Hostname: page-component-6d856f89d9-8l2sj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-16T04:52:00.027Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Political Cleavages in Spain and the 1979 General Election

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2014

J. M. Maravall
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

THE TRANSITION FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY IN Spain has been a fascinating experience ever since the Autumn of 1976, when the Ley de Reforma Politica (Law on Political Reform) was passed through the Francoist Cortes and later through a national Referendum. Setting aside the political virtuosity of the different players involved in this dramatic experiment, three aspects of the transition have been particularly important from the point of view of a sociological analysis of Spanish politics: first of all, the ideological moderation of the electorate, which would fulfil an essential prerequisite of democratic stability; secondly, the continuities with past political cleavages between Left and Right, in spite of a parenthesis of four decades of dictatorship; finally, the threat to the new democracy coming from the political violence of Basque separatists and from the activities of Francoist groups which are also active within the army. These three dimensions can be re-examined in the light of the results of the General Election of 1 March 1979, the first constitutional general election in Spain since 1936 and the second election since the death of Franco.

Type
Article
Information
Government and Opposition , Volume 14 , Issue 3 , 01 July 1979 , pp. 299 - 317
Copyright
Copyright © Government and Opposition Ltd 1979

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Carrillo, S., Después de Franco iQué?, Editions Sociales, Paris, 1965 Google Scholar. It was often thought that the PSOE would find electoral strength only as a very moderate, non‐working‐class party. See Miguel, L. G. San, ‘Para und Sociologia del Cambio Político y la Oposición en la España Actual’, Sistema, 4, 1974 (p. 102)Google Scholar, Preston, P., ‘The Anti‐Francoist Opposition: The Long March to Unity’, in ibid. Spain in Crisis, Hassocks (Sussex), Harvester Press, 1976 (p. 153)Google Scholar, also the data on potential socialist vote in Miguel, A. de, ‘Spanish Political Attitudes, 1970’, in S. G. Payne (ed.), Politics and Society in Twentieth Century Spain, New Viewpoints, New York, 1976 Google Scholar.

2 Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan, S., ‘Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction’ and Linz, J. J., ‘The Party System of Spain: Past and Future’, in Lipset, S. M. and Rokkan, S. (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments. Cross‐National Perspectives, Free Press, New York, 1967 Google Scholar.

3 , Linz, ‘The Party System…’ (pp. 264–265)Google Scholar.

4 Lipset, and Rokkan, , ‘Cleavage Structures…’ (pp. 50–51)Google Scholar.

5 This would largely explain loyalties in militant groups: socialism in the Asturian miners and Basque steel workers, communism in some sectors of Madrid, Catalan and Andalusian building and metal workers. See Maravall, J. M., Dictatorship and Political Dissent, Tavistock, London, 1978 Google Scholar (chapters 3, 4 and 8) and ibid.‘Spain: Eurocommunism and Socialism’, Political Studies, 27, 2, 1979.

6 From Benegas, J. M., Estrategia Política para Euskadi, Partido Socialista Obrero Español, Madrid, 1978 (p. 10); also, El País, 6 03 1979 (p. 11)Google Scholar.

7 Around one third of the population in the Basque Country is immigrant and 48 per cent feels discriminated against as non‐Basques. See Campo, S. del, Tezanos, J. F. and Navarro, M., La Conciencia Regional en España, Cuadernos para el Diálogo, Madrid, 1977 Google Scholar.

8 Sartori, G., Parties and Party Systems, Cambridge University Press, 1976 Google Scholar (chs. 6 and 10). On these doubts see Linz, J. J., ‘II Sistema Politico Spagnolo’ in Rivistá Italiana di Scienza Politica, 3 1978 Google Scholar.

9 See the analysis of the disjunction between trade‐union and party vote in Maravall, ‘Spain: Eurocommunism and Socialism’, op. cit. While 62.4 per cent of PCE voters thought that CC.OO. were more active in the struggle for working‐class interests, PSOE voters were divided between support to CC.OO. (26.4) and support to UGT (21.8).

10 As examples of this struggle to win the vote of CC.OO. supporters see the articles by two national leaders of the Workers’ Commissions and the Sartorius, N., ‘Qué votarán los de CC.OO.?’, La Calle, 48, 20–26 02 1979 Google Scholar, and Ariza, J., ‘Comisiones ante las Elecciones’, Informaciones, 30 01 1979 Google Scholar.

11 From a Data Institute survey in the autumn of 1977 and J. J. Linz, op. cit. If we consider UCD voters only and if the scale is reduced to 1 to 7 (instead of 1 to 10), UCD ranks as 4.14, which on a 1 to 10 scale corresponds to position 5.91. Data calculated from Alvira, F. et al., Partidos Políticos e Ideologías en España, Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, Madrid, 1978 Google Scholar, (answers from 1301 voters in 21 provinces).

12 See Informaciones, 3 March 1979 (p. 2), and comments by Nicolás Redondo (general secretary of UGT, member of the executive committee of the PSOE and socialist candidate for Vizcaya) and Ramón Rubial (president of the PSOE, senator, president of the Basque General Council); also the post‐electoral report of the executive committee of the Socialist Party in the Basque Country of 7 March 1979, in El País, 8 March 1979 (p. 13).

13 Alfonso Guerra had said in the PSOE Escuela de Verano (Summer School for party cadres) in August 1978 that the organization of the party in the rural areas might overturn the hold of the local caciques. Guy Hermet had agreed that ‘clientelism’ had practically disappeared in the North‐West of Spain: see Hermet, G., ‘Espagne: Changement de la Société, Modernisation Autoritaire et Démocratie Octroyée’, Revue Française de Science Politique, 27, 4–5, 1977 (p. 586)Google Scholar.

14 This runs counter to the arguments of M. Roskin that the younger, the more left, and that social class is a poor predictor of voting: see Roskin, M., ‘Spain Tries Democracy Again’, Political Science Quarterly, Winter 1978–1979 (p. 641)Google Scholar. In 1977, 49 per cent of manual workers had voted for the PSOE, 9 per cent for the PCE; 52 per cent of the PSOE vote and 49 per cent of the PCE vote were working class (from a sample survey of 33 provinces carried out in August‐September 1978 by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas).

15 Lipset and Rokkan discuss extensively both questions, the first in the context of their adaptation of the AGIL paradigm of Parsons. See Lipset, and Rokkan, , ‘Cleavage Structures…’ (in particular pp. 14 and 27)Google Scholar.

16 The Episcopal Conference and the Spanish Confederation of Business Organizations (CEOE) did in fact express views rather strongly opposed to the Left.