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The Subject in Hegel’s Absolute Idea

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 December 2018

Clinton Tolley
Clinton Tolley*
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego, USActolley@ucsd.edu
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Abstract

There has been a tendency in some of the most influential recent interpretations of Hegel to downplay (or simply ignore) the theological characterizations that Hegel gives to the subject-matter of logic, and to emphasize, instead, certain continuities taken to exist between Hegel’s conception of logic and that of Kant. In the work of Robert Pippin and others, this has led to an ‘apperception’-oriented interpretation of Hegel’s logic, according to which Hegel follows Kant in taking logic to be primarily concerned with the nature of human self-conscious subjectivity. Here I put pressure on this interpretation—first, by foregrounding textual and systematic evidence for taking the theological characterizations to accurately convey Hegel’s considered position on logic, as the science of the ‘absolute idea’, and then, secondly, by showing how Hegel’s arguments for the absolute formality and universality of logic point instead to a more fully-fledged rejection of Kant’s conception as too specifically psychological.

Type
Articles
Information
Hegel Bulletin , Volume 40 , Special Issue 1: Science of Logic , April 2019 , pp. 143 - 173
Copyright
© The Hegel Society of Great Britain, 2018 

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