Last updated 09/07/24: Online ordering is currently unavailable due to technical issues. We apologise for any delays responding to customers while we resolve this. For further updates please visit our website: https://www.cambridge.org/news-and-insights/technical-incident
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 August 2011
In a study entitled Letter and Spirit in Jewish and Roman Law I suggested that the antithesis γράμμα καὶ πνεῦμα (Letter and Spirit) coined by Paul was the equivalent to the Greek antithesis ῥητὸν καὶ διάνοια, which was a commonplace in ancient Greek rhetoric. After this article was printed, I discovered a passage in Origen which confirms beyond all doubt the correctness of my conjecture. This statement is found in his refutations of an argument advanced by Celsus. This pagan philosopher charged that there were many contradictions between the Law and the New Dispensation, which demanded an explanation. For instance, “Why did he give them laws by Moses that they were to become rich and powerful… Yet his son, the man of Nazareth, gives contradictory laws, saying that a man cannot come forward to the Father if he is rich or loves power.”
1 Cf. Kaplan, Mordecai M.Jubilee Volume, New York 1953, pp. 109–135Google Scholar.
2 Origen, Contra Celsum VII.18. translation by Chadwick, H., Cambridge 1953, p. 409Google Scholar.
3 Contra Celsum VII.20, Chadwick l.c., p. 411, cf. also Schneider, , The Catholic Biblical Quarterly, XV (1953) 167Google Scholar.
4 Contra Celsum. VII.21, Chadwick, l.c., p. 411–12.
5 Cf. H. de Lubac, Origène, Homélies sur L'Exode, pp. 9–33.
6 Cf. Siegfried, Philo, Jena 1875, pp. 351–3, Chadwick l.c., p. 411, note 2. who refers to Spec. Lec. I.287, and my article cited above, pp. 118–119.
7 Inst. Or. III.6,46, VII.1.15, VII.10.1.
8 Oddly enough, with respect to the interpretation of an agreement, Paulus writes: We are not bound by the form of the letters but by the meaning they express. Non figura litterarum sed oratione, quam exprimunt litterae, obligamur. (D.44.7.38 cf. Bulletino dell'Istituto di Diritto Romano, 53–54 (1945), pp. 349, 354). This is the closest to the term Letter of the law in the Digest. On the other hand, with regard to the interpretation of a will, Javolenus reports that Labeo appears to have followed the form of the words, and the Proculus the intention of the testator. Mihi Labeo videtur verborum figuram sequi, Proculus mentem testantis. (Digest, 50.16.116). The phrase figura litterarum or figura verborum has a close parallel in the Talmudic phrase: One is misleading if he translates a Biblical verse according to its form (Ke-Tsurato) i.e. of the letters and words constituting it, namely, if he translates it literally, Kiddushin 49a. Littera is found in purely literary contexts with an entirely different meaning. Thus we find Cicero writing: ad me litteram numquam misit (Letters to his Friends II.17.6) and Quintilian introduces a verbatim quotation with these words: Locum ad litteras subieci (Inst. Or.9.1.25).
9 For the interpretation of the pleonastic He, cf. Baba Kamma 63b. For the redundant Vav, cf. Yebamot 68b.
10 Occasionally, the rabbis spoke of the “word of the law” when referring to the interpretation of its literal sense. Thus R. Tarfon objected to a certain type of exegesis because it would lead to the abolition of the word of the law (Davar min ha-Torah), in this instance to the Levirate marriage (Gittin 83a). In the same sense the phrase Davar min ha-Torah is used in an Amoraic discussion in Yebamot89b.
11 Cf. Quintilian, Nam hi, quia verborum mutatio sensus quoque verteret, omnes figuras in verbis esse dixerunt (Inst. Or. 9.1.15).
12 In English, literal and verbal are most often synonymous, thus one may speak of inspiration or of a translation as being literal or verbal, with no apparent difference in meaning. However, the term “verbal” may be confusing as it is often used in contrast to oral, when we speak of a verbal contract in opposition to an oral one. Strictly speaking, in English the difference between literal and verbal is mainly a matter of etymology. Literal is derived from littera, a translation of γράμμα which in turn goes back to the Hebrew Ot. Verbal stems from verbum the Latin equivalent for ῥητὸν.
13 Cf. my article cited above, pp. 111–112.
14 Cf. also Schulz, History of Roman Legal Science, 78–79.
15 For the use of ἐπιμελητής to denote an executor of a will, cf. Diogenes Laertius V. 56 ἐπιμεληταὶ δε ἔστωσαν τῶν ἐν τῆ διαθήκη γεγραμμένον and Beauchet, Histoire du Droit Privé de la République Athénienne, III.699. This Greek term occurs also in Talmudic literature, cf. Krauss, Lehnwörter im Talmud, II, 106, 459.
16 Philo too held that if the law were unreasonable or impossible when taken in its literal meaning, it was to be interpreted allegorically, cf. Siegfried, Philo, 165–168 and Wolfson, Philo, I.136. F. Prat pointed out that Origen too held that “il nʼy a pas dans la Bible un iota ni un seul trait vide de sens,” also that it was necessary to “Abandonner la lettre où le sens corporel de l'Ecriture toutes les fois quʼil en résulterait quelque chose d'impossible, d'absurde ou d'indigne de Dieu… La seul question qui se pose est de savoir ce quʼon entend par absurde, impossible, et indigne de Dieu.” Vigouroux, Dictionnaire de la Bible, IV. p. 1877, cf, also Siegfried, l.c., 353–9.
17 Cf. Yebamot 79a, and the gloss of Chajes ad locum.
18 Cf. Moore, Judaism I, 337–338.
19 That is, she is not compelled to marry him but the levir is forced to release her by submitting to the ceremony of Halitsah, i.e. of having his shoe loosed as prescribed in Deut. 25.9. The rabbis in order to protect the widow of a childless husband from being coerced to marry an undesirable levir, permitted the use of certain forms of strategy where the law did not afford adequate remedy, cf. Yebamot 106a.
20 On this point, cf. Origen, Contra Celsum II.3, De Principiis IV. 12. Homélies sur la Genèse, 17.9. For parallels to the statement of Paul, Professor Nock kindly drew my attention to Aristeas 144, and Philo, De Somniis I. 92 ff, Spec. Leg. I. 260, Quod Omnis Probus Liber Sit, 2, Quaest. Gen. IV. 172.
21 It is not unlikely that Paul, in the course of development of his concept of Ruah Mishpat was initially influenced by Isa. 42.1: “Behold my servant, whom I uphold, mine elect, in whom My soul delighteth. I have put my Spirit (Ruhi) upon him. He shall make the law (Mishpat) go forth to the nations.” It is very plausible to assume that the ancient Jewish tradition incorporated in the Aramaic translation of this verse (and presupposed in the Palestinian Talmud, Demai VII.1,26a which was correctly explained by R. Aryeh Leib Jelin in his glosses to Yebamot 93b) was known to Paul. According to it, this verse alluded to the Messiah who, invested with the holy spirit, will expound laws to the nations (Dinin le-Amemin yegale). The Aramaic verb “galeh” means to reveal, and in Rabbinic Hebrew signifies mostly “to expound,” cf. Cohen, Boaz, Sabbath Prohibitions known as Shebut, New York 1949, p. 39Google Scholar, note 106a. It is noteworthy that the Aramaic translator of Isa. 12.3 “therefore with joy shall ye draw water out of the wells of salvation” paraphrases it as follows: And ye shall receive a new law with joy from the select of the righteous. (For the well known use of the symbolism of water for Torah, cf. Taʼanit 7a and Wieder, Journal of Jewish Studies, IV, 1953, p. 139, note 2). Such an interpretation might have been current also in the Pharisaic circles in which Paul moved in his early days.
