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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 June 2011
In this article I shall argue that Friedrich Schleiermacher found the self that Immanuel Kant lost. Two steps are necessary to support this argument. First, I shall demonstrate that Kant knew that he had lost the self. Second, I shall demonstrate that Schleiermacher knew that he had found the self that Kant had lost. I am aware that these two demonstrations will not actually prove that Schleiermacher did find the self that Kant lost. I believe, however, that if we understand why Kant thought that he had lost the self and if we understand the way in which Schleiermacher believed that he retrieved this self, we shall be better off. We shall have discovered a way to reach beyond the limits of our own mental constructs and affirm the unity and integrity of life itself.
1 Hirsch, Emanuel, Geschichte der neuern evangelischen Theologie (5 vols.; Giitersloh: Bertelsmann, 1949-1954) 5. 298–99.Google Scholar
2 Ibid., 298-99.
3 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason (trans. Smith, Norman Kemp; New York: St. Martin's, 1965) 423Google Scholar (B). The letters “A” and “B” refer, respectively, to the standard pagination of the first and second editions. Modifications of this translation have been made for clarity, precision, and style. These changes have not been explicitly noted in the text.
4 Forster, Eckart, “Is there a ‘Gap’ in Kant's Critical System?” Journal of the History of Philosophy 25 (1987) 533–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
5 Ibid., 540-50.
6 Ibid., 541.
7 Ibid., 540-41.
8 , Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 241 (A).Google Scholar
9 Ibid., 135 (A).
10 , Förster, “Is there a ‘Gap,’” 541.Google Scholar
11 , Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 288–91 (A).Google Scholar
12 Kant, Immanuel, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (trans. Ellington, James; Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1970) 478.Google Scholar
13 , Förster, “Is there a ‘Gap,’” 550.Google Scholar
14 Eckart Förster, “Kant's Selbstsetzungslehre,” in idem, ed. , Kant's Transcendental Deductions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989) 229Google Scholar.
15 , Förster, “Is there a ‘Gap,’” 548.Google Scholar
16 , Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 430 (B).Google Scholar
17 Ibid., 423 (B).
18 Ibid., 429 (B).
19 As Forster suggests (“Kant's Selbstsetzungslehre, 226), “Kant wavers—for at least a while—in his assessment of the status of the ether” as to whether it exists “outside of the idea” of it, “in the idea” of it, or merely as “a thought object.”
20 Ibid.
21 Burkhard Tuschling, “Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of Matter in Kant's Opus postumum,” in , Förster, Kant's Transcendental Deductions, 207Google Scholar.
22 Ibid., 212.
23 Ibid., 213.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 216.
26 , Förster, “Kant's Selbstsetzungslehre,” 226.Google Scholar
27 Jules Vuillemin, “Kant's Dynamics,” in , Förster, Kant's Transcendental Deductions, 246–47Google Scholar.
28 Ibid., 247 . , Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 156Google Scholar (A); 195 (B).
29 , Vuillemin, “Kant's Dynamics,” 247.Google Scholar
30 Ibid.
31 Vleeschauwer, Herman-Jean de, La Deduction transcendentale dans I'oeuvre de Kant (3 vols.; Paris: Leroux, 1934–1937).Google Scholar
32 Vleeschauwer, Herman-Jean de, The Development of Kantian Thought: The History of a Doctrine (trans. Duncan, A. R. C.; Toronto: Nelson, 1962) 1–2Google Scholar . Originally published as L'Evolution de la pensee kantienne (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1939)Google Scholar.
33 Henrich, Dieter, Fichtes ursprungliche Einsicht (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967) 17Google Scholar ; English translation by Lachterman, David R., “Fichte's Original Insight,” Contemporary German Philosophy 1 (1982) 23Google Scholar.
34 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, “Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre fur Leser, die schon ein philosophisches System haben,” in idem , Werke (ed. Medicus, Fritz; 6 vols.; Leipzig: Eckardt, 1910) 3. 478–81Google Scholar . Fichte believed that Kant's philosophy had a foundation; concerning this Fichte stated, “For me, in no way is the Critique of Pure Reason lacking in foundations. They are very clearly placed there. But they have not been assembled (aufgebaut) and the building-materials–although already nearly prepared–are placed next to and superim-posed on one another in the manner of a very arbitrary order” (p. 479n.). Fichte also believed that Kant had actually established a system for tying together all of human knowledge. Kant had simply failed to specify it. Fichte believed “that Kant, himself, had conceived of such a system, that all which he actually expounds (vortrdgt) are fragments and results of this system, and that his statements only have meaning, coherence, and cohesion (Zusammenhang) by means of (unter) this presupposition” (p. 478). Fichte assigned to himself the task of delineating this “system” which was present but undisclosed in Kant's work. After all, Fichte asserted, who better than he, since he was the only one who understood the master. Concerning this, Fichte stated that “it may appear arrogant and slanderous (verkleinerlich) to others, if one individual steps forward and says: until this moment, among a multitude (Menge) of worthy scholars who turn their time and energies upon the exegesis of a certain book, not one individual has understood this book other than in a completely topsy-turvy way (gam verkehrt). Straight off, they have found the opposite system to that which is expounded. They have found dogmatism instead of transcendental idealism. I alone, however, understand it correctly” (p. 481) (my translation).
35 As Henrich suggests (Fichtes urspriingliche Einsicht, 15–16; ET: “Fichte's Original Insight,” 22–23), Fichte did not discover a fact but a difficulty.
36 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, Fichtes Bestimmung des Menschen, in Schleiermachers sdmmtliche Werke (31 vols.; Berlin: Reimer, 1834-1864) 3.1. 530.Google Scholar
37 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, Grundlinien einer Kritik der bisherigen Sittenlehre, in Schleiermachers sdmmtliche Werke, 3.1. 29.Google Scholar
38 Ibid., 27.
39 Ibid.
40 , Schleiermacher, Fichtes Bestimmung, 530.Google Scholar
41 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, Dialektik (ed. Jonas, Ludwig) in Schleiermachers sdmmtliche Werke, 3.1. 428.Google Scholar
42 , Schleiermacher, Grundlinien einer Kritik, 19.Google Scholar
43 Ibid., 19-20.
44 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, “Uber das hochste Gut,” in Friedrich Schleiermacher Kritische Gesamtausgabe I Schriften und Entwtirfe, vol. 1: Jugendschriften 1787–1796 (ed. Meckenstock, Günter; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1984) 1. 81–125Google Scholar . Die Kritische Gesamtausgabe (KGA) der Schriften, des Nachlasses und des Briefwechsels Schleiermachers is a new critical edition of Schleiermacher's work which has been in the process of being published by Walter de Gruyter in Berlin since 1980. Albert Blackwell's book , Schleiermacher's Early Philosophy of Life (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1982)Google Scholar is a first-rate study of Schleiermacher's earliest philosophic tracts.
45 , Schleiermacher, “Uber das hoschste Gut,” 100–101.Google Scholar
46 Ibid.
47 , Schleiermacher, Grundlinien einer Kritik, 22.Google Scholar
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., 23.
50 , Schleiermacher, Dialektik, 20.Google Scholar
51 , Schleiermacher, Grundlinien einer Kritik, 23.Google Scholar
52 , Schleiermacher, Fichtes Bestimmung, 528n.Google Scholar
53 Thiel, John E., God and the World in Schleiermacher's Dialektik and Glaubenslehre: Criticism and the Methodology of Dogmatics (Basler und Berner Studien zur historischen und systematischen Theologie 43; Bern: Lang, 1981) 10.Google Scholar
54 This belief puts my work at odds with three major works in English on Schleiermacher's Dialektik: Brandt, Richard R., The Philosophy of Schleiermacher: The Development of His Theory of Scientific and Religious Knowledge (New York: Harper, 1941)Google Scholar ; Spiegler, Gerhard, The Eternal Covenant: Schleiermacher's Experient in Cultural Theology (New York: Harper & Row, 1967)Google Scholar ; and Thiel, God and World. Each of these authors misconstrues the central canon of Schleiermacher's Dialektik—that “God” and “world” are distinct but inseparable ideas. This misconstrual results from a failure to understand the way in which the gap in self-consciousness functions in Schleiermacher's work. Their errors are based, in part, on their failure to understand the way in which Schleiermacher found the self that Kant lost.
55 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsatzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhange dargestellt (7th ed.; 2 vols.; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1960)Google Scholar . For an English translation, see Schleiermacher, Friedrich, The Christian Faith (eds. Mackintosh, H. R. and Stewart, J. S.; trans, of 2d ed.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976)Google Scholar.
56 Reuter, Hans-Richard, Die Einheit der Dialektik Friedrich Schleiermachers: Eine systematische Interpretation (Munich: Kaiser, 1979) 17.Google Scholar
57 Mehl, Paul Frederick, “Schleiermacher's Mature Doctrine of God as Found in the Dialektik of 1822 and The Second Edition of The Christian Faith (1830-31)” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1961)Google Scholar . I found Mehl's discussion of religious consciousness in Schleiermacher's 1822 lectures on the Dialektik insightful and helpful in my own understanding of the basic division that Schleiermacher makes between the primary and subsequent stages of human consciousness. Like Mehl, I also found Rudolf Odebrecht's article “Das Gefuge des religiosen Bewusstseins bei Fr. Schleiermacher,” (Blatter fur deutsche Philosophie 8 [1934] 284–301Google Scholar ) extremely useful in understanding the “religious element” in the earliest stages of self-consciousness developed by Schleiermacher in his 1822 lectures.
58 , Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 123–25Google Scholar , 133-37 (paragraphs 29, 33).
59 Ibid., 133-37 (paragraph 33).
60 , Schleiermacher, Dialektik, 371.Google Scholar
61 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, Schleiermacher's Introduction to Plato's Dialogues (trans. Dobson, William; New York: Arno, 1973) 17–18.Google Scholar
62 Ibid., 17.
63 Ibid., 7.
64 , Schleiermacher, Dialektik, 429.Google Scholar
65 Ibid., 492-95.
66 Ibid., 429.
67 Ibid., 532n.
68 Ibid., 524n.
69 Ibid., 429.
70 Ibid., 509n.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid., 497n.
73 “Der Grund des Denkens ist zwar selbst kein Denken” (“The ground of thinking is, of course, itself not thinking”) (ibid., 504).
74 Ibid., 423.
75 Ibid., 529.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., 532n.
78 Ibid., 524.
79 Ibid., 414.
80 Ibid., 429.
81 , Henrich, Fichtes ursprungliches Einsicht, 32Google Scholar ; ET: “Fichte's Original Insight,” 36Google Scholar.
82 Ibid.
83 I am in agreement with Frank, Manfred (Das individuelle Allgemeine: Textstrukturierung und -interpretation nach Schleiermacher [Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1985] 94ff.)Google Scholar that Henrich's essay and the new Fichte scholarship it has inspired have been remiss in not taking into account Schleiermacher's own penetrating insights into the inadequacies of a reflection model for a viable theory of self-consciousness.
84 I am grateful to Dean Ronald F. Thiemann for making this suggestion to me after I read this paper at Harvard Divinity School on 8 October 1992.
85 , Schleiermacher, Dialektik, 524.Google Scholar
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., 528n.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., 430, 529.
91 Ibid., 529.
92 Ibid., 435.
93 Ibid., 430.
94 Ibid., 474-75.
95 Ibid., 430.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., 153.
98 Ibid.
99 Odebrecht, Rudolf, “Das Gefiige des religiosen BewuBtseins bei Fr. Schleiermacher,” 285Google Scholar . Odebrecht's discussion of the primary and secondary stages of religious consciousness is remarkably insightful and played a crucial role in helping me identify the preconscious stage of religious experience. I find his analysis limited by two factors, however. First, although Odebrecht affirmed that the feeling of absolute dependence is not the core of religious consciousness (p. 296), he nevertheless described the original stage of this experience as a “fullness of transcendence” (“Erfulltsein von Transzendenz”) (p. 292). This positive predication of the primordial stage of the self-consciousness should not suggest that the self at this stage is actually filled with God, that is, the transcendent ground of determination. Schleiermacher denied that God can be directly experienced (Dialektik, 153, 474-75). Here, I am in agreement with Mehl (“Schleiermacher's Mature Doctrine of God,” 105), who has also taken issue with Odebrecht's “incautious statement.” Second, Odebrecht did not take Schleiermacher's 1831 lectures into account in this discussion. This reduces the explanatory power of his essay because the 1831 lectures demonstrate a third stage of religious consciousness. This is the stage that transforms the experience of the cancellation of the self s own agency into a fully predicated, positive description of the content of religious experience.
100 , Schleiermacher, Dialektik, 475.Google Scholar
101 Ibid., 524.
102 Ibid., 474, 430.
103 Ibid., 539.
104 Ibid., 396.
105 , Reuter, Die Einheit der Dialektik, 240.Google Scholar
106 Ibid., 245.
107 Ibid., 240.
108 , Schleiermacher, Dialektik, 395.Google Scholar
109 Ibid., 539.
110 Redeker, Martin, Schleiermacher: Life and Thought (trans. Wallhausser, John; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1973) 40.Google Scholar
