¹ The name Amalek, while singular in Hebrew, can refer to both Amalek and his descendents. The biblical quotations in the article are from The Jerusalem Bible (ed. Fish, Harold; Jerusalem: Koren, 1986)Google Scholar.

² On the concept of a normative conflict between religion and morality, see Sagi, Avi and Statman, Daniel, Religion and Morality (Amsterdam: Rodopi, forthcoming)Google Scholar chap. 6. On the concept of moralityʿs dependence on Godʿs command, see chap. 1 of the same book.

³ Abrabanel Commentary on the Torah on Deut 25:17.

⁴ Ibid. Two tannaim suggest this argument: “R. Judah the prince says: ‘Amalek had to make his way through five nations to come and wage war against Israel.’ … R. Nathan says:… ‘He crossed four hundred parasangs to come and wage war against Israel’” (Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael [trans. Lauterbach, Jacob Z.; 3 vols.; Philadelphia, Jewish Publication Society, 1933Google Scholar] 2. Amalek. 1).

⁵ Abrabanel Commentary on the Torah on Deut 25:17.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ See also Mecklenburg, Yaʿakov Tzevi, Ha-Ktav ve-ha-Kabbalah (Jerusalem: ʿAm ʿOlam, 1969)Google Scholar on Exod 17:8.

⁸ Abrabanel Commentary on the Torah on Deut 25:17.

⁹ For a similar view, see Yitzḥhak ʿAramah, ʿAkedat Yitsḥak (Israel: n.p., 1974) Exodus. 42.87b.

¹⁰ Nahmanides, , Commentary on the Torah (trans. Chavel, Charles B.; New York: Shilo, 1973)Google Scholar on Exod 17:16. See also Abrabanel Commentary on the Torah, on Deut 25:17. Abraham Sofer (1815–71) (Sefer Ktav Sofer [Tel Aviv: Sinai, 1975] 110b), relying on Nahmanides, expressed a similar view: “God did not command us to revenge and destroy Amalek, man and woman, infant and suckling, because they hurt us and afflicted us, but to uproot them from the world because they raised their hand against God, and Godʿs enemies will be extinguished.”

¹¹ Sofer, Sefer Ktav Sofer, 110b–111.

¹² Plato Euthyphro 9e.

¹³ In the formulation of this dilemma, I have related exclusively to the family of deontological concepts, such as “right” and “wrong.” In many other versions of this dilemma, however, the formulation also applies to the family of axiological concepts, such as “good” and “bad.” The terms of the dilemma are not relevant in the present context. For further analysis, see Avi Sagi and Daniel Statman, “Introduction,” in idem, Religion and Morality.

¹⁴ See Idziak, Janice M., ed., Divine Command Morality: Historical and Contemporary Readings (New York: Edwin Mellen, 1979)Google Scholar; and Helm, Paul, ed., Divine Commands and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981)Google Scholar. For a critical analysis of this thesis, see Sagi and Statman, Religion and Morality, chap. 1.

¹⁵ See Avi Sagi and Daniel Statman, “Tlut shel ha-Musar ba-Dat ba-Masoret ha-Yehudit,” in idem, eds., Bein Dat le-Musar (Ramat-Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1993) 115–44.

¹⁶ As is known, the ritual of the broken-necked heifer is performed when someone is found slain outside the city and the killer is unknown. See Deut 21:1–9.

¹⁷ Some sages objected to this inference; as Josiah Pinto (1565–1648) stated, “the broken-necked heifer is meant for one who was slain from among the children of Israel, so how can it be extended to the Amalekites” (quoted in Yaʿakov b. Shlomo Ibn Habib, Ein Yaʿakov, 2.Yoma 22.Va-yarev ba-naḥal). Notwithstanding several attempts to overcome this difficulty (see also the commentary of Ḥanokh b. Yosef Zondel, Anaf Yosef, on the margins of Ibn Ḥabib, Ein Yaʿakov, 2.Yoma 22.Va-yarev ba-naḥal), the fact remains that, at least for R. Mani, this ritual is concerned with the value of human life and not necessarily Jewish life. This approach concurs with that of R. Akiva, who stated “Beloved is man created in Godʿs image” (m. ʾAbot 3.14); see also the commentary of Israʾel Lifshits (1782–1860) Tifʾeret Yisraʾel, m. ʾAbot 3.14. This is also the view suggested in the homily in m. Sanh. 4.6: “For this reason was man created alone, to teach thee that whosoever destroys a single soul of Israel, Scripture imputes [guilt] to him as though he had destroyed a complete world; and whosoever preserves a single soul of Israel, Scripture ascribes [merit] to him as though he had preserved a complete world.”

In a detailed study concerning the different textual versions of this mishnah, Efraim E. Urbach (Me-Olamam shel Hakhamim [Jerusalem: Magnes, 1988] 561–77) proved that the words “of Israel” appear in some sources but not in others. However, Urbach claims that “a complete reading of the mishnaic statement… leans toward the version excluding the word ‘Israel’” (p. 562). Urbach assumes that the word “Israel” became part of the text because the mishnah deals with procedures for questioning witnesses to a murder, relevant only to Jews. Hence, “we must distinguish between a version attempting to teach a moral and the use [of this text] regarding procedures for questioning witnesses” (ibid).

¹⁸ Bornstein, Avraham, Avnei Netzer, part 1: Oraḥ Ḥayim (New York: Ḥevrat Netzer, 1954)Google Scholar 2.508. Bornstein rejected (2.508, unnumbered footnote) the possibility that the injunction forbidding the punishment of future generations applies only to “Israel and not to the nations” and cited evidence from halakhic sources “that this is also the practice of the nations.”

¹⁹ Maimonides Book of Commandments 189.

²⁰ Karo Shulḥan Arukh, Oraḥ Ḥayim 685.7.

²¹ Sofer, Yaʿakov, Kaf Ha-Ḥayim (Jerusalem: n.p., 1928) 685.29.Google Scholar

²² See Pesikta de-Rav Kahana (trans. Braude, William G. and Kapstein, Israel J.; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1975) 56Google Scholar. See also Kasher, Menahem M., Torah Shelemah (37 vols.; New York: Schlesinger, n.d.) 14. 272.127Google Scholar.

²³ The Zohar (5 vols.; trans. Sperling, Harry and Simon, Maurice; London: Soncino, 1949) 3. 205Google Scholar.

²⁴ Ibid., 3. 206.

²⁵ Ibid., 3. 207.

²⁶ For instance, Yeshaʿayahu Horowitz (1560–1630) categorically states (Shenei Luḥot Haberit [5 vols.; Jerusalem: Shaʿarei Ziv, 1963] 2. 89Google Scholar) that “Amalek is the impure body per se [the sefirot of impurity] and Samael is its minister.” See also Shimʿon M. Mendel, Baʿal Shem Tov al ha-Torah (2 vols.; Jerusalem: n.p., 1974/75) 2. 225.24; and Elimelekh Tzevi of Dinov, Benei Yisaḥar, Adar 3a.

²⁷ Piekarz, Mendel, Ḥasidut Polin bein Shtei Milḥamot ha-Olam (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1990) 327Google Scholar; see also 278, 326.

²⁸ See, for instance, Yitzḥak Arieli's claim (Midrash Ariel al ha-Torah [Jerusalem: Mosad Einaim la-Mishpaṭ, 1992] 2. 322–23) that Amalek is “essential evil… a defiled and corrupt race without even a glimmer of good,” whereas Israel is a “pure race.” Membership in the defiled race, however, is not determined by ethnic criteria: “Anyone who hates the people of Israel as such, belongs to the race of Amalek.” See also Yehudah Gershoni, “Berurei Halakhah be-Inyianei ha-Shoʾah,” in Emunah ba-Shoʾah (Jerusalem: Ministry of Education, 1980) 23; Joseph D. Soloveitchik, “Kol Dodi Dofek,” in idem, Ish ha-Emunah (Jerusalem: Mosad harav Kuk, 1968) 101–102.

²⁹ On the dualistic approach to divinity in the Zohar, see Lachower, Fischel and Tishby, Isaiah, eds., The Wisdom of the Zohar (3 vols.; trans. Goldstein, David; Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) 2. 447–74Google Scholar.

³⁰ Hirsch, Samson Raphael, Be-Maʿagalei Shanah: Pirkei Iyun midei Ḥodesh be-Ḥodsho (4 vols.; Bnei Brak: Netsaḥ, 1966) 2. 190Google Scholar.

³¹ Ibid., 2. 191.

³² Ibid., 2. 193.

³³ Moshe A. Amiel, Derashot el Ami (3 vols.; Tel-Aviv: Vaʿad le-Hotsaʾat Kitvei ha-Rav Amiel, 1964) 3. 132. Note that in order to establish the fact of Amalek's aggressive militarism, Amiel relied on considerations similar to those endorsed by Abrabanel to show that Amalek had waged an unjust war (p. 133). In keeping with his symbolic interpretation, however, Amiel broadened the scope of the term to encompass the notion of military might in general.

³⁴ Ibid., 3. 132.

³⁵ Samson Raphael Hirsch, Commentary on Exodus (Jerusalem: Breuer, 1964) 171 (Exod 17:14) [Hebrew]. See also idem, Commentary on Deuteronomy (Jerusalem: Breuer, 1988) 323 (Deut 25:19) [Hebrew].

³⁶ B. Ber. 10a. English translations of this verse read “the sinners,” probably following “the wicked.”

³⁷ Amiel, Derashot el Ami, 143.

³⁸ Abba Mari, who lived in Provence in the fourteenth century and banned the study of philosophy because of its alleged foundations on an allegorical interpretation of the Torah, mentions this understanding of Amalek as an example: “They left no verse unturned… made Abraham and Sarah into substance and form… and Amalek into the evil instinct,” (Rashba [Shlomo b. Avraham Aderet], Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot ve Sefer Minḥat Kanaʾot [Jerusalem: Mossad ha-Rav Kuk, 1990] 1. 344). See also Spiegel, Jacob, “Shaʿar Reshit Ḥokhmah (Ha-Arokh) le- Rabbi Shmuʾel b. Meshulam,” in Benayahu, Meir, ed., Sefer ha-Zikaron le-ha-Rav Yitzḥak Nissim (Jerusalem: Yad ha-Rav Nissim, 1985) 245Google Scholar. I am grateful to my colleague, Dr. Dov Schwartz, who pointed out these sources to me.

³⁹ Scholem, Gershom, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (New York: Schocken, 1974) 340–41Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ See Yisraʾel b. Shabetei Hapstein Kozienice, Avodat Yisraʾel (Bnei Brak: n.p., 1973) 22b. Compare Elimelech of Lyzhansk, , Noʿam Elimelekh al Ḥamishah Ḥumshe Torah (New York: Schlesinger, 1942) 81Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Zadok ha-Cohen of Lublin, Peri Tzadik (Lublin: n.p., 1907) 172.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Kozienice, Avodat Yisraʾel, 22b. Although this approach is prominent in hasidic tradition, it is clear that, on the one hand, its roots go back much further and, on the other, several of its contemporary supporters have no ties with Hasidism. One of the best known among the latter is Harlap, Yaʿakov M. (Mei Marom [Jerusalem: Beit Zabul, 1972]Google Scholar 1. 79) who claims that evil is merely the will to power, to control and subdue. In order to lead a meaningful existence, individuals must restrain and balance this aspiration by curbing and limiting their passions and desires—no single desire should overtake all others. The obligation to blot out Amalek represents the yearning to eliminate the will to power.

⁴⁴ See n. 35 above.

⁴⁵ Halakhic writings usually view the term “Amalek” in concrete terms and very rarely use it in a broader connotation that suggests nations in general. See, however, R. Yona's remarks, quoted by Yosef Karo in his commentary on Yaʿakov b. Asher's Arbaʿah Turim (Beit Yosef: Yoreh Deʿah.155 [hagahat ha-meḥaber]); Soloveitchik, “Kol Dodi Dofek,” 102; and Gershoni, “Berurei Halakha be-Inyianei ha-Shoʾah,” 23–24. These references, as mentioned, are quite unusual.

⁴⁶ Avraham Danzig, Ḥayei Adam, Hilkhot Megillah.155a. The reference to the Amalekite's belongings alludes to R. Elazar of Modiʿim in the Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishmaʾel 2. 160: “The Holy One, blessed be he, swore by the throne of his glory: I will not leave any offspring or progeny of Amalek under the entire heaven, so that people will not be able to say: ‘This camel belongs to Amalek.’” See also Chavel, Ḥayim Dov, ed., Sefer ha-Ḥinukh (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kuk, 1951/1952)691.558Google Scholar; and Maimonides, The Commandments (trans. Chavel, Charles B.; London/New York: Soncino, 1967) 203Google Scholar (positive commandment 189).

⁴⁷ Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishmaʾel, 2. 160–61.

⁴⁸ B. Sanh. 96b. The addition in parentheses appears in several versions of the Talmud, such as Yaʿakov b. Shlomo Ibn Ḥabib, Ein Yaʿakov, 2.Yoma 22.Va-yarev ba-naḥal. See also Raphael Nathan Rabinowitz, Dikdukei Soferim, Sanh. 96b.

⁴⁹ Many sages were troubled by this apparent contradiction between this talmudic passage and the passage from the Mekhilta and attempted to reconcile them. According to one approach, the mother of Haman's children is an Amalekite but not the father, and the children are thus not considered Amalekites “as the nations go by [determine ancestry by] the father” (Yosef b. Yehudah Engel, Giliyonei ha-Shas, Giṭ. 57b.mibenei banav). This approach would make the talmudic story consistent with the ban on Amalekite converts. According to another approach, the ban is said to apply not to the conversion of Amalekites per se, but rather to their entering the congregation, meaning that they can be converted but they cannot marry Jews (Mesholam Rata, Kol ha-Mevaser, 2.42). These approaches conflict, however, and the sages viewed this as a halakhic dispute between the Mekhilta, which supports a literal trend, and the Talmud, which endorses a moral trend. See, for instance, Ḥayim Yosef David Azulai, Ayin Zokher (Lemberg: n.p., 1865) 3.82–85; Eliʿezer Yehudah Waldenberg, Tzitzit Eliʿezer (15 vols.; Jerusalem: n.p., 1978) 13. 71d.

⁵⁰ The mishnah draws a distinction between allowing members of the “four nations”—Amon, Moab, Egypt, and Edom—to convert, and allowing them to enter the community, namely, to take a Jewish spouse.

⁵¹ Ḥayim Falagi, Eynei Kol Ḥai (Izmir: n.p., 1888) 73 (Sank. 96b). This approach was also supported by other halakhists. Thus, for instance, Yosef Babad (1800–75), relying on this principle, viewed the obligation to blot out Amalek as completely hypothetical: “And now, we are no longer commanded [to blot out Amalek], because Senaherib has already come up and confused the whole world” (Yosef b. Moshe Babad, Minḥat Ḥinukh, 2. 213 [commandment 604]). See also Ḥayim Hirschensohn, Malki ba-Kodesh, 1. 33; Avraham Karelitz, Ḥazon Ish al ha-Rambam (Bnei Brak: n.p., 1959) 842.

⁵² “Judah, the Ammonite proselyte” asks to “enter the community” (Rata, Kol ha-Mevaser, 2.42).

⁵³ Maimonides Laws concerning Forbidden Intercourse 12.17 in The Code of Maimonides, vol. 5: The Book of Holiness (trans. Rabinowitz, Louis I. and Grossman, Philip; Yale Judaica Series 16; New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1965) 84Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 12.25 (p. 86).

⁵⁵ Maimonides Laws concerning Sanhedrin 18.6 in The Code of Maimonides, vol. 14: The Book of Judges (trans. Hershman, Abraham M.; Yale Judaica Series 3; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949) 52Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ Compare Ḥayim David Yosef Azulai, Pataḥ Eynayim (Jerusalem: n.p., 1959) 2.61.Sanh. 96b.mibenei banav. In fact, Maimonides' ruling is more consistent with the text in 2 Sam 1:16, which states that David killed the Amalekite stranger because the latter had admitted to the killing of King Saul: “I have slain the Lord's anointed.”

⁵⁷ Maimonides Laws concerning Kings and Wars 5.1 in The Book of Judges, 217.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 6.1 (p. 220).

⁵⁹ Sifre on Deuteronomy (trans. Hammer, Reuven; New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 1986) 199Google Scholar, 217. Compare Rashi [Shlomoh b. Yitzḥak] Commentary on the Torah on Deut 20:10.

⁶⁰ Sifre on Deuteronomy, 202.

⁶¹ Compare Nahmanides Commentary on the Torah on Deut 20:10.

⁶² Y. Sheviʿit 6.5. See also Nahmanides Commentary on the Torah on Deut 20:10.

⁶³ Maimonides Laws concerning Kings and Wars, 6.4.

⁶⁴ Rʾavad [Avraham b. David] Hasagot ha-Raʾavad le-Mishneh Torah on Maimonides Laws concerning Kings and Wars 6.4.

⁶⁵ Bornstein, Avnei Netzer: Oraḥ Ḥayim, 2.508.

⁶⁶ As I pointed out above (n.18), Bornstein showed the claim that this verse applies only to Israel and not to the nations to be inaccurate.

⁶⁷ Bornstein, Avnei Netzer: Oraḥ Ḥayim, 2.508. This distinction relies on a rabbinic midrash attempting to reconcile the contradiction between two verses. One states, “Fathers shall not die for children, nor shall children die for fathers, but every man shall die for his own sin” (2 Chr 25:4), and the other suggests a different scenario, one of “punishing the iniquity of the fathers on the children, and on the children's children, to the third and to the fourth generation” (Exod 34:7). The rabbis solved this contradiction by claiming that “the one verse [in Exodus] deals with children who continue in the same course as their fathers, and the other [in 2 Chronicles] with children who do not continue in the course of their fathers” (b. Ber. 7a).

⁶⁸ Maimonides, , The Guide of the Perplexed (2 vols.; trans. Pines, Sholomo; Chicago: University of Chicago Press: 1974)Google Scholar 2. 566 (3.41).

⁶⁹ Maimonides Laws concerning the Sabbath 2.3 (my translation).

⁷⁰ Blidstein, Gerald J., Ekronot Mediniyim be-Mishnat ha-Rambam (Ramat Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1983) 223Google Scholar. Although my analysis of Maimonides' views differs from Blidstein's on several counts, I agree with his general approach as formulated in this quotation.

⁷¹ Compare Karelitz, Ḥazon Ish, 842; Waldenberg, Tzitzit Eliʿezer, 13.71d.

⁷² For a further discussion of the mediating status of interpretation in Jewish tradition, see Marvin Fox, “Judaism, Secularism and Textual Interpretation,” in idem, ed., Modern Jewish Ethics (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1975) 585–87; and Avi Sagi, “Bein Peshat le-Drash,” Tarbitz 61 (1992) 3–28.

⁷³ See above, pp. 333–34.

⁷⁴ Jonathan Sacks points out (“Creativity and Innovation in Halakha,” in Sokol, Moshe, ed., Rabbinic Authority and Personal Autonomy [Northvale, NJ: Aronson, 1992] 129Google Scholar) that this approach strongly resembles the Catholic emphasis on the ecclesia, in contrast with the Protestant tradition that emphasizes the text itself. This remark is correct in that the context of the Torah's traditional exegesis also—even primarily—includes rabbinic tradition. We should not thereby conclude, however, that Protestant exegesis does not endorse principles of textual coherence and uniformity.