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Treasury Control, the Ten Year Rule and British Service Policies, 1919–1924*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 February 2009

John Ferris
John Ferris
Affiliation:
University of Calgary
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Extract

There is one major gap in the historiography of British strategic policy during the interwar years. Historians have not examined that policy of the 1920s as if it was a coherent topic in its own right. Although writers like Brian Bond, James Neidpath, Stephen Roskill and Malcolm Smith have elucidated aspects of that matter, such as the development of the Singapore base or of the policies of the fighting services, they have still treated each such issue and department in isolation from the rest. Even those scholars like Correlli Barnett and N. H. Gibbs who have sought to examine strategic policy in the interwar years as a whole, have primarily seen the strategic decisions of the 1920s not as an autonomous historical subject but rather as a prelude to Britain's position in the 1930s. Consequently, historians have made these decisions seem inexplicable and unconnected, by removing them from the context of their time and of strategic policy. This approach has led writers to misconstrue the evolution of strategic policy during the 1920s. They have done so because of their assumptions about that issue. They have not recognized these assumptions as being such, but have treated them instead as a bedrock of self-evident fact. Yet when these assumptions are examined, they can be demonstrated to be false.

Type
Articles
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 30 , Issue 4 , December 1987 , pp. 859 - 883
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1987

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References

1 Barnett, Correlli, The collapse of British power (London, 1971)Google Scholar; Bond, Brian, British military policy between the two world wars (Oxford, 1980)Google Scholar; Gibbs, X. H., Grand strategy, volume one, rearmament policy (London, 1976)Google Scholar; Neidpath, James, The Singapore naval base and the defence of Britain's eastern empire, 1919–1941 (London, 1981)Google Scholar; Roskill, Stephen, Naval policy between the wars, volume one: The period of Anglo-American naval antagonism, 1919–1929 (London, 1968)Google Scholar; Smith, Malcolm, British air strategy between the wars (Oxford, 1984)Google Scholar.

2 Roskill, , Naval policy, p. 215Google Scholar. The only partial exception to this view is Neidpath, Singapore, who has questioned in passing the orthodox view of the effect of the ‘ten year rule’ but not that of Treasury control on the services' policies.

3 Even Peden's, G. C. revisionist British rearmament and the Treasury (London, 1979), pp. 7–8Google Scholar has accepted this view of the Treasury's power in the 1920s.

4 Darwin, John, Britain, Egypt and the Middle East, imperial policy in the aftermath of war, 1918–1922 (London, 1981), p. 28Google Scholar; Kennedy, Paul, The rise and fall of British naval mastery (London, 1976), P. 273Google Scholar.

5 Board memorandum No. 2964, ADM 167/72.

6 Minute by Wilson, 2 June 1929, T 161/618 S.33420.

7 Board meeting, 2 July 1925, ADM 167/71; CID paper No. 892–B, CAB 4/17; 236th. CID meeting, 5 July 1928, CAB 2/5; Hankey to Vansittart, 14 May 1931, CAB 21/2093.

8 Ferris, , ‘Strategic policy’, pp. 92–7, 120–1, 173, 241–5, 249–50Google Scholar. Neither Gibbs, , Grand strategy, p. 8Google Scholar, nor Roskill, , Naval policy, pp. 21, 219–21Google Scholar, have adequately discussed the origins or the meaning of the naval one power standard. Gibbs, , Grand strategy, p. 23Google Scholar, and Haggie, Paul, Britannia at bay. The defence of the British empire against Japan, 1931–1941 (London, 1981), pp. 6–8Google Scholar, have cited the cabinet's definition of that standard of May 1925 as though this was the only definition of the 1920s. Smith, , Air strategy, p. 32Google Scholar, has taken the RAF standard of June 1923 to mean that the Home Defence Air Force was supposed to equal the entire French air force in metropolitan France, instead of simply the first-line strength of the French ‘air division’ (cf. Ferris, John, ‘The theory of a “French Air Menace”, Anglo-French relations and the British home defence air force programmes of 1921–1925’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 03 1987)Google Scholar.

9 Memorandum 10 Feb. 1922 (by Barstow, according to internal evidence), T 171/1228; minute by Barstow, 20 Feb. 1923, T 161/184 S.16984.

10 Memorandum by Niemayer, 6 Apr. 1925, T 176/21; cf. minute by Warren Fisher, 29 Dec. 1923, T 161/217 S.21914.

11 Minute by supply services branch, 15 July 1919, T 1/12469.

12 Warren Fisher to Lloyd George, 3 Sept. 1919, T 171/155.

13 See notes 27 and 28 below.

14 See note 9 above; minute by Warren Fisher, 16 Nov. 1922, T 161/119 S.9627/01. An example of the general imprecision of such principles is the fact that in 1946 Admiral Richmond stated that had an almost identical principle (‘any reasonably probable risk’) been used to define British naval strength during the interwar period, its maritime needs would have been met (Richmond, Herbert, Statesmen and sea power (Cambridge, 1946), p. 328)Google Scholar.

15 In order to avoid confusion between ‘financial years’ (beginning on 1 April of any year and ending on 31 March of that following) and calendar years, this article will use the convention ‘1913–1914’ etc. to refer to the former and ‘1913–14’, etc. to the latter.

16 Haldane to Richmond, 31 Aug. 1924, Richmond papers, National Maritime Museum, RIC 7/4.

17 Jeffery, Keith, The British army and the crisis of empire, 1918–1922 (Manchester, 1984), pp 11–12Google Scholar, Orde, Anne, Great Britain and international security, 1919–1926 (London, 1978), p. 4Google Scholar

18 Baldwin to Derby, 17 Aug. 1923, W.O. 137/7; MacDonald to Thomson, 10 Mar. 1924, F.O. 800/219.

19 Britain almost always spent more on its services than did any other nation, and even more so when one includes military expenditure by the Colonial Office and the colonial, dominion and Indian governments, in any year between 1919–31. However, other states may have spent more money on their armed forces than they admitted, while factors like conscription, the relative level of wages and prices and variations in the rate of exchange, caused the purchasing power of military expenditure to vary from state to state. Nonetheless, Britain's real spending on military forces during the 1920s at least equalled that of any other nation.

20 Ferris, , ‘Strategic policy’, pp. 52–80Google Scholar.

21 Ibid. pp. 86–90.

22 This figure, and those in notes 34 and 67 below, are rough approximations of the probable expenses of the services' policies at these times.

23 Lloyd George to Chamberlain, 9 Jan. 1919, Lloyd George papers, House of Lords Record Office, F/7/2.

24 Minute by Niemayer, 29 Oct. 1918, passim, T 1/12268.

25 Memoranda by finance branch (10 Feb. 1919), John Bradbury(undated) and Niemayer (11 Apr. 1919), T 171/157. The actual size both of the ‘normal year’ budget and of the amount to be allocated to the services rose throughout spring 1919.

26 G T 7729, CAB 24/84

27 Minute by Barstow, 28 July 1919, T/12353

28 Minute by Barstow, 27 June 1919, passim, T 1/12469

29 Barstow to Trenchard (two letters) 5 Sept 1919, AIR 8/19

30 In the absence of a statement about the desired level of navy estimates or of any detailed assessment of the RAF's role, it is impossible to be absolutely certain about Barstow's views on this issue However, he did not favour the abolition of the RAF and by autumn 1919 did not object to normal RAF estimates of £15 million It seems unlikely that in early summer 1919 Barstow could have expected RAF estimates to be much smaller than £12 million In real terms, post-war navy estimates at 66 per cent of those of 1913–14 would have equalled between £40m and £46 million depending upon whether the pre-war allocation for naval construction was included If this allocation was excluded and if RAF estimates had been intended to be only £ 12 million, then Barstow's proposed service policies might just have been squeezed into the £110 million level However, this would have been a very tight fit and the real cost of his proposals might have been expected to approach £120 million That is, the policies which the Treasury's supply services branch wanted the services to follow might by its own calculations have been up to 10 per cent more expensive than the ‘normal’ estimates which the finance branch wished to impose on the services

31 Cabinet meeting, 15 July 1919, CAB 23/11.

32 Cabinet meeting, 5 Aug. 1919, CAB 23/15.

33 G.T. 7975, CAB 24/86; minute by Churchill, 1 July 1919, AIR 2/89 B.7442; Churchill to Lloyd George, 4 Aug. 1919, Lloyd George papers, F/9/1; entry 7 Aug. 1919, Henry Wilson diary, Imperial War Museum; Trenchard to Churchill, 30 July 1919, Trenchard papers, RAF Museum, 21.

34 See note 22 above; AIR 2/89 B.7442, ibid., and passim; board meetings, 16 July 1919, passim, ADM 167/56; board memoranda, No. 874, passim, ADM 167/57; memorandum by Churchill, 6 Aug. 1919, W.O.32/3510.

35 Ferris, , ‘Strategic policy’, p. 38Google Scholar.

36 Ibid. 82–91.

37 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons (P.D.), vol. 119, cols. 610–702, 7 08 1919Google Scholar.

38 The finance committee meeting, 11 Aug. 1919, CAB 27/71.

39 Cabinet meeting, 15 Aug. 1919, CAB 23/15.

40 Maurice Hankey diary, Churchill College, Cambridge, entry for 25 Aug. 1919.

41 Churchill to War Office, 31 Aug. 1919, W.O. 32/11286; Ferris, , ‘Strategic policy’, pp. 103–15Google Scholar.

42 Bond, , Military policy, pp 23–6Google Scholar, Silverman, Peter, ‘The Ten Year Rule’ Journal of the Royal United Senices Institute, p 661 (1971)Google Scholar, Ken Booth, ‘The Ten Year Rule, an unfinished debate’, ibid p 663, (1971), Stephen Roskill, ‘The Ten Year Rule the historical facts’, ibid p 665 (1972) and Naval policy, p 215, Gibbs, , Grand strategy, pp 3–4Google Scholar, McDonald, J K, ‘Lloyd George and the search for a postwar naval policy, 1919’, in Taylor, A J P (ed), Lloyd George, twelve essays (London, 1971)Google Scholar

43 Ibid, see also Roskill, ‘The Ten Year Rule’ McDonald has correctly refuted Roskill's argument that these decisions were triggered by the publication of a cabinet paper by Long, noting that the finance committee's decisions preceded the publication of that paper

44 Memorandum by Hankey, 17 July 1919, Hankey papers, 8/8

45 See notes 27, 28 and 33 above, Churchill to Lloyd George, 1 May 1919, Lloyd George papers, F/9/1

46 G T 6477, CAB 24/71

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48 Roskill, , Naval policy, p 215Google Scholar.

49 Hankey to Speed, 14 Dec. 1923, W.O. 32/9314.

50 Bond, , Military policy, pp. 23–6Google Scholar.

51 CID paper No. 892-B, CAB 4/17.

52 The 236th CID meeting, 5 July 1928, CAB 2/5.

53 Chalmers, W. S., The life and letters of David Beatty, admiral of the fleet (London, 1951), pp. 376–7Google Scholar. For proof that the departments interpreted the ‘ten year period’ in this legalistic fashion, cf. board memorandum No. 2064, ADM 167/72; minute by Wakefield, 21 Mar. 1928, passim, T 162/136 E.18938.

54 Trenchard to Wilson, 7 Jan. 1920, Trenchard papers, p. 139.

55 See note 12 above; FC (7) and (13), CAB 27/72.

56 FC (12), ibid; the 12th finance committee meeting, 24 Oct. 1919, CAB 27/71.

57 Cols. 732–52, P.D., vol. 120; FC (22), CAB 27/72; memorandum by Treasury, 28 Oct. 1919, T 171/155; CMD 779 of 1920. About £40 million of the increase in the size of the ‘normal year’ budget had occurred between March–October 1919, before this decision by the finance committee.

58 Minute by Barstow, 26 Jan. 1920, Lloyd George papers, F/7/3.

59 Ferris, , ‘Strategic policy’, pp. 142–67Google Scholar.

60 Darwin, Imperial policy, passim, and Jeffery, , Crisis, pp. 31–75, 96–155Google Scholar, offer excellent accounts of these issues.

61 Trenchard to Wilson, 7 Jan. 1920, Trenchard papers, 139.

62 Ferris, , ‘Strategic policy’, pp. 100–3Google Scholar.

63 Ibid. 94–6.

64 Board meeting, 18 Aug. 1919, ADM 167/56.

65 FC (18), CAB 27/72.

66 The 15th and 19th finance committee meetings, 6 Nov. 1919 and 9 Feb. 1920, CAB 27/71.

67 See note 22 above.

68 Ferris, , ‘Strategic policy’, pp. 105–7, 115Google Scholar.

69 Wilson diary, entry for 15 Aug. 1919.

70 Chamberlain to Churchill, 14 Oct. 1919, T 161/228 S.23365; Long to Bonar Law, 20 Feb. 1920 and draft for same, ADM 116/1677; the 33rd finance committee meeting, 25 Feb. 1921, CAB 27/71.

71 Minute by Barstow, 21 Mar. 1920, T 171/1116.

72 Warren Fisher to Lloyd George and Chamberlain, 16 June 1920, T 171/180; minute by Barstow, 10 July 1920, T 161/81 S.6288.

73 Entry 14 Jan. 1921, Hankey diary.

74 Chamberlain to Doyd George, 16 July 1920, 20 Aug. 1920, Lloyd George papers, F/7/3; the 29th finance committee meeting, 7 Dec. 1920, CAB 27/71.

75 Ferris, , ‘Strategic policy’, pp. 118–19Google Scholar; FC (69), CAB 27/72.

76 Ferris, , ‘Strategic policy’, pp. 119, 138–9Google Scholar.

77 Ibid. pp. 120–32, 151–4, 162–5; Ferris, ‘Anglo-French relations’.

78 The 9th meeting of the Bonar Law committee, 26 January 1921, CAB 16/37; the 33rd finance committee meeting, 25 Feb. 1921, CAB 27/71; minute by Barstow, 24 June 1921, T 161/ 119 S.9654; report of Geddes committee, Dec. 1921, AIR 8/41.

79 Ferris, , ‘Strategic policy’, pp. 172, 278–9Google Scholar.

80 Ibid. pp. 172–7.

81 Memorandum by general staff, Jan. 1922, 3rd. Churchill committee meeting, 12 Jan. 1922, CAB 27/164; memorandum by Barstow, 10 Feb. 1922, T 171/1228; ‘Conversation’, 21 Feb. 1922, CAB 23/36, part one.

82 Ferris, , ‘Strategic policy’, pp. 140, 171Google Scholar.

83 Ibid. pp. 212–14; minute by Niemayer, 27 Mar. 1923, T 171/214.

84 Ferris, , ‘Strategic policy’, pp. 190–2, 213Google Scholar.

85 Ibid. 278–9.

86 Ibid.

87 For example, cf. minute by Barstow, 20 Feb. 1923, T 161/800 S. 18917/1; memoranda by Barstow, 2 Nov. 1923, 31, Jan. 1924, T 161/227 S.23175; memorandum by Barstow, 15Feb. 1924, T 161/228 S.23285.

88 Ferris, , ‘Strategic policy’, pp. 196–7, 201–4Google Scholar.

89 Cabinet meeting, 21 Feb. 1923, CAB 23/45; the 168th CID meeting, 14 Dec. 1922, CAB 2/3.

90 Ferris, , ‘Strategic policy’, pp. 197–9, 204–8Google Scholar.

91 Minute by Murray, 9 Jan. 1924, ADM 1/8672.

92 Note 88 above.

93 The 2nd meeting of the Singapore committee, 3 Mar. 1924, CAB 27/236.

94 Ferris, , ‘Strategic policy’, pp. 192–6, 202–10Google Scholar.

95 The 165th and 168th CID meetings, 30 Nov. 1922 and 14 Dec. 1922, CAB 2/3.

96 The 3rd Salisbury committee meeting, 17 Apr. 1923, AIR 8/63.

97 Memoirs by Lord Cavan (undated but circa 1939), ‘Recollections happy but hazy’, chapter: ‘Washington 1921’: Lord Cavan papers, Churchill College, Cambridge.

98 The 1st and 3rd Churchill committee meetings, 9 and 12 Jan 1922, CAB 27/164, C P 88, CAB 24/58, minute by Geoffrey Salmond, 13 Apr 1923, AIR 5/282, board meeting, 21 Nov 1923, ADM 167/67, memorandum by Barstow, 18 Dec 1922, T 161/206, S 19717

99 Ferris, , ‘Strategic policy’, pp 212–14Google Scholar.

100 Ibid p 215

101 Minute by Barstow, 23 Dec 1923, T 161/227 S 23175, minute by Barstow, 24June 1922, I 161/119 S9654, memorandum by Barstow, 18 Dec 1922, T 161/206 S 19717