Toranosuke Katayama has accused the Yokohama Municipal government of acting “illegally” after Japan's biggest city threw a virtual spanner in the controversial resident registry network’, see ‘Japan's Biggest City Rebels against Nationwide Network’, Mainichi Daily News: Mainichi Interactive, 3 August 2002, , accessed 28 January 2004).Google Scholar

³⁷ The JFC endorsed 62 candidates in the 2003 local elections; 29 were successful. See ‘Matsushita seikei juku no kenkyu’, Foresight, 2 (February 2004), p. 92.Google Scholar

³⁸ The club's platform includes: ‘releasing details of all revenue and expenditures related to elections, making elections based on individual politicians, not political parties while campaigns should be supported by volunteers and voluntary donations, prohibiting prefectural governors and mayors from seeking third terms and prohibit family members from taking over from politicians who die or retire. The club will offer staff to candidates who endorse those ideas and show how campaigns can be run by volunteers and voluntary donations.’‘Political Club Looking for “clean” Members’, Asahi Shimbun, 29 January 2003, http://www.asahi.com/english/politics/K2003013000228.html, accessed: 30 January 2003.Google Scholar

³⁹ I interviewed Matsuzawa when he was a non-party affiliated prefectural assemblyman in his Kawasaki office in autumn 1991. For an autobiographic account of Matsuzawa's early foray into local politics, see Matsuzawa Shigefumi, Sainensho giin no funtoki: chiho kara no seiji kaikaku (A Record of the Youngest Assembly Member's Hard Fight: Political Reform from the Locality), Tokyo, Gyosei, 1991.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See ‘Matsuzawa Shigefumi no manifaesuto’ (Matsuzawa Shegefumi's Manifesto), at http://www.matuzawa.com/kanagawa/k_power/k_power_02.htm, accessed 9 February 2004.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See Matsuzawa's interview in ‘Koizumi Unlikely to Deliver on Reform of Post’, Nikkei Weekly, 26 January 2004, p. 6.Google Scholar

⁴² Just a few days after Nakada won the mayoral election in Yokohama, the Mainichi Shimbun's political dictionary column focused on the meaning of Matsushita Seikei Juku. It noted that the hallmark of the MSJ graduates is that they are not second-generation politicians with name recognition and a strong pre-existing political base. See ‘Matsushita Seikei Juku’, Mainichi Shimbun, 2 April 2002. Nakada intimated: ‘In Japan, it is very difficult to become a Diet member without kinship of politicians, enormous financial capabilities, or support from influential groups. Although I come from an ordinary household, the Matsushita School provided me with the education, inspiration and confidence to seek office anyway.’ Nakada Hiroshi, ‘Let's Change Japan!: Reform Initiatives from Yokohama’, public speech at CSIS, Washington DC, 23 June 2003, available from CSIS website.Google Scholar

⁴³ Okada Kunihiko candidly remarked that while the MSJ has succeeded in grooming its students to win elections, it is another matter whether it had indeed succeeded in producing good political leaders. He intimated that it is still too early to tell. Okada Kunihiko, author interview, 4 October 2002.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Seki Kiyoshi, author interview, 21 May 2002.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ ‘Matsushita seikei juku no kenkyu’, Foresight, 1 (January 2004), p. 76.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Ibid.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Yamamura noted that although the MSJ alumni have enjoyed electoral success, the limitation of the institute is that not a single one of them had become a minister. The breakthrough was in September 2004 when Ito Tatsuya became the first MSJ graduate to become a minister. See Yamamura Akiyoshi, ‘Matsushita seikei juku ga seikai ni bakko suru’ (The MSJ Prevails in the Political World), Bungei Shunju, February 2004, pp. 374–81. In my opinion, the real limitation of the MSJ is not whether its graduates have become ministers or not but whether they can become politicians with principles and visions.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ It is not true that politicians from all Japanese parties lack principles and consistency. Politicians from the Japan Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party are very firm on certain principles such as opposing the revision of the Constitution.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Seki Kiyoshi remarked that it is the nature of Japanese society that few women are interested in running in elections. Seki Kiyoshi, author interview, 21 May 2002.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ For Ohmae Kenichi's biography see Ohmae et al., ‘Biography of Keinichi Ohmae’, . On the Isshin Juku, see http://www.kohmae.com/profile/index.html.Google Scholar

⁵¹ The term ‘isshin’ in Japanese can mean renovation, renewal, reform, a complete change or even a revolution.Google Scholar

⁵² For Ohmae's motivations to establish the Isshin Juku, see Ohmae Kenichi, Ohmae Kenichi no Isshin Juku (Ohmae Keinichi's Isshin Juku), Tokyo, Purejidento sha, 2000.Google Scholar

⁵³ See, for example, advertisement to recruit students for Ozawa's school in Asahi Shimbun, 22 November 2003, p. 11.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ ‘Koizumi School of Politics Set to Debut’, Asahi Shimbun, 24 December 2003, at http://www.asahi.com/english/politics/TKY200312240096.html, accessed 24 December 2003.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Ibid.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ On the LDP's organizations for power, see Sato Seizaburo and Matsuzaki Tetsuhisa, Jiminto Seiken (Liberal Democratic Party Government), Tokyo, Chuo Koronsha, 1986; and Inoguchi Takashi and Iwai Tomoaki, Zoku giin no kenkyu (Research on Policy Tribes), Tokyo, Nihon Keizai shimbun, 1987. Political machines that provide goods and services to voters are expensive to maintain. Indeed, the insatiable demand for funds to maintain political machines is a root cause of money politics and political corruption in Japan.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ See editorial of Manichi Shimbun, 5 September 2004 on Abe's reforms amidst a sense of crisis within the LDP. On Abe's reforms to recruit LDP candidates outside the party ranks who will be appealing to voters without party affiliation, see ‘LDP's Future in Jeopardy Unless Party Reforms’, editorial in Daily Yomiuri Online, 19 August 2004, at http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/newse/20040819wo81.htm, accessed 19 August 2004.Google Scholar