¹ The Times, 9 January 1889.

² The Times, 24 January 1889.

³ Garvin, J. L., The Lift of Joseph Chamberlain, II, 319Google Scholar.

⁴ The highlight of the N.L.F. conference of 1888, held in Birmingham, was Gladstone's mass meeting at Bingley Hall (7 November). See below.

⁵ For the United States, where he was to get married.

⁶ See E. P. M. Wollaston, The Flowing Tide, 2886-99; A Study m Political Meteorology, passim (Gladstone Memorial Trust Prize Essay, 1959).

⁷ Particularly by his ‘Momentous letter’ on the Radical Unionist meeting of 31 May, his vote against the Second Reading of the Home Rule Bin on 8 June, and a violent speech at the end of June, in 1886.

⁸ For example, he declined to issue a joint election address in 1886, ‘as we do not really quite agree as to the Irish question. I am against anything in the shape, or taking the name of a Parliament in Dublin…’. John Bright to Joseph Chamberlain, 9 June 1886 (Chamberlain Papers). Later he refused to contribute a preface to a volume of Chamberlain's speeches on the Irish question, published in 1887. See Arthur Chamberlain to John Bright, 9 and 13 February 1887; John Bright to Arthur Chamberlain, 11 and 15 February 1887; and Joseph Chamberlain to Arthur Chamberlain, 8 and 18 February 1887. Bright had described the 1 Round Table conference as ‘a piece of impudence’ and Chamberlain had concluded: ‘This Old Man is not friendly’, but the tension soon eased (Chamberlain Papers). Bright much disliked acting with the Conservatives. Lady St Helier recounts:‘He told us that when he went down to the House of Commons he sat in the library, and waited until the division bell rang, as he could not bear going into the House to be cheered by a party who were antipathetic to him in every sense of the word’ (Lady St Helier, Memories of Fifty Years, 245-6).

⁹ See below for a letter to Arthur Chamberlain of 8 March 1886 (Chamberlain Papers). See also a letter to Sir Charles Dilke of 6 May 1886:‘… I do not really expect the Government to give way, and, indeed, I do not wish it. To satisfy others I have talked about conciliation, and have consented to make advances, but on the whole I would rather vote against the Bill than not, and the rejection of the Irish members is only, with me, the flag that coven other objections. I want to see the whole Bill recast and brought back to the National Council proposals….’ The day before he had written to Harcourt in almost identical terms, adding that he would prefer to fight the matter out and abide by the consequences (Gwynn and Tuckwell, The Life of Sir Charles Dilke, 11, 222; Gardiner, A. G., The Life of Sir William Harcourt, 585). For a full treatment of the Birmingham end seeGoogle ScholarHurst, M. C., Joseph Chamberlain and West Midland Politics, 1886-1895 (Dugdale Society, and )Google Scholar . All this makes nonsense of the claim that Chamberlain really believed in full Home Rule, provided the Irish members were kept at Westminster, in the months immediately before the crucial vote of 8 June 1886. Earlier there was some curious wavering, just as there was later over relations with the Conservatives. Whilst he had described Gladstone's scheme as ‘death and damnation’ in a letter to Dilke of mid-December 1885 (and insisted they must stop it, although not openly committing themselves against it then and there), he had himself put forward a Home Rule plan of some boldness at a conference with Dilke, Harcourt and Harrington at Devonshire House on i January 1886. Not only was there to be an Irish Parliament, but a fixed contribution to the Imperial Parliament, the ability to impose tarifis and an end to Irish representation at Westminster ( Gwynn, and Tuckwell, , op. cit. 197Google Scholar ; Gardiner, , op. cit. 557Google Scholar ). Even so there is nothing in letters to intimate friends after the letter to brother Arthur indicating any departure from profound hostility to Gladstone's Bill. Chamberlain's accounts to both Dilke and Lady St Helier of the meeting of the ‘2000’ on 21 April 1886 exaggerated his own part in it quite considerably ( Gwynn, and Tuckwell, , op. cit. 215;Google ScholarHelier, St, op. cit. 287Google Scholar ).

¹⁰ There was not much evidence in favour of their claim. Certainly, their morale had risen under Churchill's leadership, their ability to fight municipal elections had improved and their election machinery had been reconstructed. On the other hand the Conservative share of the poll in 1885 had been slightly lower than in 1880, though an increased electorate had brought an increased vote. Of the sixty-three local contests fought in the years leading up to 1885 they had won but three. On the eve of the general election of that year, they had considered it best to fight only two of the sixteen wards in the municipal elections so as to conserve strength for the bigger cause. Hardly a sign of resilience (Hurst, op. cit passim). There had also been difficulty in finding parliamentary candidates. See Lord Norton to Lord Salisbury, aa August 1885 (Salisbury Papers). ProfessorBriggs, in History of Binmtigham, II, 164–300, tended to take the Conservatives at their own valuationGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ There was one compensation. From 1888 on they and the Liberal Unionists fought the municipal elections as official allies. This meant they received a sizeable share of the candidatures and increased their council representation quite substantially. By 1891 they had nineteen members as opposed to twenty-nine Liberal Unionists and twenty-four Gladstonian Liberals. Even in 1886 and 1887 there had been enough Liberal Unionists, willing either to vote Conservative or abstain in wards where the Liberal happened to be a Home Ruler, to bring them a few gains, especially as Conservative candidates often called themselves ‘Unionists’ (Hurst, op. cit. passim).

¹² All the more so after Lord Randolph Churchill resigned in December 1886, and Lord Salisbury's influence with a section of them declined. See the correspondence between Lord Salisbury and Sir James Sawyer, passim (Salisbury Papers). Their attitude was often heightened by the arrogant hostility of a good many Radical Unionists.

¹³ Garvin hit the nail on the head when he wrote of Chamberlain's reaction to the Hawardea Kite: ‘first he has to think of Birmingham. Above all things, be must be sure of his base, if human ability can hold it’ ( Garvin, , op. cit. 138). See note 9, and belowGoogle Scholar.

¹⁴ Wollaston, op. cit passim. The Southampton by-election of 23 May 1888, for example, was fought almost entirely on the temperance issue ( ‘Annual Register’, 1888, pp. 123–4Google Scholar ). Issues of domestic reform predominated at Rochester, Gorton and Govan-all of them either just prior to, or contemporaneous with the great Radical Unionist victory at Central Birmingham in the early spring of 1889. At another contest-East Perthshire-held at this time many Liberal Unionists voted for the Gladstonian‘out of respect’ 1 Others, because an Irish Nationalist member, assisting him in the campaign and personally popular with the electorate, was flung into gaol (The Times, January and February 1889, passim; SirPease, Alfred E., Elections and Recollections, 221)Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Naturally enough the Unionists tried hard to blame the Home Rule cause for any delay in the remedying of grievances, Chamberlain's ‘Baptist Letter’ of 25 February 1887 is a good example of this ( Chamberlain, Joseph, A Political Memoir, ed. by Howard, C. H. D., pp. 252–4)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Lucy, Henry Sir, A Diary of the Salisbury Parliament, 1886-93, opposite p. 402Google Scholar.

¹⁷ The Conservative Chief Whip, Akers-Douglas, estimated that the Liberal Unionists of the 1886 Parliament could be divided into four groups: those willing for either Harrington or Salisbury to be prime minister (6); the firm adherents of Hartington (43); those of Chamberlain (21); and those who, illogically enough, still looked to Gladstone (Draft of letter from Aken-Douglas to A. B. Forwood, 19 July 1886, Chilston, Viscount, Chief Whip, ed. by Hurst, M. C., 83Google Scholar ; see also Akers-Douglas to Salisbury, 18 July 1886. Salisbury Papers). The figure for Chamberlain's firm following is undoubtedly too high and must include old-fashioned Radicals of the Bright and P. Rylands type. Balfour was probably much nearer the mark in restricting it to the West Midland Radical Unionists, though there were a few from other areas, e.g. W. S. Caine before his reversion to Gladstonianism. He sat for Barrow-in-Fumess. For Balfour's unsent memo., intended for Salisbury and dated 23 November 1888, seee Dugdak, Lady Blanche, Arthur Janus Balfour, i, 202Google Scholar . Admittedly, almost twenty M.P.'s joined the N.R.U., but only four voted with Chamberlain against the Proclamation of the Nat. League in 1887. From the other side Gladstone's estimate of‘sot or eight’ tallies with Balfour's ( Gardiner, , op. cit. II, 26Google Scholar ). The ‘Annual Register’ for 1886 claimed that of the seventy-eight Liberal Unionists returned ‘not more than twelve were adherents of Mr Chamberlain’ (see p. 244). It should, of course, be noted that the discrepancies between the estimates for 1886 and those of later dates can be accounted for in part at least by defections.

¹⁸ Dugdale, , op. cit. 101Google Scholar.

¹⁹ See Balfour to Chamberlain, passim. Chamberlain papers; and Chamberlain to Balfour, passim, Balfour Papers, Add. MS. 40773.

²⁰ In a letter to Salisbury of 31 July 1892, Balfour takes Chamberlain's part against Harrington. Salisbury Papers; and Dugdale, op. eh. 211. Hicks Beach would also appear to have intervened for the same purpose (see Edward Heneage to J. Chamberlain, 9 May 1890 (Chamberlain Papers)).

²¹ Chamberlain founded the National Radical Union on 17 June 1886, but joined the Liberal Unionist Association early in August of the same year. The Times, 9 August 1886. It had been said that he had wished to do so earlier, but had been prevented by his entourage. The Times, ai May 1886, p. 10.

²² Dealt with in Hartington to Chamberlain, 9 October 1889 (Chamberlain Papers).

²³ Goschen, the Duke of Argyll, Lord Lansdowne and their like, who had opposed the second Irish Land Act. Both Argyll and Lansdowne had resigned from the second Gladstone Ministry over it.

²⁴ Speaking in the Govan by-election, Sir G. O. Trevelyan insisted that:‘If o working class constituency like this rejected such a candidate (the Gladstonian)…then this would be declaration on the part of the working men of the West of Scotland that they wished to be governed by a system of unmitigated and unadulterated Toryism.’ The Times, 18 January 1889.

²⁵ ‘Annual Register’, 1889, pp. 6-7. 11

²⁶ See Middleton to Alters-Douglas, 30 December 1886. Chilston, , op. cit. 104. Harrington admitted in April 1889 that only the Chamberlainites among the Liberal Unionists could gain working class votes (The Liberal Unionist, April 1889, 153)Google Scholar.

²⁷ The same factors governed the attitudes towards Liberal reunion. Arthur Elliot, writing of the majority inside the Liberal Unionist party, considered that the Liberalism of some Moderates ‘had become so “moderate” that a political microscope would have been necessary to distinguish them from Conservatives born and bred’ ( Elliot, , The Life of Lord Goschen, II, 120). Once having gone against Gladstone they had found it all too easy to go down the slippery slope. Some had even voted Conservative in 1885 before the split took place (Google ScholarPease, , op. cit. 59 and 75), and became Liberal Unionists simply to soften their break with tradition. Harrington realised this. SeeGoogle ScholarHolland, B., Life of the Duke of Davonshite, 1833-1908, II, 90, 93 and 94Google Scholar.

²⁸ It had been for that very reason that Bright had suffered defeat at Manchester in 1857. and had had to seek safety at Birmingham, where the political priorities were different.

²⁹ Gooch, G. P., The Life of Lord Courtney of Penwith, 261. Another feeling was that everything would be alright if Gladstone aaid so. Harcourt pointed out to Harrington on 24 December 1885, that ‘In talking to men like Jesse Collings and Broadhurst’ he found ‘a sort of general and ignorant toleration of the idea of an Irish Parliament. When the difficulties are stated to them they say, “Oh, these are administrative details (J. Ceilings’ phrase) which you statesmen must deal with.” Men of this kind will of course be greatly influenced by the authority of Mr G. They say they don/t mean teparation, but they are sure that Mr G has some plan which is not separation, and they do not care to inquire what it is.’Google ScholarGardiner, , op. cit. I, 554Google Scholar. It is ironical that the force of Harcourt's logic helped to make Collings into an ardent Unionist, ‘the chief eunuch of your seraglio’, as he described him to Chamberlain (ibid, II, 13).

³⁰ The voting in Gt Britain was: Gladstonian Liberal, 1,236,741; Conservative, 955,553; Liberal Unionist, 361,340; and Irish Nationalist, 2911. In Ireland: Conservative, 81,096; Liberal Unionist, 18,483; Irish Nationalist, 96,713. As no fewer than 218 members out of a total of 672 were returned unopposed they really prove nothing very precise, but the fact that 66 of the 85 Irish Nationalist were among the 218 proves a great deal. Ireland had 103 members at Westminster.

³¹ Writing to Motley, in 1889, Harcourt proclaimed the programme of ‘Tithes, District Councils, Land Purchase, Free Education’ which Chamberlain had imposed on the Government ‘odious to the Tory mind’. On 9 January 1890, to the same, he wrote ‘…If Joe really was to succeed in inducing the Government to adopt a Birmingham programme he would secure the destruction of the Tory Government and the Tory Party, and Salisbury knows a trick or two of that’ ( Gardiner, , op. cit. II, 151–2Google Scholar ).

³² The British economy underwent a considerable depression from 1873 to 1896. Though 1886-90 marked a temporary recovery, prospects never became rosy enough to allay discontents and fears for the future.

³³ Chamberlain, , op. cit. 277Google Scholar.

³⁴ W. H. Smith to Akers-Douglas, 24 December 1886; Chilston, , op.cit. 100Google Scholar ; Lord Randolph Churchill to Joseph Chamberlain, 24 December 1886 (Chamberlain Papers).

³⁵ Joseph Chamberlain to Lord Harrington, 7 September 1886, Devonshire Papers, 340, 2042.

³⁶ Lord Randolph Churchill to Joseph Chamberlain, 23 September 1886 (Chamberlain Papers).

³⁷ 2 October 1886. He spoke of freehold plots and allotments of land for the agricultural labourer, alterations in the law of tithe, a Land Transfer Bill, and the reorganization of local government and local taxation, besides Ireland, Parliamentary procedure and retrenchment ( Churchill, W. S., Lord Randolph Churchill, II, 164–5)Google Scholar.

³⁸ Garvin, , op. cit. 268Google Scholar ; Joseph Chamberlain to Lord Harrington, 9 September 1886 (Devonshire Papers, 340, 2043).

³⁹ On local government, foreign policy, the attitude towards ‘moderate’ Liberal Unionism, and the bask aims of the Budget. A tentative compromise on local government, arrived at in November 1886, was ruined through Hicks Beach opposing the Irish pan of die plan. Salisbury to Cranbrook, a8 November 1886, gives details of what was proposed (Cranbrook Papers, Ser. no. 13).

⁴⁰ Harcourt received letters in identical terms from Dr Dale and Jesse Collings. Each disclaimed any communication with Chamberlain, or ‘any knowledge on his part of the overtures they were making’, and gave the same reasons for wanting reunion ( Gardiner, , op. cit. II, 21)Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Dilke had urged the use of Henchell rather than Labouchere as a go-between for Chamberlain in the crucial weeks before 8 June ( Gwynn, and Tuckwell, , op. cit. 219). For the Chamberlain-Labouchere proceedings, see Algar Thorold, The Life of Henry Labouchere, ch. 12. John Morley regarded Chamberlain's suggestion of this trio as a farce (Morley to Gladstone, 4 January 1887. Gladstone Papers, Add. MS. 44255, fo. 177)Google Scholar.

⁴² Many Gladstonians, ranging from Lord Spencer to the humble rank and file, were against concessions to Chamberlain- ‘a careerist’. Lord Spencer to Lord Granville, 27 December 1886. Granville Papers, 30.29.22A. Gladstone to Harcourt, 8 January 1887, Harcourt Papers. Gladstone was aware of his strength, telling Harcourt, ‘Chamberlain is under a great necessity of moving. We are not!’ He also estimated the following on the Radical Unionist side at only ‘six or eight’ (see Gardiner, , op. cit. II, 26 and note 17)Google Scholar . Parnell was dead against Chamberlain's idea of settling land questions prior to the granting of Home Rule. This too weighed heavily with Gladstone. See his letter to Harcourt of 8 January 1887. Clearly, he shared Spencer's estimation of Chamberlain, writing as he did to Harcourt: ‘We stand midway in his (Chamberlain's) estimation between the Government+Churchill and the Government-Churchill’ ( Gardiner, , op. cit. II, 25)Google Scholar.

⁴³ Gardiner, , op. cit. II, 29. Gladstone approved strongly of Morley's whole approach, describing him as ‘very solid on his pins’. Gladstone to Granville, 30 December 1886. Granville papers, 30.29.29AGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁴ This much is quite clear from Gardiner's account of the proceedings ( Gardiner, , op. cit. II, 16–38; especially p. 27). Nevertheless, Morley (Google ScholarMorley, John, Life of Gladttone, III, 367Google Scholar ) claimed mat: ‘Mr Chamberlain gradually advanced the whole length’ (i.e. towards Home Rule), but defined' the whole length ‘as’ some kind of legislative authority in Dublin'; hardly a conclusive proof.

⁴⁵ Chamberlain admitted to Dilke that the letter had been ‘indiscreet’, but had been relieved to see the end of the talks. Doubtless he still hoped he would be able to keep Gladstone ‘out for life’ ( Gwynn, and Tuckwell, , op. cit. 265–7;Google ScholarGardiner, , op. cit. II, 36)Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Holland, , op. cit. II, 183–4Google Scholar.

⁴⁷ Morley to Gladstone, 18 December 1886. Gladstone Papers, Add. MS. 443552 fo. 146.

⁴⁸ Garvin, , op. cit. 318Google Scholar ; Hurst, op. cit. passim.

⁴⁹ On the morning of 18 April 1887, the day on which the vote on the Second Reading of the Crimes Bill was to be taken, the article containing the notorious forged letter allegedly written by Parnell appeared. Its contents gave the impression he had condoned the Phoenix Park murders of 1882.

⁵⁰ Chamberlain to Balfour, 30 March 1887. Copy (Chamberlain Paper).

⁵¹ A view due to united pressure from the Liberal Unionists.

⁵² During the course of 1887 the Government became anxious to avoid by-elections whenever possible (see W. H. Smith to Salisbury, 10 September 1887, Salisbury Papers).

⁵³ In the whole Liberal Unionist party, of course, he included Harrington. Such a suggestion was either hypocritical, or a sign of very wishful thinking in an old man. The fact that just over a fortnight after this encounter of 5 April 1887 he spent the whole of a drive into London from Dollis Hill counting the buses ‘with utmost gravity’ suggests he was extremely ‘old’ ( Chamberlain, , op. cit. 262–8Google Scholar ; Gladstone, Mary, Diariet and Letters, 396)Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ In a letter to Chamberlain of 4 March 1887 Trevelyan had seemed quite happy with the Liberal Unionist party (e.g. ‘…The Devonshire dinner went off capitally. The audience was largely mixed of both sections, but it all went off most smoothly and heartily…’) but deplored that Harrington would be going to Goschen's dinner. On the 9th Chamberlain had written that though the Round Table conference was at an end so far as he was concerned, he had pressed for an ‘immediate resumption of the negotiations’ and had met with ‘a series of excuses’. Trevelyan, on the 14th, however, seemed already on the way back to Gladstone, ending a non-committal letter with the words: ‘I thought a great deal in the Daily News this morning very reasonable.’ Trevelyan to Chamberlain, 4 and 14 March 1887. Chamberlain to Trevelyan (Copy), 9 March 1887. Chamberlain Papers.

⁵⁵ Cecil, Lady G., Life of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, IV, 150Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ Harrington to Chamberlain, 13 Jury 1887. Garvin, , op. cit. 434Google Scholar. For Harrington's view of a fortnight later, ibid.

⁵⁷ As with the counter-attack, to with the ‘National Party’, Churchill might justly be regarded at its inventor. He fully intended the ‘Unionist’ party proposed in his Manchester speech of a March 1886 to be progressive and patriotic. Presumably, the ‘essential English, ness’ of its approach would not have injured its national appeal ( Churchill, , op. cit. 69–71)Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ Gardiner, , op. cit II, 35Google Scholar . For full version, Chamberlain to Harcourt, 26 February 1887. Harcourt Papers.

⁵⁹ ‘Annual Register’, 1887, pp. 36-7.

⁶⁰ Garvin, , op. cit. 435–6Google Scholar ; Churchill, , op. cit. 345–8Google Scholar.

⁶¹ Churchill to Chamberlain, 3 February 1887 (Chamberlain Papers).

⁶² Garvin, , op. cit. 435Google Scholar.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Chamberlain, , op. cit. 272Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ Dr Dale commented: ‘If Mr Gladstone's speech had been made before the Home Rule vote, no split would have occurred’ ( Dale, A. W. W., Life of R. W. Dale of Birmingham, 470Google Scholar ). Harcourt had been putting pressure on Gladstone to make some such gesture during the latter half of May 1887. He was even willing to back Chamberlain's four-point programme of the full supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, retention of the Irish members, protection of the minorities and separate treatment for Ulster, and the right of London to legislate for Irish law and order, as a basis for reunion. There was now, however, not the slightest chance of Gladstone leaving the Gladstoniana in the lurch as William Bright had feared in January. He knew very well how little Harcourt's views on Chamberlain were echoed in the Liberal party (see Harcourt to Gladstone, 27 May 1887. Gladstone Papers, Add. MS. 44201, fo. 127). Nevertheless, it was wise to oblige Harcourt on his strongest point- Irish members at Westminster. For the speech, ‘Annual Register’, 1887, pp. 106-7.

⁶⁶ Garvin, , op. cit. 316Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ Rather significantly, Chamberlain urged Harcourt to ensure that Gladstone, not Parnell, should put forward the motion condemning the Government's action ( Gardiner, , op. cit. II, 46)Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ Joseph Chamberlain to Arthur Chamberlain, 8 March 1886 (Chamberlain Papers.)

⁶⁹ The Times, 2 June 1887, p. 6. Conservative morale slumped at this time. W. H. Smith to Salisbury, 20 May 1887 (Salisbury Papers). In November, Smith was very doubtful about the efficacy of public meetings in helping the Government cause. W. H. Smith to Salisbury, 7 November 1887 (Salisbury Papers).

⁷⁰ Briggt, , op. cit 184Google Scholar ; Hunt, , op. cit. 45Google Scholar.

⁷¹ Collings, J. and Green, B., Life of Collings. 196–301Google Scholar.

⁷² Middleton to Akers-Douglas, 30 December 1886; Chilston, , op. cit. 104Google Scholar.

⁷³ Middleton to Akers-Douglas, 9 July 1887; Chilston, , op. cit. 135Google Scholar.

⁷⁴ ‘Annual Register’, 1888, pp. 4-6.

⁷⁵ F. B. Grotian to Akers-Douglas, 14 July 1887; Chilston, , op. cit. 147Google Scholar.

⁷⁶ ‘Annual Register’, 1887, P. 135.

⁷⁷ Elliot, , op. cit. I 138–9Google Scholar.

⁷⁸ Parl. Dec. 3rd ser. CCCX (1887), 656.

⁷⁹ Garvin, , op. cit. 343Google Scholar.

⁸⁰ ‘Annual Regirter’, 1888, p. 9.

⁸¹ Chamberlain had not originally been opposed to the clauses, but had changed to suit the mood of most Radical Unionists. For Caine's Birmingham speech of May 1888, the part played by Harrington in pressing temperance views on the Government and the effect of the Ayr by-election, where the Liberal Unionist candidate jettisoned the licensing clauses, see Newton, J., W. S. Caine, M.P., A Biography, 104–5. Of the Liberal Unionists only Chamberlain and Ceilings voted with Gladstone on the Parish Councils issueGoogle Scholar.

⁸² ‘Annual Register’, 1888, pp. 165-9. He was not, of course, claiming to be in the inner councils of the Conservative party. See page 64.

⁸³ Balfour to Salisbury, 24 November 1888 (an unsent memo.). Balfour Papers, Add. MS. 40689.

⁸⁴ On 24 October 1887 Gladstone had admitted to Dilke: ‘I think…that the organization of dissentient Liberalism, in which he has borne so large a part, has been enormously favourable to his general creed as an advanced Radical, whereas Harrington with his weak-kneed men has been utterly hoodwinked, and hoodwinked by himself’ ( Gwynn, and Tuckwell, , op. cit. 270)Google Scholar.

⁸⁵ With a Radical Unionist Association in being, he felt better able to concentrate directly on Ireland. As things turned out. he was able to weather the defection of William Harris, father of the original caucus, and the passivity of Dale well enough. ‘Annual Register’, 1888, p. 149.

⁸⁷ ‘Annual Register’, 1889, p. 88.

⁸⁸ Sir James Sawyer to Salisbury, 28 October 1888 (Salisbury Papers). M For Chamberlain's approval of Churchill, see Garvin, , op. cit. 437Google Scholar . Chamberlain to Austen Chamberlain, 3 December 1888 (Chamberlain Papers). Sawyer to Salisbury, a April 1889, describing a dinner at Highbury on 4 October 1888 (Salisbury Papers). Surprisingly enough Churchill had asked Dilke, in June 1885, whether he could sit for Birmingham if he took office, and Chamberlain had said: ‘If R. C. takes office without coercion, we should not oppose him I’ ( Gwynn, and Tuckwell, , op. cit 147Google Scholar .) Nevertheless, when it came to the point Chamberlain always put a spoke in the Churchill wheel. Taking office without coercion brought no unopposed return in 1885; when Churchill asked whether he should ‘come over’ in January 1887, Chamberlain said no, fearing he might lead a reunited Liberal party ( Gwynn, and Tuckwell, , op. cit. 267Google Scholar ); and then in April 1889 was largely responsible for the Conservative pressure on Churchill to desist. For a frank avowal of his attitude towards Churchill, Balfour to Salisbury, 2 July 1889 (Salisbury Papers).

⁸⁹ Chamberlain to Aken-Douglas, 13 September 1887, Chilston, , op. cit. 141Google Scholar; ditto, 8 April 1889, ibid. 163; Smith to Akers-Douglas, 27 October 1889, ibid. 165; Salisbury to Smith, 8 November 1888, Hambledon MSS.; Smith to Chamberlain, 23 October 1889 (Chamberlain Papers); Smith to Salisbury, 27 October 1889 (Salisbury Papers).

⁹⁰ The Times, 6 April 1889.

⁹¹ Trouble with the Conservatives, especially with die Gaxette newspaper and the Churchill faction of the Central Division association continued well into 1895. And this despite a joint committee for the city having operated since 1890.

⁹² ‘Annual Register’, 1888, p. 191.

⁹³ ‘Annual Register’, 1889, p. 12.

⁹⁴ For canvassing returns, Powell Williams to Chamberlain, II and 12 April 1889 (Chamberlain Papers). For Balfour's views, Balfour to Salisbury, a July 1889 (Salisbury Papers).

⁹⁵ The result was: Liberal Unionist, 5621; Gladstonian Liberal, 2561. Fowler wrote to Morley on 18 April 1889: ‘Birmingham! Ought we to have fought?-if had not interfered, the Dissentients and Tories would have openly quarrelled, and a cynical neutrality on our side would have avoided the blow (and it is a blow) (of the 3000 majority after the visit of Mr Gladstone)’ ( Hamilton, E. H., Henry Fouler, Lord Wolverhampton, 240Google Scholar ).

⁹⁶ Balfour to Salisbury, 24 December 1892 (Salisbury Papers).

⁹⁷ Balfour to Salisbury, 29 June 1895 (Salisbury Papers).

⁹⁸ Hicks Beach to Salisbury, 16 November 1800 (Salisbury Papers).

⁹⁹ All Chamberlain's advisers, except Collings, thought it better that he should ‘lie low’ during the by-election campaign, so as to avoid any possible provocation of his allies! He was wise enough to comply. Austen Chamberlain to Chamberlain, 10 April 1889 (Chamberlain Papers).

¹⁰⁰ Chamberlain to Harrington, 21 January 1889 (Devonahire Papers, 340, 2206).

¹⁰¹ Balfour to Salisbury, 31 July 1892 (Salisbury Papers and Dugdale, op. cit. 211).

¹⁰² Any thought Chamberlain had of deserting the Conservatives never resulted in positive steps, though at times the alliance galled him to the point where he announced he would take them ( Gwynn, and Tuckwell, , op. cit. 274). Nevertheless, he could write to Dale:‘Mr Gladstone has not only divided his party-he has demoralized his section of it, and it is no longer Home Rule alone which separates us.’ Chamberlain to Dale, 10 December 1890 (Chamberlain Papers)Google Scholar.

¹⁰³ Five gains, and two losses, was the Unionist score in Staffa, Warwick and Works. The gains were all in places near Birmingham, the losses on die borders of die area.

¹⁰⁴ The only other by-election in die same counties during this parliament had been Coventry, in July 1887, when die Conaervativea lost die seat ( Hunt, , op. cit. 57–8Google Scholar ).

¹⁰⁵ W. S. Caine, to J. Fell, 17 March 1890, for a contrary view. Lancashire Record Office, C19. DDFe/50.

¹⁰⁶ On 7 April 1889, Harcourt wrote to Morley: ‘I tee the Liberal Unionists had to abandon their proposed big meeting last night’, and added: ‘and I doubt if J. C. can face the Birmingham public just now’ ( Gardiner, , op. cit. 75Google Scholar ). Caine estimated that the ‘idiotic folly’ of The Times had ‘doubled the difficulties surrounding the Unionist Party’. Caine to Fell, 10 March 1890. Lancashire Record Office, C19. DDFe/43.