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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2009
1 Rohl, John (ed), 1914 Delusion or design?' The testimony of two German diplomats (London, 1973. P 21Google Scholar
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5 Koch, p. 1.
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34 Quoted in ibid. p. 343.
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46 For example, he contends that Bethmann aimed to avoid prolonging the war by doing the minimum militarily, and he elaborates on Bethmann's respect for international law. Zechlin, in Koch, pp. 217–20
47 Lambi, pp. 124, 244.
48 On Vienna's central and neglected role in the origins of the war. Williamson, Samuel R. Jr, ‘Vienna and July 1914: the origins of the Great War once more’, in Williamson, and Pastor, Peter (eds.), War and society in cast central Europe, vol. V: essays on World War I: origins and prisoners of war (New York, 1983)Google Scholar.
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68 Joll, p.143: see also p. 144 for a similar point.
69 Ibid. p. 141.
70 Ibid. p. 64.
71 Ibid. p. 84.
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81 This has become the main theme of the writings of John Terraine.
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84 Burk, p. 5.
85 Neilson, p. viii.
86 Jeffery, p. 56.
87 Ibid. pp. 64–5.
88 Neilson, pp. 8–9. 116.
89 Ibid. p. 278.
90 Ibid. p. 142–6.
91 Ibid. p. 265.
92 Ibid. p. 272–3.
93 See, for example, Ibid. pp 191, 209.
94 Burk, pp. 21–2.
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98 Avner Offer has recendy highlighted the Royal Navy's attention to blockade against Germany until Fisher's departure in 1910. This was neglected by the Roval Navy after 1910, and by Marder, subsequently, Offer, ‘The working classes, British naval plans and the coming of the Great War’, Past and Present, no. 107 (05 1985). 204–26Google Scholar.
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102 In addition to Sumida s edition of Pollen s privately circulated works there is a book by his son Pollen, AnthonyThe great gunnery scandal the mystery of Jutland (London, 1980)Google Scholar
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