¹ Rothfels, Hans, The German opposition to Hitler: an appraisal (Hinsdale, Illinois, 1948), pp. 61–2Google Scholar; Ritter, Gerhard, Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung (Stuttgart, 1956), pp. 201–3Google Scholar; Zeller, Eberhard, The flame of freedom: the German struggle against Hitler (London, 1967), pp. 31–4Google Scholar.

² Cf. Hoffmann, Peter, ‘Ludwig Beck: loyalty and resistance’, Central European History, XIV (1981), 332–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ Hoffmann, Peter, ‘Peace through coup d'étal: the foreign contacts of the German resistance 1933–1944’, Central European History, XIX (1986), pp. 6–13Google Scholar.

⁴ Hoffmann, Peter, The history of the German resistance 1933–1945 (London, 1977), pp. 278–89Google Scholar.

⁵ Hoffmann, , History, pp. 293–4Google Scholar.

⁶ For this and the three following paragraphs see Kramarz, Joachim, Stauffenberg: the architect of the famous July 20th conspiracy to assassinate Hitler (New York, 1967), pp. 52–86Google Scholar, 113–26; Beck, Ludwig, Studien, ed. Speidel, Hans (Stuttgart, 1955), p. 62Google Scholar; Streit, Christian, Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen 1941–1945 (Stuttgart, 1978)Google Scholar; Krausnick, Helmut, Wilhelm, Hans-Heinrich, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges: Die Einsatzgruppen der Sicherheilspolizei und des SD 1938–1942 (Stuttgart, 1981)Google Scholar; Hoffmann, , History, pp. 290–300Google Scholar.

⁷ In the limited space available the question cannot be addressed at length what Stauffenberg might, could or ought to have done between 1938 and the end of 1942. Some answers are implicit in his explanation for deciding to join the conspiracy. An appropriate theory was developed in Bèze, Théodore, Du droit des magistrals (Geneva, 1970; first published, 1574)Google Scholar.

⁸ Kramarz, , Stauffenberg, p. 122Google Scholar; Müller, Christian, Oberst i. G. Stauffenberg (Düsseldorf, [1970]), pp. 254–5Google Scholar; Bussmann, Walter, Die innere Entwicklung des deutschen Widerslandes gegen Hitter (Berlin, [1964]), p. 29Google Scholar; Bussmann, interview with the author on 27 Aug. 1974; Brigadier (ret.) Oskar-Alfred Berger, letters, 7 May and 30 June 1984, and interview with the author on 12 July 1984; Berger was Gruppenleiter I in OKH/GenStdH/Organisationsabteilung where Stauffenberg was Gruppenleiter II in 1942.

⁹ See preceding note, and ‘Anlage [1] zum Kriegstagebuch der Heeresgruppe Don bezw. Heeresgruppe Süd vom 22.11.42–23.3.43 (O. B.-Gespräche)’, Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv, Freiburg i.Br., RH 19 VI/42.

¹⁰ Handliste der Generalstabsoffiziere, OKH/HPA Amtsgr. P₃, Stand 1. Juli 1943, National Archives, Washington, T–78 roll R 57.

¹¹ Kramarz, , Stauffenberg, pp. 120–6Google Scholar.

¹² Ibid. pp. 96–104; von Herwarth, Hans with Starr, S. Frederick, Against two evils (New York, [1981]), pp. 211–27Google Scholar; ‘Rede von Hans Christoph Freiherr von Stauffenberg am 2. August 1963’, mimeographed, ([Bad Boll, n.d.]), p. 126; Zeller, , Flame, pp. 189–91Google Scholar.

¹³ Kramarz, , Stauffenberg, p. 122Google Scholar; cf. Müller, , Stauffenberg, pp. 254–5Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Kaiser, Jakob, ‘Deutschlands Trennung war vermeidbar’, Das Parlament, 20 07 1954Google Scholar; Nebgen, Elfriede, Jakob Kaiser: Der Widerstandskämpfer (Stuttgart, [etc.] 1967), pp. 140Google Scholar, 165, 177; Gisevius, Hans Bernd, To the bitter end (Boston, 1947), pp. 503–4Google Scholar; Ritter, , Goerdeler, pp. 366–9, 543 n. 61, 618Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Ritter, , Goerdeler, pp. 352–60, 612–16Google Scholar; Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung: Die Kaltenbrunner-Berichte an Bormann und Hitler über das Attentatvomso. Juli 1944 (Stuttgart, 1961), pp. 410–12Google Scholar, 110–11, 173–6, 299–300; [von Trott, Clarita], ‘Adam von Trott zu Solz: Eine erste Materialsammlung, Sichtung und Zusammenstellung’, mimeographed typescript ([Reinbek, 1957]), pp. 261–3Google Scholar. The story that Stauffenberg wanted a guarantee of Trott's trustworthiness and accepted Leber's word for it (Trott, ‘Trott’, Appendix I/III) is subject to doubt; von Stauffenberg, Berthold Count had known Trott from 1938 and he had had discussions with him through the years: Spiegelbild, p. 56Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Goerdeler, Carl Freidrich, ‘Unsere Idee’, Nov. 1944, typescript, 11 1944, p. 25Google Scholar, Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Nl. Goerdeler 26; Gisevius, , End, pp. 502–5Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Balfour, Michael and Frisby, Julian, Helmuth von Moltke: a leader against Hitler (London, 1972), pp. 271–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar; von Moltke, Freya, Balfour, Michael, Frisby, Julian, Helmuth James von Moltke 1907–1945: Awvalt der Zukunft (Stuttgart, [1975]), pp. 219, 262–4, 285Google Scholar; OSS report Dogwood 234 of 30 Dec. 1943 and related correspondence in the possession of Freya von Moltke; cf. Hoffmann, , History, pp. 735–7nGoogle Scholar. 66–68c, and Hoffmann, Peter, Widerstand, Staatsstrekh, Attentat: Der Kampfder Opposition gegen Hitler (4th rev. edn, Munich, 1985), pp. 278–9Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Moltke to Freya von Moltke 19 July, 8 Aug., 7 and 30 Sept. 1943, Moltke papers in possession of Freya von Moltke; memorandum in Balfour, Frisby, , Moltke, pp. 273–7Google Scholar.

¹⁹ This point is confirmed as Moltke's own view, most probably supported by Lt.-Col. von Stauffenberg, by Moltke's letter to Freya von Moltke of 7 Jan. 1944, and by what Dr Theodor Steltzer and Dr Eugen Gerstenmaier, both members of the ‘Kreisau Circle’, had told DrAnderson, Ivar, the editor of Svenska Dagbladet, on 6 10 1943Google Scholar; Moltke, , Moltke, p. 285Google Scholar: Anderson diary 17 Sept., 6 Oct., and 30 Oct. 1943, Royal Library, Stockholm, Ivar Andson papper L 91:3; the view is reflected as well in the memorandum for President Roosevelt of 29 July 1944 by the Director of OSS, William J. Donovan, in Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. (F.D.R. Library), PSF OSS file. A suggestion similar to Moltke's had been made earlier in 1943 by Kurt Freiherr von Lersner in Ankara who was backed by Ambassador von Papen, to the United States Naval Attache in Ankara; Earle, George H., ‘Roosevelt's fatal error and how I tried to prevent it’, Human Events, XVII, 12, (24 03 1960), 1–4Google Scholar.

²⁰ Balfour, , Frisby, , Moltke, pp. 279–80Google Scholar.

²¹ Interview with Nina Countess von Stauffenberg (Claus' widow) 23 Aug. 1969 and letter 19 Jan. 1973; confirmation from Mrs Erika Dieckmann (sister of Colonel Mertz von Quirnheim, Stauffenberg's closest collaborator in home army staff), letter 30 Jan. 1979; after extended attempts to establish a link between the conspirators and the pro-Soviet prisoners' associations in Russia, the Gestapo came to the conclusion that there had not been any; Spiegelbild, p. 507.

²² See Foreign relations of the United States, diplomatic papers: the conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (FRUS [etc.]) (Washington, 1961), pp. 475–654Google Scholar, esp. pp. 497–508; FRUS 1944 I (Washington, 1966), pp. 504–14Google Scholar; cf. Balfour, , Frisby, , Moltke, pp. 279–80Google Scholar.

²³ Donovan to Roosevelt 29 July 1944, F.D.R. Library PSF OSS file.

²⁴ Pogue, Forrest C., United States Army in World War II: the European theater of operations: the supreme command (Washington, D.C., 1954), pp. 102–6, 339–43Google Scholar; Ehrman, John, Grand strategy. Volume v: August 1943–September 1944 (London, 1956), pp. 8–10, 110, 389Google Scholar.

²⁵ Hoffmann, , History, pp. 228–39Google Scholar.

²⁶ Dulles, Allen Welsh, Germany's underground (New York, 1947), pp. 131–3Google Scholar; Gisevius, , End, p. 486Google Scholar; confirmed by Eduar d Waetjen's comments o n Dulles' manuscript oiGermanys underground, in 1946 or 1947, in Princeton University Library, Allen W. Dulles papers, Box 20: ‘Hellmuth [Count Moltke] and I tried to convince Peter Yorck, Adam Trott and others who were inclined to the eastern solution of the necessity of the western solution for Germany. Trend towards East grew after Moltke's arrest in Jan. 1944. Possibly Moltke could have prevented this had he been able to remain with the conspirators.’ ‘Adam Trott met me in April’ 44 in Zürich. Adam and I no longer agreed on foreign policy. He was very disturbed because of Gisevius' and my conversations with AWD [Dulles] and about Beck's and Goerdeler's wish to be informed whether western allies were interested in Germany opening western front if eastern front could be held by German armies until the American and British forces had reached German eastern borders of 1920. He asked Gisevius and me to abandon our talks with Dulles and informed me that I would no longer belong to their circle if I did not do so.' This was obviously a manifestation of Trott's frustration at western silence, since Trott certainly did not act on his own advice. Waetjen told the author (interview 5 Dec. 1986) that Trott toyed with the idea, simply because he looked at every method for saving Germany.

²⁷ H[ans] B[ernd] G[isevius], memorandum for A[llen] W[elsh] D[ulles], July 1944, typescript in the author's possession; Gisevius, , End, p. 493Google Scholar.

²⁸ Hoffmann, , Widerstand pp. 301–2Google Scholar.

²⁹ Spiegelbild, pp. 247–8; Goerdeler, , ‘Unsere Idee’, p. 29Google Scholar; cf. Hoffmann, , Widersland, p. 742 n. 120Google Scholar. The matter remains a mystery. Presumably ‘Count Bismarck’ was the senior government official (Regierungspräsident) in Potsdam, Gottfried Count von Bismarck-Schönhausen; cf. Ritter, , Goerdeler, p. 550 n. 104Google Scholar. Bismarck died in 1955, apparently without having been interviewed by Ritter.

³⁰ Speidel, Hans, Invasion 1944: Ein Beitrag zu Rommels und des Reiches Schicksal (5th edn, Tübingen, [1964]), pp. 87–8Google Scholar.

³¹ Col. J. E. Smart, letter to the author 22 Jan. 1969. Speidel did not mention the episode in his later reminiscences published in 1977: Speidel, Hans, Aus unserer zeit: Erinnerungen (Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, Vienna, 1977)Google Scholar. The references recounted here may relate to what the widow of the Quartermaster General, General Eduard Wagner, remembered: the Quartermaster General had said about a week before Stauffenberg's assassination attack ‘that now one could no longer await the result of the negotiations with Eisenhower through the Sorbonne’ Wagner, Eduard, Der Generalquartiermeisler: Briefe und Aufzeichnungen (Munich, Vienna, 1963), pp. 235–6Google Scholar.

³² Speidel, , Invasion, p. 91Google Scholar.

³³ Leber, Annedore, Das Gewissen steht auf (9th edn, Berlin, Frankfurt/M., 1960), pp. 134–6Google Scholar; John, Otto, ‘Zum Jahrestag der Verschwörung gegen Hitler – 20. Juli 1944’, W'ochmpost: Zeitung für Kriegsgefangene (London), no. 138, 18 07 1947, pp. 4–6Google Scholar; John, Otto, ‘Some facts and aspects of the plot against Hitler’, typescript (London, 1948), pp. 41–7Google Scholar; John's reports for Stauffenberg and Col. Hansen (Canaris' successor): John, Otto, ‘Bericht. Betrifft: Spanien/Portugal’, typescript (n.p., 02/03 1944)Google Scholar, and ‘Bericht’ [from Madrid, ], typescript (n.p., 03 1944)Google Scholar, both from papers of Dr Walter Bauer; Dr Walter Bauer to the author 1 April 1964; the reports were printed in John, Otto, Zweimal kam ich heim: Vom Verschwörer zum Schülzer der Verfassung (Düsseldorf, Vienna, 1969), pp. 361–8Google Scholar; see also John, , Zweimal, pp. 139–41Google Scholar, 145–7; A. W. Dulles' reports to OSS Nos. 1888–9 and 1890–3 of 27 Jan. 1944, O.S.S. Archive, C.I.A., Langley, Virginia; cf. FRUS 19441, pp. 496–8; the OSS cover-name for John was Luke (Dulles to OSS 27 Jan. 1944, Breakers cable no. 1888–9, OSS Archive); indictment dated 20 Dec. 1944 against Dr Klaus Bonhoeffer, Dr Rüdiger Schleicher, Dr Hans John, Friedrich Justus Perels and Dr Hans Kloss, Institut für Zeitgeschichte, Munich, ZS/A–29/1.

³⁴ Spiegelbild, p. 175.

³⁵ Trott, , ‘Trott’, pp. 252–3Google Scholar; Malone, Henry O. (author of Adam von Trott zu Solz: Werdtgang tints Verschwörers 1909–1938 [Berlin, 1986])Google Scholar, letter 13 Dec. 1978; Lindgren, Henrik, ‘Adam von Trotts Reisen nach Schweden 1942–1944’, Vierteljahrshefle für Zeigeschkhte 18 (1970), pp. 281–2Google Scholar, 289–91; the American minister in Stockholm, Johnson, Herschel V., to the secretary of state 26 June 1944, FRUS 1944 I, pp. 523–5Google Scholar; Rothfels, Hans, ‘Trott und die Aussenpolitik des Widerstandes’, Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, XII (1964), 309–10Google Scholar; van Roon, Ger, Neuordnung im Wider-stand: Der Kreisauer Kreis innerhalb der deutschen Widerslandsbewegung (Munich, 1967), pp. 316–17Google Scholar.

³⁶ Johnson, to secretary of state 26 June 1944, FRUS 1944 I, pp. 523–5Google Scholar, 552; according to Johnson to secretary of state, 14 Sept. 1944, indirect information from Willy Brandt indicated that ‘contact could not be made in time’ Malone was informed by Willy Brandt that Brandt was in process of arranging this contact, in June 1944, when Trott called it off because he had been warned by another person that such a contact was likely to be leaked to German authorities. Trott was on good terms with consul-general Pfleiderer in Stockholm who was working to establish a contact with the Soviet legation there at the behest of ambassador Friedrich Werner Count von der Schulenburg, at about the same time; Trott, , ‘Trott’, pp. 252–3Google Scholar; cf. Mastny, Vojtech, ‘Stalin and the prospects of a separate peace in World War II’, American Historical Review, LXXVII (1972), 1370Google Scholar; cf. also Fleischhauer, Ingeborg, Die Chance des Sonderfriedens: Deutsch-sowjetische Geheimgespräche 1941–1945 (Berlin, 1986), pp. 235–40Google Scholar, using new and older sources unevenly.

³⁷ Johnson, 26 06 1944, FRUS 1944 I pp. 523–5, 552Google Scholar.

³⁸ See sources in Hoffmann, , Widerstand, pp. 743 n. 132 and 133, and 790 n. 218Google Scholar.

³⁹ Roon, , Neuordnung, pp. 589–90Google Scholar; Leber, Annedore, Den Men, immer lebendigen Freunden (Berlin, 1946), p. IIGoogle Scholar; Ritter, , Goerdeler, p. 471 n. 19Google Scholar (according to Mr s Reichwein, F.-D. Count von der Schulenburg also agreed to the meeting); Sänger, Fritz, ‘Stauffenberg: Auch mit de r KP’, Die Zeit, no. 34, 18 08 1978, p. 7Google Scholar (only Fritz Sänger says that Goerdeler approved); Finker, Kurt, Stauffenberg void der 20. Juli 1944 (4th edn, Berlin, 1973), p. 199Google Scholar, quotes Mr s Reichwein as saying: ‘I assume that Stauffenberg was informed of it.’ Mommsen, Hans, ‘Social views and constitutional plans of the resistance’, in The German resistance to Hitler (London 1970), p. 140Google Scholar accepts Gisevius' and Goerdeler's allegations that Stauffenberg thought in terms of a revolutionary uprising by the army and the people, after the coup d'état, to ensure the political success of the revolution through a combination of the ‘revolution from below’ with the ‘revolution from above’ see Gisevius, , End, pp. 486–8, 507–12Google Scholar; Goerdeler, , ‘Unsere Idee’, p. 25Google Scholar: Stauffenberg wanted ‘an unclear political course in connection with left-wing socialists and communists’. Mommsen also cites evidence from; Hösslin, Major Roland (Spiegelbild, p. 373)Google Scholar, a friend of Stauffenberg's, that Stauffenberg i considered ‘the Wehrmacht in our state as the most conservative institution which was at the same time rooted in the people’, and that Stauffenberg thought the army or home army alone could i maintain order against revolution; on balance, Mommsen considers Stauffenberg's alliance with socialists and communists a tactical move. Cf. below, pp. 14, 19–20.

⁴⁰ Cf. notes 35 and 36 above; Spiegelbild, p. 507; Mrs Hilde Mertz von Quirnheim, interview 9 Sept.: 972 and letters 18 Dec. 1978, 28 Jan. 1979; Mrs Erika Dieckmann, letter 30Jan. 1979; Gisevius, , End, p. 509Google Scholar; Hassell, p. 283.

⁴¹ Spiegelbild, pp. 110–11, 173–6; Trott, , ‘Trott’, p. 262Google Scholar; Mrs Clarita von Trott, letter 28 March 1987.

⁴² See discussion of evidence in Hoffmann, , Wider stand, pp. 744–6 n. 139Google Scholar.

⁴³ Waetjen, interview 5 Dec. 1986; Dulles, , Underground, pp. 93, 134Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Waetjen memorandum, Allen W. Dulles papers, Box 20. Waetjen, letters to the author 3 July 1987, confirms the circumstances (1944 in Dulles' office in Bern) and contents of the MS typed and corrected by another hand.

⁴⁵ Roon, , Neuordnung, pp. 254–5Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Freya von Moltke, interview 17 May 1987, also for the statement in the following sentence.

⁴⁷ Dr Ivar Anderson, diary 30 Oct. 1943; generally see Hoffmann, , History, pp. 228–39Google Scholar; Hoffmann, , Widerstand (expanded), pp. 283–95Google Scholar; Lindgren, , ‘Trotts Reisen’, pp. 274–91Google Scholar.

⁴⁸ Anderson, diary 30 Oct. 1943.

⁴⁹ Mommsen, , ‘Social views’, pp. 135–40Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ See above, at note 27.

⁵¹ Gisevius, , End, pp. 493–5, 507Google Scholar.

⁵² Cf. Hoffmann, , History, pp. 365–6Google Scholar.

⁵³ Cheston, Charles S., acting director, OSS, ‘Memorandum for the President’, typescript, 27 01 1945Google Scholar, F.D.R. Library PSF Box 170 OSS Jan. 1945. During the week 4–11 Feb. 1945 Gisevius gave a full report on ‘The background and story of the 20th of July’ to Mary Bancroft, one of his OSS contacts before 11 July 1944 and a close friend of Allen Dulles; this report, a typescript marked in Mary Bancroft's hand ‘From M.B. to AWD.’, returned to Mary Bancroft by the C.I.A., is in the author's possession. It reiterates in untempered terms Trott's and Stauffenberg's alleged leanings: ‘During the war years, Stauffenberg had gathered around him a circle of men, mostly young “ostelbische ” nobles, who toyed with the idea of a revolution of soldiers, peasants and workers. Communistic and religious attitudes were mixed in their imagination with the high esteem, inherited from their fathers, in which they held the old Prussian military castes. They hoped that the Red army would support a militarily strongly ruled communistic Germany and looked towards the East for a solution of their problems…On one of his trips to Stockholm, Trott had established relations with the “Freies Deutschland” Committee through the Russian legation. Out of this contact grew the tacit understanding that the Germans should open the Eastern front and let the Russians march in. Such a gesture – so the Stauffenberg circle believed – would be suitably rewarded by Stalin. Over against this suggestion of letting in the Russian army, the Beck circle who favored the “Western solution”, had nothing to propose. Goerdeler's contact in Stockholm and Gisevius'contacts in Bern remained without any reply from the governments in London and Washington.’

⁵⁴ Cheston to Roosevelt 1 Feb. 1945, F.D.R. Library PSF Box 171 OSS Feb. 1945.

⁵⁵ Dulles, Breakers cable no. 4377, 28 Jan. 1945, OSS Archive. The phrase completed here to read ‘Germans feel little hope for German[y]'s [economic life] under American and British occupation’ is given in the original received cable as the apparently corrupted phrase ‘Germans feel little hope for Germans under American and British occupation’.

⁵⁶ Allen Dulles' cable no. 1890–3 from Bern to OSS 27 Jan. 1944, OSS Archive.

⁵⁷ [Allen Dulles] to OSS, Breakers cables no. 4110–4114 13 July 1944 and no. 4111–12 15 July 1944, OSS Archive; cf. OSS Research and Analysis Branch Summary L 39970 of 18 July 1944 and L 39971 of 22 July 1944, National Archives, Washington, Record Group 226. Dulles' information was derived from Gisevius, Waetjen, and from Captain Dr Theodor Strünck (of Abwehr) who had come to Switzerland on 9 July.

⁵⁸ Dulles, , Germany's underground, pp. 172–3Google Scholar.

⁵⁹ Dulles, , Germany's underground, p. 140Google Scholar. According to Leber, Julius, Ein Mann gekt seinen Weg: Schrifien, Reden und Briefe (Berlin-Schöneberg, Frankfurt/M., 1952), p. 286Google Scholar, Stauffenberg and Leber had concluded even before the allied landing in Normandy that the attempt to prevail upon the German army commanders in the west to have their troops retreat and allow an allied occupation was no longer feasible. Equally, Stauffenberg and Beck rejected Goerdeler's idea to try such an approach; Goerdeler, , Unsere Idee, pp. 28–9Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ Dulles, , Germany's underground, p. 170Google Scholar.

⁶¹ See below, at note 70.

⁶² Dulles, Breakers cable no. 4077, 25 Jan. 1945, OSS Archive; Cheston, , ‘Memorandum for the President’, 27 01 1945Google Scholar, F.D.R. Library, PSF Box no. 170. As was customary with both diplomatic and intelligence cables received in Washington, Dulles' cables were paraphrased in slightly fuller and re-written sentences.

⁶³ Stettinius Record 24–31 Dec. 1944, FRUS: the conferences at Malta and Yalta 1945 (Washington, 1955), pp. 436–7; Britain and America continued to support the Polish government-in-exile in London; The Times, Late London Edn, 2 Jan. 1945, p. 3Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ Ambassador Harriman from Moscow to secretary of state 10 Jan. 1945, FRUS…Malta and Talta, pp. 453–4.

⁶⁵ Acting secretary of state to secretary of state 7 Feb. 1945, FRUS…Malta and Talta, p. 957.

⁶⁶ Dulles, Breakers cable no. 4077, 25 Jan. 1945, O.S.S. Archive; Dulles, Allen, The secret surrender (London, 1967)Google Scholar; Smith, Bradley F. and Agarossi, Elena, Operation Sunrise: the secret surrender (New York, 1979)Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ Gisevius, , End, pp. 483–572Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ Ibid. p. 483.

⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 487.

⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 509.

⁷¹ Stauffenberg's background and political concepts would exclude any pro-Soviet or pro-communist views, nor are there any positive indications of such views. Cf. Zeller, , Flame, pp. 395–6Google Scholar and passim; Müller, , Slaujfenberg, pp. 149–63, 240–80, 330–475Google Scholar. This would be irrelevant, of course, if there were proof that Stauffenberg radically changed his mind. It might be argued that conspirators could only have reduced their chances of survival, after their arrest, if they had revealed any communist or Russian connections to their Gestapo interrogators. But there were on the regime side many who also toyed with the idea of coming to terms with the Soviet Union; cf. Martin, Bernd, ‘Verhandlungen über separate Friedensschlüsse 1942–1945’, Militärgeschichtliche MiUeilungen (1976), no. 2Google Scholar, passim; Fleischhauer, Chance, passim. In view of the bias and inconsistencies in Gisevius' and Dulles' information, the thesis has yet to be proven that the Stauffenberg group of younger conspirators, particularly Claus Count von Stauffenberg, had ‘opted for the East’.

⁷² Spiegelbild, pp. 19–20.

⁷³ Ibid. p. 19.

⁷⁴ Ibid. pp. 19–20, 110.

⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 136.

⁷⁶ Mommsen, , ‘Social views’, pp. 135–40Google Scholar.

⁷⁷ Balfour, , Frisby, , Moltke, p. 277Google Scholar.

⁷⁸ Nina Countess von Stauffenberg, interview 23 Aug. 1969 and letter 19 Jan. 1973; Mrs Erika Dieckmann, letter 30 Jan. 1979; Spiegelbild, p. 507; cf. Hoffmann, , Widerstand, p. 743 n. 132, pp. 305–6, 744–6 n. 139Google Scholar; Franz Josef Furtwangler, letter to Mrs C. von Trott 8 July 1947 in Trott, , ‘Trott’, p. 240Google Scholar; Roon, , Neuordnung, p. 585Google Scholar; Lindgren, , ‘Trotts Reisen’, pp. 290–1Google Scholar; Spiegelbild, p. 402, confirmed by Col. (ret.) Peter Sauerbruch, interview 9 Feb. 1977 and Dr Gotthard Baron von Falkenhausen, letter to Dr Clemens Plassmann 24 March 1947; cf. Spiegelbild, pp. 175, 226; Leber, , Mann p. 286Google Scholar.

⁷⁸ FRUS 1944 1, pp. 505–7, 510–13; Leber, , Mann, p. 286Google Scholar. The plan to open the western front was ascribed to the Beck-Goerdeler group for May 1944.

⁸⁰ Goerdeler, , ‘Unsere Idee’, p. 29Google Scholar.

⁸¹ Ibid. pp. 56–7, 91–2, 174–6.

⁸² Ibid. pp. 91–2, 175.

⁸³ Ibid. p. 175; cf. Spiegelbild, pp. 91, 98, 101, III, 116, 198, 402.

⁸⁴ Ibid. p. 34.

⁸⁵ John, , Zweimal p. 159Google Scholar; Spiegelbild, p. 101, in, 174, 506–7.

⁸⁶ Gisevius, , End, pp. 508–10Google Scholar.

⁸⁷ Trial of the major war criminals before the international military tribunal: Nuremberg 14 November 1945–1 October 1946, XXXIII (Nuremberg, 1949), 423Google Scholar; Dulles, , Germany's underground, p. 140Google Scholar may have drawn his information from this source.

⁸⁸ Ziegler, Delia (Stauffenberg's secretary), ‘Bericht über den 20.7.1944’, typescript ([n.p., n.d., probably 1946]), p. 2Google Scholar; a similar account is given by Topf, Erwin, ‘Klaus Graf Stauffenberg’, Die Zeit 18 07 1946Google Scholar.

⁸⁹ Zeller, , Flame, pp. 285–6Google Scholar.

⁹⁰ Yorck, in Trial, XXXIII, 423Google Scholar; Stauffenberg to Goerdeler on 18 July 1944 according to Kunrat Hammerstein, Freiherr von, Spähtrupp (Stuttgart, 1963), p. 291Google Scholar. Beck had told Gisevius on 13 July 1944 that ‘total occupation could not be prevented’ Gisevius, , End, p. 518Google Scholar.

⁹¹ Spiegelbild, p. III.

⁹² Ibid. pp. 111, 198.

⁹³ Astor, David, ‘Why the revolt against Hitler was ignored: on the British reluctance to deal with German anti-Nazis’, Encounter, XXXII (1969), p. 4Google Scholar.

⁹⁴ Hoffmann, , History, pp. 397–439Google Scholar.

⁹⁵ von Schlabrendorff, Fabian, Revolt against Hitler (London, 1948), p. 131Google Scholar.